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Alasanda and Varvara

BY

D. C. SIRCAR, *Calcutta*

A large number of cities and towns in the vast area subdued by Alexander the Great were called *Alexandria* after the mighty conqueror. An Indian form of the name *Alexandria* is *Alasanda* found in the *Milindapañha* and other works. It is sometimes called the *nagara* (city or town) of the Yavanas (the Greeks probably of Bactria and India) and sometimes a *dvīpa* (a territory between two rivers or an island).[1] Since, however, there were several Alexandrias even in the north-western areas of India and in Afghanistan (both comprised in the Uttarāpatha division of Bhāratavarṣa), there has been difference of opinion among scholars as regards the identification of Alasanda mentioned in Indian literature.

Among the Alexandrias of Uttarāpatha, mention may be made of (1) Alexandria-under-the-Caucasus (Hindukush), identified with modern Charikar or Opian near Kabul; (2) Alexandria-among-the-Arachosians, identified with modern Kandahar; (3) Boucephala Alexandria on the western bank of the Jhelum; (4) Nicia (Alexandria) on the eastern bank of the Jhelum; (5) Alexandria at the confluence of the Chenab and the Indus; (6) Sodrian Alexandria below the confluence of the Punjab rivers; and (7) several cities and towns built by Alexander the Great in the land watered by the mouths of the river Indus.[2] The most important Alexandria outside the above zone is of course the celebrated city of that name in Egypt.

About the Alexandrian towns in the lower valley of the Indus, Cunningham says, "In the time of Alexander, the only place of note in the Delta was Patala; but he is said to have founded several towns himself during his long stay in Lower Sind, waiting for the Etesian winds to start his fleet. Unfortunately the historians have omitted to give the names of these places. Justin alone notes that, on his return up the Indus, he built the city of Barce ..... Ptolemy has preserved the names of several places, as Barbara, Sousikana, Bonis and Kolaka, of which the first is most probably the same as 'Barbariké emporium' of the *Periplus* and perhaps also the same as the Barce of Justin."[3] According to Ptolemy, Patala and Barbarei stood on islands in the Lower Indus.[4]

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[1] Cf. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, s. v. Alasanda.

[2] See *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, pp. 37[illegible] ff.; Smith, *Early History of India*, 1924, pp. 52, 72, 110 ff.; Raychaudhuri, *Political History of Ancient India*, 1938, p. 212.

It is interesting to note in this connection that a people called Varvara or Barbara is well-known from ancient and medieval Indian literature. Pargiter says, "The Varvaras are generally mentioned in conjunction with the Śakas or Yavanas (Sabhā-P., XXXI, 1199; Vana-P., CCLIII, 15254; Śānti-P., CCVII 7560-61, etc.); and from the allusions it appears they were mainly a western or north-western race."[5] The Purāṇas also mention the Varvaras along with the Śakas or the Śakas and the Yavanas,[6] while, in late medieval works, they are not only associated with Sauvīra (Lower Indus valley to the east of the river) and Lāṭa (Southern Gujarat), but are also mentioned between Lāṭa and Saindhava (Sind or the Lower Indus valley to the West of the river) and placed between two localities called Māyāpura and Saptaśṛṅga.[7] Since these Varvaras apparently lived in the lower valley of the Indus, there seems to be no difficulty in associating them with the city of Barbara probably founded by Alexander the Great in the same area.

As regards the identification of Alasanda mentioned in Indian literature, the general tendency among scholars now is to regard it as the same as Alexandria-under-the-Caucasus near Kabul.[8] Of course the recent discovery of an edict of Aśoka in Greek and

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[3] *Ancient Geography of India*, ed. Sastri, p. 319.

[4] VII.i.59; cf. Smith on Alexander's haven (*op. cit.*, pp. 110-111).

[5] *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, trans.*, p. 319, note 7.

[6] Sircar, *Studies in the Geography of Ancient and Medieval India*, p. 21, note 6.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 79-80, 106.

[8] See, e.g., *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, p. 348,, etc.

Aramaic (meant apparently for the Yavana and Kamboja subjects of the Maurya emperor) at Kandahar has made it possible to think that Alexandria-among-the-Arachosians was the headquarters of the Yavana-Kamboja province in Aśoka's empire.[9] But Sylvain Lévi has emphatically declared that Alasanda of the Indian literature is identical with Alexandria in Egypt.[10]

Lévi's theory is primarily based on the evidence of the *Milindapañha* which mentions Alasanda in three different passages. In the first of these passages, the Yavana king Milinda (Menander) says that his *jāta-bhūmi* (land of birth) was Alasanda-dvīpa which was 200 *yojanas* from Śākala (Sialkot in the Punjab), the capital of the Indo-Greek king.[11] Lévi points out that the Chinese translations of the *Milindapañha* give the distance between Alasanda and Śākala as 2000 *yojanas* which would suit a distant locality like Alexandria in Egypt. But the distance of 200 *yojanas* given in the Pāli text cannot possibly be discarded without sufficient reason, and Lévi's argument on this point is not strong enough as we shall presently see.

The second passage in the *Milindapañha* mentions Alasanda in the following list of territories—Śaka-Yavana, Cīna-Kirāta, Alasanda-Nikumba, Kāśi-Kosala, Kaśmira and Gandhāra.[12] The most interesting feature of this list is that Alasanda is mentioned here separately from the lands of the Śakas and the Yavanas. This seems to suggest that Alasanda, associated with the Yavanas, lay outside the Indian Yavana country which included Śākala according to the *Milindapañha*. This fact, however, does not definitely suggest its identification with Alexandria in Egypt.

More important is the third passage saying how a sea-faring merchant could visit the following lands in course of his voyage—Vaṅga, Takkola, Cīna, Sauvīra, Surāṣṭra, Alasanda, Kola-pattana and Suvarṇabhūmi.[13] Since Alasanda is here represented as situated on the sea-shore, Lévi thinks that it is certainly identical with Alexandria in Egypt. But there is another passage in the *Milindapañha* which seems to go clearly against the above identification.

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[9] *Purāṇa,* Vol. V, pp. 251 ff.

[10] *Indian Historical Quarterly,* Vol. XII, pp. 124 ff. But see the views of Sastri in Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 692 ff.

[11] Ed. Trenckner, p. 82.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 359. The identification of Vaṅga with the deltaic region of South Bengal is not less satisfactory than that with the Banka Island.

After declaring that Alasanda-dvīpa was the land of his birth, Milinda states that his *jāta-nagara* (the township where he was born) was Kalasī-grāma which bears an Indian name and could not have been situated in the Egyptian Alexandria or in its neighbourhood.[14] There is moreover some evidence to show that Alasanda was situated near about the mouths of the river Indus.

The *Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra* mentions two kinds of *pravāla* (coral), viz. *alakandaka* (v.l. *alakandraka, alaksandraka*) and *vaivarṇika* (v.l. *vaivalguka*),[15] and Lévi is certainly right in regarding the name Alakanda, from which *alakandaka* is derived, as identical with Alasanda. Lévi has also drawn our attention to Bhaṭṭasvāmin's commentary on the *Arthaśāstra*, which explains *alakandraka* as follows—*Alakandro Varvara-kūle samudr-aika-deśaḥ; tatra-jātam=alakandrakam,* "Alakandra is a part of the sea near the shore in Varvara; the coral produced there is called *alakandraka.*." This suggests that Alakanda=Alasanda was a locality on the sea-shore in the Varvara country which, as we have seen, lay near about the mouths of the Indus. This small territory seems to have been subject to Scythia or Indo-Scythia in the age of the *Periplus* and Ptolemy's *Geography.*

Lévi, however, says, "The coast of Barbara, Barbaria of the *Periplus,* is the coast of Somali on the Gulf of Aden where the port of Berbera still preserves the ancient name."[16] In his opinion therefore, Alakanda = Alasanda has to be identified with Alexandria in Egypt. But the distance between Alexandria and Berbera being about 2000 miles, there is really no sense in locating the former on the coast of the latter. Moreover, Varvara in the Lower Indus Valley was well-known to the Indians till the late medieval period, so that a fear of confusion would have prevented Bhaṭṭasvāmin from applying the same name to the Berbera coast nearly 2000 miles away. In these circumstances, if the Chinese versions of the *Milindapañha* locate the birth place of Mi-lan (Milinda) on the sea-shore", as Lévi points out,[17] Kalasī-grāma in Alasanda-dvīpa may have been a place in Lower Sind.

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[14] *Ibid.,* p. 83. The existence of some Brāhmaṇas in the population of the Egyptian Alexandria in Roman times can hardly explain the nomenclature of Kalasīgrāma.

[15] Ed. Shamasastri, p. 78; Lévi, *loc. cit.*

[16] *Op. cit.,* p. 129.

In this connection, Lévi further draws our attention to the fact that, according to the *Periplus,* the Mediterranean coral was imported to the Indian ports (including Barbaricum) which did not export coral outside, while Pliny also refers to the export of coral by the Gallic people to India. But this apparently refers to the *vaivarṇika* coral of the *Arthaśāstra,* which Bhaṭṭasvāmin explains as follows—*Yavana-dvīpe Vaivarṇa-nāmo samudr-aika-deśaḥ; tatrabhavaṁ vaivarṇikam,* "A part of the sea in Yavana-dvīpa is called Vivarṇa; coral produced there is called *vaivarṇika.*"[18] If then the *alakandraka* coral was the product of the Mediterranean, as Lévi thinks, where could the *vaivarṇika* coral of Yavana-dvīpa have been fished? Yavana-dvīpa here seems to indicate the Roman world. The *Garuḍa Purāṇa* (Ch. 80) also mentions the following places as the source of coral—Kerala and other [Indian] territories as well as the Nīsaka, Romaka (the Roman empire) and Devaka countries. If coral, possibly fished near Barbaricum, was not exported outside, the reason may be that it had a greater demand in India itself.

Lévi points out that early Jain literature mentions *alisaṁdaya* or *alisaṁdaga* as the same as or as a variety of *cavalaka* or chick pea and regards the name as derived from Alexandria in Egypt.[19] But the grain seems to have been an Indian produce (probably growing in the Lower Indus valley), and there is probably no reason to associate it with Alexandria.

A tradition regarding the existence of the Yavanas in the Lower Indus valley in the age of the Guptas seems to be known to Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṁśa,* Canto. IV. Verse 60 says that Raghu started from Aparānta (Northern Konkan), by the land-route, to

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[17] *Op. cit.,* p. 126.
[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 129-30.
[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 127-28.

Persia to conquer the Pārasīkas. The preference of the land-route to the sea-route is explained by verse 61 which states that Raghu wanted to frighten the Yavana girls as it were. The stanza suggests that, in going to Persia from the Northern Konkan, Raghu had to cross the country of the Yavanas in the lower valley of the Indus, with whom, he had no occasion to fight.[20] It is tempting to associate these Yavanas with the Varvara country in which Alasanda was situated.

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[20] Sircar, *The Successors of the Sātavāhanas in the Lower Deccan*, pp. 325-26.

A Survey of India's Resistance to Mediaeval Invaders from the North-West: Causes of Eventual Hindu Defeat

BY

ASHIRBADI LAL SRIVASTAVA, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt. (Lucknow),
D.Litt. (Agra), Agra

The history of the resistance offered by the Hindu States of North-Western and Northern India against the mighty Arab and Turkish invaders from Central Asia and of the causes of their eventual fall has not been studied in correct perspective. For one thing, the long period of about 570 years from their first invasion in 636 A.D. to the foundation of the Sultanate of Delhi in 1206 A.D. during which the process of Muslim infiltration, both through repeated invasions and peaceful migration from Arabia and Central Asia, has been treated by modern writers as one unbroken period. This is unscientific and misleading from the chronological and factual points of view. It is forgotten that there were intervals of long duration during which no invasion occurred from the North-West and the country enjoyed peace and tranquillity. Secondly, such a treatment ignores the fact that in the early days of these invasions a very stiff resistance was offered by the Hindus and quite successfully, for about four hundred years—a resistance which rolled back the tide of invasion times out of number and the like of which the Arabs had never before encountered in their wars of aggressive conquests in the three continents of the world. In the third place, the main causes of the defeat of the Hindus were not the same during different epochs of this long period of 570 years. And finally, it fails to take account of the fact that the Arabs were then the masters of the largest and most powerful empire which embraced parts of three continents, Asia, Africa and Europe and that they and their successors, the Turks, were inspired by a belief that they were doing God's work of extirpating misbelief and converting humanity to Islam, a belief that gave them unbounded enthusiasm and ambition. Modern writers of Indian History, whether Europeans or Indians, have overlooked the earlier resistance put up by the Hindus and in analysing the causes of the Indian defeat have concentrated their attention only on the last phase of the struggle. In fact the European scholars have gone out of their way to build up sedulously the theory that in fighting qualities the Hindus as a race were inferior to the Central Asian Arabs and Turks and other Islamic peoples, and this, in their opinion, was the principal cause of the downfall of the Hindu States of the early mediaeval age. Lane-Poole, for example, remarks: "To the contrast of union and disunion, north and south, race and climate, was added the zeal of the Moslem and the greed of the robber."[1] Vincent A. Smith, an equally acknowledged authority, writes that the invaders were superior fighters as they came from the colder climate of the north, were eaters of meat, and were inured to warfare.[2] This theory[3] is based on an uncritical acceptance of the palpably biased accounts of mediaeval Muslim writers, so prone to magnify the exploits of their compatriots and minimise those of their adversaries, and lays an undue emphasis on the debacle of the time of Muhammad of Ghur to the utter exclusion of the earlier three and a half centuries' magnificient resistance offered by the Hindus of Sindh, Afghanistan and the Punjab.

The entire period of the Arab and Turkish invasions of the early mediaeval age can be divided into four epochs, the first two of which overlapped for a considerable time in the beginning. They are: (1) the contest between the Arabs and the Western Coast of India from 636 A.D. to 713 A.D.; (2) the Arab and Turkish onslaught against the Hindu Afghanistan from 643 A.D. to 870 A.D.; (3) the Turkish attempt to conquer the Punjab from 870 A.D. to 1030 A.D., and (4) Muhammad of Ghur's conquest of North-Western India and the Gangetic valley from 1175 A.D. to 1206 A.D. Each of these well-defined epochs had its own peculiar problems; there were also peculiar circumstances that tempted the invaders, and produced their own results.

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[1] Stanley Lane-Poole, *Medieval India.*

[2] V. A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India.*

[3] This theory has been exploded by the present writer. See his paper on the "*Causes of the Fall of Hindu States in Early Medieval Age*", *vide* Vikram University Journal, Vol. I, No. 4 (Nov., 1957).

The first Arab expedition which aimed at the conquest of Thana near Bombay was undertaken as early as 636 A.D. (15 A.H. during the Caliphate of Omar), but it was repulsed.[4] This was followed by successive Arab expeditions to Broach, to the Gulf of Debal in Sindh, and to Baluchistan (Makran), then a part of the kingdom of Sindh.[5] In spite of difficulties and defeats the Arabs continued raiding the frontier of Sindh both by land and sea. They concentrated their attack on Kaikan (Kikana), a hilly region round the Bolan Pass, which was peopled by hardy Jats, who led pastoral lives and bravely defended their country from the Arab invaders. Numerous Arab expeditions followed and there was a state of war between the Arabs and Sindh upto 712 A.D., when Imad-ud-din Muhammad bin Qasim succeeded in capturing it and establishing Arab rule there. The conquest of Multan followed in 713. This outlying Indian kingdom lost its independence after more than 75 years' brave resistance against the mightiest empire of the mediaeval age. It is worthy of note that the Arabs were at that time the conquerors of many countries of Asia, Africa and Europe which included Egypt and other countries of North Africa, and Portugal, Spain and the Southern half of France. It is equally significant that the Arabs during their career of conquest completely vanquished the most ferocious races of Central Asia, such as, the Mongols, the Uzbeks, and the Turks—the ancestors of heaven-born generals like Chingiz Khan and Timur—races that were reckoned for centuries the best fighters in the whole of Asia and far superior to the Arabs in military quality, horsemanship and ferocity. None of the countries conquered by the Arabs in the 8th century A.D. offered such a prolonged, tough and successful resistance to the aggressions of the Arabs as did the Hindus of the mediaeval age. Whereas many countries of Asia, Africa and Europe succumbed to their onslaught each after a few years' resistance, Sindh yielded after nearly 75 years' struggle. For example, Syria which was the first country to face the Arab aggression fell within a year (635-636 A.D.), and after the surrender of Damascus its capital, "other towns fell like ninepins before the conquerors."[6] Iraq fell without fighting[7] in

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[4] Biladuri, K. H. B., Pt. II, p. 209.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Philip K. Hitti, *The Arabs*, p. 49.
[7] *Ibid.*

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637 A.D. The whole of the mighty Persian Empire was annexed within five years of the famous battle of Al-qadesia fought in 637 A.D., that is, it was conquered in "about a decade"[8] in all. A whirl-wind campaign led to the conquest of the entire Central Asia inhabited by the ferocious Turks, Turkomans, Uzbeks and Mongols in eight years, (642-650 A.D.). All the countries of North Africa were conquered and occupied by the Arabs during 639-709 A.D. In the ancient land of Egypt the story was the same as elsewhere—a rout, a siege and the cry of victory. Babylon was taken in this manner, and Alexandria was captured within a year.[9] In 711 A.D. Tariq, the Berber general of Musa, landed at Gibralter and on July 19 of the same year defeated Roderick, the king of Spain, who disappeared altogether. "After this decisive victory the march of the Moslems through Spain almost amounted to a promenade."[10] "Within the short space of seven years the conquest of the (Iberian) Peninsula, one of the fairest and largest provinces of mediaeval Europe, was effected. The conquerors were there to stay—for centuries at least."[11] In about a dozen years' spasmodic operations the southern half of France was subdued. The Arab expansion in Europe received its first check at the battle of Tours and Poitiers where the Muslim leader Abdar Rehman was defeated by Charles the Martel in October 732 A.D.[12]

It will be clear from the above account that the Hindus of Sindh put up braver and more prolonged resistance to the Arabs who had established, during the hundred years that followed the death of Prophet Muhammad, the largest and most extensive and powerful empire in the world. The failure of Sindh to prevent the final occupation of their country by the Arabs in 712 A.D. was due to several internal causes. In the first place the province was internally disunited, as its king Dahir was a usurper and was therefore unpopular. The country was torn by internal strife, its population was sparse and lacked social solidarity owing to the oppression of the lower orders of the society by the ruling hierarchy. Its resources too were small and it received no assistance from the neighbouring Indian provinces or kingdoms. King Dahir's governors were almost semi-independent princes and did not seem to have co-operated with him in the time of the crisis. Owing to these causes many of Dahir's subjects, particularly the Buddhists and the traders refused to fight on the plea that it was none of their business. Quite a considerable number of them supplied valuable information to the invader, and joined him against their king and country. The Arab force was vastly superior to that of Dahir both in number and equipment, though not in the qualities of courage, daring and contempt of death. The garrison of 4,000 Sindhi troops at Debal had to face 25,000 Arabs, the flower of the Khalifa's army, and, with a disparity of one to six and a traitor supplying the besiegers with very useful information, it was surprising that they could hold out for as many days as they did. Nirun, Sehwan, and Sisam combined did not possess the quarter of the fighting strength of the army of invasion. Finally, Dahir's ignorance, initial lethargy and want of leadership and his silly mistakes furnished an adequate explanation of his defeat and the enslavement of Sindh. He failed to make adequate arrangements for the defence of his frontier after the Arab conquest of Makran (modern Baluchistan) which bordered on and was contiguous to Sindh. A misplaced belief or ignorant fate prevented Dahir from raising his little finger and allowing Debal, Nirun, Sehwan, Sisam and several other places, comprising lower Sindh, not to fall into the hands of the enemy. By a curious infatuation or folly he waited till the invader had arrived near Rawal, and made no attempt to check his progress or to attack him while he lay for months on the other side of the Mihran, almost paralysed by sickness that grievously affected his horses. He allowed Muhammad bin Qasim to cross the river without obstructing his passage. He staked his all on the issue of one pitched battle. Instead of supervising his men in the field of battle as a general and leader and sending succour wherever necessary, he took a personal part in fighting as a soldier and lost touch with the various divisions of his army. He expiated for the loss of Sindh with his life, but not in the eyes of the posterity, as he paved the way for his country's bondage.[13]

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 67.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

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[13] A. L. Srivastava, *The Sultanate of Delhi*, (3rd. ed.), 18-21.

It is a pity that no serious and united attempt was made to liquidate the Arab pockets of Sindh and Multan on our soil, even when the latter had grown effete and lost touch with the Caliphate. When an ambitious and patriotic Hindu ruler thought of military action, the Arabs successfully resorted to an artifice to save their illegal possessions. They treated the Hindu population in their territory as hostages and threatened to exterminate them whenever a neighbouring Hindu king prepared to launch an attack on them. The Hindu priests of the celebrated Sun Temple of Multan would declare, in order to save themselves and their families, that the god had predicted the destruction of those who would invade Multan or Sindh. The assailants would consequently at once renounce their designs.[14] "When the unbeliever," writes Al-Masudi, "march against Multan and the faithfuls do not feel themselves strong enough to oppose them, they threaten to break their *Idol*, and their enemies immediately withdraw."[15]

The second epoch which lasted from 643 A.D. to 870 A.D. envisaged a long struggle between the Arabs (afterwards followed by the Turks) and the modern kingdom of Afghanistan, the ancient *Asvakayana* (Sanskrit) or *Assakenoi* (Greek), then known as kingdoms of Kabul or Kiapishi (Kapisha) and Zabul (Jabala) or Zabulistan. These then constituted a part of India and were under Hindu rule. On account of their geographical situation they were the second among the Indian powers to face the brunt of the Arab aggression and onslaught. The Arabs had conquered and occupied Iran (Persia) by 643 A.D. and pushed the frontier of the Caliphate to the Western frontier of the Hindu Kingdom of Kabul and Zabul. From that year they began an attempt to conquer the Kabul valley, and a prolonged warfare was the result. The history of this struggle is quite interesting and shows great Hindu resistance, unique in mediaeval annals. In spite of their prolonged aggression lasting for 220 years the Arabs failed to conquer the Hindu Afghanistan. Their place was then taken by the Turks, and what the greatest empire of the mediaeval world failed to do was accomplished by the ruler of a petty principality. Yaqub Ibn Layth, who had started his career as a brigand in Seistan and risen to be the founder of the Saffavid dynasty of Persia and the neighbouring territories that lay to the west and south-west of the Hindu kingdoms of Kabul and Zabul, took the fullest advantage of the internal dissensions among the ruling party in Kabul and made successful use of down-right treachery, against his unsuspecting Hindu neighbour in 870 A.D. Lagaturman, destined to be the last Kshatriya ruler of Kabul, was overthrown by his Brahman minister, Lallya, *alias* Kallar, who, though credited by Kalhana, the author of *Rajatarangini* with ability and strength was defeated and driven out of Kabul by Yaqub Ibn Layth within a year of his usurpation. While invading the Zabul territory Yaqub sent a message that he would submit to the Hindu King and should be permitted to do him homage along with his troops, for otherwise the latter would disperse and prove dangerous to both of them. Yaqub's troops "carried their lances concealed behind their horses and were wearing coats of mail under their garments. The Almighty made the army of Rusal (Ratbil?), blind, so that they did not see the lances. When Yaqub drew near Rusal, he bowed his head as if to do homage, but raised a lance and thrust it in the back of Rusal so that he died on the spot. His people also fell like lightning upon the enemy, cutting them down with their swords and staining the earth with the blood of the enemies of the religion. The infidels when they saw the head of Rusal upon the point of a spear took to flight and great bloodshed ensued.... This victory, which he achieved, was the result of treachery and deception, such as no one had ever committed."[16] Lallya's position seems to have become untenable after the above disaster and he abandoned Kabul and shifted his capital to Udbhand (the modern fort of Und) on the right bank of the Indus, 15 miles above Attock in Rawalpindi district. This happened in 265 A.H. corresponding to 870 A.D., and the Hindu rule ended in Afghanistan once for all.[17]

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[14] Elliot and Dowson, Vol. I, p. 82.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

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[16] *Jam-Ul-Hikayat* of Nur-ud-din Muhammad Ufi in Elliot and Dowson, Vol. II (2nd ed.), pp. 176-177.

[17] Elliot and Dowson, Vol. II (2nd ed.) pp. 419. For the details about the Arab and Turkish conflict with the Hindu rulers of Afghanistan, see the present writer's article entitled '*Hindu Kings of Afghanistan*, *vide* Uttara Bharati, a Journal of Research of the Universities of Uttar Pradesh, Vol. IV, No. 2 (March 1958), pp. 1-5.

The main causes of the loss of modern Afghanistan by the Hindus are evident on the face of the narrative given above. The internal disunity brought about by a Brahmanical revolution against the Kshatriya ruler must be said to have been the most prominent factor. The absence of help from other parts of the country was an equally important handicap. At any rate it was not the physical or moral superiority of the invaders that brought them victory, though they were certainly more numerous and better equipped. Perhaps the struggle would have continued for an indefinite period, if Yaqub had not made use of downright treachery which even the contemporary Muslim opinion considered as unparalleled in the warfare of that age. It is an important lesson for the posterity that the territory once lost could not be recovered.

The third period of conflict commenced in 963 A.D. (when a Turkish adventurer named Alptigin, who was originally a slave and a vassal of the Sāmānid king of Khurasan and Bukhara, established himself as an independent ruler at Ghazni), and lasted till 1030 A.D. The Turks had sometime before embraced Islam and possessed all the zeal, bigotry and narrow-mindedness of neophytes. With Ghazni as their base they started raiding the frontiers of India. A successor of Alptigin named Pirai, signalised his rule by undertaking an invasion of the Indian territory in the possession of the Hindu-Shahi king of the Punjab and a prolonged warfare ensued. Sabuktigin, who became ruler of Ghazni in 977 A.D., continued the policy of raiding the Indian frontier. In 986 Jaipal, the raja of the Punjab, invaded Ghazni in retaliation, but had to fall back on account of a storm. Sabuktigin was succeeded in 998 A.D. by his famous son Mahmud who invaded India, it is said, seventeen times. A brave resistance was offered by Jaipal who was eventually defeated and who burnt himself to death (1001 A.D.), as he did not like to survive the humiliation of a defeat. His son Anand Pal continued the resistance, but the Punjab fell to the invader in the time of Anand Pal's son Bhim Pal in or about 1019 A.D. The province became a part of the Ghaznavide empire. Mahmud carried out several lightning raids into the country beyond the boundaries of the Punjab and devastated Mathura and Kannauj and went as far in central India as Kalinjar ~~and in~~ the West as far as Somnath. But these were mere plundering expeditions. The Punjab alone was permanently lost to India. Mahmud's successors repeated their ancestor's exploit by carrying out raids into the interior of the country, but failed to extend their dominion beyond the frontiers of the Punjab. Three generations of the Hindu-Shahi monarchs sacrificed themselves in defending their country. But they could not stem the tide of the invading forces. They had to fight for a long period, and often single-handed, against a more powerful and better equipped enemy. It must be admitted that in the long warfare Indian troops must have got tired and demoralised. Moreover, Mahmud was a superior general and leader. The rapidity of his movement, his shock-tactics and fanatical zeal rewarded him with extra-ordinary success, and an impression was created that his armies were invincible. In fact he became an object of terror, and could not be dislodged from the Punjab.

Mahmud's successors in the Punjab could not extend the area of their kingdom. In 1044 A.D., Mahi Pal, the raja of Delhi, wrested Hansi, Thaneshwar and Kangra from the Ghaznavides and re-established Hindu worship in those parts. He even invaded Lahore, but had to return without success. It is a pity that Indian rulers of the time did not combine together to make a concerted attempt to drive out the Ghaznavides from the Punjab.

The fourth and the last period of the Turkish attempt to impose foreign rule on India began with the accession to power of Shihab-ud-din *alias* Muiz-ud-din Muhammad of Ghur in the year 1173 A.D., and lasted till 1206 A.D., when the Turkish rule was permanently established at Delhi under the title of the Sultanate of Delhi. Muiz-ud-din Muhammad known to history as Muhammad of Ghur invaded Multan in 1175 A.D. and captured it. The whole of Sindh fell to him in 1182. In 1186 A.D. he captured the Punjab and in 1192 put the last Ghaznavide ruler Khusrau to death. His occupation of the Punjab naturally brought him into conflict with Prithvi Raj III, the ruler of Ajmer and Delhi. The valiant Chauhan had fortified important towns on his frontier right upto Bhatinda in order to defend his kingdom. But Muhammad captured Bhatinda in 1189. Prithvi Raj tried to recover it, and in a tough battle fought at Taraori in 1191 A.D. he defeated the invader. Muhammad was wounded seriously and fled to Ghazni. The invader returned next year, and defeated Prithvi Raj on the same field. The result was the occupation of Delhi and Ajmer by the Turks. Muhammad's lieutenant Qutb-ud-din Aibak occupied Bulandshahr, Meerut and Delhi. By 1193 A.D. there were one after another four risings against the intruders, but they could not be driven out. Flushed with success the invader next turned against Jai Chand, Gahadwad King of Kannauj, who had disputed with Prithvi Raj the overlordship of Northern India and had not assisted him against the Turkish invader. He was compelled to fight single-handed. He launched a vigorous attack on the enemy who was perplexed and was about to break down when Jai Chand himself was struck in the eye by a fatal arrow and killed at Chandwar in 1194 A.D. Muhammad of Ghur immediately proceeded to Banaras and occupied some other important towns, but the capital city of Kannauj could not be taken till 1198 A.D. The Chandel king Pramardi Deva of Kalinjar and Mahoba was practically the last ruler to fight stubbornly. Thereafter organised resistance came almost to an end, and during the space of twelve years the invader over-ran the whole of the Gangetic valley and occupied the country as far as Lakhnauti near Gaur in Bengal.

Modern historians have exercised their ingenuity in finding out the causes of this debacle. The opinions of three of them, being the latest, deserve special notice. Prof. Muhammad Habib states emphatically that the iniquitous Hindu social system that assigned the people who manned social services to the most abject humiliation outside the city walls, whereas all caste people, Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras lived inside, was responsible for the sudden cessation of organised resistance to the Turkish onrush. The result was, to use his own words, "*A turnover of public opinion — a sudden turnover no doubt, but still one that was long overdue.*"[18] One is struck at the boldness of this assertion, made in complete disregard of the fact that there is no contemporary or even later evidence to substantiate it. The learned Professor's fanciful theory that these lower orders of the Hindu society embraced Islam, which had ushered in a revolution and assured them better social and economic status besides throwing open to them the doors of Heaven, is pure guess and is devoid of evidence, contemporary or modern. There is no hint about this so-called turn-over of public opinion in the pages of Dharmasvāmin's autobiography, the only non-Muslim contemporary foreign chronicle written by a Tibetan monk who visited India in 1234-1236 and saw with his own eyes the effect of the Turkish ravages in Bihar and the panic caused by it and by the raids of the military commands established by the conquerors in the interior of the country.[19] This foreign visitor mentions the flight of the people from their homes[20] and the existence of untouchability,[21] but has not a word to say about the untouchables' alleged non-co-operation or their turning Muslims and joining the invaders. Dr. P. Saran naturally does not agree with Professor Habib in view of lack of evidence and says: "It is equally unwarranted to attribute it (the Ghorian conquest), *solely* to the social and religious peculiarities of the Hindus, for our ideas about them are also vague and indistinct and based on no sure knowledge of facts." He, however, gives two main causes of the debacle, viz., (1) iniquitous system of caste and (2) the absence of contact with the outside world.[22]

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[18] Introduction to Elliot and Dowson, Vol. II, 2nd ed. p. 52.

Before examining Dr. Saran's conclusions it is pertinent to point out that another scholar of the Aligarh School, Khaliq Ahmad Nizami has recently reiterated Prof. Habib's fantastic theory, ignoring Dr. Saran's weighty observation regarding the lack of any definite evidence on the point. It is however, fair to add that Prof. Habib himself refers to Dr. Saran's observation, but without commenting on it or modifying his own theory in the light of this remark.[23] Now, to take Dr. Saran's second argument first. Recent research has shown that until the beginning of the 13th century A.D. Indian scholars and monks not only undertook long journeys to China, Tibet and other Himalayan countries but stayed for years in those countries, learnt the local languages and translated Indian scriptures and other books into Tibetan and Chinese.[24] There is reason to believe that India must also have had commercial relations with these countries. As for South India, it maintained cultural and commercial contact with the countries of South-East Asia even after the Muslim conquest of North India. Chinese and Tibetan scholars and monks continued to come to India in search of Buddhist works and relics. Dr. A. S. Altekar published in 1959 the autobiography of a Tibetan monk,[25] named Chag Lo-tsa-ba Chos-rja-dpal *alias* Dharmasvāmin who visited Bihar and stayed there for two years (1234-36 A.D.). This Tibetan monk gives a graphic picture of the condition of Northern India of that time and the panic caused by the progress of the Turkish invaders, and says that he met many Tibetans and Ceylonese monks in India. As regards his first argument, Dr. Saran himself admits that there is no definite evidence to show that caste system in itself was responsible for the rapid fall of the Gangetic valley to the Turkish invader during 1194-1202 A.D. Caste might have been a powerful cause of weakness and lack of solidarity, but there is no recorded or unrecorded evidence to show that at that time any group or section of the people refused to co-operate with their rulers in the time of war or of an invassion, or that there was any desertion from their armies for reasons of caste. Baneful though the castes were, they had not acquired the political values they possess in the present democratic set-up in the country. At any rate, in the absence of definite evidence, it is against the canons of historical reasoning to make the caste system, injurious though it is in the modern conditions of society, *solely* or even *mainly* responsible for the defeat of the Hindu rulers. A more probable cause seems to be the wide-spread demoralisation and panic caused by the defeat of great Hindu kings and an erroneous belief in the invincibility of the Turkish hordes who used shock-tactics and impelled the lesser Indian rulers to think that resistance was hopeless. It may be presumed with reason that after the fall of such mighty warrior-kings as Prithvi Raj and Jai Chand there must have been anxious and hurried consultations among the smaller rulers of the Gangetic valley, their ministers and advisers, and they must have thought further resistance to be futile. It was in these depressing circumstances that they seemed to have taken shelter behind the letter of the well-known injunction in the *Mahabharata* to submit and avoid anarchy, and ignored its spirit. It was, therefore, the implicit, nay blind, Hindu faith in shastraic injunctions to avoid anarchy at all cost even at the sacrifice of independence and sovereignty, that must be held to have been the primary cause of the debacle. It was enjoined upon the Hindus by their shastras to dread anarchy, and to avoid it by submitting to an invader, if his object was the occupation of the country. "If a powerful king approaches kingdoms weakened by anarchy from desire of annexing them to his dominion," writes the *Mahābhārata,* "the people should go forward and receive the invader with respect. There is no evil greater than anarchy. If the powerful invader be inclined to equity, everything will be right. If, on the other hand, he be enraged (on account of resistance), he may exterminate all. The cow which can be easily milked has not to suffer any torture whatever. The wood that bends easily does not require to be heated. The tree that bends easily has not to suffer any torture (at the hands of the gardeners). Guided by these instances, O hero, men should bend before those that are powerful. The man that bends his head to a powerful person really bends his head to Indra."[26]

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[19] *Biography of Dharmasvamin*, K. P. Jaiswal R. Institute, Patna.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 61, 62, 64, 93-95.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

[22] *The Struggle for Empire*, pp. 125-126.

[23] *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the Thirteenth Century*, by K .A. Nizami, 67-72; Introduction, xiii-xviii.

[24] P. N. Bose, *Indian Teachers in China*, 115-116; Bagchi, *India and China*, 56-57, 204; A. Kaul, *Kashmir's Pandits*, 29, Rahul Sankritayan, *Tibet men Budh Dharma*, 37, 39-43; K. Sarla Khosla, *Influence of Buddhism on Kashmir*, (unpublished thesis prepared under the guidance of the present writer).

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[25] *Biography of Dharmasvāmin*, tr. into English by, Dr G.. Roerich, K.P.J.R.I., Patna, 1959.

In view of its importance it is necessary to quote the relevant lines of the Sanskrit text:—

अथ चेदाभिवर्तेत राज्यार्थी बलवत्तरः ।
अराजकाणि राष्ट्राणि हतवीर्याणि वा पुनः ॥ ६ ॥
प्रत्युद्गम्याभिपूज्यः स्यादेतदत्र सुमन्त्रितम् ।
नहि पापात् परतरमस्ति किंचिदराजकात् ॥ ७ ॥
स चेत् समनुपश्येत समग्रं कुशलं भवेत् ।
बलवान् हि प्रकुपितः कुर्यान्निःशेषतामपि ॥ ८ ॥
भूयांसं लभते क्लेशं या गौर्भवति दुर्दहा ।
अथ या सुदुहा राजन्नैवतां वितुदन्त्यपि ॥ ९ ॥
यदतप्तं प्रणमते नैतत्सन्तापमर्हति ।
यत् स्वयं नमते दारु न तत्संनामयन्त्यपि ॥ १० ॥
एतयोपमया वीर ! सन्नमेत बलीयसे ।
इन्द्राय स प्रणमते नमते यो बलीयसे ॥ ११ ॥ *Shānti Parva*, LXVII 6-11

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[26] *Mahabharata, Shanti Parva,* Section, LXVII, Eng. Tr. by Pratap Chandra Ray, Calcutta, p. 215.

That the Mahabharata has been read reverently, recited, listened to, and talked about by all classes of people, educated and uneducated, all over Northern India through the ages, needs no argument. Its popularity in the 11th century A.D. is attested by no less an authority than Alberuni who writes: "Besides, they have a book which they hold in such veneration that they firmly assert that everything which occurs in this book is found in other books, but not all, which occurs in this book is found in other books. It is called Bharat, and composed by Vyas, the son of Pārāsara at the time of the great war between the children of Pandu and those of Kuru."[27]

The present writer can say from his personal knowledge that during four months of the rainy season there used to be *Kathas* of the *Mahabharata* when this work was read and explained by learned pandits and listened to at village gatherings in most parts of Uttar Pradesh in the early years of the present century.

This is an instance to show that sometimes out of good comes evil, and that a nation that does not make use of discrimination in the interpretation and application of its valued scripture not only loses its independence, but also suffers tremendously and for centuries.

The general causes of our defeat may now be conveniently summarised in the light of the above discussion. A nation's greatest enemy, says Sir Jadunath Sarkar, is within, not without. Internal factors consequently must take the first place. The first and foremost cause was the moral and social degradation of the people, especially of the upper and middle classes who not only set the tone of the society but really mattered in that age of aristocracy when for all practical purposes their rise meant the rise of the nation and their degradation, the nation's degradation. This degeneration is portrayed in contemporary literature as well as in the architecture of the age. The classical work of Damodar Gupta entitled *'Kuttani Matam Kavyam'*, depicts the corrupt society of the early years of the 9th century A.D., and the numerous literary works of Kshēmēndra (990 A.D.—1060 A.D.), especially *Kalāvilāsa*, *Samayamāṭṛkā*, *Desōpadēsa* and *Narmāmālā*, and the voluminous *Kathāsarit Sāgara* of Soma Deva (1063-1081 A.D.) show the depth to which the Hindus of the tenth and eleventh centuries had fallen. The social and moral life of the monks and nuns in the Buddhist monasteries in all parts of Northern India had, since the middle of the 7th century A.D., been over-taken by degrading evils,[28] and by the 9th century moral degradation had become rampant in the non-Buddhist society as well. Their perverted beliefs and practices did not remain confined within the four walls of their houses and monasteries, but found expression in the Hindu sacred places as well. The Hindu temples erected in that age had obscene images and figures on the outer parts of the shrines, prominently exposed to the gaze of the people. Whatever might have been their artistic or even religious value, no apologist can hide the fact that the presence of obscene images must have produced a very demoralising and sensual effect on all concerned. One has only to cast a glance at the temples of Khajuraho, Konarak and Jagannath Puri, and at the sculptured representations in the caves of Bhubaneshwar and other places to visualise the effect on the mind and character of the people. A society tainted with moral and social evils could not be capable of resisting a powerful invader for an indefinite period.

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[27] Alberuni, Vol. I, p. 132.

Secondly, North-Western India, including Hindu Afghanistan and part of Sindh, was even before the 7th century A.D. isolated and looked upon by the conservative elements of our society as 'border-lands' inhabited by 'barbarians.'[29] There was in those regions, particularly in Afghanistan, a great inter-mixture of races, and Indo-Greeks, Indo-Parthians, Kushans and Hunas, who in course of time embraced Hinduism, had become one with the indigenous Hindu population. This being repugnant to the rising conservatism in the country, the rest of India took little interest in the affairs of these people who could expect no help or sympathy from their country-men and had to depend upon themselves and face the enemy single-handed. Thirdly, after the extinction

[28] Monks, students and teachers of Nalanda were entertained by musicians and dancers from South India who had to be paid handsomely. See *Dharmasvāmin's Biography*, pp. 92-93.

[29] Thomas Watters: *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, Vol. I, p. 180.

of the Maurya Empire there was no such thing as the defence of the frontiers of India by the united might and resources of the Indian people, because our North-West frontiers and all other frontiers were the frontiers of small independent kingdoms. There was no central government for the whole of India or even for the whole of Northern India, which could think and act for the country as a whole. The kingdoms of Sindh, Kabul, and Zabul, though ruled by brave monarchs and inhabited by warlike people, encountered superior forces backed by the might and resources of the biggest and most powerful empire of the age, with their slender man-power and financial strength. The other Indian States were interested in their wars as their neighbours' wars and not their own. Obviously Hindu Afghanistan or Sindh could not, under these circumstances, carry on an unequal contest for an indefinitely long period.

Fourthly, the country during the period experienced a Brahmanical reaction that produced three-fold effect on its fortune. In the first place, under the stress of this movement Brahman ministers overthrew their Kshatriya and Sudra masters, usurped their thrones and set themselves up as rulers which brought about a kind of political revolution and instabiilty. Lallya (also known as Kallar), the Brahman minister of the Kshatriya king Lagaturman of Kabul, deposed and imprisoned his sovereign and seized his kingdom in 870 A.D. (256 A.H.) at a time when his country was faced with a first class external crisis on account of the aggressions of Saffavid Yaqub ibn Layth.[30] Within a year of his usurpation Lallya was driven out of Kabul by Yaqub, and Afghanistan, which had for centuries been the North-Western part of India, was lost once for all. In Sindh, while the Arab raids were in operation, the Brahman minister Chach deposed and slew his Sudra master, Sahasi Rai II, married his widowed queen and set himself up as ruler,[31] about 700 A.D. Chach's son Dahir had to pay the price of his father's usurpation. In 712 A.D. he was defeated and killed by the Arab general Muhammad bin Qasim and Sindh was for ever lost to Hindu India. In the second place, the rise of orthodox Hinduism alienated the Buddhist population in the country and quite a large number of them, at least in Sindh, not only became indifferent towards the ruling family but even went over to the side of the Arab invaders and rendered them material assistance against their king and country.[32] Thirdly the Hindus in general and their upper classes in particular had by this time developed strange ideas of contamination and defilement and taboos of food and drink which made them shudder from the fear of losing caste if they fell into the hands of the *mlechhas.* This made them either face death outright or put up resistance only to a certain point so as to be able to withdraw from the field before they could be taken prisoners. And finally, in as much as religious orthodoxy and ritualism run counter to the simplicity of the poor, the lower orders of our society felt a widening gulf between them and their new rulers who pursued a suicidal policy of social and religious exclusion. The Jats and the Meds in Sindh felt so much oppressed that like Buddhists they joined Muhammad bin Qasim against Dahir. The political result, therefore, of the Brahmanical orthodoxy was the destruction of that social solidarity the presence of which is reckoned as the best guarantee of the preservation of political independence.

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[30] *Kitab-ul-Hind* of Al-Beruni, Eng. Trans. by Sachau, Vol. II, 10-13.

[31] *Chach Nama;* R. C. Majumdar. The Classical Age, p. 165.

Fifthly, in the later days of their struggle with the foreign invaders the Hindus of Afghanistan and Sindh had the ill-luck to have to fight simultaneously on two fronts. In the early days of Kia-pi-shi's clash with the Arabs, Kashmir was on friendly terms with the Shāhis of Kabul. Lalitāditya Muktapida (c. 713-750 A.D.) of Kashmir had an alliance with the Shahi ruler, because his frontier too was subjected to Arab raids. This policy was given up by Lalitāditya's successors, Shankarvarman especially, which compelled the rulers of Kabul to denude their troops from their Western front for the defence of their dominion from the grasping ruler of Kashmir, and which minimised their power of resistance against the Muslims.

Finally, the mistakes of policy and strategy and those of detail in the course of fighting cannot be lightly brushed aside, as they contributed greatly to deciding the fate of the country. For example, the ignorance of the governments of Afghanistan and Sindh about the warlike ambition and activities of the Arabs and their failure to take adequate steps in time for the defence of the country cannot be easily accounted for. Dahir foolishly sent no reinforcement to Debal and other towns of Sindh and allowed these to be individually isolated and conquered. As we have seen he made no attempt to attack Muhammad bin Qasim, while the latter lay encamped for two months on the bank of the Indus paralysed by sickness among his horses, and pinned his faith on a single pitched battle.

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[32] The movement seems to have been widespread and begun earlier than this period. Gohilya or Guhil, who was of Nagar Brahman parentage, had seized Chittor from King Man Mori and set himself up as king in the 6th century A.D.

As regards the external causes, one must admit that, though in no way braver than the Indian troops, the Arab and the Turkish armies were better fighting forces on account of their complete equality and social solidarity. Islam had swept away all distinctions of caste and race and given a cohesion to the various races of Central Asia and knit them together into a homogeneous unit. They were, moreover, free from the evil of drunkenness, as the early Muslims religiously obeyed the Quranic injunction which forbade wine. The result was that the invading forces displayed an unexampled unity of purpose and effort, which were beyond the Indian troops, divided as they were by caste, religion and diverse social practices.

The invaders were mostly well-mounted archers and their horses and arms gave them indisputable military superiority over our troops. The Arabian horses were proverbial in history, and Turkoman horses were even better. "The Turkoman horse is the noblest in the whole of Central Asia," writes the *Cambridge Medieval History*, "and surpasses all other breeds in speed, endurance, intelligence, faithfulness and a marvellous sense of locality. The Turkoman horse is tall, with a long narrow body, long thin legs and neck .... on their predatory expeditions the Turkomans often cover 650 miles in the waterless desert in five days ..... They owe their power to the training of thousands of years in the endless steppes and deserts, and to the continual plundering raids, which demanded the utmost endurance and privation of which horse and rider were capable."[33] The Turks, whose homeland lay just south of that of the Turkomans, were only a little less hardy and were mounted on fleet Turkoman and Arab horses. "The Turks were so famous for the speed and vigour of their cavalry charges," writes Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "that in the Asiatic world the phrase Turk-Savār (i.e. Turkish horseman) became a general name for the richly accounted, superbly mounted, dashing cavalry of any race." (*Hindustan Standard*, Sunday edition, 7th March, 1954). The weapons of the rank and file of the invaders were a composite bow of two pieces joined together by a metal band which discharged deadly arrows to a range of 80 to 100 paces and "which pierced curiass and shield with ease," and long spears. The Turkish nobles and their horses were clad in armour and fought with bows and arrows and spears. They were also equipped with long sharp swords.

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[33] *Cambridge Medieval History,* Vol. I. p. 331.

Leaving individual cases apart, there was perhaps, generally speaking, better generalship on the enemy side in as much as larger forces always call for greater skill in leadership and organisational capacity of a higher order than small armies which were at the disposal of the rulers of Sindh, Kabul, Zabul and the Punjab. In fact these latter could not afford to maintain larger armies on account of their limited resources in men and money, and, had therefore fewer opportunities of developing generalship of a high order.

Our leaders and commanders had failed to keep pace with the development of tactics that had been taking place in Asia even before the birth of Islam, and were perfected by Arab and Turkish converts to Islam. The tactics consisted in employing mounted archers as light troops for harassing and bewildering the enemy and causing confusion in his ranks by archery fire, and then charging him with armoured heavy cavalry. The squadrons of the invading army were divided into five divisions, namely, right wing, centre, left wing, advance guard and reserve, and used to be drawn up in the form of a crescent. The enemy would not attempt to come close or make a general frontal attack; but large bodies of the enemy mounted archers would hover round and ply their arrows against the Indian army that was posted in a long formation and divided only into three parts, right wing, centre and left wing. The enemy would late in the day steal round the wings and would molest the fighting Indian army from behind. In the moment of its confusion the Turkish horses would pour a cloud of arrows and the horns of the crescent would enclose the Indian rear.

Moreover, whereas the Rajputs prided themselves on their swordsmanship and looked upon the battle as a tournament in which to display their skill and chivalry, the Arabs and the Turks fought to win, and believed that everything was fair in war. They were averse to taking advantage of the enemy's weakness and to resort to feint and manoeuvres in which the Arabs and Turks were adepts.

Both Mahmud of Ghazni and Muhammad of Ghur, the former on a much larger scale than the latter, made use of shock-tactics to dishearten and demoralise the Indian troops and people. With lightning rapidity they would swoop down upon our fair cities, plunder and destroy wealthy shrines and devastate the land with fire and sword. These tactics were repeated times out of number and so much frightened the people that they began thinking that Mahmud's troops were invincible. Therefore, political and military demoralisation set in, and people wrongly began believing that resistance against the Turkish horses was useless. It was this feeling that paralysed our society in that age. Finally, the Arabs and the Turks were inspired by a great religious enthusiasm which made them feel and believe that God had made them His instrument in purging the world of idolatry and making it safe for Islam. Our people had no such inspiring ideology to sustain them, except the defence of their country and religion, which gave them power to resist and not to carry war into the enemy's country. Mere physical strength and military weapons do not constitute the total equipment of an army. An inspiring ideology and a burning desire to act offensively so as to destroy the enemy's power to strike are as essential as military training and equipment.

Chach-Nāma:
References to Persia, Zabul, Kashmir and Kanauj

BY

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Chach-Nāma,[1] the earliest chronicle of Sind, is a Persian version of a genuine Arab history, composed not long after Muhammad Kāsim's conquest of Sind. The original Arabic work is lost. The Persian translation of it which has come down to us was made early in the thirteenth century, by one Muhammad Alī Kūfī of Uchh. Though mainly a record of the Arab general's transactions during the invasion, the *Chach-Nāma* in its earlier portion treats of Sind when it was ruled by Hindu kings, and takes us back to the closing years of the fifth century A.D. Two later chronicles of Sind, *Tarīkh-i-Masūmī* (1600 A.D.) and *Tuhfātu-l-Kirām* (1768 A.D.), base their account of the Hindu reigns and the Muslim conquest on the *Chach-Nāma*, but on some important particulars and dates they differ from it. These three chronicles are our main source for the history of Sind during the two centuries and a quarter preceding the Muslim conquest.

We learn from these chronicles that powerful kings of the Rai dynasty, with their capital at Alor,[2] on the banks of the Indus, ruled in Sind for a period of 137 years. In 1 A.H. (622 A.D.), when Sāhāsi II, the fifth and last king of the Rai dynasty, died, his talented chamberlain, a Brahmin, named Chach, who had "won the confidence of the Rai and the more tender regards of the Rani," seized the throne and proclaimed himself king.[3] He married the widowed queen who bore him two sons, Dharasiah and Dāhir,[4] and a daughter named Bai. Mahrat, the ruler of Chitor (that name is uncertain), who was a brother or kinsman of the deceased Rai, marched on Alor to claim the inheritance, but he was killed by Chach, in a single combat. As the feudatories in the kingdom were not disposed to acknowledge the usurper, Chach had to undertake prolonged campaigns against them, in all the parts of his dominion. These engaged him for several years, and practically all the information which the *Chach-Nāma* gives us about his long reign pertains to these military campaigns. The *Tarīkh-i-Masūmī* dismisses these campaigns of Chach in a single line, with the euphemistic remark that "taking his army for exercise, he visited the limits of his country."[5] When Chach died, after a prosperous reign of 40 years, the sovereignty of Sind devolved on his brother Chandar, who professed the Buddhist faith. It was not uncommon in that age for the rulers in the same line being either Hindus or Buddhists. Chandar reigned for 7 years. After his death Dāhir reigned at Alor, while Dharasiah established himself as an independent ruler at Brahmanabad,[6] in Lower Sind. Thirty years later, when Dharasiah died, the entire kingdom came under the sway of Dāhir. Then, in 710-11 A.D., began the Arab invasion of Sind under Muhammad Kāsim; Dāhir was killed in the fighting near Rāwar in June 712 A.D., and by the following year the conquest of the kingdom was complete, and the entire country from the port of Debal to Multan passed into the hands of the Muslims. On the collapse of the Hindu resistance R. C. Majumdar remarks: "To the inexplicable want of strategy on the part of Dāhir and the treachery of the Buddhists of the south, we must add the base betrayal of the chief officials and grandees of Sind to account for its ignominious end. All important chiefs and officials seem to have deserted his cause. This is partly accounted for by the superstitious idea that according to the Hindu *shāstras* the country was destined to fall into the hands of Muhammadans, and it was, therefore, useless to fight. But the attitude of the chiefs was perhaps due to the personal feelings against the son of the usurper who had driven out the royal family."[7]

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[1] Selected extracts from it translated into English by H. M. Elliot appear in the first volume of *The History of India As Told By Its Own Historians*. *The Chachnamah* by Kalichbeg is a complete English translation of the Persian chronicle. Daūdpotā has published a complete text of the chronicle under the title *Fateh-nāmeh-i-Sind*.

[2] Alor, now a small place, lies on the east bank of an old bed of the river, near modern Sukkur, in Upper Sind. Its gradual decline was due to the river ceasing to flow past it and the Arabs, after the conquest, making their capital at Mansūra, in Lower Sind.

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[3] Deducting 133 (137 lunar = 133 solar years) from 622, we obtain 489 A.D. as the date of the commencement of the Rai sovereignty.

[4] Hodivala suggests the restoration of these corrupt names to Dhara-Sena and Dhīra-Sena respectively—*Studies in Indo-Muslim History,* I, 80.

[5] Malet, *A History of Sind,* 12. It is a complete English translation of the *Tarikh-i-Masumī.*

[6] The extensive ruins of the ancient city of Brahmanabad, "the Pompeii of Sind", lie to the east of the Indus, 8 miles south-east of Shahdādpur.

The kingdom of the Rais which Chach seized comprised not only Sind itself, but also a large part of the eastern Punjab and Baluchistan. The four important states on its borders were Persia, Zābul or Zābulistān,[8] Kashmir and Kanauj. In Persia, to the west of Sind, the Sassanian monarchy was overthrown by the Arabs in 641 A.D. Zābul or Zābulistān was a powerful Hindu kingdom to the north-west of Sind.[9] Kashmir, the political limits of which in the seventh century extended considerably southwards, formed the northern boundary of the kingdom of Sind.[10] On its north-eastern boundary lay the old state of Thāneswar (in eastern Punjab) which together with the kingdom of Kanauj formed part of the great empire of Harsha.

The *Chach-Nāma* makes several references to these kingdoms which I propose to notice here. They throw a sidelight on the political arrangements in North-west India in the seventh century A.D. — a period in the history of that region which, excepting for what Hiuen Tsiang tells us, is largely a blank. Owing to the nature of the Persian letters and the habit of scribes, who are rarely particular about putting the diacritical points, or properly placing them, proper names occurring in many of these references in the chronicle are very corrupt. Zābul, for instance, has been transformed by the scribes into "Ramal" or "Ranmal," and to add to the confusion both Elliot and Kalichbeg, in their translations, treat "Ramal" or "Ranmal" indiscriminately as either the designation of a country or the name of a ruler.

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[7] "The Arab Invasion of India", *Journal of Indian History,* X (1931), supplement, 48.

[8] G. Le Strange notes that "the whole of the great mountainous district of the upper waters of the Helmund and the Kandāhar rivers was known to the Arabs as Zābulistan, a term of vague application, but which more particularly denoted the country round Ghazna."—*Lands of the Eastern Caliphate,* 349.

[9] The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang (or Yuan Chwang), who visited this kingdom in 644 A.D. calls it Tsau-ku-ta or Tsao-li and its capital as Ho-si-na, which is identified with modern Ghazni—*On Yuan Chwang's Travels,* II, 625.

[10] Cunningham's *Ancient Geography of India,* 89 (Majumdar's ed.).

The *Chach-Nāma* mentions that, after the death of Khusru Parviz,[11] when a woman sat on the throne of Persia, Chach marched with a large army towards Kirmān and determined "the boundary between Makrān and Kirmān." The real object of the expedition, it appears, was to seize Makrān, the sovereignty over which was probably lost by Sind, when earlier a Persian army had invaded that border district and killed the fourth Rai king in battle. Khusru Parviz was deposed and slain by his son in 628 A.D., but the parricide died in a few months and absolute chaos resulted. Among the rulers, who during the next four years followed rapidly on one another on the throne of Persia, were two daughters of Khusru Parviz, named Pooran-dukht and Azermi-Dukht. The former reigned from May 630 to October 631 and the latter for just a few months immediately thereafter.[12] As Chach's expedition to Kirmān occurred during one of these two reigns,[13] his accession, which was several years prior to it, very probably took place in 622 A.D. as stated in the *Tuhfātu-l Kirām*. R. C. Majumdar, on a critical examination of the conflicting chronological data provided in the *Chah-Nāma* and the *Tuhfātu-l Kirām*, also came to that conclusion.[14] I refer to this as the precise date of Chach's accession is important for a proper understanding of the early history of Sind.[15]

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[11] The name in the Persian texts appears as "Kasra" or "Kisra" son of Hormuz, which no doubt refers to Khusru Parviz, known also as Chosroes II. His father was Hormuzd IV, ruler of Persia from 579-590 A.D. Kisra is the Arabic form of the Persian title Khosraw.

[12] Malcolm, *History of Persia,* I, 160-4; Sykes, *History of Persia,* I, 527-30; Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua,* 401; Paruck, *Sassanian Numismatics,* 114-9; Valentine, *Sassanian Coins,* 7.

[13] The statement in the *Chach-Nāma* that it was then 2 A.H. (623 A.D.) is obviously wrong. Elliot suggests that *do* (two) in the Persian text should be read as *dah* (ten).

[14] *The Arab Invasion,* 25-6.

[15] Elliot (I, 414) erroneously places Chach's accession in 631 A.D.; Cunningham (*Numismatic Chronicle,* 1894, 272) in 642 A.D.; Vaidya (*History of Mediaeval Hindu India,* I, 20) in 648 A.D.; and V. Smith (*E.H.I.,* 369) in 646 A.D.

Harsha or Harshavardhana of Kanauj (607-47 A.D.), contemporary of Chach (622-61 A.D.), was the greatest monarch of his time in India. The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang, who visited this monarch in 636 A.D., says: "He went from east to west subduing all who were not obedient; the elephants were not unharnessed nor the soldiers unhelmeted. After six years he had subdued the Five Indies. Having thus enlarged his territory, he increased his forces; he had 60,000 war elephants and 100,000 cavalry. After thirty years his arms reposed and he governed everywhere in peace."[16] "Even the most powerful of Harsha's enemies, viz. the Chalukyas of the Deccan", observes a modern historian, "bear witness to his suzerainty over the whole of *Uttarāt patha* or Northern India. The pre-eminence of Harsha over other contemporary rulers of the North is also indicated by the 'music-pace-drums' which he alone was entitled to use, other kings not being permitted to adopt the paraphernalia in question. It is not suggested that the whole of Northern India was actually controlled by imperial officials. Large tracts of this wide region were doubtless under powerful local rulers who owed only a nominal allegiance to the imperial throne. But even the rulers of distant Kashmir, Sind, Valabhī and Kāmarūpa had a wholesome dread of the power of Harsha."[17] Kanauj, the imperial capital, was a place of such grandeur and accumulated riches that the expression "You want Kanauj", meaning "you want the impossible", had passed into a proverb, and we find it used in that sense in the *Chach-Nāma* almost a hundred years after the passing away of Harsha.[18]

There is no reliable evidence that Harsha, at any time, either before or after the accession of Chach, attempted to incorporate the kingdom of Sind in his empire. Bāṇa in *Harsha Charita* no doubt says that Harsha "having pounded the king of Sind, made his wealth (*Lakshmi*) his own",[19] but there is nothing either in the account of the Chinese pilgrim or in the *Chach-Nāma* to substantiate that statement. Allan very rightly remarks that "*Harshacharita* is by no means an historical work in the modern sense of the term; it is an exercise in a particular literary genre, with an historical instead of a mythological theme."[20] Bāṇa calls Harsha's father Prabhākaravardhana, ruler of Thāneswar, who died in 605 A.D., "a lion to the Huna deer, a burning fever to the king of the Indus land, a troubler of the sleep of Gujarat (? Gurjaras), a bilious plague to that scent-elephant the lord of Gāndhāra, a looter to the lawlessness of the Lāṭas, an axe to the creeper of Mālwā's glory".[21] These poetical phrases, however, hardly warrant our concluding, as has been done by some scholars,[22] that Prabhākaravardhana defeated the several powers named by Bāṇa, though he probably augmented to some extent the limits of his kingdom. "Unquestioning confidence in the representations of Indian panegyrists", warns Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall,[23] "would entail the conclusion that in the by-gone days of this country, everybody—above all if a patron—was constantly vanquishing everybody else." The *Chach-Nāma* at any rate does not record any encounter between the Rais of Sind and Prabhākaravardhana of Thāneswar.

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[16] S. Beal, *Si-Yu-Ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World*, I, 213.

[17] Raychaudhuri in *An Advanced History of India*, 158.

[18] Kalichbeg, 52.

[19] Tr. Cowell and Thomas, 76.

The *Chach-Nāma* narrates that when, early during his reign, Chach marched against Agham, the powerful feudatory chief of Brahmanabad, and compelled him after severe fighting to retire with his army to the fort, it was to "the king of Hindustan, that is, Kanauj" that the besieged chief sent letters for help, but Agham died before the letters were answered. His son unable to hold the fort any longer—the siege had lasted for one year[24]—sued for peace and submitted to Chach. The king of Kanauj at this time was undoubtedly Harsha, but his name as given in the Persian texts is hopelessly corrupt and hardly recognizable.[25]

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[20] *The Cambridge Shorter History of India*, 104.

[21] *Harsha Charita*, 101.

[22] See Vincent Smith, *Early History of India*, 384; Vaidya I, p. 1ff; Buhler: "A state, the circuit of which amounted to 7,000 *li* or 1200 miles, might exercise a considerable influence, keep its neighbours in fear, and afford to a very talented king the means for greater conquests."—*Epigraphia Indica*, I 69.

[23] *J.A.S.B.*, XXXI, 3. Cf. R. C. Majumdar: "Sindh was hostile to Prabhākaravardhana as well, and it is just possible that Harsha might have led a campaign against it. But the detailed description of Hiuen Tsiang leaves no doubt that Sindh was a strong and independent kingdom when he visited it, and Harsha's military campaign, if there was any, evidently bore no fruit."—*The Classical Age*, 106.

Chach's initial campaign, after his accession, was however, against the faudatory chief of Pābiya and Askalanda, whose territory lay to the north-east of Alor. Defeated at Pābiya, on the southern bank of the Beas, the chief fell back on his stronghold of Askalanda,[26] where he was assassinated by a nobleman of his court. Chach then advanced against Bajhrā (or Bachherā), the powerful chief of Multan, who was a kinsman of Rai Sāhāsi II. He engaged Chach in a sanguinary battle on the banks of the Rāvī. Defeated in the field Bajhrā took refuge in the fort of Multan, from where he appealed for aid to the King of Kashmir. But the latter died before the messenger reached Kashmir. As his son was only a boy several divisions of the army had raised their head in revolt. The counsellors and nobles conferred and sent a reply that "it was not at this time in their power to provide the means of assistance, and that Bajhrā must rely upon his own resources". Bajhrā was constrained to sue for peace. Promised safe conduct he withdrew with his followers and dependents to the mountains of Kashmir. From Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, it appears that the king of Kashmir, who died at this time was Bālāditya, the last ruler of the Gonanda dynasty. He was not succeeded by a minor son. In fact the Kashmir chronicle records that he lost his male issue during his lifetime. Bālāditya, though survived by three younger brothers, was succeeded by his son-in-law, Durlabhavardhana (625-61 A.D.), a person of humble origin who became the founder of the famous Karkoṭa dynasty of Kashmir.[27] His accession probably was attended by disorder and commotion on account of "the obstacles created by the chief ministers", and it was for that reason perhaps that Kashmir could not send assistance to Bajhrā. Kalhaṇa, whose chief sources were other chroniclers "who composed each the history of those kings whose contemporaries they were" (i. 9), may, in this matter, perhaps be taken as the more reliable authority.

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[24] Cf. Abul Fazl: "Its citadel had 1400 towns, at an interval of a *tanab*, and to this day there are many traces of its fortifications."—*Ain-i-Akbari*, II, 338. (Tr. Jowett, 2nd ed.).

[25] Elliot (I, 147) gives it as "Satbān son of Rāsal" and Kalichbeg (*The Chachnamah*, 33) as "Sayār or Satbār son of Rāil Rai or Rāsal Rai". "Satbān", "Sayār" and "Satbār" are probably corruptions of "Śīlāditya or "Śri-Harsha". Hiuen Tsiang refers to Harsha by his title Śīlāditya. Prabhākaravardhana, according to Bāṇa (*Harsha Charita*, 101), "was famed far and wide under a second name Pratāpaśila" traces of which are noticeable in "Rāsal" or "Rāil". The initial syllable "Pra" has apparently been mistaken for the Persian word "Pisar" meaning "son of". I suggest that the name in the original Arabic chronicle very probably was "Śīlāditya Pratāpaśila" or "Śri-Harsha Pratāpaśila".

[26] Cunningham (*Anc. Geo.* 242-3) identifies it with Ūchh, but Raverty places it 29 miles to the east of it. Its supposed identification with one of the Alexandrias built by Alexander the Great is subject of much controversy.

About the states of Zābul and Kābul on the western borderland of India Majumdar writes: "In the seventh century A.D. these two kingdoms formed parts of India both politically and culturally, being Indian in language, literature and religion, and ruled over by kings who bore Indian names."[28] The *Chach-Nāma* makes many references to Zābul, but the name having been corrupted by the scribes into "Ramal" or Ranmal",[29] scholars have failed to connect these references with that Hindu kingdom on the north-western border of Sind. Hodivala, influenced by the fact that "*Raml*" in Arabic signifies "sand", suggests that "*Mūlk-i-Ramal* may be understood as 'the sandy country', which is an appropriate designation for parts of modern Mārwāḍ and Jaisalmir."[30] In view, however, of the clear indication in the chronicle that "Ramal" lay to the north-west of Sind, the learned professor's identification cannot be accepted.

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[27] *Rājataraṅgaṇī*, I, 114-9 (Stein's ed.). The dates of Durlabhavardhana's reign given above are those generally accepted by scholars. Kalhaṇa's chronology of the Karkoṭa dynasty is seriously contradicted by the Chinese Annals of the T'ang dynasty, and requires a correction of 31 years, as shown by Cunningham (*Anc. Geo.*, 90-2). Max Muller accepts Cunningham's correction (*India; what can it teach us?*, 34-8). For a contrary view see S. P. Pandit's Introduction to the *Gauḍavaho*. Cunningham believes that Durlabha is "mentioned by the Chinese under the name of Chu-lo-pa, as an Indian king who between A.D. 627 and 645 was required to aid the envoys from Kipin or Arachosia on their way back from China"—*Coins of Medieval India*, 26-27).

[28] *The Classical Age*, 164-5.

[29] In Persian characters the difference between "Zābul", "Ramal", "Ranmal" and "Nirmal" is slight. The presence, omission and the placing of the diacritical dots make all the difference. The initial *Za* (Z) can easily appear as *ra* (R) if the dot is left out or as *nūn* (N) if the dot is not properly placed. Similarly, *ba* (L) can be mistaken for *m* (M) if the dot is missing, or for *nun* (N) if the dot is not in proper position. I cannot account for the omission of *alif* (A) in the variant readings of Zābul, though there is no doubt that these refer to that kingdom.

When Matta, the feudatory of Siwastān (Sehwan), was defeated by Chach, it was to the kingdom of Zābul, which bordered on his territory[31] that the defeated chief went for refuge. In Kalichbeg's translation (p. 32) the passage reads: "Mattah preferred going to the direction of Hind to the kingdom of Nirmal, called Bhattī or Bhettī."[32] Elliot (I, 146) who read "Mūlk" (country) as *Malik* (king)—the two words in Persian are spelt alike—rendered the passage thus: "Matta found it expedient to repair to *Malik* Ramal, who was also called Bhatti."[33] "Ramal" and "Nirmal" here are both corruptions of Zābul.

When Chandar (661-668) sat on the throne of Sind, Matta, the disaffected chief of Siwistān, went to the king of Kanauj Sīharas son of Rāsal[34] and represented to him that the unworldly Chandar, whose "whole day is occupied in the study of his faith with other religious persons in the temple", could be easily overthrown, and induced him to attempt the conquest of Sind. The king of Kanauj then sent his brother Barhās son of Rāsil or Kasāīs[35] to Kashmir for help. A grandson of the great Chach (by his daughter) was then the king of Kashmir and Ramal. He is not named in the chronicle but from the confused account of the invasion it appears that his name probably was Rāsal or Rāsil.

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[30] *Studies*, I, 85.

[31] The satrapy of Siwistān, to the west of the Indus, included Būdhiya or (as the Arab geographers call it) Budah or Budha which is identified with modern Kachhi or Kachh Gandāva district in Baluchistan

[32] At other places (pp. 40, 43, 55, 157) Kalichbeg gives the designation of the country as "Ramal". Only at one place (p. 159) he treats "Ramal" as the name of the ruler.

[33] Elsewhere in Elliot (pp. 153, 154, 155, 175, 177) "Ramal" appears, without exception, as the designation of a country or kingdom.

[34] Kalichbeg writes the name as Sahīras son of Rāsil.

[35] Elliot gives the brother's name simply as "Barhās son of Kasāīs." The *Tuhfātu-l Kirām* refers to him as Basahis (Postan's Tr., *J.A.S.B.*, 1845, xiv, 82).

He was prevailed upon by Barhās to join the expedition. The allied armies advanced to Alor, but failed to take by assault the fort in which Chandar had taken up position. Rāsil then tried treachery, but it was discovered and he himself was taken prisoner. Later he was released on his giving hostages and vacating the forts seized by the allied armies during their march. That in brief is the account of the invasion in the *Chach-Nāma*. Very little is known about the history of Kanauj after the death of Harsha in 647 A.D. It is, therefore, not possible to identify Sīhiras son of Rāsil. The name, however, seems a corruption of "Śrī-Harsha Pratāpaśila", and it is not inconceivable that the author of the Arab chronicle assumed that Harsha was still reigning in Kanauj. Barhās son of Rāsil (or Kasāīs), described as the brother of the king of Kanauj, is unknown to Indian history. The king of Kashmir at this time was Pratāpāditya II (661-711 A.D.), son of Durlabhavardhana by his wife Anaṅgalekha, who was the daughter of Bālāditya, the last Gonanda ruler of Kashmir. The statement in the *Chach-Nāma* that he was the son of a daughter of the "great Chach" is indeed puzzling. Ramal of course is Zābul, but how and when that kingdom came to be ruled by the king of Kashmir we do not know.

The next reference to the kingdom of "Ramal" is in connection with the engagement of Chach's daughter, Bai, to "Sohan, king of Batiah, in the country of Ramal" (Kalichbeg, 43). Elliot (I, 154) gives the name of the suitor as "Sūban (var. Sūrīn), king of Bātia in the country of Ramal." The betrothal took place when Dharasiah and Dāhir ruled independently at Brahmanabad and Alor respectively. Dāhir, however, warned by the astrologers that her husband would become "king of Hind and Sind", himself took her to wife, though the marriage was not consummated. Though Sohan (Sūban) is described as the ruler of Bātia (Batiah) "in the country of Ramal", it is evident from a subsequent reference that the designation embraced the entire country. The relevant words in that reference (Elliot, I, 177) are "the country of Ramal, which is called Batiya". "Bhattī", "Bhettī", "Batiah", "Bātia" and "Batiya" are all variant readings of the other name by which the country or the kingdom of Zābul was then known. The correct form of that alternative designation appears to have been Bhattī. Confirmation of this is provided by the tradition of the Bhattī ruling house of Jaisalmer. The Bhattīs claim kinship with the Yadus or Yādavas, whom, says James Tod, "we trace from Gujni (Gazni), migrating eastward to Salpoora in the Punjab, and eventually with the progress of Islam, across the Sutlej to their present seats in the Indian desert... Yadu-Bhatti family thus claim Gujni as their ancient capital" (*Travels in Western India,* 464). In his *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan* (I, 101-2; 1920 ed.) he writes: "The Yadu was the most illustrious tribe of Ind, and became the patronymic of the descendants of Budha, progenitor of the Lunar (Indu) race. Yudhishthira and Baladeva, on the death of Krishna and their expulsion from Delhi and Dwaraka, the last stronghold of their power, retired by Multan across the Indus. The two first are abandoned by tradition; but the sons of Krishna, who accompanied them after an intermediate halt in the further Duab of the five rivers, eventually left the Indus behind, and *passed into Zabulistan, founded Gajni,* and peopled these countries even to Samarkand. The annals of Jaisalmer, which give this early history of their founder, mix up in a confused manner the cause of their being again driven back into India; so that it is impossible to say whether it was owing to the Greek princes who ruled all these countries for a century after Alexander, or to the rise of Islamism. Driven back on the Indus, they obtained possession of the Punjab and founded Salivahanpur, Thence expelled, they retired across the Sutlej and Ghara into the Indian deserts; whence expelling the Langahas, the Johiyas, Mohilas, etc., they founded successively Tanot, Derawar, and Jaisalmer in S. 1212 (A.D. 1155), the present capital of the Bhattis, the lineal successors of Krishna. *Bhatti was the exile from Zabulistan,* and as usual with the Rajput races on any such event in their annals, his name set aside the more ancient patronymic, Yadu". Cunningham, writing about the Bhattis many of whom are settled in the Punjab (*Archaeological Survey of India Report,* 1863-64, 20 and 151), observes: "According to the generally accepted tradition of the race, their *Yādava* ancestors occupied Gajni or Gajnipur, which is said to have been fortified by Raja Gaj or Gajpat, who reigned fourteen generations before Sālivāhan. The actual foundation of the city is placed twelve generations before Raja Gaj. Colonel Tod has identified this Gajnipur with the Ghazni of Afghanistan; but the true position would appear to be at Rawalpindi, where tradition places an ancient city named Gajnipur". Cunningham's identification of the

Ghazni of Yādava tradition with "a small village named Gajni", 3 miles to the north of Rawalpindi, is obviously incorrect, as shown by the *Chach-Nāma.*

The *Chach-Nāma* records a still another invasion of Sind by the ruler of Zābulistan. That was in or about the year 707 A.D. when Dāhir ruled over the entire kingdom. "Seeing Dāhir's rise", the chronicle states, "the king of Ramal, one of the neighbouring princes, became jealous of his power... He invaded the country with a large army consisting of brave cavalry and infantry, great warriors and furious elephants. He came in the direction of Būdhiah, camped in the outskirts of it, took possession of that part of the country. From there he crossed the river and came direct to Alor." (Kalichbeg, 55). The fact that the enemy came *via* Būdhiya and crossed the Indus to reach Alor also supports the identification of Ramal with Zābul. Aided and advised by one Muhammad Allafī, who with a band of 500 Arab followers had escaped to Sind and taken service in the Sind army, Dāhir defeated the enemy and took 80,000 prisoners and 50 elephants. In the brief notice of this invasion by Elliot (I, 155) the "Chiefs of Ramal" are designated as the invaders. "*Malūk*" (chiefs) in his manuscript is clearly a mistake for "*Malīk*" (king), as the narrative expressly mentions that the Allafī Arabs together with the Sind royal guards made a surprise night attack on "the camp of the king of Ramal".

The *Tuhfātu-l Kirām,* composed in the second half of the eighteenth century, designates the invader "Rahee Ra Mal, governor of *Kanauj*" and later as "Ran Mal".[36] The *Bahawalpur State Gazetteer* (p. 28n) contains the remark that Dāhir, in A. H. 81, "repulsed an invasion by Ranmal, governor of Kāmarājya, a province of Kashmir, with the aid of the Arabs", but no authority of an earlier date is referred to for that statement. Zābul (turned into Ramal or Ranmal by the scribes) was, as we have seen, a territorial designation. That name apparently ceased to be used after Ghazni came into prominence with the rise of the Ghaznavids in the tenth century. The chroniclers of later times puzzled by the terms Ramal and Ranmal in the earlier authorities, seem to have assumed these to be the names of persons—many Hindu names end in *mal*—and connected them with either Kanauj or Kashmir, the two kingdoms on the borders of Sind with which they were familiar. That appears to be the only possible explanation for these curious statements diverging from the almost contemporary account of the invasion in the *Chach-Nāma*.

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[36] Postan's translation, *J.A.S.B.*, 1845, XIV, 83. In the Sindhi edition of the *Tuhfātu-l Kirām,* published in 1957, the invader is referred to as "the ruler of Kanauj, Raja Ran Mal."

The last reference to Zābul in the *Chach-Nāma* is connected with Muhammad Kāsim's campaigns in Sind. After the defeat and death of Dāhir at the battle of Rāwar in June 712 A.D., his son Jaisiya[37] carried on resistance against the enemy. The chronicle records that "Jaisiya, who had fled to the *country of Ramal*, which is called Bātiya, came back from that place, infested the roads, and distressed the Muhammadan army" (Elliot, I, 177). Kalichbeg (p. 159), however, took "Ramal" here to be the name of a ruler, and rendered the passage: "Jaisiah had shifted to the *country ruled by king Ramal,* called Bātiah, and from there used to harass the army of Islam and rob them on the highways." The inconsistencies in his texts in regard to the term "Ramal" scarcely seem to have bothered him.

Muhammad Kāsim, after the capture of Alor, marched towards Multan which at the time was held by Kundrāi (or Gūrsiya), son of Chandar and cousin to Dāhir. Multan fell to the Muslims after severe fighting lasting for two months. From there the Arab conqueror advanced with his army to the boundary of Kashmir. We learn from the Annals of the T'ang dynasty that in 713 A.D. Chin-to-lo-pi-li, the king of Kashmir, who is identified with Chandrāpīḍa (711-719), applied to the Chinese Emperor for aid against the Arabs who had advanced to the foot of the Kashmir hills.[38]

The *Chach-Nāma* relates that Muhammad Kāsim dispatched an envoy "at the head of ten thousand horse towards Kanauj, to convey a letter from the Khalīfa, and with instructions to invite the Chief to embrace Muhammadanism, to send tribute, and make his submission" (Elliot, I, 207). Rai Har Chandar son of Jahtal (or Jahshal),[39] the king of Kanauj, amazed at the presumption of Muhammad Kāsim, summarily dismissed the envoy with a message for his master that Kanauj would fight to the last to preserve its independence. Before Muhammad Kasīm could declare war on the "cursed infidel", he was recalled, tortured and killed by the new governor of Iraq, between whom and Hajjāj (cousin and father-in-law of Muhammad Kāsim) there was a blood feud.[40] The romantic story of his death given in the *Chach-Nāma* is no doubt fictitious. Curiously an exactly similar legendary story is told of one Kasim Pīr, belonging to the fourteenth century, whose tomb is at Āmāra in Cutch (*Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, V,* 249; *Bombay Govt. Selections,* CLII, N.S., 28-9). Apart from what the *Chach-Nāma* records about Har Chandar or Hari Chand of Kanauj, the contemporary of Muhammad Kāsim, we have no other information. The history of Kanauj after Harsha's death in 647 A.D., till the rise of Yaśovarman (c. 725-753) is practically unknown. The intervening three-quarters of a century witnessed political disintegration and rise of ambitious chiefs who scrambled for the inheritance of the vast empire of Harsha, but we have no precise information about these developments. All that can be surmised is that Har Chandar must have been the immediate predecessor of Yaśovarman on the throne of Kanauj.

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[37] The name is an obvious corruption of Jaisinha. He was so named as his birth coincided with Dāhir slaying a lion at great risk to his own life. (Kalichbeg, 185-6).

[38] Cunningham, *Anc. Geo.*, 91; Bamzai, *History of Kashmir*, 110.

APPENDIX

Kanauj *versus* Kinnauj

According to Raverty, the passages in the *Chach-Nāma* which Elliot translated as referring to Kanauj are really concerned with *Kinnauj,* a dependency of Multan which "adjoined the latter territory on the east and included a part of the present Bikaner state" ("The Mihran of Sind", *J.A.S.B.,* lxi, 207, 208, 254; *Notes on Afghanistan,* 505, 566, 571). Raverty's view, which he based on

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[39] Abul Fazl, whose brief account of the Arab conquest of Sind is apparently based on the *Chach-Nāma,* gives the name of the king of Kanauj as "Hari Chand"—*Aīn-i-Akbari,* 345.

[40] *Futūh-l Buldān* of Al Bilāduri (Elliot, I, 124); The *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* IV, 433-4; *The Cambridge History of India,* III, 7.

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certain statements made by the tenth-century Arab traveller Masūdī in his *Murūju-l Zahab,* is entirely untenable. Vincent Smith (*J.R.A.S.*, 1908, 775) surprisingly adopted Raverty's view without discussion and inserted a corrigenda to that effect in his *Early History of India* (4th ed., 369 n). It does not appear to have bothered these two scholars that *Kinnauj,* either as a place or as a district, is entirely unknown.

Multan, according to the *Chach-Nāma,* was one of the four satrapies of the Hindu kingdom of Sind—they were in fact feudatory states—and nowhere does that chronicle suggest that Kanauj or Kinnauj (as Raverty reads it) was a dependency of Multan. The references to Kanauj in the *Chach-Nāma* clearly relate to the celebrated kingdom of Harsha and his successors. Its sovereign is styled as *"the king of Hindustān, that is, Kanauj"*, to whom the feudatory of Brahmanabad appealed for help when besieged by the armies of Chach (Elliot, I, 147). Nor Sīharas son of Rāsal, described as "the king of Kanauj", who invaded Sind, in the time of Chandar (661-68 A.D.), could have been the ruler of a petty dependency of Multan. The *Chach-Nāma* prefaces this reference to Kanauj with the remark, which is significant, that, at the time, "the country of Hindustan was in a flourishing condition" (*Ibid.*, 153). Dowson, not finding any name corresponding to Sīharas s/o Rāsal in the genealogical tables of the Kanauj dynasty in Prinsep's *Essays on Indian Antiquities* (II, 258), remarked that the "prince of some other and nearer place than the great Kanauj is really intended", but that suggestion is not warranted. The history of Kanauj for a long time after the death of Harsha (647 A.D.) is unknown, and Prinsep's tables are naturally, therefore, incomplete. Rai Har Chandar who, in 715 A.D., defied the Arab conqueror of Sind also could not have been merely the petty chief of a dependency of Multan (Elliot, I, 208).

Masūdī's confused references to Kanauj also relate to the great Kanauj famous in Indian history, though Sprenger in his translation,[41] contrary to the Indian mode of pronouncing and spelling

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[41] *Meadows of Gold and Mines of Gems.* Elliot correctly writes the name as Kanauj; Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille in their French translation *Les Prairies D'or* write it as *Kanoudj.*

यह पुस्तक वितरित न की जाय
NOT TO BE ISSUED

that name, transcribed it *Kinnauj*. Kanauj even in the tenth century, was a powerful Hindu kingdom in no way subject to the Muslim state of Multan. This is what the Arab traveller himself writes: "One of the neighbouring kings of India, who is far from the sea, is the Bauüra, who is lord of the city of Kanauj. This is the title given to all the sovereigns of that kingdom. He has large armies in garrisons on the north and on the south, on the east and on the west, for he is surrounded on all sides by warlike kings. Each of them numbers 700,000 or 900,000 men. The army of the north wars against the prince of Multán, and with the Mussulmans, his subjects, on the frontier. The army of the south fights against the Balharā, king of Mānkir. The other two armies march to meet enemies in every direction" (Elliot, I, 21, 23). The Balharās are identified with the Rāshṭrakūṭas of the Deccan who, like their Chālukyan predecessors, styled themselves "Vallabha", and Mānkir represents their capital Mānkhed or Mānyakheta, 60 miles to the south-east of Sholapur (R. G. Bhandarkar, *Early History of the Dekkan*, 134; Dey, *Geo. Dic.*, 126; Hodivala, I, 22; *I. A.*, vi, 64). The title *Bauüra* of the kings of Kanauj, no doubt, presents a problem. Sprenger (p. 193) gives it as *Barudah* with the remark that elsewhere in the manuscript "the title of this king is clearly written as *Budah.*" Raverty (*Mihran*, 206) also transcribes it *Budah*. Hodivala (I, 25) notes: "The right reading seems to be Bozah, Bozoh or Bodzah i.e., *Bhoja*. Bhoja the Great ruled at Qanauj from c. 840-890 A.D. His dominions were very extensive; his power was acknowledged up to the Vindhyās from sea to sea and he is also known to have conquered his formidable foe, the king of Bengal. He was succeeded by Mahendrapāla (890-910 A.D.), and he, by *another Bhoja* who died after a short reign and was succeeded by his half-brother Mahipalā, who ruled from about 910-940 A.D. Masūdī's statement that the title was common to all the kings of Qanauj is probably due to the fact that Bhoja the Great was succeeded, after some years, by another prince of the same name, who had been ruling shortly before the time of Masūdī's arrival (916 A.D.) in India". That explanation is neither far-fetched nor unreasonable.

I come now to the two passages in Masūdī relied on by Raverty, who of course reads Kanauj as *Kinnauj*. This is how he himself translates one of these passages: "The Malik of *Kinnauj* who is one of the Maliks of Sind is Budah, which is the title of the Maliks of *Kinnauj*. There is likewise a town called by this name, and it is at present within the pale of Islam, and is among the dependencies of Multan." (*Mihran* 206-7). Masūdī's reference to the king of Kanauj as one of the kings of Sind is no doubt intriguing, but it may perhaps be explained by the fact that Arab writers use the term Sind in a vague sense, as opposed to Hind, to designate the whole of North-west India including Kashmir, Kandāhar, Punjab and Sind.[42] Thāneswar, the ancestral state of Harsha, which he incorporated in his empire, was in eastern Punjab, and it very probably continued to be part of the kingdom of Kanauj under the Pratihāras. As explained by Hodivala, Masūdī failed to distinguish between *Bhoja*, which he understood to be the title of the kings of Kanauj, and *Budah* the name of the district to the west of the Indus which, in his time, was a dependency of the Muslim state of Multan. That is responsible for his confused statement discussed above and another to which I will presently refer. Budah is the same which is frequently mentioned as Būdhiya in the *Chach-Nāma*. In the other passage, as translated by Elliot (I, 21), Masūdī informs us that the Indus comes from "the highlands of Sind, from the country belonging to Kanauj in the kingdom of Bauüra (Budah), and from Kashmir, Kandahār, etc." Here also Masūdī confuses Budah with Bhoja, and hence the statement that Indus flows through the kingdom of Kanauj. Kanauj at that time could not, in my opinion, have possessed any territory in north-west Punjab which was in Muslim hands.[43] Nor was Kanauj (Raverty's Kinnauj), at any time, either before or after the Arab conquest of Sind, "a dependency of Multan."

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[42] Masūdī, for instance, refers to the king of Kandahār as one of the kings of Sind (Elliot, I, 22) and describes Kashmir as "situated in the mountains of es-Sind" (Sprenger, 382).

[43] R. C. Majumdar takes Bauüra to be the Arabic corruption of Pratihāra or its Prākrit form Pradihāra, and relying on the two passages discussed above concludes that the empire of the Pratihāra kings of Kanauj "must have included portions of the Punjab"—(*Journal of the Department of letters*, Calcutta University, X, 65).

Garuda of Vishnu

BY

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Vishṇu riding his vehicle, *Garuḍa,* a mythical bird, is a very familiar theme in Indian art. It has its roots buried deep in the Vedic lore. The tradition, unbroken throughout the ages, is very much alive to this day, both in India and in the lands and islands, specially of South-East Asia, that came under the influence of Indo-Aryan culture during the early centuries of Christian era. At home, this particular art motif has all along been very popular in every nook and corner of the country, and is prevalent in every conceivable medium: stone, wood, metal, ivory, etc., besides paintings. There is an endless variety of treatment of this simple theme, each pleasing in its own way, redounding to the credit of the concerned artist, aglow, at the same time, with his religious fervour.

Attention paid to the *vāhana,* the bird Garuḍa, in some representations, far exceeds that bestowed on the divine rider, Lord Vishṇu. Anyway, Garuḍa very often figures very prominently in the artistic compositions with Vishṇu as the central figure. In fact, there are cases where Garuḍa alone is shown, while the holy association of the god Vishṇu is only to be inferred. Recently I came across two metal images which illustrate the point. In one (Fig. 1), Garuḍa appears in human form, except for the claws or claw-like feet below the stumpy legs. He has four hands, the two front ones in *añjali mudrā,* are held before the chest, while the back two are each clutching a cobra. The chubby oval face of Garuḍa wears a broad smile. His aquiline nose is as conspicuous as his goggle eyes, chin and cheeks are. He wears his hair like a wig, in tresses, flanking his upper body. He also wears ornaments like necklace and bangles. The most striking feature of this figure is the tail spread fanwise, like that of a peacock, forming a large *prabhāmaṇḍala,* as it were, at the back, the treatment of feathers being realistic. From the shaft rising from the middle, at the back, ending in a floral design, it appears that the object was originally hung or suspended at a place of worship or formed part of a portable miniature metal temple wherein Vishṇu was placed as the main deity. It is also possible that the shaft supported an image of Vishṇu. The piece stands about five inches high. I happened to see it with an antique-dealer, Mr. S. C. Batra of New Delhi, to whom it had been offered for purchase. From the style, it at first appeared to be of Gupta age, but a closer examination showed that it could hardly be over a hundred years old.

The other metal figure which I happened to inspect is in three pieces: four-armed Vishṇu, the bird Garuḍa, the former riding the latter, and a round pedestal, fitting into each other as one whole, measuring from base to top about one foot (Fig 2). This was purchased by one Mr. E. Parl Welch of Crestview, California, from an antique shop in the Ashoka Hotel at New Delhi. This also looks old, but is in reality a comparatively late piece, less than a hundred years old. The child-like serene crowned figure of four-armed Vishṇu, holding his most common emblems *gadā, chakra, padma* and *śaṅkha* is in sharp contrast with the ferocious-looking and aggressive figure of Garuḍa, with a monster's head, outstretched human arms and spread-out wings. The treatment of wings is very realistic in its own way. The wig of Garuḍa is here replaced by hair rising like flames behind the head. The delineation of Garuḍa in this composition is decidedly more eye-catching than that of his master, Lord Vishṇu.

This figure is strongly reminiscent of the famous Deogarh panel of the Gupta period, depicting Gajendramoksha episode (Fig. 3). The proper balance and restraint shown by the artist here is truly characteristic of the art of the period. Mark the dignified posture of Vishṇu on the back of the flying-down Garuḍa. Here, as in the foregoing instance, Garuḍa is shown as wearing a snake-necklace. Mark also the traditional wig of Garuḍa in the present case.

Garuḍa is shown again as occupying a very prominent place in another panel at Deogarh itself, namely the one depicting Vishṇu as Anantaśāyin (Fig. 4). He is shown as 'sleeping on the seven-hooded cosmic serpent Śesha forming a canopy over him. Lakshmī, sitting at the feet of Vishṇu, is shampooing his



FIG. 1. Garuḍa in human form



FIG. 2. Four-armed Vishṇu & Garuḍa



FIG. 3. Deogarh. Gajendra Moksha



FIG. 4. Deogarh. Śeshasayi Vishṇu



FIG. 5. Nālandā. Seal of Kumāragupta

right leg. Behind her is Bhūdevī holding a *chāmara* (*chauri*), next stands Garuḍa in reverential mood holding in his left hand the hood of a snake coiled round his neck and with the right planted on the hip.'[1] The position of Garuḍa as shown here, being next to the two consorts of the Lord, Lakshmī and Bhūdevī, is more elevated than that accorded to the weapons of the Lord, shown in the same panel, on the lowermost band, in their personified forms as human beings: Kaumodakī, Sudarśana, Śārṅga and Nandaka.[2]

Instances of Garuḍa appearing alone carrying the authority and sanctity of his master, the god Vishṇu, are known from seals, tokens, coins, etc., mostly belonging to the Gupta period. The Guptas, it may be recalled, were zealous devotees of Lord Vishṇu, and, as such, they styled themselves *Paramabhāgavatas.* The famous Allahabad stone-pillar inscription of Samudragupta, recounting his military exploits, has a significant expression, *garutmadaṅka*, which Fleet has rendered as 'Garuḍa-tokens.' According to him, these were either 'coins or banners bearing representations of Garuḍa,' and 'were given by feudatories to Samudragupta' as tributes.[3] Whatever the exact significance, the term does refer to an object bearing a likeness of Vishṇu's vehicle, Garuḍa. In this connection, it is worth remembering that the seals of the Gupta monarchs as well as those of some of their feudatories do have a Garuḍa emblem very prominently displayed on them. The seal attached to the Gaya copper charter of Samudragupta, for instance, has 'at the top, Garuḍa, represented as a bird, standing to the front, with outstretched wings.'[4] Likewise, the seal affixed to the Rājim copper charter of Tīvaradeva, shows 'a figure of Garuḍa, facing full-front depicted with the head of a man and the body of a bird, with his wings expanded, with, apparently, human arms hanging down between the wings and the feet, and with a serpent, with expanded hood, standing up in front of and over each shoulder.'[5]

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[1] M. S. Vats, *The Gupta Temple at Deogarh,* No. 70 of the *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India,* p. 14, Plate X, b. The mistaken identification of Garuḍa here by Gopinatha Rao has been rightly pointed out by Vats, p. 15, footnote 1.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 15. The first one, *gadā* or 'mace', being in the feminine gender, is shown as a lady. These weapons are traditionally called *āyudhapurushas.*

[3] *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum,* Vol. III (*Inscriptions of the Early Gupta Kings and their Successors*), Calcutta, 1888, p. 8 text line 24, p. 14 and footnote 3, and in the Index, p. 313 under *Garuḍa.*

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 255, Pl. XXVII.

By far the most imposing specimen of this type of Gupta seals is perhaps the Bhitari metal seal of Kumāragupta II, son of Narasiṁhagupta and Mitradevī. Mr. V. A. Smith's description of the device on it runs as follows: "The upper section of the face of the seal, being slightly less than one half of the surface, is occupied by a quaint figure of the mythical monster Garuḍa, executed in tolerably high relief. He is represented standing on a base composed of two parallel lines, facing front, with outspread wings. His face is that of a man, broad and full, with thick lips. His hair is arranged exactly like the wig of an English Judge. A snake is twined round his neck, its head projecting above his left shoulder."[6]

Strangely enough, among the numerous baked clay sealings discovered subsequently at Nālandā are some that contain impressions of a seal almost exactly similar to that of Bhitari just described. One of them is nearly complete (Fig. 5), while the rest are fragmentary. These clay sealings have been published by Dr. Hirananda Sastri.[7]

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 292, Pl. XLV.

[6] *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol. LVIII, Part I, 1889, p. 85.

[7] *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 66 (*Nalanda and its Epigrphical Material*), Calcutta, 1942, pp. 64 ff. Plate VIII.

The Early Buddhist Elite

BY

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It is now generally accepted that early Buddhism began as a monastic movement and gradually developed into a *religion* with a following which included not only monks and nuns but also laymen and laywomen. This transformation occurred over a considerable period of time and it took final shape only during the age of Aśoka. In this interval of time two changes were taking place within Buddhism. One was the development in dogma and practice.[1] The other was its extension outside of its original homeland comprising the Magadhan lands into areas of central and western India. In this work of the development of Buddhism as a philosophical creed as well as a religion of the masses of people an elite group played a leading role. Information on this group is scattered through the various works of the Pāli Canon, and more specifically the *Thera* and *Therī Gāthās,* and the present paper aims at collating all such information and analysing it to examine the regional and social background of this elite group.

The period under study may conveniently begin with 500 B.C. and end around 250 B.C. The *terminum ad quo* is based on the acceptance of 486 B.C. as the date of the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa.*[2] The *terminum ad quem* is established by the fact that Vītāśoka and Tissakumara, two of Aśoka's sons are included in the *Thera Gāthā,* one of the major sources for this study.[3] This is a period of some

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[1] For details of the development of Buddhism as a religion see the author's *Buddhism and Asoka,* (Baroda, 1949), Pp. 22 ff

[2] See R. C. Majumdar and A. D. Pusalkar (Edrs.), *The Age of Imperial Unity,* (Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1951), p. 36; also Madan Mohan Singh, "The Date of Buddha Nirvana", *Journal of Indian History,* XXXIX, iii, December 1961, pp. 359-363; P. H. L. Eggermont, *The Chronology of the Reign of Asoka Moriya,* (Leiden, 1962), pp. 142-143.

[3] See the verses attributed to Vītasoka verses 169-170 and Ekavihariya verses 537-546 in the *Thera Gāthā,*

250 years. It may be unreasonable to assume that during this long period the Buddhist elite remained fixed in their social and philosophical characteristics and attitudes. What seems to be obvious, however, is that this elite group became already fixed within almost half a century after the Buddha's passing away and the later additions are too few to substantially alter the character of the majority of this group belonging to only a generation of the Buddha's followers. This is also indicated by the geographical distribution of this elite leadership as will be seen later.

II

We may begin with the question, what constituted an elite? The criteria adopted are two-fold. In the first instance the person's intellectual, spiritual attainments and/or organizational skills would be the most obvious qualifications for his inclusion among the elite. Such is the case with Sāriputta and Moggallāna, Ānanda and Upāli, Mahākassapa and Rāhula, Mahāpajāpati Gotami, Paṭācārā and Dhammadinnā. The other is the attribution of an elite status to the person either by the Buddha himself or some of his eminent disciples or the redactors of the Pāli Canon who thought it fit to include information on them or their utterances in parts of the Pāli Canon.

The present list of 332 individuals is drawn mainly from the *Thera* and *Therī Gāthā*. These two works purport to preserve statements of personal views and spiritual experiences of the monks and nuns whose personalities and contributions were considered to be significant enough to be remembered by posterity. The personal details, however, are very meagre and additional information must be sought from the commentary, the *Paramatthadīpanī* ascribed to Dhammapāla, a scholar from Kānchī who lived later than the celebrated Buddhaghosa ascribed to the first half of the 5th century A.D.[4] The Commentary is of a date much later than the *Gāthās* and hence some of the details presented in it are obviously suspect. However, the work preserves, in a substantial part, traditions of a much earlier age and may be accepted as a reasonably authoritative text for parts of the biographical tradition concerning the person mentioned in the *Gāthās*.

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[4] See B. C. Law, *The Life and Work of Buddhaghosa* (Calcutta, Thacker, Spink & Co., 1923), pp. 9-11.

The *Gāthās* give us a list of some 332 individuals of whom 261 are monks and 71 nuns. Another list of an elite group is preserved in the *Anguttara Nikāya*[5] and is ascribed to the Buddha himself. It mentions 41 monks and 12 nuns recognized as outstanding leaders. With the exception of 1 monk and 1 nun the rest are found in the *Gāthā* list. The monk and nun not included in the *Gāthā* list are Bāhiya Dāruciriya and Sigālamātā. Bāhiya died during the Buddha's lifetime and hence could not have contributed much to the spread and organization of the Faith. Sigālamātā belonged to a rich merchant's family of the Rājagaha and was the mother of Sigāla to whom was addressed the well-known *Sigālovāda Sutta*.[6]

III

The following analysis is concerned with three major lines of inquiry, regional distribution, social origins and reasons of conversion. Buddhism began its early career in Magadha (including the Kosalan regions) and gradually spread to parts of northern, central and western India. This expansion was mainly the work of the elite group and an examination of the regional distribution reveals, to a certain extent, this process of expansion. Secondly, an analysis of the social background of the elite prior to their conversion helps us understand the extent of the appeal of Early Buddhism to various social groups. Finally reasons of conversion provide a clue to the motivation influencing profound changes in the life of the elite.

Regional Distribution: Of the 332 individuals we do not know the regional origins of 21 monks and 3 nuns. Among the 308, whose regional affiliations before conversion are known, 220 or over 71% (165 monks and 55 nuns) came from what may be described as urban areas. Some 88 or over 28% (75 monks and 13 nuns) belonged to the countryside or rural areas. Furthermore, some 189 or nearly 86% came from four cities, Sāvatthi, Rājagaha, Kapilavatthu and Vesāli. Of the other cities 6 belonged to Sāketa; Kosambi, Banaras and Ujjeni contributed 5 each, 4 belonged to Champā, 3 to Pāṭaliputra, 2 to Bharukaccha and 1 to

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[5] *Anguttara Nikāya*, edited by Morris (London, Pali Text Society, 1885), I, pp. 23-26; 88.

[6] See *Dīgha Nikāya*, edited by Rhys Davids and Carpenter (London, Pali Text Society, 1890-1911), III, pp. 180-193.

Suppāraka. This shows a heavy concentration of the elite group in the old homeland namely, the Magadhan area. This is not difficult to understand since a majority of the elite group were contemporaries of the Buddha and nearly all of the Buddha's work was confined to the Magadhan area. It also indicates the fact that the formation of the elite group, recognized as such in the Canonical literature in Pāli, came to a virtual end within half a century after the Buddha's demise.

Similar facts are revealed in the distribution of the rural group. Of the 85 persons known to have hailed from rural areas some 65 or over 76% came from Magadha and adjoining areas (Magadha, Kosala and Malla countries), 9 (7 monks and 2 nuns) belonged to Border areas (presumably the sparsely inhabited tribal areas), 5 (all monks) came from the Avanti region, 2 (both monks from the Kuru country, 1 each (all monks) from the Sākyan, Kolian and Himalayan areas and Sunaparanta.

The Early Buddhist elite group thus, belonged substantially to Magadha and adjoining areas, and it was largely urban. This may have been due to either the Buddha spending more time in the urban as against rural areas or that the urban elements were better qualified intellectually and otherwise, to be recognized as an elite even in an equalitarian society of "homeless wanderers" such as the Buddhist Saṃgha. This is confirmed by information given in the *Nikāyas* as most of the sermons of the Buddha preserved in the Pāli canon were delivered in large cities like Rājagaha, Sāvatthi and Kosambī. But these were the cities where the Buddha spent most of his rain-retreats (*vassa*) whereas he was supposed to have spent the rest of the year (8 months) going from place to place. The Buddha's journeys in the dry parts of the year must have taken him frequently into the rural areas where he must have made many conversions. Many of these conversions, however, failed to figure in the elite group.

But a few from among these rural elite became outstanding leaders like Sāriputta and Moggallāna.[7] A large number chose to live in the rural areas as they were either *samaṇas* or *paribbājakas* of non-Buddhist persuasions who were converted to Buddhism.

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[7] Sāriputta was a native of a village (variously described as Upatissa or Nāḷaka) and his 3 younger brothers and 3 sisters all joined the Order. *Paramatthadīpanī* edited by Woodward, (P. T. S., London, 1940), II, Pp. 93 ff; Moggallāna was born in a village called Kolita near Rājagaha, *Ibid.*, I Pp. 84 ff.

Social origins: Of the 332 persons included in our list we do not know social origins of 4 (3 monks and 1 nun). Of the rest, 134 or 40·8% (117 monks and 17 nuns) belonged to the Brāhmaṇa caste, 98 or over 29% (74 monks and 24 nuns) belonged to the *Gahapati* or Vessa group, 75 or over 22% (53 monks) and 22 nuns) were members of the Khattiya order, 11 (7 monks and 4 nuns) came from the Sudda class and 10 (7 monks and 3 nuns) may be described as belonging to the degraded classes of contemporary society.

Going a little deeper into the social background of these elite, we find that among the 134 Brāhmaṇas, 27 belonged to families called Brahmaṇa *mahāsālas* or wealthy Brahmaṇas. Of the 75 Khattiyas 4 belonged to Khattiya *mahāsāla* families and as many as 59 to *Rājakulas* or families possessing political power in various degrees ranging from ruling families to petty officials. Of the 98 vessas, 24 were *Gahapati mahāsālas* and 43 *Seṭṭhis*, or families of leading merchants and bankers. This gives us a total of 157 or over 47% of the total group belonging to the upper strata of society.

Two interesting facts emerge from these statistics. One is that the elite group was overwhelmingly upper caste in social composition. Of the three traditional upper castes Brāhmaṇas were in a majority, the Vessas came second and the Khattiyas third. Whereas among the Brāhmaṇas nearly 80%, (107 in number out of 134) belonged to common Brāhmaṇa families the proportion is exactly the reverse among the Khattiyas (10 out of 75 belonged to common Khattiya families).. The proportion is a little better among the Vessas where 31 belonged to common *Gahapati* families, 24 belonged to the *Gahapati mahāsāla* group and 43 belonged to *Seṭṭhi* families. This leads us to the second conclusion that richer elements dominated in the elite group.

This is quite different from what we would expect from the common characterization of Buddhism as a movement anti-Brāhmaṇa in spirit and appealing more to the poorer and degraded sections of the population because of its message of equality of spiritual opportunities for all. Such a characterization may be true to an extent in the case of the ordinary following but, as our statistics show, not in the case of membership of the elite group. If these statistics have any meaning we may have to modify somewhat our description of Buddhism in its attitude to the Brāhmaṇa group.

Now about the Brāhmaṇas, the Pāli texts consistently distinguish *Brāhmaṇas* from *Brahmabandhus.* There is a whole *vagga* devoted to the description of an ideal Brāhmaṇa in the *Dhammapada* and the transformation of a *Brahmabandhu* from being a mere Brāhmaṇa is poignantly referred to in many cases.[8] The Buddha, it seems to us, was opposed more to Brāhmaṇa sacerdotalism and priesthood than to the Brāhmaṇa as a class or caste. The Brāhmaṇas were heir to a tradition of keen intellectuality and earnest spiritual speculation and, on their conversion, these qualities of theirs would naturally place them in an advantageous position in the elite group. The Buddha simply recognized this social reality and accepted his ex-Brāhmaṇa followers, like Sāriputta and Moggallana, Aññā Kondañña and Vaṅgisa, Mahā Kaccāna and Mahā Kassapa, as members of the Buddhist elite group. These Brāhmaṇas brought their intellectual qualities to the new faith and gave it a prestige which must have substantially helped it challenge the claims of learning and piety of the sacerdotal Brāhmaṇa tradition.

The predominance of Khattiyas belonging to the ruling or wealthy families is another feature that needs some explanation. Buddhism was, at least in the beginning, primarily a Khattiya movement of protest against Brahmanical sacerdotalism. In our elite group of 75 Khattiyas, 63 belonged to the upper class families and only 12 were members of the common Khattiya group. Among the upper class Khattiyas members of the Sākya clan dominated and this should cause no surprise. Of the 59 members (40 monks and 19 nuns) belonging to what are called *Rājakulas* as many as 28 (14 monks and 14 nuns) belonged to the Sākya tribe. The Licchavīs contributed 6 (4 monks and 2 nuns), the Mallas (all monks) gave 6 and the Kolis 1 (monk) to the elite group. The oligarchic tribes contributed, from among their ruling families, as many as 41 out of 59 of the elite. The reason for such heavy representation may be the fact that the Buddha was himself a Sākyan, and a scion of the republican oligarchies, and it was natural, therefore, for his close relations like his son Rāhula and cousin Ānanda, apart from their own intellectual and spiritual qualifications, to assume leadership. Another reason may be the general crisis with which the oligarchies were confronted by the expansion of the great monarchies like those of Kosala and Magadha which made some of the leading personages seek an "escape" into the *Saṃgha*. Among the other royal families represented in the eliite group we have one member of the Bimbisārid and 2 from the Maurya dynasty.[9]

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[8] See *The Sutta Nipāta* edited by Anderson and Smith (London, Pali Text Society, 1913), p. 54.

The large number of *Seṭṭhis* (43) also calls for some explanation. We saw earlier that the Vessas contributed as many as 98 members to the elite group as against 134 Brāhmaṇas, the largest single group. Of these 98, 43 were *Seṭṭhis* and 24 belonged to *Gahapati mahāsāla* families. This large number belonging to the wealthy Vessa classes naturally reflects the general situation wherein Buddhism received enthusiastic support from the trading and mercantile classes. Now why should persons belonging to some of the richest families in the region give up their vocations and families and join the Buddhist order in such large numbers? The reasons seem to be complex and among them we might suggest the fact that with joining the order came an opportunity for spiritual leadership, a possibility presumably remote for them in sacerdotal Brahmanism and that membership of the Order had already become a "status symbol". If this be true then we must conclude that, though the Vessas, ~~as members~~ of the twice-born castes, were entitled to learn the Vedic lore the opportunities for intellectual advancement for them in that area had practically ended by the time Buddhism appeared on the scene. Also the elaborate ritual involved in Brahmanical religion had begun to appear meaningless to many of the Vessas to whom Buddhism opened a new dimension of spiritual thought and effort.

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[9] Abhaya, son of Bimbisāra, Ekavihāriya and Vītasoka, sons of Asoka. Strangely enough Mahinda, another son (or brother according to northern Buddhist tradition) and Sanghamittā, daughter of Asoka, do not figure in the elite list probably because the Canon was already closed by the time they began their ministry.

Finally, the small number of Suddas and members who came from families described as degraded castes need not appear strange at all. There are 11 Suddas and 10 degraded castes represented in the elite group. The greatest of these was Upālī, an ex-barber who became an authority in *Vinaya* or Rules of monastic discipline. In general however, it must have been difficult for the lower classes to join the order in large numbers and much more difficult to secure a position among the elite, the intentions of the Buddha to encourage the lowest and the lowly notwithstanding.

Reasons for conversions : Conversion to a faith is a complex process in which several factors are involved. However, it is possible to speak of one dominant factor which finally tipped the scales in favour of conversion of the subject from one set of beliefs and opinions to another. Excluding 13 cases where the precise reason for conversion is unknown members of our elite group are always stated to recall when the conversion occurred and what the most memorable factor in the process was.

These reasons may be classified under descriptive headings such as (1) impact of the personality of the Buddha, (2) impact of the personality of one or more of his leading disciples, (3) influence of prominent lay disciples, (4) domestic difficulties and personal tragedies and (5) intellectual reasons. Of the 319 known causes, 139 or over 43% (120 monks and 19 nuns) conversions were due to the impact of the personality of the Buddha, 77 or more than 24% (55 monks and 22 nuns) were due to the disciples, 18 (10 monks and 8 nuns) were due to the influence of relatives, 5 (4 monks and 1 nun) were caused by persuasion by lay disciples, 41 or over 12% (29 monks and 12 nuns) were due to domestic difficulties and 39 or over 12% (37 monks and 2 nuns) were occasioned by intellectual dissatisfaction with existing beliefs and opinions.

Among these conversions the largest single contributory factor seems to be the influence of the personality of the Buddha. Some of the leading disciples like Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Ānanda and Mahā Kassapa, were responsible for converting the next large group. Domestic difficulties, like ill-treatment by a husband or mother-in-law or harassment by superiors, would easily induce a person to seek an escape into the sheltered life of the monastery but the number of elite in such a group is not overly large. The most interesting group seems to be the one that attributes its conversion to intellectual conviction and change and among them are to be found some of the most outstanding of the elite such as Sāriputta and Moggallāna. Many of these had already adopted the life of ascetics and had undertaken a serious study of philosophy. As in the case of the Buddha himself these disciples did not find the satisfaction they were seeking in the philosophies they had studied. A confrontation with the Buddha and his intellectual appeal were enough in these cases to induce these people to discard their old opinions and enthusiastically accept the new persuasion.

This raises the question of the respective roles of emotion and intellect as factors dominant in the conversion process of the elite. Personal influence of the Buddha and his disciples certainly seems to have affected many people, accounting for as many as 216 or over 67% of the total number of conversions. These individuals were intellectually alert but their full intellectual and spiritual development occurred only after conversion. And even where reasons stated are the Buddha's influence or the influence of some of his leading disciples care is always taken to indicate that the members concerned were intellectually convinced of the truth of the Buddhist position.[10] And if we analyse the meaning of the terms "influence of the Buddha" it appears that two characteristics attributed to the Buddha made the deepest impression and these were his compassion (*karuṇā*) and his intellect (*paññā*), the two basic postulates of the Buddhist Creed.[11]

Then there are a few reasons which are interesting in themselves. There were some who were attracted by the material comforts provided by the monasteries,[12] at least one joined the order because he was tired of war and violence,[13] and there were quite a few whose conversion is attributed to the effect of the mircales performed by the Buddha.[14] Then there were the fallen women who found a way out of their life of sin through conversion to Buddhism and work in the order. Among them the most celebrated is Ambapālī but others such as Aḍḍhakāsi and Vimalā Purāṇagaṇikā may also be mentioned.[15]

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[10] E. G. Abhayatheri, *Therī Gāthā*, verses 35-36.
[11] See *Ibid.*, verses 148, 157; *Thera Gāthā* verses 24, 69, 94.
[12] E. G. Sumangala, and Nīta, *Thera Gāthā*, verses 43, 84.
[13] Piyañjaka, *Ibid.*, Verse 76.
[14] Subāhū and others, *Ibid.*, Verse 55 ff.

IV

We may now state the conclusions based on an analysis of the information on the Early Buddhist elite as found in the *Thera* and *Therī Gāthā* and the Commentary on them. First of all we can form some estimate of the size of the Buddhist Samgha reflected in the number of elite mentioned in our sources. If we assume that the proportion of 1 elite to 50 followers is reasonable then we get a figure of 16,600 as the size of the Buddhist Samgha during the period under survey. Possibly the figure may have been much larger for we must remember that besides the persons mentioned by name in the Pali Canon, there must have been thousands whose memory is not preserved at all. The Buddha's following of monks and nuns during his lifetime is mentioned by the stock figure of 1250.[16] This is generally regarded as a gross exaggeration. But our survey has shown that a large proportion of our elite group lived either during the time of the Buddha or within a generation of his demise. If that is true and if our estimated proportion of 1 elite to 50 ordinary (or unmentioned) monks is reasonable then 1000 or 1200 is not too large a figure for the size of the Buddhist order by 450 B.C.

The conclusion, then, seems inescapable that Buddhism attracted a numerous following of monks and nuns within half a century of its commencement and that this following must have gone on increasing. The withdrawal of such a large mass of men from economically productive work must have had serious economic implications. Even during the lifetime of the Buddha a charge was made that he had arrived to turn wives into widows[17] and the Buddha himself was sometimes chided for living on the labour of others.[18] The economic consequences of a large-scale monastic movement led to the rise of anti-monastic sentiments reflected in the *Arthaśāstra* where Kauṭalya advises the king not to allow freely ascetics frequenting the villages for fear of interruption in their work.[19] This was later repealed by Asoka when he ordered that ascetics of all sects might live wherever they liked in his dominions.[20]

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[15] *Therī Gāthā,* Verses 252-270, 25-26, 72-76.

[16] *addhatelasáni bhikkhusatāni, Dīgha Nikāya, II,* Pp. 2 ff.

[17] *vedhavyāya āgato samaṇo gotamo, Mahā Vagga,* I, XXIV, 5

[18] See *The Sutta-Nipāta,* p. 13.

Turning to the composition of the elite group we find that its character was overwhelmingly urban. Champā, Rājagaha, Sāvatthi, Sāketa, Kosambī and Banaras were renowned as the six great cities of the Buddha's time.[21] These six cities contributed 153 (little less than 50%) of the 308 members of our elite group. Regionwise the old kingdom of Kosala dominated the group with its 95 members (89 from Savathi and 6 from Saketa), the republican areas of the Sakyas and Vajjians gave 59 (Kapilavastu 44 and Vesālī 15), Magadha was numerically third with 53 (41 from Rājagaha, 4 from Champā, 5 from Banaras and 3 from Pāṭalīputra. Trailing far behind were the two other kingdoms of the Vatsas (5 from Kosambī) and Avanti (5 from Ujjeni). Western India is represented by only 3 (2 from Bharukaccha and 1 from Suppāraka) all of whom may be regarded as pioneer missionaries like Fuṇṇa.[22] The picture of the spread of Buddhism as revealed by this analysis shows that it was based mainly in Magadha and Kosala with small pockets of following in the Vatsa and Avanti regions and with only a sprinkling in Western India.

The combined urban-rural figures confirm the conclusion above. Kosala with its 116 (95 urban and 21 rural) comes second, the Avanti region has only 10 (5 each from urban and rural areas), the Himalayan regions (1), the Kuru country (2) and the so-called border areas (9) have an insignificant representation in the elite group. The same is the case with Western India. The Punjab and the Takkasīlā region are not represented at all.

In their social composition the Brāhmaṇas were the largest single group, the Vessas second and the Khattiyas third. The Suddas and the degraded castes accounted for only 21 out of

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[19] R. Shamasastry, *Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra* (Mysore, 1924), p. 47.
[20] See *Rock Edict* VII.
[21] See *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, p. 146.
[22] *Thera Gāthā*, Verse 70.

328 members, an insignificant proportion. Among Vessas and Khattiyas the wealthier elements predominated but among the Brāhmaṇas the number of ordinary Brāhmaṇa families is larger than that of the wealthy. This predominance of the Brāhmaṇa elements helped Buddhism establish its own prestige as an intellectual movement and create its own tradition of learning and philosophical development. The presence of the rich Vessas must have brought in material contributions, a fact confirmed by the status of Anāthapindika, one of the richest bankers of the time, among the lay-devotees of the Buddha. The Suddas and degraded castes, though few in numbers preserved the equalitarian spirit of the early Buddhist movement and helped in the spread of the faith among the lower segments of the population. The large number of ex-*samaṇas* and *paribbājakas,* both in the elite group and the general monastic following of the Buddha, must have seriously affected the fortunes of the non-Buddhistic *paribbājaka* movement though these *samaṇas* and *Brāhmaṇas* as distinct groups continued to exist until the time of Asoka.[23]

Finally the analysis of the reasons of conversions reveals the tremendous impact of the personality of the Buddha on his contemporaries and succeeding generations. The appeal of the Buddha, both as magnificent personality and a mighty intellectual, contributed immensely to the spread of his doctrine. The fact that intellectuals like Sāriputta and Moggallāna and Mahā Kassapa flocked to him in such large numbers is a testimony to the Buddha's intellectual powers and persuasive skill which left such a deep impress on posterity that his followers, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, made him into a *mahāpurusa* and a *devātideva* (superman and god of gods). He appeared as the final summation of the transcendental qualities of an all-pervasive compassion coupled with a penetrating intellect. These were the qualities which the elite were called upon to emulate in their lives and spread the *Dhamma* far and wide which they accomplished with such a striking success.

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[23] See *Rock Edict* VIII where Asoka refers to his visits to *Samaṇas* and *Brāhmaṇas.*

Nepal's Relations with Indian States (1800 - 50)

BY

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Geographical proximity notwithstanding, the political relations of Nepal with Indian States, other than those on her immediate border, were neither frequent nor intimate before the 19th century, although most of the princedoms in western Nepal, in particular, were ruled by the scions of the various Rajput dynasties in India.[1] Natural ramparts as mountains, rugged terrains, and marshy pestilential swamps in the foothills sealed off these Nepalese kingdoms from the Indian states. The Hindu rulers of Nepalese states were not eager to forge political contacts with their Indian counterparts, then ruled mostly by the Muslims, any more than the hills of Nepal provided any allurement for these ambitious Muslim rulers. Consequently, these Nepalese states remained wholly unscathed while the Indian states were in the welter of political upheavals, the concomitants of rise and fall of powers. The kaleidoscopic changes in India's political scene left no marked bearing on the Nepalese states, safely ensconced in the mountain fastnesses.

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[1] For the early history of Nepal and her relations with India see S. Levi, *Le Nepal; Etude Historique D'un Royaume Hindon* (Paris, 1905-08); D. R. Regmi, *Ancient Nepal* (Calcutta, 1960); L. Petech, *Medieval History of Nepal* (Rome, 1958); D. Wright, ed., *History of Nepal* (Cambridge, 1877); *Ibid.* Second Indian Edition, 1958; H. A. Oldfield, *Skeches from Nipal* (London, 1880) I, 256-65; P. Landon, *Nepal* (London, 1928) I, 1-59; R. G. Basak, *History of North East India* (Calcutta, 1934) 239-302; B. Sharma, *Nepalko Aitihasik Ruprekha* (Nepali, Banaras, 2008 V.S.) 53-196; K. P. Jayaswal, "Chronology and History of Nepal, 600 B.C.-800 A.D.", *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (Patna) 22:III (September, 1936) 161-264.

In 12th-14th Centuries the tide of Muslim invasion drove a number of Rajput princes to the mountains of Nepal. For details see Levi, n.1; D. R. Regmi, *Modern Nepal* (Calcutta, 1961) 1-42; *Nepali Vamsavali* (Genealogical Chronicles), *Manuscript Hodgson* (*M.H.*) Vol. 18, K 481, India Office Library, London; *Hemraj Vamsavali* (*Nepali*, Rashtriya Pustakalaya, Kathmandu, 1947 V.S.)

The latter half of the 18th century forms a great divide in the history of Nepal. By the end of this century the rulers of Gurkha, one of the twenty-four states in the west of Kathmandu, had, by successive strokes of arms and subtle diplomacy, welded the congeries of mutually warring Nepalese states into a kingdom, viable, vigorous and militant.[2] Expansion by conquests was the main plank of Gurkha state policy, organisation of an imposing army the first care. The rise of militant state of Nepal was the most important political development in India's northern border in the 18th century. Aggressive and expansionist Nepal posed an abiding menace to the Indian states in her vicinity. In lightning celerity the Nepalese absorbed the small independent states on the Indo-Nepalese border by a mingled policy of nibbling, encroachment and conquest. The first decade of the 19th century witnessed Nepal's territorial limits stretched from the river Tista in the east to the river Sutlej in the west, embracing a large number of hill states on the Himalayas.[3]

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[2] Nepal before the Gurkha conquest was not a unified political entity but a congeries of states steeped in unceasing recriminations, strifes and struggles. In the valley of Kathmandu there were three independent princedoms: Kathmandu, Patan and Bhatgaon, each warring with the other. To the west of the valley lay forty-six chiefdoms, grouped under two loose-knit confederacies, called *Baisi* (twenty-two states) and *Chaubisi* (twenty-four states). To the east of the valley, there were tribal domains of the Kirats and Limbus.

Gorkha lies about fifty miles west of Kathmandu. A branch of the Rajput dynasty of Udaypur had set up a strong kingdom there. Dravya Shah conquered Gorkha in 1559. The present royal family of Nepal traces its lineal descent from Dravya Shah.

In 1768-69, Prithwi Narayan Shah, the ruler of Gorkha, conquered the valley of Kathmandu and laid the foundation of modern Nepal. For details see Levi, n. 1 (English Translation in typescript, Indian Council of World Affairs Library), I, 320-56; Regmi, *Modern Nepal,* 13-26; Wright, n. 1, 167-73; Oldfield, n. 1, 266-69; *M.H.*, Vol. 18, K 481; *Hemraj Vamsavali,* 137 et seq.; Father Gieuseppe, *"An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul,"* *Asiatick Researches* (Calcutta) 2 (1799) 307-22.

[3] On the expansion of the Nepalese kingdom see F. Buchanon-Hamilton, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal and of the territories annexed to Dominion of the House of Gorkha* (Edinburgh, 1819) 291-316; J. H. Batten, *Report on the Kumaon and Rohilcund Tarai,* 9 October 1844, (Agra, 1851); *Records of the Delhi Residency and Agency: Punjab Government Records* (Lahore, 1911) I, 249 et seq.; G. R. C. Williams, *Memoir of*

Flushed with success, the Gurkhas swooped down upon the Punjab hill states, exciting thereby the jealousy and hostility of two powers vitally interested in these states, the Sikhs under Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the British.[4] The expansionist policy of the Gurkhas had adversely affected the Company's interests; politically, it engendered frequent border disputes and affrays which were likely to culminate in a full-scale armed flare-up between the two states; economically, it had deranged the Company's commercial activities in the Himalayan and trans-Himalayan regions.[5] The occupation of the Punjab hill states, particularly the Kangra valley, by the Nepalese was thus an unwelcome development in the western border of the Company's territory. So it was for Ranjit Singh who cherished the dream of uniting all the Punjab states under his own authority.

Containing the Gurkhas was thus a compelling necessity as much for the British as for Ranjit Singh, for neither could bear with equanimity the approach of the Gurkhas to the menacing proximity of their respective dominions. The Gurkhas besieged the fort of Kot Kangra, the capital of Kangra, in 1809, compelling its ruler, Sansar Chand, to appeal to the British for protection. The British, eager to keep Ranjit Singh in good humour on account of the apprehended Franco-Russian schemes in the north-west of India, cold-shouldered Sansar Chand's appeal.[6] In despair, Sansar Chand gave himself up to Ranjit Singh who took up the

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Dehra Dun (Roorkee, 1874) 98 et seq.; E. H. Atkinson, *The Himalayan Districts of the North-West Provinces of India* (Allahabad, 1882) II, 607-97; Regmi, n. 3, 104-26; J. Hutchison and S. E. Vogel, *History of the Punjab Hill States,* (Lahore, 1933) I; D. Bajracharya and G. Nepal, eds., *Aitihasik Patra Sangraha* (*Nepali,* Kathmandu, 2014 V.S.) I, 56-74.

[4] Hutchison and Vogel, n. 3; *Report on the Protected Hill States,* 1824, *Punjab Government Records* (Lahore, 1911) I.

[5] For trade in the Himalayan region and the Company's interest in it see W. Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul* (London, 1811) 203-10; C. Markham, *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa* (London, 1879); Bogle's Memorandum on the trade of Tibet, *Select Committee Proceedings,* 24 February 1775, 4; Letters of Warren Hastings to Bogle, 1774-75, *British Museum Additional Manuscripts* (*B.M.A.M.*), 29117; S. Cammann, *Trade Through the Himalayas* (Princeton, 1951).

[6] *Foreign Political Consultations* (*P.C.*), 13 September 1811, 56.

issue with his characteristic earnestness, and drove the invading Gurkhas out. In the Sikh-Nepalese encounter at Kangra both the powers had appealed to the Company for military assistance. Lt. Colonel Ochterlony was requested by Ranjit Singh to restrain the Gurkha general, Amar Singh Thapa, from invading the tributaries of the state of Lahore. Ranjit Singh was eager to drive the Gurkhas away from the hill states but the British viewed his thrust into these states with much concern. The British kept off from involvement, their policy being to let the two powers clash with each other and act as mutual checks. Estrangement with the Lion of the Punjab was as much contrary to British policy as active hostility towards the martial Gurkhas disagreeable. The Governor-General instructed Ochterlony that as a "general principle, Government would not be disposed to exercise a power of restraint over the project of Ranjit Singh..."[7] The powerful state of Lahore, firmly allied to the British, served as an effective restraint on the Nepalese expansion further west.

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[7] *P.C.*, 4 October 1811, 19.

Chrandrasekhar Upadhyaya, the Nepalese *Vakil* at Calcutta, was asked by the Durbar to represent to the British as follows:

"Friendship has subsisted between the Nepal and the British Governments for upwards of fifty years and this circumstance has contributed greatly to the success of each. The Sutledge has hitherto been the limit of the progress of the possessions of both states to the westwards. If they were to unite they could with ease carry their arms beyond that, by which the British government might obtain possession of territories yielding crores of rupees while the Gurkha government would be content with a fourth share. If the British government should enter into this project I am ready to set vigorously about the execution of it. It is desirable that a mutual friendship should subsist between the two states conducive to their mutual advantage. It is not only useless and injurious to both to quarrel about a little bit of land. It is not my wish to do so." (From the Raja of Nepal) Home Misc. Series, India Office Library Records, Vol. 648, 246-7, Cited in K. C. Choudhuri, *Anglo-Nepalese Relations* (Calcutta, 1960).

On the Sikh-Nepalese war and the British attitude to the Sikh and the Nepalese overtures for help see A. Farooqi, *British Relations with the Cis-Sutlej states*: 1809-23 (Lahore, 1941) 43-4; H. L. O. Garett, and G. Chopra, eds., *Events in the Court of Ranjit Singh*: 1810-1817 (Translated from the papers of the Alienation Office, Poona), *Punjab Government Record Office Publications* (Lahore, 1939); *Press List of the Old Records in the Punjab Secretariat*, III, 17; *Press List of the Political Records of the Delhi and Ludhiana Residency*, 83, 107-8, 128, 209, 249.

Thus baulked in the west, north and east,[8] the martial ardour of the Nepalese found an accentuated vent in the south where the ill-defended British dominion lay in tempting opulence. The result was a series of creeping encroachments on British territory by the Gurkhas, forays over claims and counter-claims to disputed territories on the ill-defended border, accumulation of mutual bitterness, rancour and malevolence, which eventuated in a full-scale war, a pyrrhic victory of the British and a magnificent defeat of the Nepalese.

During the course of the war, the Nepalese frantically sought the succour of the powerful Indian states as Lahore and Gwalior against the British. For some time past Ranjit Singh was growing increasingly restive; the Mahrattas, with the egregious defeat in 1803-05 still green in their memory, turned receptive ears to the Nepalese entreaties; and so did Amir Khan, the leader of the Pindaris. All watched the progress of the war with the keenest eagerness; all chuckled with glee when the veteran British generals reeled before the valiant Gurkhas; there was an air of malicious expectancy; the fall of the mighty British power seemed imminent; suspense deepened..[8a]

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[8] Tibet lies to the north of Nepal, and Sikkim to the east. Between 1787 and 1793, Nepal invaded both these states. The result was Chinese intervention and the signal defeat of Nepal, and the imposition of a vague suzerainty of China over her. Since then Nepal had always to reckon with Chinese reprisal should she contemplate hostility towards Tibet and Sikkim. After 1793 Chinese hold over Tibet became stronger than before. For details see S. Cammann, n. 5; D. B. Diskalkar, *"Tibeto-Nepalese War, 1788-1793"*, *J.B.O.R.S.*, (Patna, 1933), 19: IV, 362-98; E. H. Parker, *"Nepaul and China"*, *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record*, Third Series, (Woking, The Oriental University Institute) 13-4 (Jan.-April 1899) 68 et seq.; B. Acarya, ed., *"Nepal Chin Yuddha Sambhandhi Patra"*, *Nepal Sanskritik Parishad Patrika, Varsa* 3, *Anka* 3, (Vaisakh, 2011 V.S.) 2-3; D. Bajracharya and G. Nepal, *"Nepal-Chin Yuddha Vishayak Dui Patra"*, *Ibid.*, 50-70.

[8a] Marchioness of Bute, ed., *The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings* (London, 1858) I, 298; *Ibid.*, II, 144-5; *Summary of the Administration of the Indian Government from October* 1813 *to January* 1828 *by the Marquis of Hastings* (London, 1824) 10-19; Garett and Chopra, n. 7, 178-82; 190-94, 217.

Letter of Pandit Padmapanee, Nepalese *Vakil* to the Court of Gwalior, to Kaji Bhim Sen Thapa and Kaji Randhoj Thapa, 1871 (V.S.), Sravan

Lord Hastings found with intense anxiety nothing but "elements of war on all sides"; failure in the war, he realised, "would be the first step to a speedy subversion of our power";[9] verily, "the name and the character of the Government and of the British nation were felt to be committed on the issue."[10] Sharpest vigilance was, hence, maintained on the attitude of the Mahrattas and the Sikhs, in particular. None of the Indian powers, however, sent any active help to Nepal. The ultimate victory of the British in the war was a severe shock to Nepal.

Defeat in the war could not daunt Nepal, nor could its humiliation subdue her spirit. She smarted under the yoke of the Treaty by which the British seized one-third of her territory, and sought to destroy her martial spirit, closing for ever her career of military expansion. Eager to avenge the defeat and restore the lost territories, Nepal sought to incite the Indian powers against the British. Bhim Sen Thapa, the all-powerful Minister of Nepal, kept up lively interest in the British activities in India and maintained close relations with the Indian powers. In fact, the Nepalese records bear ample testimony to Bhim Sen's abortive attempts to rally the Indian powers against the British in India. In the courts of the Mahrattas and the Sikhs, agents were maintained, and tried emissaries were sent annually to different parts of India to report on the activities of the British and the state of feeling among the Indian powers.[11]

Vadi, 1, Roj, 2, Chittaranjan Nepali, *General Bhim Sen Thapa Ra Tatkalin Nepal* (*Nepali*, Kathmandu, 2013 V.S.), 285-91.

[9] Bute, n. 8a, 298; H. T. Prinsep, *History of the Political and Military Transactions during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings*, 1813-1823 (London, 1825) I, 134. See also E. Thompson, *Life of Charles, Lord Metcalfe* (London, 1937) 156-66; J. W. Kaye, *Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe* (London, 1858) I, 296.

[10] Prinsep, n. 9, 134. For the origin, course and results of the Anglo-Nepal war see Lord Moira's letter to Secret Committee, 2 August 1815, *Papers Relating to the Nepaul war* (London, 1824) 675-763; Prinsep, n. 9, 54 et seq.; Bute, n. 8a, 44-54, *Hemraj Vamsavali*, 168-71.

[11] *Foreign Secret Consultations* (*S.C.*), 14 October 1829, 23.

In 1820 Bhim Sen made an appeal to the principal Indian States to rise against the British. A stirring poem composed by Baninidhi, the Nepalese Court poet, was circulated in various Indian Courts. C. Nepali n. 8a, 158-9, 175-81, 285.

Thus, during the third Anglo-Mahratta war which followed in the immediate wake of the Nepal war, the Nepalese endeavoured to form a confederacy of the Mahrattas and the Pindaris against the British. A tried emissary, Pandit Padmapanee, was sent to Daulat Rao Sindhia for this purpose. Padmapanee sent from Gwalior a detailed report, referring to the Mahratta politics, and the attitude of the Peshwa, Holkar and Sindhia towards the British. On being asked by the Sindhia about Nepal's reactions to the imminent war, (Anglo-Mahratta war),

> "I (Padmapanee) said that the Maharaja (Sindhia) was the prince of the Deccan; that if he would enter into serious and solemn engagements with my master and ratify them with religious ceremonies.... that in every way we should be ready and should act according to writing; that we did not fear the English; that we should enter into no agreement with them; that if we made one, nothing after could be done, on which the Maharaja Sindhia gave me every assurance of satisfaction.... The Poona affairs are thus: Trimbakji Danglia has created great tumult.... and the English had opposed the Peshwa who has now yielded up some of his best forts.... his army is opposed to them.... If you get ready, I am willing to engage them.... There is no dependence on their words.... The Pindaries amount to 25000, and have brought spoil by the plunder of the European country who have killed many of their *sowars*. Notwithstanding, the Pindaries are still very strong and ready to fight, but they have no place of strength.... Their safety is from Daulat Rao. The Europeans are ready to oppose them.... The Maharaja's ministers have leagued with the English, this alarms and prevents him from quarrelling with them.... The Maharaja (Sindhia) and Hindu Rao wish to send you letters, but defer it on account of the road. I shall bring them with me."[12]

A streak of hesitancy, ascribable to a lurking doubt as to the sincerity of Nepal, restrained Sindhia from committing himself completely to Nepal's plans. There was no saying if the overtures of the Nepalese were not a stratagem of the British with whom they had so recently concluded a treaty. Very soon, however, the hesitancy wore out, and the Sindhia whole-heartedly busied himself in forging a league of the Mahrattas, the Sikhs and the Gurkhas. The Peshwa earnestly entreated for Gurkha military aid,

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[12] Substance of a letter from Pandit Padmapanee, Nepalese *Vakil* at Sindhia's Court, to Raja of Nepal, 12 June 1817, enclosed in a despatch of Govt. to Gardner, Resident at Kathmandu, 7 July 1817, *Nepal Residency Records (N.R.)*, Vol. 2.

> "for if there is anyone to save the Peshwa and now, that is to be done by the Gurkhas to whom everybody here looks."

Military preparations were set afoot in Nepal, evidently to keep her in readiness for this anticipated league. The Durbar urged the British to abrogate the Treaty of Segowlee which the Nepalese deeply resented as a national disgrace, and to substitute it by a new treaty, omitting altogether the article providing for the cession of the lowlands between the rivers Kosi and Gandak to the British.[13]

The British at first made light of what they later realised a disconcerting development; Resident Gardner had even asserted that Nepal was just toying with a hope and that she had no malicious intention. Shortly, however, he was "pretty certain" that the Nepalese sincerely meant mischief.[14]

But the political situation in India suggested the wisdom of soft-pedalling Nepal. The hands of the British were full with the Mahratta and the Pindari wars; stern measures against Nepal were certain to throw her into the inviting arms of these hostile powers; the result was certain to be a general flare-up in India. The British were fully aware of Nepal's intrigues, but they winked at these. Resident Gardner was clearly instructed thus:

> "In the present state of things it would be obviously inexpedient even if the proofs were complete to raise any question with the government of Nepal which would interrupt the good understanding between the two governments (of Nepal and British India) and whence it is so essential to maintain while all our forces are employed in a distant service."[15]

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[13] Govt. to Gardner, 20 November 1817, 23 July 1817, 6 August 1817, *Ibid.*

[14] S.C., 26 December 1817, 87; 22 August 1817, 36.

[15] Govt. to Gardner, 13 October 1817, *N.R.*, Vol. I; *S.C.*, 19 December 1816, 29.

No restrictive or punitive measures were hence taken against Nepal, nor were her agents in Mahratta courts arrested or detained. A mild remonstrance alone was made with the Nepalese Durbar, whose treacherous designs accorded ill with the "unexampled liberality" of the British government. Soon after, the British entered into treaties with the Sindhia and Amir Khan, the knowledge of which provided a cold douche to the zeal of the Nepalese Durbar to forge offensive leagues with them. Following the Resident's representation, the Durbar officially disavowed the activities of Padmapanee, and relaxed its intriguing efforts.[16]

In fact, ever since the termination of the Napalese war, the British sought to salve the soreness of their redoubtable foe by a policy of concillation and scrupulous non-interference in its internal affairs. A harsher treaty was not imposed on Nepal nor a heavier retribution exacted, for the British were eager to soothe her soreness by impressing on her that they were not vindictive but forbearing and generous to their gallant foes.

The British Resident's primary duty was to reconcile this over bearing, sulky and proud enemy to the political relations with the British government, the ultimate object being to transform Nepal gradually to a friendly neighbour or, at the least, a peaceful one.[17]

> "The Government have no motives for reducing the Nepal power and resources below the present state, when many powerful considerations suggest the expediency of avoiding a war with that people, however justly provoked, if peace can be maintained without loss of honour."[18]

It is in pursuance of this conciliatory policy that during the third Anglo-Mahratta war, the eastern Tarai, between the rivers Kosi and Rapti, mulcted of Nepal in 1816, was restored to her, evidently as a sop.[19]

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[16] Govt. to Gardner, 8 November, 20 November, 30 December 1817, *N.R.*, vol. 2.

[17] *S.C.*, 4 May 1816, 69-70; Major Ross of Bladenburg, *The Marquess of Hastings* (Oxford, 1900) 71.

[18] *S.C.*, 19 December 1816, 29; 11 May 1816, 32.

[19] C. U. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, I (Calcutta, 1909) 155-6; *Hemraj Vamsavali*, 172.

The British could not object to Nepal's intercourse with the Indian powers, for the Treaty of Segowlee provided no injunction against it. They knew that the Indian powers were too disunited and the Nepalese projects of alliance too amorphous for success. They were confident that,

> "the Nepalese... are not in a condition to wage an offensive war against the British government and we are strong enough in the only vulnerable points of our territory with reference to that nation to feel secure against any desultory attempts...The plan, therefore, [of league of Indian powers] what it may be, is likely to be harmless in its effects in our interests."[20]

With the consolidation of British hold on Indian states and the confirmation of their military superiority over the latter, Nepal's intriguing propensities registered a marked abatement though not absolute cessation. There was slow but perceptible thawing of tension between Nepal and the British government; the former realised the futility of rallying the mutually distrustul Indian powers against the British, and the latter was convinced of the worth of a stable rule in Nepal under its able Minister Bhim Sen Thapa, who had effectively restrained the turbulence of the Nepalese army and had kept peace with the British.[21]

The policy of Bhim Sen was peaceful but not friendly; nor was it free from deep-laid distrust. He maintained a consistent attitude of jealous exclusion of the British from the internal affairs of Nepal, and confined their unwelcome political intercourse to rigidly-defined and closely guarded limits. This seemed to him the only means to safeguard Nepal's political integrity and independence from that scheming power which before his eyes had reduced and weakened the principal Indian powers like Mysore, Hyderabad, Oudh and the Maharattas, as much by arms as by subtle diplomacy. The Resident was distrusted as the artery of British influence; being closely watched in all his movements by guards placed around the Residency, with no right of moving beyond a fixed distance, and deprived of any kind of social relation with anybody, he was virtually a *pariah,* kept under a galling and perpetual surveillance. Bhim Sen's constant concern was to prevent the Resident from assuming any form of influence, direct or indirect, in the court of Nepal. In every overture of the British government for closer relations, Bhim Sen discerned some devious project of a dangerous and encroaching neighbour, scheming to conquer and annex his country. Jealous exclusion of the British from Nepal and non-intercourse with them were his cardinal principles, adopted to preserve his country's independence at a time when the powerful states of India were slowly being weakened, transformed into vassals of the British, though euphemistically called their protected allies.[22]

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[20] Govt. to Gardner, 13 October 1817, *N.R.*, Vol. 2.

[21] For the life and policy of Bhim Sen see C. Nepali, n. 8a.

Resident Gardner paid high tributes to Bhim Sen's administrative ability, and so did his successors, Maddock and Hodgson. *P. C.*, 2 September 1820, 11; 29 April 1825, 30; *Foreign Miscellaneous Proceedings* (Demi-Official and Confidential letters), Vol. 198, 17-23, 246. See also Oldfield, n.1, 299.

The conviction of the military superiority of the British moderated Nepal's intriguing proclivities. But her martial spirit knew no diminution. Ever since the assumption of power, Bhim Sen's primary aim had been to organise an army, imposing in number and a model in efficiency. Under his fostering care, the Nepal army became a "tower of strength", as formidable as it was during 1814-16. The martial spirit of the Nepalese was actively fostered and zealously conserved with the fond hope of using it at an opportune moment when the British would be seriously engaged either in quelling an internal disturbance or fighting a powerful Indian state or warding off a foreign invasion.[23] Single-handed it was impossible to fight the British at any time other than one of crisis. Consequently, there was an invariable synchronism between the troubles of the British and excerbation of Nepal's warlike spirit. A crisis in British India invariably coincided with the vigorous attempts of Nepal to forge leagues with the Indian powers with a view to exploiting the British difficulties. The barometer of Nepal's diplomatic and military activity was regulated by the frequency and intensity of the British troubles. A causal relation may, hence, be found in the stable and peaceful relation of the Nepalese and the British governments in 1823-37 and the general calm and order in the political state of India during that period. Except the Anglo-Burmese war (1824–26), the British were not involved in any major military operation at this time, nor was Nepal's diplomatic activity too vigorous or her warlike spirit too alarming. Nepal was by and large peaceful; she was quiescent, if not cordial. The Burmese war provided a momentary stimulant to Nepal's restlessness and excitement. Emissaries were exchanged between Kathmandu and Ava, carrying what was suspected to be schemes of hostility towards the British. The Nepalese King was alleged to have written to his Burmese counterpart, undertaking to engage the British towards Brindaban and facilitate the Burmese occupation of the territories contiguous to Assam. Presumably to lull the British suspicion, the King of Nepal offered military aid to them against the Burmese. The overture was politely declined, while the Resident requested the Durbar to keep the Rajguru of Burma as hostage, should he, as suspected, go to Nepal. The triumph of the British in the war acted as an effective damper to Nepal's machinations.[24] Earlier, Ugranath, the deposed Raja of Assam, had solicited the help of Nepal against the British, and the Nepalese were inclined to respond in *lieu* of a reward of two lakhs. But as the Raja soon patched up a reconciliation with the British, the project fell through.[25]

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[22] Resident to Govt., 20 June 1832, *P.C.*, 27 August 1832, 18; Same to Same, 18 February 1833, *S.C.*, 5 March 1833, 24; Report on British political Transactions with Nepal, compiled by Dr. A. C. Campbell, Asst. Resident of Nepal, (*Campbell's Report*), *P.C.*, 18 September 1837, 69-71; Oldfield, n. 1, 299-302; W. W. Hunter, *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson, British Resident at the Court of Nepal* (London, 1896) 100 et seq.; Nepali, n. 8a, 319-21.

[23] *P.C.*, 12 February 1833, 160-1, 164; *Ootacamund Political Consultations*, 24 October 1834, 13; Hodgson to Macnaughton, Political Secretary, 13 August 1833, *Foreign Miscellaneous Proceedings* (*F.M.*), Vol. 152; Nepal Army List for January 1838, *M.H.*, Vols. VI-VII, K476-7; Hodgson's Memorandum on the Army of Nepal, *F.M.*, Vol. 125, 74 et seq.; *Campbell's Report*, 1837, n. 22.

As the third decade of the 19th century wore to its close, a cloud gathered on the political horizon of India, as yet no bigger than a man's hand, but fast assuming an all-enveloping magnitude. It was a cloud of an unprecedented crisis in the British rule in India. Years of settling calm were about to crash with deafening dins of war and violence.

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[24] Govt. to Resident, 4 February 1824, 30 April 1824, 24 June 1824, *N.R.*, Vol. 2.

[25] *Aitihasik Patra Sangraha* (*Nepali*), 82-6.

For some time past a storm was brewing in the north-west frontier of India and its environs, where the great tidal waves of Russia and England were about to lash against each other. These regions soon became the cockpit of Russian, British and Sikh diplomacy, the confluence of their ambitious schemes and discordant interests. A feeling of restlessness and an "ignorant expectancy—a looking outwards in the belief of some change, the nature of which no one understood", ran through India.[26] The Indian states, already in "brooding discontent" grew increasingly restive; they were agitated; some even betrayed disaffection.[27] Mutterings of Russo-Persian invasion of India and the imminent collapse of the 'Company's Raj' gained wide currency and ready credence. Lord Auckland, the Governor-General, was naturally uneasy at this spectre of "a vast change" opening before the British—a phenomenon which was certain to tax the resources of the British government, both military and economic, as never before.[28] All about there was an air of crisis and high events.

These were England's woes and Nepal's opportunities. The jingo spirit at Kathmandu increased; its abetters, the Pandes, became enthusiastic; the army grew proportionately excited over the dazzling vista of invasion and plunder of the British territories. The general tone of the Nepalese Durbar became bellicose, commensurate with the increasing pre-occupation of the British with these troubles in the north-west. Evidently, the rumblings of the thunder rending the Indian sky had their echo in the not-too-distant hills of Nepal.[29]

To add to the British perplexities, the Nepalese court was now rent with internecine strifes, the King, the Queens and the ambitious nobles belonging to rival parties[30] scrambling for power.

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[26] J. W. Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan* (London, 1851) I, 290.

[27] Minute of Lord Auckland, 19 June 1837, *Private Letter Book of Lord Auckland* (*P.B.*), Vol. 2, 60, *B.M.A.M.*, 37691.

[28] Metcalfe to Lord Auckland, 15 October 1836, *P.B.*, Vol. 1, 80, *B.M.A.M.*, 37689.

[29] Tickell's Memorandum of Principal Events in Nepal, 1830-1840, *S.C.*, 18 January 1841, 74; *P.C.*, 29 November 1837, 38-9.

[30] Besides the King and his two queens, each jealous of the other, there were four principal parties in the Court. The 'Choutarias' were a dynastic party of royal collaterals. The 'Gurus' were the spiritual advisers of the

All were up against Bhim Sen; the all-powerful Minister whose absolute monopoly of power for three decades created intense jealousy, concealed animosity and suppressed rancour among his rivals. In 1832 the old Regent, Queen Lalit Tripura Sundari died.[31] It was a major crisis in the state, for her death was the first material blow to Bhim Sen, a premonition of his impending fall and the resultant political commotion in the state. She was the strongest prop of Bhim Sen's power; her commanding personality had kept so long in effective restraint the rivals of Bhim Sen; her death emboldened them to undermine by intrigues the Minister's overwhelming predominance. Ere long a strong anti-Bhim Sen faction was formed in the palace, composed of the King, the Queens and the nobles, all bound by the common spirit of jealousy and vengeance and a common thirst for power.[32]

To stave off the apprehended fall, Bhim Sen resorted to the familiar course of activising the foreign policy of the state as a means, presumably, of deflecting the attention of his rivals from affairs at home to those abroad. A spirit of restiveness was rearing its head in the army, long starved of martial exploits; his peaceful policy towards the British was branded by his enemies as supine and pussillanimous, an impolitic appeasement of Nepal's traditional enemy, and, hence, anti-national. The army being the

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King and his family. The 'Thapas' emerged as the predominant party during the long rule of Bhim Sen. The 'Pandes' were a powerful party before the absolute predominance of the Thapas had been established under Bhim Sen. They were hereditary rivals of the Thapas and their bitterest enemies. The Pande family had two branches: Gora Pandes and Kala Pandes. In this paper the word 'Pande' stands for Kala Pandes. There were, besides, three smaller parties; Bashnaits, Bohras and Sishtas who had lost all authority and power under Bhim Sen's absolute rule. Genealogical List of the Kings, Choutarias, Kala Pandes, Gora Pandes, Bashnaits and others, *M.H.*, Vol. 18, K 481 .

[31] Lalit Tripura Sundari Devi was the wife of King Ran Bahadur Shah, and grandmother of King Rajendra Vikram Shah. After the death of her husband, she became the Regent, and continued so till 1832 when she died.

[32] Excerpts from the letters of the Resident at Kathmandu to Govt. from 1830 to 1840, compiled by J. R. Tickell, Asst. Resident, *S.C.*, 18 January 1841, 74; *P.C.*, 28 May 1832, 52; 27 August 1832, 18; 12 February 1833, 160; The King's *rooka* on the death of the Regent 1889 V. S., Chaitra Vadi 10, Roj. 7, C. Nepali, n 8*, 275.

repository of power in a military state as Nepal, humouring it was naturally the cardinal policy of Nepalese statesmen, for the support of the army was the strongest cement and its enmity the surest means of destruction of a regime. Bhim Sen well knew that nothing was dearer to the Nepalese than intrigues against the British and nothing more alluring than the prospect of war with them.[33] But war with the British was an extremely hazardous project; political intrigues were, hence, the most effective expedient to absorb the attention of his rivals in the court, as also to mollify the restless army. Besides giving a lie to his political opponents' charge of appeasing the British, it would convince the army that Bhim Sen was just awaiting the right opportunity to strike at the national enemy of Nepal.

In consequence, there was a "renewal or at least a sensible increase" of intrigues with the Indian states which, though not abandoned since the treaty of Segowlee, lay comparatively dormant, particularly in recent years.[34] Considerable agitation and ferment in Nepal followed suit. Speculations were in spate regarding the overwhelming strength of the Russo-Persian army, about to invade India, the comparative weakness of British army, the uneasy neutrality of Ranjit Singh, the rebellious disposition of Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur, the likely movement of the whole British army to the north-west and Rajputana and the resultant exposition of the rich Gangetic plains to Nepalese inroads. Emissaries were sent to Lahore and Teheran to pick up intelligence with a view to ascertaining the authenticity of the rumoured Russo-Persian invasion. Increased correspondence with Doorjan Sal, the ex-Raja of Bharatpur, Raja Mitterjit Singh of Tikaree, Raja of Bettia and other influential zamindars of Bihar smacked of some deep-laid scheme of Nepal. There was as yet no positive evidence of hostile machinations on the part of the zamindars of Bihar, but the political character of their correspondence with the court of Kathmandu, the exchange of secret emissaries, coupled with utter disavowal of these proceedings by Nepal, strengthened the presumption that the latter meant mischief.[35]

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[33] "Their idea of war has exclusive references to rupture with us and at any period since the pacification of 1816, nothing would have been more popular and nothing would now give more satisfaction to the military classes." Resident to Govt., 2 December 1832, *P.C.*, 12 February 1833, 180.

[34] *Tickell's Memorandum*, n. 32.

Fateh Singh, a Nepalese agent, arrived in Lahore without the requisite passport and met Ranjit Singh. Karbeer Khattree, another agent, followed Fateh Singh, after completing his journey to various parts of India, undertaken with the ostensibly harmless object of seeing the military and other resources of the British. He met Ranjit Singh and gave him complimentary presents of the King of Nepal. Similar presents were sent by Ranjit Singh to the King of Nepal as a reciprocation of friendliness. Nepal despatched embassies to Kamran Shah, the ruler of Herat, which being but "returns of civility" were nevertheless undesirable abetters of Darbar's restlessness.[36] Soon after, the rumour of Russo-Persian invasion passed off, to the intense relief of the Resident and disappointment of the Nepalese.

In July 1837 took place the long-meditated and much-desired fall of Bhim Sen. The latter was deposed and was suffered to languish in a dungeon, in utter disgrace and despair, condemned to a fate, gloomy, horrid and uncertain.[37] The fall of Bhim Sen was a domestic revolution in Nepal and a landmark in Indo-Nepalese relations. By efficient administration of the state and firm control of the martial propensities of the people, and by equally able handling of the conflicting ambitions of aspiring nobles, he had given Nepal three decades of peace, prosperity, progress and power. His fall unleashed the fissiparous elements, so long kept in effective restraint; a bitter wrangle for power ensued;

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35. *P.C.*, 28 June 1833, 21; 28 May 1833, 4; 19 December 1833, 14; H. R. Gupta, "Sikh-Nepal Relations", *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission* (*I.H.R.C.*), 30: II (Hyderabad, 1954) 52 et seq. See also letter of Bhim Sen to Ranjit, no date, cited in Nepali, n. 8*, 179.

36. *P.C.*, 15 January 1835, 43.

In grave concern Hodgson noted; "... They (Nepalese) would hail with delight the appearance of any foreign or domestic foe to our government. Let our force be turned to any such in the north-west and the Gurkhalese would pour down upon our backs 30000 regulars as well armed and trained as our sepahees and infinitely better soldiers in all moral respects." Hodgson to Macnaughton, 25 August 1833, *F.M.*, Vol. 152.

37. *S.C.*, 14 August 1837, 35: King Rajendra Vikram Shah to Lokraman Upadhyaya (Nepalese *Vakil* at Calcutta), 1894, Sravan Vadi 13, Roj 1, *Para-rashtra Mantralaya* (*Foreign Office*), Kathmandu.

the jingo spirit, the lust for plunder and war reigned supreme in the Durbar; the pent-up martial ardour of the army was about to burst forth in all its accumulated fury. Indo-Nepalese relations entered upon a new phase—a phase of storm and stress as never before. Never was there a period when so much misunderstanding was created between Nepal and the British Gavernment as in the decade following the fall of Bhim Sen. It was a time when one state stood in apprehension of invasion by the other, when many wrongs were committed, leaving a legacy of hostile and bitter feelings in both. At this very time the British were passing through one of the most critical phases of their career in India. The Indian states were known to be in a state of sullen discontent; the north-west frontier was ablaze; China and Burma were hostile; and the state of the Indian army was far from assuring—in short, all affairs were full of gloomy portents. Verily, with the fall of Bhim Sen the mainstay of Nepal's internal stability and pacific relations with the British was swept away. The long spell of strong government in Nepal was broken; Nepal lay politically weak after him, corroded with dissensions, providing ample scope for British interference.

A period of transition ensued when the internal administration was in a flux, chaotic and unstable. The court became the cockpit of factions contending for exclusive power; even the royal palace became the secret conclave where intrigues were hatched and nursed to maturity. Of all the parties squabbling for power, the Pandes were emerging as the strongest. Deprived of real power in the long rule of Bhim Sen, their sworn enemy, the Pandes had acquired little administrative experience and still lesser tact and dexterity with which Bhim Sen managed the British. They were headstrong, impulsive and rash, extremely jealous, revengeful and bitterly hostile to the British government. This anti-British sentiment was the linch-pin of their policy; they knew that nothing was more popular with the army, long starved of martial exploits, than war with the British, and nothing more alluring than the plunder of their opulent dominions. Hence,

> "They (Pandes) saw that they must be war ministers or no ministers at all, for their long exile had stripped them of all legitimate weight among their fellow nobles. . . . Thus all circumstances of their character and position correspond to

> make the Kala Pandes determined opponents of responsible intercourse with our government at Kathmandu and of that peace and good neighbourhood which could by such means only be secured to us."[38]

It is these Pandes who gradually established their absolute ascendancy in the Nepalese Durbar, and it is their warlike policy which earned them the sobriquet the 'war party', in contradistinction to the 'peace party', formed of nobles advocating peaceful relation with the British.[39]

The war-party's main policy was to spin a network of intrigues with the Indian powers. A horde of emissaries was sent to almost all the important states of India and to some beyond, with the fond expectation of finding allies in Nepal's scheme of exploiting the political troubles of the British.[40]

Situated close to the storm-centre in the north-west, alliance with the Punjab, the richest independent state of India, as also the strongest, was most prized by Nepal, and consequently, much dreaded by the British. The British were keenly aware of Nepal's great interest in the Lahore Durbar and Lahore's like disposition. Between 1833 and 1836 several Nepalese missions had been seen at Lahore receiving warm welcome from Ranjit Singh.[41] In May 1837 a Nepalese embassy, headed by Kaji Kalu Singh and Captain Karbeer Singh, arrived in Lahore with a grand suite and presents for Ranjit Singh. A month later, another emissary, Ek Krishna Baid, reached Lahore. Bhopal Singh Thapa, a Nepalese officer in one of the battalions of the French legion in the Khalsa army, was actively engaged in forging alliance between Lahore and Nepal.[42] Captain Wade, the British political agent at Ludhiana, kept a sharp vigil on the proceedings of the Nepalese emissaries. Ranjit was not averse to reciprocate the friendly gestures of the Nepalese King, although it was open to doubt if he was at that time very keen on effectuating the political alliance, particularly when it was anti-British in intent. Besides, Ranjit Singh's hands were then full with the task of suppressing the insurrection in the mountains lying immediately east of Attock, led by Payanda Khan, the famous insurgent of Durband.[43] To the British he gave a clear understanding that his coquetry with Nepal was not malicious in design. Captain Wade, hence, reported to Government.

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[38] Resident to Govt., 22 June 1842, *S.C.*, 7 September 1842, 88.

[39] The peace-party was formed with Hodgson's covert encouragement and support. Hodgson had an indirect, though very effective, hand in the fall of Bhim Sen who was, to him, an implacable enemy of the British. Hodgson exploited the mutual jealousy of the nobles aspiring for power, and entrenched his influence deeply in the Durbar. Guru Krishna Ram Pandit was the key-stone of the peace-party, in the formation of which he had acted as Hodgson's most trusted agent. The peace-party was formed to offset the growing influence of the war-party led by the Pandes.

[40] *P.C.*, 17 January 1838, 30; *S.C.*, 22 August 1838, 46-7; 13 June 1838, 10-11; 13-4; 22 August 1838, 40-5; 1 November 1838, 156; 16 May 1838, 14-5; 4 July 1838, 11-2; 25 July 1838, 7-9; 1 August 1838, 35-9; 22 August 1838, 19-29, 39; 17 October 1838, 184-90, 153-6, 171; 21 November 1838, 170; 28 November 1838, 41, 172-3; 26 December 1838, 65.

[41] H. R. Gupta, p 35; *Tickell's Memorandam*, n. 32.

> "...adverting to the present disposition of His Highness (Ranjit Singh), I have no idea that Ranjit Singh will now listen to any overtures of hostile tendency to the British government which either the ambition or military spirit of the Nepalese may induce them to make."[44]

In Ranjit Singh's court, however, the Jammu Rajas, particularly Raja Golab Singh, were keen on forging alliance with Nepal as a means of linking up the Sikh territory, now expanding down the course of Spiti, with the north-western border of Nepal. A direct territorial connexion with Nepal would not promote trade between Lhasa and Ladakh, now a Sikh territory, but would also

> "...establish a direct intercourse with a power which he (Golab Singh) thinks will not only tend greatly to augment his present influence but lead to an alliance which may at some future period be of reciprocal importance."[45]

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[42] In Ranjit's army there was an efficient Gurkha corps.

[43] P.C., 12 June 1837, 41.

[44] Wade to Macnaughton, 29 July 1837, S.C., 21 August 1837, 35.

[45] P.C., 12 June 1837, 41.

This is also corroborated by a secret report of Major Raghubir Singh and Jamadar Mannu Singh, the Nepalese agents to Delhi and the Punjab. The Jammu Rajas were shortly involved in war with Tibet. They sought to enlist Nepal's help in their dispute with Ladakh, Tibet and China. Report of Major Raghubir Singh and Jamadar Mannu Singh, 1895; Sravan Sudi 15, Roj 1, *Foreign Office,* **Kathmandu.**

There was, however, no evidence to prove Ranjit Singh's encouragement to Golab Singh's designs any more than there was any possibility of Lahore-Nepal coquetry ripening into a political league. Nevertheless, in so far as it stimulated the intriguing proclivities of Nepal, it was desirable to put and end to such political intercourse. But the British had no legal right to check such intercourse nor was there any inclination on their part to take any indirect measure to that end.

The Court of Directors' instruction was clear on this point. The Court directed:

> "In the case of Ranjit Singh you (Governor-General) had no right to control the mutual intercourse of the two parties, and we should have seen no advantage in your refusing passports to the envoys from Nepal. We are happy to perceive that Ranjit Singh's conduct in the matter has not been of a kind to justify any distrust of his intentions.[46]

Meanwhile, in the north-west the crisis deepened. Persia besieged Herat; the shadow of Russia loomed larger in Kabul; Dost Muhammad grew increasingly restive, poised between the admonitions of the British and the allurement of Russian overtures for alliance. Nepal was astir with "feverish speculation" on the probable fall of Herat, the likely advance of Persia with Russian instigation, the defection of the Afghan chiefs and the estrangement of the Lion of the Punjab.[47] Evidently, Nepal was too receptive to the stirring news of the North-west, and too responsive, too; she trimmed her sail to every passing wind.

A malicious intrigue between Nepal and Herat was gradually ripening beneath the apparently harmless negotiations for trade in horses. In December 1837, Saifullah, "the recognised envoy of Herat", arrived at Kathmandu.[48] Some months later, Indeer Beer Khattree, a Nepalese envoy, was despached to Herat but was detained by the British at Ludhiana. His trusted agent, Hamir

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[46] *Political Letter from Court,* 24 October 1838, 61.

[47] Lord Auckland to Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief, 21 June 1838, *S.C.,* 29 August 1838, 2.

[48] *S.C.,* 13 June 1838, 9; *P.C.,* 17 January 1838, 30.

Singh Khattree, however, managed to cross the Sutlej and present letters to Dost Muhammad, the ruler of Kabul.[49]

Sedulous efforts were made to exploit the uneasy relations between the British and the Burmese. Emissaries in the guise of merchants and mendicants were sent to Ava to report on the King's ill-feelings towards the British, his military strength, and military preparation of the British in that quarter. They carried offers of military aid to the Burmese if, as was supposed, they contemplated a break with the British. The King of Ava was reported to have solicited Nepal's aid in his imminent war with the British.[50]

In March 1838, Matabar Singh Thapa, the nephew of the deposed Minister, Bhim Sen, was sent to Lahore to report on Ranjit Singh's reactions to the events in the north-west and, if possible, to coax him to a political alliance with Nepal. The game was seen through by the British; they detained Matabar at Ludhiana and kept him under strict surveillance.[51] But the intercourse between the two states did not cease nor did the hope of Ranjit Singh's favourable reception to Nepal's overture dim a whit. The Nepalese agents already at Lahore kept alive the impression at Kathmandu that Ranjit Singh entertained the highest esteem for Bhim Sen and his nephew, Matabar Singh, and that should the latter act as a go-between, the much-desired alliance between the two states could be effectuated.[52]

Corresponding with the British involvement in the Afghan troubles, the attitude of Ranjit Singh changed for the worse; it evoked suspicion and concern in the British, for it accorded ill with his earlier professions of friendliness towards them. Far from discouraging the Nepalese embassies, he had himself sent some agents to Kathmandu, with letters containing his "express desire" to know the "real footing of the Gurkhas and the English". It seemed that Ranjit Singh was "waiting upon events before he germinates himself to a policy." Signet rings had been exchanged between the Rulers of Lahore and Nepal, suggesting their mutual regard. It was alleged that he had helped Matabar at Ludhiana with money, asking him to come to Lahore by "all means of fraud or force." He sought also to persuade the British to free Matabar from surveillance. Reports on Ranjit Singh's eagerness to enlist the Nepalese in larger numbers in the Khalsa army added further to the concern of the British. There was no doubt about the existence of a "perpetual intercourse" between Lahore and Nepal. Hodgson asserted that

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[49] *S.C.*, 18 July 1838, 11; 20 July 1838, 6; 26 December 1838, 65.

[50] *S.C.*, 12 December 1838, 47; *P.C.*, 14 March 1838, 171. Instructions to Nepalese missions to Ava in an undated letter preserved in the Foreign Office, Kathmandu.

For Anglo-Burmese strained relations at this time see W. S. Desai, *History of the British Residency in Burma*, 1826-1840 (Rangoon, 1939).

[51] *S.C.*, 22 August 1838, 19-21; *P.C.*, 4 April 1838, 92; *S.C.*, 25 July 1838, 9; *The Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign-India, China and Australasia* (London) XXVII (September-December 1838) 222-4.

[52] *P.C.*, 4 April 1838, 92.

> "with respect to Lahore, it would certainly appear that Ranjit *himself* has dallied with the Durbar and is still doing so, despite his friendly professions to us."[53]

The Nepalese King was reported to have written to Ranjit Singh "that the English and Muslims have now united, the Hindus must look closer to themselves."[54] The war-party in Nepal was enthused over the intelligence sent by Matabar that Dost Muhammad's accession to the Russo-Persian confederacy had greatly alarmed the British, and that Macnaughton, the British political agent at Lahore, had failed in his objects, having been treated by Ranjit Singh in a cavalier fashion.[55] The war-party was pampering the national prejudices against the British and feeding high the presumptions of the young King and his senior queen. These were ominous portents. Hodgson gravely warned:

> "...Should therefore, Ranjit play us false or the emperor of China afford any encouragement to Gurkha aggressions, and should matters not assume a happy aspect in Ava, a rupture with us and expulsion of the Residency must, I fear, be looked for at the hands of the Nepalese.[56]

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[53] *S.C.*, 20 July 1838, 1; 28 November 1838, 41.

[54] *S.C.*, 26 December 1838, 65.

[55] *S.C.*, 21 November 1838, 149.

[56] Resident of Government, 6 July 1838, *S.C.*, 20 July 1838, 1.

From the very outset, Hodgson urged the taking of a "decisive course of action" to stem the rot before it had gone too deep. He was always in favour of get-tough policy to nip the growing anti-British spirit in the bud. Otherwise, he feared, the Durbar

> "will shilly-shally through the cold season and show the cloven foot at its close when any present redress will be impossible to us."[57]

If the British did not restrain the manifestly hostile disposition of the Durbar by political pressure, elaborate and expensive defensive measures would be imperative for guarding against a certain invasion of the Nepalese, he contended. He urged that Matabar should be sent back to Nepal, for his presence at Ludhiana and clandestine intercourse with Lahore and Nepal served to maintain the reality or appearance of intrigues and to exacerbate the restlessness of the Nepalese Durbar. The best expedient to check Nepal was to keep alive her fear of British arms by its occasional display on the Nepalese frontier.[58]

Lord Auckland was totally averse to Hodgson's suggestions, for they seemed to him too provocative, precipitous and, therefore, perilous. He feared that a military demonstration as suggested by Hodgson was certain to give a handle to the war-party, enabling them to unite all against the British; it would not subdue the jingo spirit but aggravate it. When Hodgson had sounded the first note of warning in the beginning of 1837, Lord Auckland had merely shrugged it off as but "alarmist" reports, having no strong foundation. He found no sufficient evidence to credit the alleged bid of Nepal to forge offensive alliances with Lahore, Rajput states and China, nor anything unusual in her policy of non-intercourse with the British. He advised patience and forbearence, for it was the "height of folly" to resort to "demonstration of anger", and hasten thereby an armed reckoning with her which was neither unavoidable nor necessary.[59]

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[57] Same to Same, 24 September 1837, *P.C.*, 9 October 1837, 46.

[58] *S.C.*, 21 November 1838, 150; *P.C.*, 9 October 1837, 46; *S.C.*, 22 August 1838, 27.

[59] Minute of the Governor-General, 3 October 1837, 28 August 1837, *P.C.*, 9 October 1837, 47; 18 September 1837, 72; Colvin (Private Secretary to Lord Auckland) to Resident, 31 August 1837, *P.B.*, Vol. 2, 224, *B.M.A.M.*, 37691.

Warlike preparations in Kathmandu were stepped up commensurate with the aggravation of British troubles in Afghanistan, Burma and China. The unceasing traffic of men and materials of war to the military posts east and west of Kathmandu, the constant exercise of soldiers in the capital, coupled with the contumelious treatment meted out to the Resident, left no doubt as to Nepal's hostile intentions. In fact, the Resident reported that

> "Collision with us (the British) is spoken of as a thing certain to be, without attempt at concealment."[60]

He warned the Government against that

> "the facts and rumours relative to the state of things in Ava, Cabool and Persia, conspiring with the unsettled state of administration here, are producing the worst effect."[61]

Nepal made vigorous attempts to rally the Indian powers against the British. A band of spies was organised by Prabhu Shah, the father-in-law of the King of Nepal, at Gorakhpur with instructions to visit the British cantonments and to send reports on their military preparedness. The deposed Minister, Bhim Sen, volunteered information relating to the Pandes' hope of active assistance from Ranjit Singh and moral countenance from the Chinese Emperor. The arrest of Matabar by the British had thoroughly alarmed Bhim Sen who was eager to convince the Resident that the reported efforts of Matabar to coax the Persians and Afghans to invade India were absolutely baseless.[62]

The Rajput and the Central Indian states, some of them with simmering anti-British feelings, extended a warm welcome to the Nepalese emissaries sent to their courts. The attitude of Raja Man Singh, the ruler of Jodhpur, and of Apa Sahib, the ex-ruler of Nagpur and now a political *emigre* at Jodhpur, called for keenest vigilance. All measures were taken to frustrate the projected escape of Apa Saheb from Jodhpur to Nepal with the connivance of Raja Man Singh and the active assistance of the Nepalese spies. In the Court of Udaipur attempts were made to station an agent of

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[60] *Nepal Summary.*

[61] Resident to Govt., 6 July 1838, *S.C.*, 20 July 1838, 1.

[62] *S.C.*, 22 August 1838, 23.

Nepal as an effective artery of political intercourse between Kathmandu and Chittor.[63]

As for the Mahratta states, an alliance with Sindhia was the most prized object of Nepal. The Nepalese emissaries at Gwalior found Janardan Pandit, the Rajguru, Tantia Sastri, the Naib, Jagannath Sastri and Bhow Dikshit greatly responsive to schemes of hostility towards the British. Encouraged, the King of Nepal sent some more agents with complimentary presents and letters to Sindhia, evincing his desire to revive the long-discontinued political relation between the two states. The attitude of Sindhia himself was, however, one of cool indifference. He not only dismissed the Nepalese agents with studied contempt but was even keen on arresting them. The Resident at Gwalior was confident of Sindhia's fidelity to the British government and absolute apathy to Nepal's overtures. The Gaikwad of Baroda was lukewarm. He was evidently convinced of the grave risk of estranging the British.[64]

In the ex-Peshwa, Baji Rao II, with his rankling grievance against the British, the Nepalese emissaries found the heartiest reception to their project. By lavishly entertaining the Nepalese agents, by despatching his own men to Kathmandu, by promising to help with money, as also by undertaking to enlist the co-operation of Mahratta states, the ex-Peshwa brightened up the hopes of Nepal. Benares became the *rendezvous* of the Nepalese and the Mahratta intriguers, actively engaged to spark off the conflict with the British at the time of *Dusserah,* the time being deemed most propitious. Baji Rao himself contemplated a visit to Mathura, presumably to meet important Nepalese agent.[65]

One Srinivas Rao, suspected to be the agent of Baji Rao, was caught on his way to Kathmandu. Interrogated by the British, he deposed that he had been deputed sometime earlier to Nepal by Baji Rao with the mission of enlisting Nepal's aid in restoring the latter's lost authority. For Nepal's aid Baji Rao was stated to have promised a reward of Rs. two crores. Srinivas Rao further gave out that an agent of Baji Rao had been staying in Ava for the previous five years. Although Srinivas Rao was shortly found to be an "arch imposter" and his deposition utterly unreliable, yet the "chain of evidence" against the ex-Peshwa was otherwise complete enough to convince the British of his active complicity in Nepalese intrigues.[66]

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[63] *S.C.*, 25 July 1838, 7; 1 August 1838, 35-9; 13 June 1838. 8-9; 17 October 1838, 166; *P.C.*, 23 January 1839, 24-36.

[64] *S.C.*, 13 June 1838, 8, 10, 16; 22 August 1838, 40-7; 25 July 1838, 7, 12; 1 August 1838, 35-9; 17 October 1838, 190; 28 November 1838, 41.

[65] *S.C.*, 28 August 1838, 41-4.

Hodgson was greatly alarmed, and naturally so. It was the very development which he had not only foreseen but of which he had forewarned the Government. With greater vehemence he urged the adoption of a stern policy in regard to Nepalese machinations; forbearence and moderation, he held, had utterly failed to curb the intriguing propensities of Nepal. The war-party was exciting the King to expel the Resident immediately as a prelude to an open break with the British. Hodgson's remonstrances with the Durbar had thus proved completely infructuous. It was clear that the Durbar was eagerly awaiting

> "a favourable occasion of open attack on us, in concert with powerful allies which the Durbar fully expects will occur in the coming year or two."[67]

Lord Auckland found himself in a quandary. He was not unaware of the "extremely ramified" intrigues of Nepal through "mysterious" emissaries, aimed undoubtedly at securing allies in aid of contemplated aggression on British territory. He was aware, too, of the warlike feeling running high at Kathmandu and the danger it posed at such critical times. Yet, he felt it imprudent to exert strong political pressure on her, let alone adopt armed measures. Consequently, he elected to temporise, to bide time till his hands were free to deal effectively with the Nepalese menace. His policy of deliberate inaction was governed by the troubles in Afghanistan, Burma, and China, the distressing political situation in various parts of India and the inadequacy of the British army to meet these manifold exigencies. His hands were too full with these pressing cares; naturally he was now eager to avoid an open issue with Nepal.[68]

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[66] *S.C.*, 7 August 1839, 17-20, 22, 25-6.

[67] Resident to Government, 5 August 1838, *S.C.*, 22 August 1838, 7.

[68] Auckland to Hobhouse, 3 June 1838, Auckland to Fane, 21 June 1838, *P.B.*, Vol. 3½, 22, 53, *B.M.A.M.*, 37693; *S.C*, 29 August 1838, 2; *Governor-General to Secret Committee*, 10 September 1838, 21.

As regards the intrigues, the policy adopted by him was one of keen circumspection and sharp vigilance. However disagreeable the intrigues might have been, Auckland still regarded them as

> "rather originating in the struggles of faction than any determined and concerted scheme of hostility to the British power."[69]

It was patent that the Governor-General was deliberately underplaying a grave situation, for the extensive intrigues, viewed in the context of the Durbar's mood, left no doubt about their real object. Lord Auckland found that the intrigues had failed to ripen into any league of hostile powers, although Nepal had been spinning them for long. The Nepalese emissaries were still battering at the doors of the Indian states, most of whom appeared to Lord Auckland rather lukewarm, if not absolutely impervious.[70]

Above all, in June 1838, a treaty of alliance had been concluded with Ranjit Singh, "whereby the British and the Sikh interests had been completely identified."[71] It gave a lie to the floating rumour that Ranjit Singh nursed unfriendly feelings towards the British. With Ranjit Singh being won over by the British, the key-stone of Nepal's intriguing scheme was buffeted out. Preening with satisfaction, the Governor-General noted:

> "the confirmation of British and Sikh alliance is so complete and so notorious that their (Nepalese) failure to attach to their interests the Maharaja of Lahore may be reasonably considered as likely to produce a still great distaste to engage in their cause among the other powers of Hindoostan."[72]

It was further ascertained that Ranjit Singh had taken strong exception to the collusion of the Nepalese agents with Raja Dhian Singh and Matta Singh, as also to their exaggerated reports of his disaffection towards the British and active response to Nepalese overtures. With mingled relief and relish the Governor-General found that "Ranjit's mind is effectually diverted from any Nepalese connections" and the suspected "intimate alliance" of Nepal and Lahore was but idle rumour. Ranjit Singh was kept in good humour, or else, he might give a "renewed activity" to Nepalese intrigues.[73]

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[69] *S.C.*, 17 October 1838, 178; 25 July 1838, 7-8.

[70] *Governor-General's Despatch to Secret Committee,* 5 July 1838, 15; Auckland to Macnaughton, on political mission to Lahore, 11 June 1838, *P.B.*, Vol. 3½, 32, *B.M.A.M.*, 37693.

[71] Govt. to Resident, 30 July 1838, *S.C.*, 17 October 1838, 161.

[72] Govt. to Resident, 5 July 1838, *S.C.*, 12 September 1838, 16.

All this convinced Lord Auckland that it was impolitic and unnecessary to "notice too openly" or to "pry into the details of these intrigues", involving all the Indian states. Resident Hodgson was informed that,

> "To be known to have information directly incriminating Nepal which it might be highly inconvenient for us to use, yet which to abstain from using, might appear justly liable to the imputation of apprehension and weakness, is a position in which, it must be undesirable for our Government to be placed."[74]

The movement of the Nepalese agents was closely watched, but they were neither arrested nor detained, for as

> "we seek not an instant quarrel with Nepal... it has never been permitted that her emissaries should be used roughly in a manner *openly offensive to her*."[75]

Yet it was politic to be on guard. The Indian states were warned against entertaining Nepalese agents; strict watch was kept on the latter's journey to the trans-Indus region. The officers were asked to take "special care" about collecting presumptive evidence of Baji Rao's hostile disposition; all correspondence from and to Bithoor was subjected to "vigilant scrutiny", and even the "apparently trifling events" were carefully probed into. A mild hint was given to Ranjit Singh that the British government disfavoured his flirtations with the Nepalese intriguers.[76]

The situation in the north-west was coming to a head, requiring a great bulk of the British army to be shifted to that quarter. At such a time the attitude of Nepal called for "the most serious reflec-

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73. Colvin to Hodgson, 28 August 1838, *P.B.*, Vol. 4, 62, *B.M.A.M.* 37694; Govt. to Resident, 14 June 1838, *S.C.*, 20 July 1838, 5.

74. Colvin to Hodgson, 2 July 1838, *P.B.*, Vol. 3½, 67, *B.M.A.M.*, 37693; *Governor-General to Secret Committee*, 5 July 1838, 15.

75. Colvin to Hodgson, 28 August 1838, *P.B.*, Vol. 4, 62, *B.M.A.M.*, 37694.

76. Colvin to Macnaughten, 9 June 1838, *P.B.*, Vol. 3½, 30, *B.M.A.M.*, 37693.

tion" of the Government, Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-Chief, held. Nepal's army, 40000 strong and long starved of martial exploits, was restive, eager to descend into the Gangetic plains, "the garden of India", now denuded of soldiers and utterly defenceless and wholly exposed to invasion. He strongly held

> "that the Government of India has needlessly allowed a thorn to grow in her side, which must greatly paralyse her efforts elsewhere and which it behoves her to *pluck out* or *eradicate* at the earliest favourable opportunity."[77]

Nepal's geographical situation was such that clashes with her were certain to affect the adjoining kingdoms of Oudh and the states of Sindhia and Holkar and several other princes, forming a line across the whole of Bengal from the Himalayas to the Narmada. Thus, a war with Nepal would set the whole territory between Bombay and Calcutta ablaze. But the state of affairs, Sir Fane admitted, was such that the British were not in a position even to defend their territory from a likely Nepalese inroad, let alone to undertake offensive measures against them.

With equal insistence the President and the members of the Supreme Council in Calcutta urged that the Government must demand full explanation from the Nepal Durbar of its hostile activities, giving it a firm understanding that the issue of war and peace hinged solely on the nature of its explanation. This was imperative in view of the grave apprehension of a Nepalese breakthrough towards Darjeeling, then inadequately garrisoned.[78] Colonel Monson, a member of Supreme Council, vehemently criticised the soft policy of the Government regarding the Nepalese missions, having avowedly hostile intention — a fact itself justifying preparations for war on the part of the British government. The absolutely defenceless state of the Presidency of Bengal needed the "earliest and most serious consideration" of the Government.

> "the safest means of preventing the invasion of our own provinces would be to attack the Gurkhas in their own country

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[77] Fane to Lord Auckland, 24 June 1838, *S.C.*, 29 August 1838, 3.

[78] Resolution of the President and Members of the Supreme Council, 20 July 1838, *S.C.*, 20 July 1838, 5.

and at their own Capital," Colonel Monson emphatically declared.[79]

Lord Auckland admitted the weight of these suggestions. Yet, his pressing pre-occupations allowed him to adopt nothing but precautionary steps. The strength of the Bengal Native Infantry was augmented; topographical and other pieces of information relating particularly to the military routes to Nepal and her most vulnerable spots were collected through the Resident. An army of observation under General Oglander was posted on the Gorakhpur frontier as a "measure of precaution and activity, if necessary;" a local corps was formed at Darjeeling to watch the events in Eastern Nepal and Sikkim which was strongly suspected of having been won over by Nepal.[80]

These "measures of precaution and preparation", Lord Auckland thought, would suffice. The relation with Nepal were manifestly unfriendly but it appeared to him imprudent to strain those relations abruptly to the breaking point. It was safer to temporise. Lord Auckland noted:

> "Nepal has given us just cause of offence and stands in a position towards us which is not long to be borne. But it would not be wise to seek more than one great military operation at a time, and unless forced to bring matters to an issue, for which I would be prepared, I would bide my time."[81]

Thus, avoidance of an open war at such a critical time was the core of Lord Auckland's policy in Nepal, and in this he relied on Hodgson. Hodgson was warned to refrain from "more busy activity," "to remain a passive but observant spectator" of the events around him, and to "exert the most strenuous and persevering efforts to ward off so serious a contingency" as the breach of even the "nominally friendly" relations between the two governments.[82]

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[79] Minute of Colonel Monson, *S.C.*, 20 July 1838, 5.

[80] Resolution of the Governor-General in Council, 25 June 1838, *S.C.*, 29 August 1838, 4; *S.C.*, 12 September 1838, 1; Colvin to Hodgson, 14 June 1838, 2 July 1838, *P.B.*, Vol. 3½, 41, 67, *B.M.A.M.*, 37693; *S.C.*, 22 August 1838. 9-14; *The Englishman* (Calcutta), 4 July 1838; *Agra Akhbar* (Agra). 13 September 1838.

[81] Auckland to Prinsep, 20 October 1838, *P.B.*, Vol. 4, 164, *B.M.A.M.*, 37694.

The King and his Councillors grew uneasy; they dreaded the precautionary measures adopted by the British as preludes to invasion of Nepal. The King undertook to recall the emissaries and to send a complimentary mission to Calcutta as a token of penitence and effusive cordiality. Hodgson was too shrewd to be taken in by this *volte face* of the Durbar. He kept up the King's fear of British reprisals, for it was this fear, he well knew, that caused this sudden change in the tone of the Durbar. Nepal strengthened her frontier posts in the south and west as a defensive measure; it spread panic in the border and strengthened the rumour that a war was imminent with Nepal. Alarmed, Hodgson, in circular letters, cautioned General Oglander and the Magistrates of Gorakhpur and Bihar districts. This earned him a strong censure of the Government; his alarmist reports, he was told, gave unnecessary, dangerous and rather erroneous publicity to the objects and policies of the Government, and released trepidation along the border. He was sternly told:

> "He (the Governor-General) sees the necessity of watchfulness and of preparation but he sees also the danger of the two countries being, by mistrust, led into a competition of armaments and defiance and from these into mutual provocation and war. His Lordship has every reason to hope that by proper measures on our part, peace may at present be preserved with the Nepalese Court... nothing should be undertaken (beyond such measures of precaution) as are absolutely necessary which may have the effect of forcing an irreconcilable difference to a premature issue."[83]

The British had already launched upon war in Afghanistan; soft-pedalling policy in Nepal was, hence, a painful necessity.

Meanwhile, in the Durbar the war-party under the Pandes had got into stride, and the peace-party, working hand in glove with the Resident, was fast recoiling before the pressure of the jingoists. The dreams of war and plunder went into the head of the King, and the pacific counsels of the Resident seemed a far, faint and futile cry of reason. The intrigues with the Indian states, suspended for a while, were resumed, mostly under cover of bride-seeking missions.[84] The King and the senior queen were anxious to get the heir-apparent wedded, and Hodgson cashed in on this anxiety. He refused to grant passports to these missions until and unless the Durbar desisted from its hostile activities. Hodgson was convinced that

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[82] Govt. to Resident, 5 July 1838, *S.C.*, 12 September 1838, 16; 17 October 1838, 161.

[83] Colvin to Hodgson, 22 October 1838, Vol. 4, 169, *B.M.A.M.*, 37694; Auckland to Hodgson, 16 October 1838, *Ibid.*, 145.

> "So long as the Heir-apparent's marriage is *not* accomplished, so long shall we have a very useful check upon the behaviour of the Durbar."[85]

In February 1839, Bansraj Biswanath was arrested at Benaras on his way to Udaipur. Letters bearing the seal of the Rana of Udaipur and addressed to the King of Nepal were found from his custody, as also a blank paper with the red seal of the King of Nepal on it. Evidently a man enjoying the greatest confidence of the Rana of Udaipur and the King of Nepal, Bansraj was one of the swarms of spies who, in the guise of *Gossains, Pandits* and *Harkaras* came pouring into the plains in one unceasing stream. In one month alone, as many as five hundred Nepalese subjects arrived at Benaras and many more at Patna on pretence of pilgrimage or service; the police averred that never before were the Nepalese seen in such a great number at a particular place or time.[86]

At Benaras, a band of mendicants, called *Paramhangsas*, formed the *"corps de essence"* of espionage, serving as links between the Nepalese intriguers and the influential residents of the city. Commensurate with the deteriorating British relations with Burma, Nepal's intrigues with the Court of Ava increased, so much so that there was grave concern in Calcutta that the rumoured coalition of Nepal and Burma had really been effectuated. The *poojaree* of the temple at Kamakshya and the Raja of Assam were certain accomplices, for they not only entertained the Nepalese and the Burmese agents, but they themselves despatched

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[84] The Nepalese Royal family had its matrimonial relations with the Rajput families in India.

[85] Resident to Govt., 25 November 1838, *S.C.*, 20 January 1839, 44.

[86] *S.C.*, 20 May 1839, 16.

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some emissaries to both Kathmandu and Ava. There were definite evidences to prove Nepal's active bid to incite the Sikkimese and the Bhutanese against the British. Frantic appeals were made to Lhasa and Peking for help.[87]

As these Himalayan states were related to China in a variety of ways, the strained British relations with China were most likely to inflame all of them against the British; the situation in the north-east was thus fast assuming a magnitude very like that in the north-west. Hodgson warned:

> "It would be awkward if all these North-Eastern gentry clubbed together against us in certain possible emergencies."[88]

He bitterly complained that the political officers in the plains had shown "pernicious callousness" in not following the clues and many indications which he had given them; they had wasted many golden chances to intercept the emissaries and, in consequence, much valuable time had been lost. Since no rigorous measure had been taken to curb Nepal's intriguing propensities, it had formed the natural presumption in the Nepalese durbar that the British were too enmeshed in the Afghan troubles to deal with Nepal. Nepal's activities had spread unease in the border; restlessness was patent in Sikkim; insurrection flared up in Bhutan — troubled waters for Nepal to merrily fish in. The King talked openly of holding in his hands the fate of the British in India; he was gloating over the success in winning over the Mahrattas and the Rajputs who, he fondly hoped, would rise at his signal, while the rulers of China and Burma were avowedly sympathetic towards him. People in large numbers were recruited in Bihar and Gorakhpur, presumably to raise a huge army, through agents supposed to be Nepalese, and with money supposed to be ex-Peshwa's.

With greater zeal and greater hope of success, intrigues were resumed with Lahore for an alliance, still a desideratum. Ranjit Singh had died in June 1839, and with him had departed all the

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[87] S.C., 26 December 1839, 124, 127, 137, 140; *Summary of political events in Nepal, Nepal Papers in Cleveland Public Library, Ohio, U.S.A.*, 20-23 January 1840, WQ 091·92 N265.
The Anglo-Chinese war raged in 1839-42.

[88] S.C., 26 December 1839, 127, 136-9; 18 December 1839, 90.

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moderation and sagacity of the Sikh Durbar. His grandson, Nao Nihal Singh, the *de facto* ruler of Lahore, seemed greatly inclined to respond to Nepal's overtures. Matabar Singh had managed to escape to Lahore where he sedulously spun the web of anti-British plots. There were grave reasons to fear that Nepal had won over Sikkim and Bhutan, the one restive and the other seething with political troubles. Kathmandu became, by the middle of 1839, a *rendezvous* of agents from Burma, Gwalior, Satara, Baroda, Jodhpur, Jaipur, Kotah, Bundi, Rewa, Pannah, Lahore, besides many petty states in the Indo-Gangetic plain. Stories of likely combination of the Sikhs, the Mahrattas, the Rajputs, the Chinese, and the Burmese, as also of the Persians, Afghans and the Russians against the British were deliberately floated by the Pandes. Suspicion deepened into conviction that in the ensuing winter a war would break out between Nepal and British India. "Signs of more and more extended combination seemed to multiply around us," Hodgson gravely reported.[89] He strongly criticised the "continued practical acquiescence and lenient and forgiving language" of Lord Auckland's admonition to the King of Nepal. The policy of temporisation had manifestly failed to deliver the goods; only the sternest policy, the policy of like for like or *quid pro quo* could stave off a certain crisis in the Anglo-Nepalese relations. He charged the Government with having been wilfully blind to stark realities which he had not only foreseen but of which he had forewarned them. The latter had not only been impervious to his repeated warnings, but had even censured him as an alarmist. In consequence, the Resident had lost all weight in the Durbar, his repeated remonstrances having been shrugged off as but empty threats; the impression had gained ground that the Resident was not backed by the Governor-general. In a tone ringing with despair Hodgson noted:

> "Yet all my anticipations have been proved but prophetic. Had something been done to stay Nepalese insolence when our hands were free, we might now have been at ease in respect to her, *but now she feels* her advantage and is bent on

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[89] *S.C.*, 18 December 1839, 87-112; 26 December 1839, 124-7, 151; 5 February 1840, 58; 20 November 1839, 73-4; 2 January 1839, 39-44; 7 August 1839, 15-26.

pushing it to the utmost should our trouble increase according to her expectation."[90]

There was now every reason to apprehend that the Nepalese army would sweep over Sikkim and Bhutan, join the hostile Burmese through Assam and expel the Resident. To ward off this imminent peril, Hodgson urged the adoption of "some special and immediate measures of precaution," as garrisoning the military posts of Titalya and Mullaye on the Nepalese border. This should be accompanied by "decided warning and rebuke" of the Governor-General himself to the King of Nepal; this alone would sustain the recoiling peace-party and smother the resurgent Pandes.[91] In the context of the prevalent uneasy feelings in India, the brewing troubles in many states and the deterioration in the British position in the Punjab and the north-west, the extent and the object of the ramified Nepalese intrigues, reflecting the temper of the Durbar, were matters of serious concern, more so when the state of the Indian army was far from re-assuring. These intrigues, Hodgson cautioned the Government, were but

> "important parts of a *system of general intercommunication* between all our evil-wishers, how remote so ever,"

and hence,

> "restrictions of increasing severity upon the Durbar's intercourse with the plains constitute perhaps the true secret ... for controlling its wanton spirit of alienation and hostility towards the paramount government of the plains."[92]

The Government took heed. The summary arrest of all the Gurkhas found without passport in the British territory was ordered as also of all the emissaries of Indian states trying to sneak into Nepal without the requisite authority of the Government. Sterner warning was served to all the Indian states. Lord Auckland in a firm tone admonished the King of Nepal that he would not suffer the King's matrimonial necessities being pressed into political services, prejudicial to British interests.[93]

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[90] Hodgson to Colvin, 30 May 1839, *S.C.*, 26 December 1939, 127; 18 December 1839, 95; Hodgson to Father, July 1839, cited in Hunter, n. 22, 177.

[91] *S.C.*, 26 December 1839, 135.

[92] Resident to Govt., 12 March 1839, *S.C.*, 18 December 1839, 99.

[93] Auckland to King of Nepal, 18 April 1833, *S.C.*, 18 December 1839, 105-7, 97; 20 May 1839, 118.

More active or direct measures, as suggested by Hodgson, were disfavoured by the Government for fear of provoking Nepal. Besides, more frequent apprehension of individuals on mere suspicion was certain to

> "most vexatiously interfere with that freedom of national intercourse which it is the part of our general and commercial policy to encourage with every neighbouring country."[94]

The restrictive measures adopted by the British had a telling effect on the Durbar, although for a while only. The King was as much eager to send the bride-seeking missions to India as the Resident was determined to refuse them the necessary passports. The Resident played on the King's extreme eagerness to get his son wedded, refusing to be coaxed into quiescence by his alternate appeals and admonitions; the marriage missions, Hodgson well knew, were but "idle subterfuge", an admirable expedient for an ulterior end. The Resident was instructed by the Government to withhold the passports till he was convinced that the King's policy had really changed and that he would cease to give any more offence to the British. The King, then in utter obfuscation, was obliged to order the dismissal of all agents of Indian states then in Nepal, and to demonstrate his repentence by despatching a complimentary mission to the Governor-General. Thereafter, passports for marriage missions were given, though most sparingly and reluctantly; the King was positively warned that he should not send these missions to the Indian states lying south of the Jumna.[95]

By the end of 1839, the tone of the Durbar began to ring a little soft, and the war-cry of the Pandes was a whit mellowed. The signal triumph of the British at Ghazni disabused them of the fond expectation of the British *Raj* being at an end; intrigues had failed to ripen into any alliance worth the name; a confederacy of the Indian powers was a mere wishful thinking. To cap all, the dread of British invasion in the approaching cold weather was now a haunting nightmare. The Durbar hastened to undertake afresh —this time by a written engagement—to desist from intriguing activities, as also to allow the Resident to move freely within a radius of twenty miles from Kathmandu—an unprecedented concession.[96] The Durbar even tendered its troops for employment against the Afghans—"a magnificent piece of humbug", to borrow Hodgson's caustic expression.

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[94] Govt. to Resident, 3 June 1839, *S.C.*, 26 December 1839, 120.

[95] *S.C.*, 18 December 1839, 102-7.

Hodgson was too familar with such tactical move of the Durbar to feel smug or complacent. These were valuable concessions indeed, but they had been made not voluntarily but wrung out like "drops of life blood." Not the spirit of contrition but the dread of British arms had impelled the Pandes to make a pretence of burying the hatchet for a while.

> "but at present she consents and signs with the worst will to the work of keeping peace with the British, and she will bolt, if temptation again arise'.[97]

Peace had, at long last, been made with the Durbar; it was but a hollow peace; the Durbar, after ceaseless sniping at the British, needed a breathing spell for more overt hostility in future. Relapse to hostility could be prevented and the Durbar pinned to its "new course" by no other means than a policy of abiding firmness demonstrated by the display of force in the vicinity of Nepal.

Corresponding with their provocative foreign policy, the Pandes carried on a policy of vengeance in regard to their rivals and enemies in Nepal. All classes of nobles were ruthlessly mulcted of their wealth and property to subsidise the grandiose war schemes of the Pandes. This policy of vengeance at home and violence abroad released a strong, though subterranean, wave of indignation in a large section of the nobles, some of whom even contemplated to appeal to the Resident for his intervention. They were concerned that the provocative policy of the Pandes would bring on Nepal the armed invasion of the British. The King's junior queen appealed to the Resident to save her from the machinations of the senior queen.[98] Many nobles even preferred the conquest of Nepal by the British to the continuance of the Pande misrule.

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[96] Translation of an Engagement with the Red seal in the form of a letter from the Raja of Nepal to the Resident, 6 November 1839, *S.C.*, 26 December 1839, 154; Aitchison, n. 19, 68; *Ahadnama*, 1896, Bhadra Vadi 9, Roj 2, *Foreign Office, Kathmandu*. In this document Art. 7 provides for the right of the Resident to move up to a limit of 10 *Kos* beyond the Kathmandu valley. Before this, the Resident was not allowed to move beyond the valley, inspite of his insistence.

[97] Hodgson to Prinsep, 18 October 1839, *S.C.*, 26 December 1839, 149; Same to Maddock, Political Secretary, 8 November 1839, *S.C.*, 26 December 1839, 154.

> "All persons of rank now look to the Company's government and earnestly hope that the Governor-General will ere long be led to address the Raja in such terms as may frighten him with justice at home and abroad and redeem him from the toils of the Ranee [Senior] and Pande[Ranganj Pande] whose unjust and irregular ambition threatened equal mischief to the state in its domestic and in its foreign relations."[99]

Now was, Hodgson held, the opportune time to compel Nepal to "succumb thoroughly and once for all". Her court was divided; the ruling party was greatly unpopular; a section of the nobles covertly pro-British and bitterly hostile to the Pandes; some nobles had been "won by gold".[100] Particulars about the topography and military and other resources of Nepal had already been collected. All this rendered the subjection of Nepal "a comparatively facile achievement". On these grounds Hodgson suggested

> "that if there be any inclination to the other course with Nepal [i.e. war], many circumstances combine to render the present season one of singular advantage to us. If Nepal will not be ruled by advice, she may be humbled, I strongly incline to think, with a speed and certainty that would surprise the world as much as has lately done the acquisition of Afghanistan."[101]

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[98] *S.C.*, 18 December 1839, 82; 26 December 1839, 121.

The senior queen, with the help of her henchmen, the Pandes, was scheming at forcible deposition of the King and the execution of the junior queen and her two sons; the senior queen wanted to set up the Heir-Apparent, her own son, a minor, as the King so that she could rule as the Regent. *S.C.*, 18 December 1830, 115; 26 December 1830, 131.

[99] Resident to Govt., 14 April 1839, 115, *S.C.*, 18 December 1839, 115.

'Many eyes are turned towards the Residency and many prayers put up that the Company may soon attack and take possession of Nepal." *Nepal Summary of events*, September-October 1838, 15-31 August 1838.

[100] Hodgson to Torrens, Offg. Foreign Secretary, 22 July 1839, *S.C.*, 26 December 1839, 138.

[101] Resident to Govt., 8 November 1839, *S.C.*, 26 December 1839, 164.

"Nay, I have been sounded from various quarters, and quasi-tenders of allegiance made to me in the event of war." Hodgson to Maddock 2 December 1839, *Nepal Summary of events*, 4-18 October 1839.

The members of the Supreme Council in Calcutta also strongly felt that it was now imperative to abjure the erstwhile policy of temporisation and forbearance, and resort, instead, to more active interference in the court-politics of Nepal. They felt the urgency of forming or openly countenancing a "British Party" in the Durbar, composed of the senior queen, the Thapas, the Gurus, the Chautarias and all others hostile to the Pandes. This party would act as a counterpoise to the war-party and would temper its hostile propensities. The Councillors strongly held that the Government should demand a drastic change in the Nepalese administration or else they should be fully prepared for an armed invasion of Nepal. A change in Nepal's policy should be "compulsorily exacted", if she were to be reduced "to the footing of a faithful and useful ally". With wars in Afghanistan and China, and an imminent showdown with Burma, the British rule in India was approaching a crisis with its future itself at stake. Before such a crisis befell, it was prudent to settle accounts with Nepal, by either crushing her by arms or rendering her innocuous by political means. It was "absolutely fatal" to let "the most formidable power" to vent its "decidedly hostile" spirit on the weakest and the richest part of British India at this critical time. The Councillors confidently held that Nepal could be reduced in one single campaign in one season, and that she would be a very profitable acquisition.[102]

Lord Auckland had for long realised the gravity of the situation. He clearly saw Nepal's abiding hostility masqueraded as disavowals of ill-feeling, and, occasional effusive cordiality. He realised, too, that the wars in Afghanistan and China had keyed up Nepal's bellicose spirit, and that a war with her could not be avoided for long. He was aware too that,

> "Our next war with Nepal must be a war of conquest and must not be entered on until after much accurate examination and perfect preparations. We have more pressing cares before us and must not attempt too many things at once."[103]

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[102] Minutes of the President and Members of the Supreme Council, S.C., 18 December 1839, 67-75.

[103] Auckland to W. Bayley, 23 January 1840, *P.B.*, Vol. 9, 7, *B.M.A.M.*, 37698.

Nepal was certainly a thorn in the side of the British dominion in India, but not one of "active and immediate peril." It was, to him, "wholly improbable" that single-handed she would hazard an open rupture with the British; nor was there any likelihood of a coalition of Indian powers under her guidance and inspiration. It could be hoped that the internal dissensions would keep her engrossed for some time, while a British invasion was certain to unite all the parties, now squabbling for power, against the British. As for the "British Party", Lord Auckland was manifestly sceptical, for

> "though all in their turn might try to use us for the sake of rising to power, we can look to no consistent and faithful support from any of them."[104]

If such a party were created by the British, the latter would have to protect it against all odds. It was, evidently, an onerous obligation which the pressing cares of the British did not warrant undertaking. Such overt interference in the internal affairs of a foreign court was "clearly inconsistent with the principle and right", so long as there had not been an open break with that court. The British might then be justly accused by the King of Nepal of clandestine intrigues with parties in his court—a deed which the British government itself charged him with doing in Indian states, acknowledging British paramountcy."[105]

Besides, a war with Nepal was certain to spark off a war with Burma with whom she had reportedly reached an understanding.[106] Even a more drastic policy regarding the intrigues was risky, for all the Indian states were strongly suspected to be in a state of sullen ill-will. In Hyderabad there was a nascent revival of Wahabism; a widely-ramified plot was unearthed there, with

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[104] Auckland to President in Council, 18 July 1839, 2 September 1839, *S.C.*, 18 December 1839, 68, 73.

[105] Auckland to Robertson, 17 July 1839, Same to J. C. Robertson, 12 July 1839, Same to Carnac, 13 July 1839, P.B., Vol. 6, 382-3, 178, 159-60, *B.M.A.M.*, 37696; Auckland to Hobhouse, 13 October 1838, *P.B.* Vol. 4 138, *B.M.A.M.*, 37694; Governor-General to Secret Committee, 7 February 1839, 3.

[106] "We may hold it as certain that we shall not have a Burmese without also having a Nepalese war." Auckland to Hobhouse, 18 June 1839, P.B., Vol. 6, 102, *B.M.A.M.*, 37696; Auckland to Carnac, 30 June 1839, *Ibid.*, 138.

Prince Mubarizuddaullah as its arch accomplice. The rulers of Lahore, Baroda, Rohilkhand, Rampur, Panna, Bhopal, Satara, Jodhpur, and others were suspected as active coadjutors. The conspirators contemplated a simultaneous attack on Allahabad, Kanpur, Meerut, Delhi and Muttra.[107] The Government did not take the matter very seriously, for the suspected unity of the Indian powers was too ill-assorted, and their project too amorphous for success. With sharp religious differences, acute discord and mutual rancour, and lack of identity of interests, it was impossible for the Indian states to be politically united, and hence, the idea of their military combination is in itself absurd", the Foreign Secretary confidently asserted.[108]

In so far as almost all the Indian states were in varying degrees of restlessness,[109] it was impolitic to take too stringent measures against all, for such a policy involved much wastage of time and betrayed nervous weakness on the part of the British government.

> "I am decidedly opposed to a course of policy which would involve the Government in minute and extensive scrutinies into supposed ramifications of vague and incoherent plots," Lord Auckland emphatically declared.[110]

Besides, Lord Auckland had "perfect confidence" in the rulers of Oudh, Gwalior, Nagpur and Hyderabad, "and all others are inconsiderable."[111]

To the members of the Supreme Council this policy amounted to impolitic underestimation of the magnitude and imminence of a certain danger. Lord Auckland, they held, had so long soft-pedalled Nepal, but to no purpose; his policy had not tempered Nepal's hostile attitude but had intensified it. With greater vehemence the Councillors noted:

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[107] *S.C.*, 12 June 1839, 10-15; 9 May 1839, 22-31.

[108] Offg. Secretary with Governor-General to Prinsep, Offg. Secretary, Secret and political department, 25 April 1839, *S.C.*, 12 June 1839, 10.

[109] There was no fear of universal and active feeling of aversion to the British rule, but the Indian people were, generally speaking, without sympathy for the British government, Lord Auckland conceded. Minute of the Governor-General, 22 April 1839, *Ibid.*, 12.

[110] Minute of Lord Auckland, *Ibid.*

[111] Auckland to Hobhouse, 10 May 1839, *Hobhouse Papers, B.M.A.M.*, 36474, 3.

> "We have little hesitation in declaring that there appears to us to be no security for the stability of the British empire in India, so long as the power of Nepal remains unreduced... an operation which in comparison with a war either beyond Indus or in Ava would cost but little and which would contribute more than anything else to place us in a position calculated to secure to England the undisturbed possession of India for ages to come."[112]

Now was the time for drastic action; now or never. To this Lord Auckland replied:

> "I have no hesitation in recording my decided opinion that we ought not to court the risk of a war with Nepal in the approaching season", for "I do not share an acute apprehension of immediate danger from the government of Nepal. I by no means regard that power as likely to venture an assault upon us on the plains under any circumstances of which we can at this time contemplate the probability."[113]

He strongly deprecated the "tendency to over-alarm" for he was sure that Nepal would "bark long before she ventures a bite." Hence, he stuck to the "policy of peace and patience."[114]

In February 1840, Ranjang Pande was confirmed as Minister. The Jingo spirit in the Durbar reached its acme now, the Engagement of November 1839 was honoured more in breach than observance; the difficulties of Hodgson became acutest and the danger of the British government gravest. With the absolute preponderance of the Pandes, the Indo-Nepalese relations, precariously maintained over successive crises, seemed destined to a violent breach.

Intrigues with the Indian states suspended awhile, were resumed with renewed zeal, though under more delusive pretences. News of Russian advance to Khiva was hailed with delight; British hostility with China was a welcome development, and the widening rift between the Sikhs and the British animated the hope of a

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[112] President in Council to Governor-General, 9 October 1839, *S.C.*, 18 December 1839, 74.

[113] Governor-General to President in Council, 2 September 1839, *Ibid.*, 73.

[114] Colvin to Captain Jenkins, 30 July 1839, *P.B.*, Vol. 6. 206, *B.M.A.M.*, 37696.

Lahore-Nepal league. Emissaries continued to pass from one state to another with invitations matrimonial in appearance but political in intent. Attempts were made to tamper with the Gurkhas in the Indian army, as also to stir up disaffection among the Rajas and zamindars of Bihar and the north-western province.[115]

In April 1840 a band of Gurkha soldiers broke into the Ramnagar estate, in Champaran district, already escheated to the British government, and laid hold on 91 villages by forcible occupation.[116] Preparations for war were stepped up in Nepal and attempts were made to set the frenzied soldiers upon the Resident who had hitherto foiled all the efforts of the Durbar to rouse the Indian states against the British. Wild cries as

> "down with the Chiefs, down with the *Feringhees,* we will be Chiefs ourselves, we will have back our old territories, we will conquer to the Ganges", reverberated in the Capital.[117]

Hodgson's reaction could easily be imagined. He was now convinced that nothing but the removal of the hostile war-party from power could mend matters.

Lord Auckland was naturally uneasy, poised between two opposing considerations, the imperative need for, and the grave risk of a decisive action in regard to Nepal. It seemed that the policy of masterly inaction had run its course. The attitude of Nepal, viewed in the context of Ramnagar outrage, attempts on the Residency and the bellicose temper of the war-party, vindicated the repeated assertions of Hodgson.

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[115] *S.C.,* 5 February 1840, 55-62; 31 August 1840, 80; 10 August 1840, 89-92; 14 September 1840, 90; 3 August 1840, 4-6; *Bengal Political Proceedings,* 4 May 1840, 16-8; 15 June 1840, 1; *The Asiatic Journal,* n. 51, XXXIII, (September-December 1840) 202.

[116] Joint Magistrate, Champaran to Resident and Govt., 12 August 1840, *District Records of Champaran: Letters Issued* (*D.R.C.L.I.*), Vol. 17; *S.C.,* 8 June 1840, 131; 29 June 1840, 88-9; 27 July 1840, 99-104; 17 August 1840, 69-86; 31 August 1840 78-81; *Bengal Judicial Proceedings: Criminal Branch* (*B.J.P.C.*), 9 June 1840, 72-7; Chautaria Pushkar Shah to Jasbeer Rana and Bakhtbeer Rana (Leaders of the Gurkhas occupying the Indian villages), 1897, Jyestha Sudi 4, Roj 4, *Private Collection of Baburam Acharya, Kathmandu.*

[117] *S.C.,* 20 July 1840, 59; Oldfield, n. 1, 318-9.

Active deliberations were hence set afoot in Calcutta to formulate such a plan of campaign as would bring the inevitable war with Nepal to "a most prompt and successful issue". It was planned to launch a direct attack on Kathmandu with a mixed corps of European and Native Regiments, numbering in all twenty thousand regulars, moving from Tirhut and Sarun frontier. The objects of the war were not to crush the nation, but to overthrow the warlike regime and replace it by an administration peaceful and friendly to the British.[118]

The Councillors were eager for war; the Press was fretting;[119] Hodgson was expectant; only Lord Auckland was calmly anticipating a timely submission of the Nepalese Durbar. The clink of arms excited all, but Lord Auckland, stewed in the Afghan juice, heard in it an ominous ring. He fondly hoped that Nepal would be scared by the stern admonition of the British government, and that the war could still be avoided.[120] His hope was not oversanguine. His military preparations had thoroughly alarmed the King. The latter withdrew the troops from the Ramnagar estate, vacating the occupied lands. The immediate *casus belli* was gone; Lord Auckland sighed a breath of relief. Yet, as a measure of precaution, the show of military preparations was kept up on the Nepal frontier.[121] It served as an admirable scarecrow to cow Nepal to quiescence.

Meanwhile, British relations with the Lahore Durbar worsened; the issue of the passage of the British troops through the Punjab reinforced the mutual bitterness. The Sikhs were sulky, hatching intrigues.[122] Nao Nihal Singh and Raja Dhian Singh, the two strongest men in the Durbar, were far from apathetic to Nepalese overtures for an alliance. Their attitude was in marked contrast to that of Ranjit Singh. The latter was, generally speaking, cautious and circumspective in regard to Nepal-Lahore alliance; he dallied with it, but he was

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[118] *S.C.*, 31 August 1840, 86, 14 September 1840, 1-2; 26 September 1840, 2-6; Colvin to Hodgson, 28 August 1840, *P.B.*, Vol. 12, *B.M.A.M.*, 37701.

[119] *Agra Akhbar*, 4 June 1840, 23 August 1840, 5 September 1840; *Delhi Gazette*, 9 September 1840; *Samachar Darpan* (Serampore) 26 October 1840.

[120] Auckland to Hobhouse, 15 August 1840, *P.B.*, Vol. 12, 42, *B.M.A.M.*, 37701.

[121] Colvin to Hodgson, 28 August 1840; Same to E. C. Ravenshaw, Magistrate of Chuprah, 13 September 1840, *Ibid.*, 196; *B.J.P.C.*, 22 September 1840, 24-7; *S.C.*, 24 August 1840, 104.

[122] *P.B.*, Vol. 12, 158, 185, 284, 300, *B.M.A.M.*, 37701; Kaye, n. 26, 502.

> "much too shrewd to trade the advantage of a British alliance for the dubious guarantee of a connection with Nepal."[123]

After his death missions were exchanged between Kathmandu and Lahore with greater frequency; Lahore was eager to employ the Gurkhas in the Khalsa army, and Nepal ready to supply them. Matabar Singh was brought out of his erstwhile "obscurity", and Nao Nihal Singh settled a pension on him, giving him hopes of employment in the Sikh army. Raja Dhian Singh, Bhai Ram Singh, Lehna Singh and Devi Singh buoyed up the hope of Matabar Singh of accomplishing the much-desired alliance.[124]

Lord Auckland was alive to the menace of Lahore-Nepal league. Yet he felt it unwise to press the obdurate Sikhs too hard to abandon their flirtations with the Nepalese. He was wholly opposed "to attach undue weight" to the intrigues of these Courts, for they were "occurrences which are to be expected in an Asiatic Court." He felt that the war-party in its own interest was giving widest possible publicity to the Lahore-Nepal alliance, and consequently, the appearance of Lahore's willingness for such a project had far outgrown its reality. Notwithstanding the Jammu Rajas' keenness, the Lahore Durbar, for its part was still wavering and indecisive; a streak of mingled misgiving and hesitancy was clearly discernible; the risk of an overtly anti-British alliance seemed to balance the temptation it offered. Hence, a mild warning alone was given to Lahore,

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[123] R. A. Huttenback, "Gulab Singh and the creation of the Dogra state of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh," *The Journal of Asian Studies* (Ann Arbor, Michigan) 20:IV (August, 1961) 476-88: *S.C.*, 27 April 1840, 119.

[124] *S.C.*, 17 August 1840, 79-82; 27 April 1840, 12-3, 119; 26 October 1840, 138; Ganda Singh, ed., *The Punjab in* 1839-40 (*Selections from the Punjab Akhbars, Punjab intelligence etc.*, Patiala, 1952), 172, 178, 188, 193, 199, 244, 247, 249-50; I. B. Banerji, "Nao Nihal Singh and the Nepalese Mission to Lahore," *I.H.R.C.*, XXII (October, 1945) 17 et seq.

"that the maintenance of any close intercourse with the Sovereign of Nepal would therefore ill accord with the duty and the interest of the Lahore state."[125]

Nepal made one more effort, a more daring one, to win over Lahore. In August 1840, Karbeer Khattree, an experienced Nepalese spy, was sent with a draft treaty of alliance, written by the King himself, to Benares. There he was to meet Attar Singh, an influential *Sardar* of Lahore. The treaty was to be finalised by both these persons. Should Karbeer be intercepted by the British, Attar Singh, provided with a similar draft by the Lahore Durbar, would go to Kathmandu. Karbeer escaped from Kathmandu with the Resident's passport after having deluded him by a cock and bull story. He coaxed the Resident to wink at his mission, which, he assured the Resident, was just a ruse to wheedle the Pandes, his deadliest enemies, and to escape from their clutches. Once out of Nepal, Karbeer convinced Hodgson, he would assist the British in all possible ways so as to ruin the Pandes. Hodgson, for himself, smelled no rat, for his acquaintance with Karbeer was of long standing; he knew Karbeer as one of the many chiefs chafing under the yoke of the Pandes and keenly desiring their overthrow. Besides, Hodgson himself had helped Karbeer's family to escape from Nepal, with fear of vengeance at the hands of the Pandes haunting them.[126]

No sooner had Karbeer reached Benaras than the real nature of his mission was revealed. Karbeer, along with his agents, was immediately arrested. From his person was found, besides the draft treaty, *khareeta* of the King of Nepal to his counterpart in Lahore. Similar missives were found addressed to the Queen of Lahore and the principal officers as Attar Singh, Dhian Singh and Govind Ram. There were, besides, letters addressed to Matabar Singh and some influential persons at Lucknow, Kumaon, Ambala and Benaras. The circumstantial evidences were too strong to prove Nepal's malicious designs; the extent of Lahore's complicity in these designs was also patent as never before. It was clear that the mission "must have had the distinct sanction and encouragement of the Court of Lahore." Lord Auckland who was hitherto averse to attach "too great an importance" to the reports of these intrigues, was constrained to

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[125] Torrens, Offg. Political Secretary to Clerk, Political Agent at Ludhiana, 1 June 1840, 4 June 1840, P.B., Vol. 11, 12, 30, *B.M.A.M.*, 37700; Auckland to Hobhouse, 11 May 1840. P.B., Vol. 10, 79, *B.M.A.M.*, 37699.

[126] *S.C.*, 31 August 1840, 71.

> "believe much more in an inclination at Lahore to intrigue with Nepal; for there is far more sympathy in politics, habits and religion between the two nations, and it is difficult to believe that the letters which were seized upon Karbeer Khattree at Benares were not looked for by Attar Singh and written to meet the known inclinations of some of these to whom they were addressed at Lahore."[127]

More decisive step was, hence, a compelling necessity. The first move was towards Matabar. He was the king-pin of Nepal-Lahore intrigue, being esteemed highly in the influential quarters of Lahore. He was a valuable political weapon which could be profitably used against Nepal, if such a contingency ever arose. He was an inveterate enemy of the Pandes, the ruling party in Nepal; he was ready to serve any cause which would destroy them. The Pandes, on their part, were morbidly afraid that he would go over to the English to wreak his vengeance on them (Pandes). They had, hence, kept his family as hostage at Kathmandu. Matabar was fearful that his family would be tortured by the vengeful Pandes; Matabar had even implored the Resident, through agents, to save his children at Kathmandu, and if possible, to smuggle them out of Nepal. More recently he found himself in financial straits at Lahore, in spite of the stipend. He had even appealed to the British Political Agent at Ludhiana to help him in getting an allowance from the British Government. Matabar was getting gradually low in spirits; the thought of the fate of his family sat heavily on his troubled mind. All these suggested the propriety and feasibility of winning him over to the British side.[128] In fact, Hodgson had already suggested that,

> "In the too probable event of a war with Nepal, Matabar Singh's services would be of extreme value to us... for not

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[127] Auckland to Hobhouse, 20 November 1840, *P.B.*, Vol. 13, 99, *B.M.A.M.*, 37702; S.C., 21 September 1840, 138; 16 November 1840, 73; 14 December 1840, 88-95.

[128] S.C., 21 September 1840, 100; 29 June 1840, 85.

Matabar's prestige and influence at Lahore waned when, contrary to the expectation, he failed to forge an alliance between Lahore and Nepal. The

> to mention the energy of his character, he is now looked upon as in some sort, the head of his late exiled party i.e., the Thapas."[129]

Matabar had intimate knowledge of the passes and routes of Nepal; his popularity in the Nepalese army was immense.

> "Such a man being merely shown in front of our ranks or being but known to be there would half paralyse the army of Nepal in the act of striking."[130]

At any rate, the knowledge that Matabar was an ally of the British would greatly restrain the Pandes from persisting in their policy of sniping at the British.

Matabar was assured that the Resident would take personal interest in his family at Kathmandu. He was promised suitable reward for helping the British against the Pandes, his deadliest enemies. Assurances of a secure living and the temptation of a reward led Matabar to accept the British overture. He lived hereafter at Ludhiana, suffering the life of a stipendiary kept in close surveillance.[131] On representation by the British, the Nepalese agents were dismissed from the Lahore court; Maharaja Kharak Singh asked the King of Nepal to refrain from keeping up intercourse with Lahore, except through the British Government, to whom the Sikhs were attached by a "firm friendship and alliance."[132]

Meanwhile, Hodgson had gone far in creating, with the nobles hostile to the Pandes, a party well disposed towards the British; this party, with the instigation of the Resident, sought to overthrow the Pandes from power.[133] Hodgson played upon the

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Sikhs clearly saw that the Nepalese were just beating in the air, and that their government was rent with discords. The Pandes were neither known nor esteemed at Lahore. They had to acquiesce in the King's dependence on Matabar for effectuating the alliance. Though "disliked", Matabar was "indispensable". *S.C.*, 21 September 1840, 142.

[129] Resident to Govt., 27 January 1840, *S.C.*, 18 February 1840, 67.

[130] *Ibid.*, *S.C.*, 29 June 1840, 85.

[131] *S.C.*, 29 June 1840, 85-7.

[132] *S.C.*, 23 November 1840, 64.

[133] *Nepal Summary*, 1-13 August 1840.

acute rivalry among various elements in the Durbar and assured the peace-party of all help for seizing power. It is the persuasion of these peace loving nobles, coupled with the pressure of the Resident and his own morbid fear of British reprisals that led the chicken-hearted King to undertake to abide by the engagement of 1839, as also to desist from intriguing with Lahore and other Indian states. The King was now increasingly aware that the schemes of the Pandes were illusory and their *modus operandi* extremely hazardous. In utter panic, the King was disposed to dismiss the Pandes whose unpopularity at home kept pace with that abroad; their provocative foreign policy was certain to culminate in a fatal war with the British.[134]

The British took full advantage of the situation, "when the palace is yet more divided, the Chiefs far more openly disgusted, and the army half organised,"[135] besides.

> "there being a large and distinguished portion of the chieftaincy which would be now glad to find honourable safety under the aegis of the predominant influence, though not of the direct dominion of the British Government."[136]

Accordingly, Lord Auckland in a sternly-worded *khareeta* asked the King to bring about an "entire change" in the administration "as shall conduce to the prosperity of the Nepal state itself, while giving security to the adjoining territories." To add to the King's fear, a corps under Colonel Oliver was moved closer to the Nepal frontier as an army of observation. That dished the lot.[137]

On 1 November 1840, Ranjang Pande was deposed, followed shortly by his cohorts. A pro-British noble and a prominent member of the peace party, Choutaria Fateh Jang Shah, was then made Minister. The latter, with Hodgson's active help, soon set up a regime under the "moral aegis" of the British government and the protective influence of the Resident—a regime amenable to

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[134] S.C., 5 October 1840, 153-4; 26 October 1840, 128, 135; Auckland to Hobhouse, 19 October 1840, *P.B.*, Vol. 13, 11, *B.M.A.M.*, 37702.

[135] Resident to Govt., 3 July 1840, *S.C.*, 20 July 1840, 59.

[136] Same to Same, 22 September 1840, *S.C.*, 5 October 1840, 153.

[137] Govt. to Resident, 28 October 1840; Lord Auckland to Raja of Nepal, 26 October 1840, *S.C.*, 26 October 1840, 134-5; Same to Same, 2 November 1840, *P.B.*, Vol. 13, 60, *B.M.A.M.*, 37702.

British wishes and conducive to their interests.[138] It was acknowledgedly a *pis aller*, a political expedient to weather a crisis; but it was designed, as Hodgson, its author, himself admitted, to be a nucleus of British influence in the Nepalese Durbar.[139] The pro-British regime lasted for almost three years, during which the predominant influence of the Resident kept Nepal thoroughly subdued, leaving no scope for indulgence in machinations with Indian states.[140]

Matabar received the news of the formation of a pro-British ministry in Nepal in the coolest grace. This shattered his hope of going back to Nepal and assume supreme power with the help of the British, his recent allies. He found to his utter dismay that the latter had given him only false promises to grind their own political axe; they had neither rescued his children from Kathmandu nor evinced any inclination to back up his bid for power. A rankling grievance of being thoroughly duped by the British made him restive; he resumed his intriguing pursuits. He started from Ludhiana a systematic vilification campaign against the new regime at Kathmandu, branding the ministers as minions of the British, the proverbial Trojan horses, traitors to the country. He sought to excite the King's jealousy and fear of the ministers and to persuade him to depose them. He gave himself out as the King's most loyal servant, the only man who could foil the devious designs of the British. In a secret petition to the King Matabar sought to convince the latter of his persistent efforts to win over Lahore at a grave risk to his own life itself. He wrote that Sher Singh and Dhian Singh were extremely eager for the alliance, realising that

> "there is old friendship between the Sikhs and the Gurkhas; now is the time for Nepal to rise. Unless both Sikhs and Gurkhas rise together, nothing effectual will be done."[141]

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[138] *Nepal Summary*, November 1840, *S.C.*, 23 November 1840, 130.

[139] Resident to Govt., 22 June 1842, *S.C.*, 7 September 1842, 88.

[140] On this point see Hodgson's letters to various persons in *Hodgson Mss. Bodeleian Library, Oxford* (*H.M.B.L.*) Vols. 9, 10 and 16. See also *Notes On the Services of B. H. Hodgson, Collected by a Friend* (Calcutta, 1883).

[141] Petitions of Exul (Matabar) to King and Queen of Nepal, October 1841, *S.C.*, 28 February 1842, 67.

Sher Singh was stated to have been willing to pay for forty to fifty thousand Nepalese soldiers for two years. Matabar entreated the King to employ his good offices to effect his (Matabar's) release from the close surveillance of the British. Once freed from the British clutches, he would form the Sikh-Nepal alliance in a couple of months; and even if he failed to remove the Residency from Kathmandu, he would "at least restore things to the state they were at Bhim Sen's time." As an evidence of his loyalty to his country, he declared that he had spurned the offer of Rupees twenty thousand which the British had made, should he lead the British army massed in the Tarai into Nepal. The King was exhorted to take full advantage of British plight in Afghanistan and China and to reciprocate the Lahore Durbar's extreme eagerness for this alliance.[142]

The British totally discounted the rumoured eagerness of the Sikhs for an alliance with the Nepalese. It was more probable that Matabar was "reviving the semblance of reality" of the alliance with a view as much to deluding the King of Nepal as to utterly discrediting the new ministers. Matabar was trying to animate the King's fondness for intrigues and to augment his own importance as the most efficient agent for the purpose. It was evident that Matabar would persevere in his pursuits

> "the more recklessly in proportion as he finds that we cannot and will not fulfil his aspiring aims at power and revenge . . . his sole chance of deluding his own sovereign is in the character of a successful negotiator with Lahore."[143]

In fact, Matabar's proceedings were highly suspicious and, hence, called for strictest watch. His political intercourse with the King was carried on beneath the profuse professions of friendship with the British. He sought to disabuse the British of their suspicion of Sikh-Nepalese coalition by impressing on them that notwithstanding the keenness of the Pandes, the Sikhs were reluctant to stake their long-standing amity with the British for the dubious advantage of alliance with "so inefficient and poor a government as Nepal has for years been."[144] The British political agent at Ludhiana was convinced that Matabar was in a difficult position; he was inclined to the view that Matabar was playing a subtle diplomatic rope trick, by wheedling the Pandes into the belief that the Sikhs were agreeable to the contemplated league, and that he was sincerely trying for it.

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[142] *Ibid.*

[143] Resident to Clerk, 9 April 1842, *S.C.*, 3 August 1842, 70.

[144] Clerk to Govt., 23 November 1840, *S.C.*, 21 December 1840, 96.

> "Having now seen a good deal of Matabar Singh", Clerk noted, "I am strongly impressed with the belief that his dominant desire is to serve his own interests and avenge himself on the Pandes by any means; that the means he would prefer as most prompt and affording him the best security for the future would be to precipitate hostilities between the British government and Nepal, he exerting himself on our side, but that failing his hope of reaching his aim, he would gladly avail himself of those means which a league prompted by himself between Lahore and Kathmandu might be effected by his party, afford of lifting him into power."[145]

The British could hardly be duped by Matabar's deft political game. More rigorous surveillance was imposed on him, and shortly after he was shifted to Simla. The only feasible political expedient to mollify his restlessness was to allow his children to join him at Simla. Lord Ellenborough, who succeeded Lord Auckland, was opposed to the latter's Nepal policy.[146] Matabar's position seemed to him absolutely "anomalous"; it was an odd policy, he held, to maintain with a huge subsidy a man who had no bones about his hostility towards the British, or at any rate, who was seeking to grind nothing but his own personal axe. Lord Ellenborough was, hence, keen on setting Matabar free; he even instructed the Resident to sound the Durbar if it would give a guarantee of Matabar's personal safety at Kathmandu.[147] Hodgson vehemently opposed Matabar being set free, for

> "So long as Exul (Hodgson's pseudonym for Matabar) remain with us, we retain in the event of rupture with Nepal,

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145. *Ibid.*

146. On this point see *H.M.B.L.*, Vols. 9, 10 and 16; *Notes on the Services of B. H. Hodgson*, n. 140; Hunter, n. 22, 204; A. Law, ed., *India Under Lord Ellenborough* (London. 1926) 26 et seq.; Lord Colchester, ed., *History of Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough in his correspondence with the Duke of Wellington* (London, 1874); *Governor-General to Secret Committee*, 8 July 1842, 21. Ellenborough recalled Hodgson in December 1843.

147. Govt. to Resident, 28 April 1842, *S.C.*, 3 August 1842, 73.

a valuable instrument to facilitate her punishment. If peace were maintained with Nepal under Kela Pande guidance, the counterpoise of the Thapas, of whom Exul is the head, might be beneficial."[148]

An extremely ambitious, revengeful and choleric character Matabar could rest contented with nothing but supreme and exclusive power as Bhim Sen enjoyed. It was certain that he would be disagreeable to the ruling ministers; his impulsive and insolent nature was certain to alienate all elements, and his vaulting ambition would unleash party strifes and their inevitable concomitants, blood-baths; the political set up admirably serving the British interest would thus be rent asunder; Indo-Nepalese relations would relapse to the same dangerous state as before.

These were weighty arguments; Lord Ellenborough revised his decision;[149] Matabar was retained under British custody till April 1843, when, following the complete change in British government's Nepal policy, he was freed and allowed to return to Nepal. In December 1843 Matabar became the Minister of Nepal.[150]

Stringent measures against Matabar were all the more needed for there was a strong belief that the Jammu Rajas were keen on enlisting his services in their war with Tibet. The Sikhs were by 1841-2 masters of Ladakh, and were carrying fire and sword into western Tibet. The Jammu Rajas were trying to link up Nepal and Ladakh by a chain of forts. George Clerk, the political agent at Ludhiana, cautioned the Government that

> "it can never be safe for the Government of India to allow the approximation to Nepal of any other powerful and aspiring hill state."[151]

The gradual advance of the Sikh territory along the British frontier, as evidenced by their occupation of Mandi, invasion of Kulu, and the demonstration against Bushire, tended to give validity to this apprehension. A junction of Sikh-Nepalese territories would "grievously and durably" affect the British interests at Kumaon, the recovery of which formed one of the most cherished desires of Nepal.[152]

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[148] Resident to Govt., 20 August 1842, *S.C.*, 5 October 1842, 142.

[149] *S.C.*, 3 August 1842, 72-3, 85-6; 28 February 1842, 67.

[150] J. T. Wheeler, *Diary of Events in Nepal*: 1841 to 1846 (Calcutta, 1878) 31.

[151] Enclosure to Secret letter from India, Vol. LXXIX, 1841, Thomason to Lushington, 1 September 1841, India Office Library, London, Cited in Huttenback, n. 123; *S.C.*, 4 October 1841, 40; 11 October 1841, 46-9.

The Sikh-Nepalese war keyed up the ebbing excitement in Nepal; she was eager to join the war and make political capital thereof. Ladakh appealed to Nepal for military help against the Sikhs, who in their turn, sought Nepal's aid against Tibet. Nepal was in a fix. If she helped the Sikhs, she could hope to be rewarded with a part of the coveted western Tibetan territory. But alignment with Lahore was risky, for Tibet being a tributary of China, the latter might intervene on her behalf. Neither Tibet nor China desired Nepal's unwarranted interest in the Sikh-Tibetan war; both had deep distrust of Nepal; both were alive to Nepal's eagerness to exploit the situation.[153]

The King of Nepal even sounded the Resident if he would help the Sikhs against the Tibetans, the allies of China, with whom the British were having war. Hodgson turned down the overture, warning the king that the British disapproved of the Sikh invasion of Tibet, and that

> "We had no desire to do injury to China in any quarter, and should willingly desist from our compulsory operations in China proper so soon as justice had been rendered to us."[154]

The British were concerned for three reasons: First, the Sikh-Tibetan war had set off disquiet in the hill states of the Himalayas; Secondly, it had given fresh impetus to Nepal's bellicose spirit; thirdly, it was likely that China, Tibet's overlord, would intervene on the latter's behalf. The appearance of China in close proximity to Nepal would aggravate the latter's hostile attitude towards the British. Besides, Sikh-Nepalese coalition against Tibet would rouse many Himalayan states having complex ties with Tibet and China. Thus, there was great risk of the British being involved

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[152] Minute of Lt. Governor of N.W.P., *S.C.*, 11 October 1841, 49.

[153] *S.C.*, 1 February 1841, 61; 11 October 1841, 89-91; 19 October 1841, 55; 21 June 1841, 67-70; 12 April 1841, 143-4; 31 May 1841, 154; *Nepal Summary*, 1-15 May 1841, 18-29 May 1841.

[154] *S.C.*, 3 January 1842, 128.

> "in a labyrinth of trans-Himalayan politics, the clue to which may be difficult to find, and unprofitable to use when found."[155]

Pressure was brought to bear upon the Lahore Durbar to call off the invading Sikh army, for its activity had greatly harmed British commercial interests in the Punjab hill states. Hodgson kept a rigid control over the state of affairs at Kathmandu. The King was warned against taking undue interest in the war. Hodgson was confident that so long as the pro-British ministry was in power there was no fear of Nepal's joining either the Sikhs or the Tibetans in the war. The Sikh-Tibetan war could not assume greater complexity due greatly to the effective restraint of Nepal by the British.[156]

By the end of 1843, the greatest crisis in British rule had been over. Afghanistan was quiet and Burma relatively less bellicose; the Indian states were quiescent. Restlessness in Nepal ebbed in consequence, corresponding with the settling calm in Indian affairs; the most critical phase in the Indo-Nepalese relations was over by 1844. Nepal hereafter found herself torn by domestic feuds; the squabbles of the nobles for power were the main political events in the following two years.

Towards the end of 1843, the British had to resolve a serious rift between Oudh and Nepal. Darshan Singh, the Nazim of Oudh, a notorious persecutor of tenants, forcibly evicted Raja Digvijoy Singh, a talukdar of Balrampur, on charge of revenue default. The latter took refuge in the Nepalese territory and indulged in systematic raids on Darshan Singh's men, lodged at Balrampur. Darshan Singh pursued the desperados into the Nepalese territory and ransacked it. The Nepalese government waxed great wrath over such violent intrusion into their territory. Contemplating retaliation, a large army was assembled on the Oudh-Nepal border, spreading a wave of alarm in the whole area. Panic-struck, the King of Oudh appealed to the British government for protection. The British found themselves in an embarrassing predicament; Oudh was their protected ally, and with Nepal they had no desire to pick up a quarrel; besides, Nepal had a just cause for indignation. The Resident at Lucknow advised the King to take precautionary measures by connecting Lucknow with the Nepal-Oudh border by a chain of roads. Thanks to the Resident's intercession, the matter could not reach a perilous pass; an indemnity was paid by the King of Oudh; Darshan Singh was dismissed from service and the Napalese Durbar, its anger assuaged, recalled the troops from the border; the storm thus blew over peacefully.[157]

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[155] S.C., 11 October 1841, 89.

[156] *Ibid.*, S.C., 16 August 1841, 34-44; *Nepal Summary*, 1-14 September 1842; 30 August 1841, 32. The Sikh military activities greatly harmed British commercial interest at Lahoul, Spiti, Kulu and Bushire. Gulab Singh was scheming to extend his political influence over these Himalayan states which were under British protection. *S.C.*, 13 December 1841, 42.
For the Sikh-Tibetan war, 1841-2, see *Pre-Mutiny Records of Kumaon District: Political Letters Received*, Series III, Vol. 1, No. 117; *Ibid.*; *Political Letters Issued*, Vol. V, No. 50; A. Cunningham, *Ladak and Surrounding Countries* (London, 1854) 333-55; K. M. Panikkar, *Founding of the Kashmir State* (London, 1953) 74-89.

When, following the fall of Matabar Singh, a coalition Ministry was in the saddle,[158] there occurred two incidents which were suggestive of rejuvenation of Nepal's active interest in the political state of India. One of them was the first Sikh war, and the other, the abortive Patna conspiracy of 1846.

Through the tense period of the first Sikh war, the Resident maintained a policy of mingled vigilance and firmness. In April 1844, the Resident had reported to the Government that Heera Singh, an influential Sikh *Sardar*, was trying to incite the Nepalese King against the British. Arms were sent from Kathmandu to all frontier outposts but nothing untoward happened, thanks to the Minister Matabar Singh's preference for peace.[159] When the Anglo-Sikh war broke out in 1846, a section of officers in the Durbar was stirred; a grand council at Kathmandu eagerly debated whether or not to furnish armed assistance to the Sikhs. Jang Bahadur and Kaji Gagan Singh, two members of the coalition ministry, advised the King and the Queen to have no truck with the Sikhs. The King, on their advice, twice offered the Nepalese troops for employment against the Sikhs; twice the offer was politely declined. "Utmost friendliness" was maintained by the Durbar throughout the course of the war. The Resident confidently held that "neither the Sovereign nor the Heir-Apparent nor any party of weight in the Nepal Durbar has or had a serious thought of venturing on a collision with the British power.[160]

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[157] *P.C.*, 27 January 1844, 141-81, 185-7; 3 February 1844, 217-29, 237-51; 9 March 1844, 118-20.

[158] Matabar was assassinated in 1845; thereafter a Coalition Ministry was formed, of which Jang Bahadur was a prominent member. *S.C.*, 13 June 1845, 15; 25 October 1845, 1; 29 November 1845, 38, 40.

[159] Diary of Resident, 15-23 April 1844, *N.R.*, Vol. 5 (Secret Dept. Confidential News Letters).

The King, however, asked for a reward of a territory in Kumaon or elsewhere as a price for his neutrality. But his request was turned down as a "sturdy and shameless begging."[161]

The Resident's discerning eyes could not fail to note that Nepal was none too happy over the effectual reduction of Lahore, the only state to which she could look for help during any troubles with the British in future. Her congratulations on the British victory could ill conceal her genuine uneasiness.[162]

About the same time, a wide-spread conspiracy, with Babu Kunwar Singh as its head, was unearthed at Patna. The conspiracy was aimed at setting up a league of Hindu and Muslim powers of India, with the rulers of Nepal, Lahore and Delhi as its principal accomplices. Letters bearing the names of Kunwar Singh and the Patna Nawab were believed to have reached the Nepalese agents at Kathmandu. It was suspected by some British officers that the King of Nepal had promised Khawaja Hussain Ali Khan and Kunwar Singh, the two principal accomplices, all help "to erase the names and marks of the Europeans from Hindoostan."

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[160] Resident to Govt., 6 March 1846, *S.C.*, 25 July 1846, 142; 29 November 1845, 40; 28 February 1846, 21; 25 July 1846, 129-32.

[161] Colvin to Lawrence, 7 April 1846; Colvin to Currie, Foreign Secretary, 7 April 1846, *N.R.*, Vol. 7; *S.C.*, 25 July 1846, 150. Letter of King Rajendra Vikram to Lokraman Upadhaya, 1962, Magh, Sudi 12, Roj 7, *Baburam Acharya Collections.*

[162] "All reports tend to prove that Nepal is full of mourners for the defeat of the Sikhs." Offg. Resident to Govt., 10 January 1846, *S.C.*, 28 February 1846, 21.

Some of the prominent Rajas and Zamindars were known to have joined the conspiracy. On thorough investigation, the reports of Nepalese complicity turned out, however, to be baseless. Resident Colvin strongly doubted if the alleged sojourn of Kunwar Singh at Kathmandu was true, although he did not wholly discount the likelihood of Hussain Ali's having found political asylum in Nepal. There was not "the least hope of assistance and support" of Nepal to the conspiracy, Colvin asserted. But when the conspiracy petered out, many accomplices found the Nepalese Tarai a haven of refuge.[163]

With Jang Bahadur's assumption of power in September 1846, a new era dawned in the Indo-Nepalese relations. The year 1846 is a great divide in the history of these relations. It saw the restoration of domestic order and stability after many years of tumult and chaos; and internal order in Nepal was the prerequisite to stable relations between the two governments.[164] An epoch ended in the Indo-Nepalese relations and there began another. The era of active enmity ended and that of good faith, understanding and cordiality began. The idea of wreaking vengeance on who were hitherto distrusted as the national enemies yielded place to that of experimenting with their goodwill. The policy of active hostility was abjured in favour of restricted friendliness and cautious deference to the British. Jang Bahadur realised that the goodwill of the British was the *sine qua non* for consolidation of his regime. His main aim was to convert the British government from a source of menace to Nepal to that of strength for his own rule. Peace with the British was his settled policy; for without it, he knew, warlike spirits at Kathmandu would raise their head; these spirits would breed internal instability and invite external danger. He knew that close relations with the Indian states were disagreeable to the British; the latter, he was convinced, wanted to see Nepal remain isolated from the Indian states and Indian politics. In consequence, during Jang Bahadur's rule Nepal's relations with Indian states were far less intimate than they were in the decade immediately before his assumption of power.

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[163] *S.C.*, 28 February 1846, 24; 25 July 1846, 144-5; *P.C.*, 28 February 1846, 12-4; 4 April 1846, 3-4; *B.J.P.C.*, 14 January 1846, 95-101; 21 January 1846, 40-51; 28 January 1846, 43-43U; 1 April 1846, 30-34; *Important Judicial Bundles*, Alphabet-M, No. 37, *State Central Records Office*, Bihar, Patna. See also K. K. Datta, *Biography of Kunwar Singh and Amar Singh* (Patna, 1957) 64-8.

[164] For Jang Bahadur's life and career, see P. J. B. Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jang Bahadur Rana* (Allahabad, 1909).

Jang Bahadur was keen on plugging the sources of discord with the British government, and evincing his friendliness towards them. Thus, during the Second Anglo-Sikh war (1848-49), Jang Bahadur offered the services of Gurkhas under his personal command. Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, politely declined the overture, in spite of the Resident's pleadings for its acceptance, it being a symbol of Jang Bahadur's sincere cordiality. Dalhousie was shrewd enough to realise that Jang Bahadur's friendly gesture was as much a "gratifying circumstance", promising "well for the future peace of India", as it was suggestive of his anxiety to provide employment to the vast, but ideal, Nepalese army.[165] Jang Bahadur was naturally disappointed. During the course of the war, he, along with the King, the principal civil and military officers, 32000 soldiers and 52 guns, encamped in the Tarai forests on the Indo-Nepalese border. The ostensible object was hunting and strengthening the Nepalese posts on the frontier for administrative convenience. The Resident did not entertain any apprehension, confident as he was, of Jang Bahadur's eager bid to ingratiate himself with the British. But Lord Dalhousie had some misgivings and concern; the magnitude and coincidence of the hunting expedition was "unusual and suspicious." It appeared to him as an attempt, on the part of Jang Bahadur, at creating a diversion in favour of the Sikhs, by obliging the British to keep a force locked up in the Nepal Tarai, and thereby preventing them from despatching additional troops to the Punjab. As a measure of precaution five hundred horsemen were post-haste brought from Madras and three hundred men of the Queen's 80th Foot, recently brought from Dinapore, were hastily sent back to that station. The Resident accompanied Jang Bahadur to the Tarai. Lord Dalhousie made a strong representation with the Durbar for spreading alarm on the border. The expedition soon returned from the

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[165] Lord Dalhousie's Minute, 8 June 1848, *S.C.*, 24 June 1848, 65.

Tarai where it had suffered greatly from malaria. Dalhousie heaved a sigh of relief.[166]

In April 1849, Maharanee Chanda Kaur, the ex-queen of Lahore, escaped to Nepal from her internment at the fort of Chunar. The British did not press the Nepal Durbar for her surrender when Jang Bahadur assured that his government would keep the Queen under strong surveillance, and that he would be personally responsible for her safe custody.[167]

In the closing months of 1849, British relations with Sikkim were strained following the incarceration of Dr. Campbell, the Superintendent of Darjeeling, and of Dr. Hooker, the celebrated naturalist by the Raja of Sikkim. When remonstrances were of no avail, Lord Dalhousie seriously thought whether or not to withdraw from the Raja the guarantee of protection of his territory from the Nepalese invasion. This guarantee, contained in the Treaty of Titalya (1817), alone had hitherto saved Sikkim from the covetous designs of her more powerful neighbours. Hence,

> "to cancel this engagement (i.e. Articles I and IX of the Treaty of Titalya) is virtually an invitation to all these (Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan) to possess the remainder of Sikkim."[168]

Nepal being the strongest of the three states, it was likely that withdrawal of British protection from Sikkim would be immediately followed by her incorporation into Nepalese dominion. A huge armed force would then be necessary to keep watch on Nepal, as also to prevent Darjeeling from "falling into the inappropriate speck in the immense mountain kingdom of Nepal." Jang Bahadur was eager to help the British against Sikkim, presumably with the hope of some territorial reward in the area on which he had set his heart for long. Ultimately the Raja of Sikkim was cowed by the open threat that if he did not submit to the British demands, he would forfeit their guarantee of protection from the Nepalese invasion.[169]

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[166] *S.C.*, 30 December 1848, 45; 27 January 1849, 57-62; 24 February 1849, 37-9; Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 22 January 1849, *Hobhouse Papers, B.M.A.M.* 36476, 332; Ganda Singh, ed., *Private Correspondence Relating to the Anglo-Sikh wars* (Patiala, 1955) 160; J. G. A. Baird, ed., *Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie* (Edinburgh and London, 1911) 50; *The Friend of India*, 11 January 1849, 25 January 1849; *The Bengal Hurkaru*, 11 January 1849.

[167] *P.C.*, 22 March 1850, 408; *The Friend of India*, 3 May 1849.

[168] *Campbell's Memorandum*, 1 February 1850, *P.C.*, 14 June 1850, 433.

The upshot was that the British occupied the Sikkimese lands bordering on Nepal, thus cutting off the approaches from Nepal to Darjeeling. They also held one of the two passes leading into Nepal on the line of the river Rummo. The increasing British influence in Sikkim caused uneasiness in Nepal, and the road building activities of the British in the area intended to promote their commercial interests, were viewed with suspicion and disfavour.

By his pacific and friendly policy, Jang Bahadur soon convinced the British of the real change in Nepal's foreign policy. The erstwhile suspicion of the British, too, wore out, if gradually. A careful watch was, however, maintained on Nepal. Sir Charles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief in India, while pinpointing the grave defects in the Indian military administration, laid great stress on the hazard of a combination between Jang Bahadur and Golab Singh. Such a combination appeared to him as the "greatest external danger" of the British. To guard against this menace, he strongly pleaded for strengthening the British military posts on the Himalayas.[170]

Nepal's relations with the Indian states were far more intimate in the first half of the nineteenth century than either before or since. These intimate relations were coeval with the most active phase in the history of Nepal's foreign relations, as also with the stormiest era in her domestic history. Nepal's relations with the Indian states were prompted less by neighbourly feelings than by political considerations. In the first decade of the 19th century Nepal looked upon the weak Indian states on the southern slope of the Himalayas as alluring field for conquest and aggrandisement. After the defeat at the hands of the British and the establishment of the unwelcome relations with them, Nepal realised the worth of alliance with the Indian states as a means of setting up a confederacy against the British. Various attempts were made to forge an ill-assorted unity of the Indian states, as also to articulate their brooding discontent and sullen disaffection towards the British. Close watch was kept on British proceedings in these states; moral support and armed succour were proferred to them if they planned a rupture with the British; it was a means of creating a grave internal crisis for the latter and of keeping them occupied while Nepal could launch a sudden invasion and restore her lost territories. Single-handed Nepal did not dare risk an open collision with the British, and hence, the eagerness for coalition with Indian powers. No wonder, England's woes were Nepal's opportunities; there was an invariable synchronism between the crises of the British in India, exacerabation of hostile spirit in Nepal and the frequency and intimacy of the latter's relations with the Indian states. Unfortunately for Nepal, all her efforts to rally the Indian states proved wholly abortive due mainly to the fact that their fear of British arms far outweighed the allurement of Nepal's overtures; the risk of enmity with the British balanced the temptation of exploiting their troubles. Besides, there was an innate jealousy between the Indian states and the British maintained sharpest vigilance over their proceedings.

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[169] P.C., 14 June 1850, 369-554; J. D. Hooker, *Himalayan Journals* (London, 1854) 124, 426-63.

[170] Lt. General Sir W. F. P. Napier, ed., *Defects, Civil and Military of the Indian Government, by Lt. General Sir Charles Napier* (London, MDCCCLIV, 3rd Edition) 371-2.

Very often diplomatic relations with Indian states were strengthened and made more intimate by the ruling parties in Nepal as a means of earning prestige at home. Parties squabbling for power throve in machinations with the Indian states; they indulged in intrigues with the latter to subserve their own political ends by humouring the army and exciting the jingo spirit of the Nepalese in general. Such intrigues were expected to bear fruit in a combination against the British; nothing was dearer to the Nepalese than perplexing the latter, their sworn enemy; whichever party succeeded in forming a confederacy of Indian states and, with its help, defeating the British, was certain to entrench itself deeply into the esteem of the Nepalese people in general and the army in particular. In consequence, the most tumultuous period in Nepal's internal history coincided with the most active phase in her foreign relations, and active foreign policy was demonstrated by close relations with the Indian states. An active foreign policy kept the Nepalese in a state of eager expectancy, and the army in abiding excitement.

Commensurate with the consolidation of the British rule, and the resultant enervation of the Indian states, Nepal's intriguing propensities were considerably abated. The realisation of the grave risk of estranging the British, overwhelming in economic and military resources, acted as an effective moderator of Nepal's eagerness for intriguing against the British; and since Nepal looked upon the Indian states as effective means of subserving her own ends, her relations with them (Indian states) became increasingly tenuous.

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REFRENCE BOOK

Glimpses of a Dying Culture from a Personal Diary

BY

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Muraqqa-i-Delhi, a diary of Khan Dauran Nawab Zulqadar Dargah Quli Khan, Salar Jang, Motamand Daula, Motaman-ul Mulk, was written during the reign of Mohammad Shah (1718-1748 A.D.). The author's account of Delhi covering the period from 1738 to 1741 A.D. is based on personal observation. He also gives an account of the eminent personalities of his times who left lasting impression on his heart and mind. The diary thus portrays the life of the Sufis, divines, poets and artists, male and female dancers and singers, beautiful boys and boy-hunters. This book, therefore, seems indispensable for the students of history working on the social, political and cultural life of the 18th century India. The diary is in Persian. Its text was edited, with an exhaustive introduction by Hakim Sayyid Muzaffar Husain, and printed in the Taj Press, Hyderabad (Deccan). The Urdu translation of the same was rendered by Maulana Zabih Sahib, and later this translation was revised by the late Khawaja Hasan Nizami. The revised edition was published by Mahboob-ul Mutabah Barqi Press, Delhi, in 1933. However, the later revised translation in Urdu does not strictly follow the original text and sometimes one wonders if it has any relation at all with the Persian text.

The Persian text and the introductory note of the editor shows that the diary, *Muraqqa-i-Delhi* does not present a daily account. The editor of the diary remarks, "It so happened that Nawab Dargah Quli Khan Bahadur who accompanied Nawab Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah on his visit to Shahjahanbad in 1738 A.D. made this the occasion to chronicle all that had attracted his notice". As such the diary is not a daily account; nor does it describe very systematically the socio-cultural life under well-divided parts and chapters. However, the author presents his observations under certain headings, which are: an account of the anniversary ceremonies at the Qadam Sharif of the Prophet Mohammad and

Qadāmgah of Hazrat Ali, and at the shrines of Muslim saints; an account of the living Muslim divines; an account of Bazars of Delhi; an account of *Basant* and other Muslim festivals; an account of prostitutes' locality; an account of poets; an account of Marsiya-reciters, musicians, jesters and mimics; and an account of female dancers. The diary thus under the said headings, highlights some of the features of socio-cultural life of Delhi during the first half of the 18th century.

The author of the diary needs detailed introduction here to establish the authenticity of his account. Nawab Dargah Quli's great grand-father Khandan Quli Khan, came to India from Qandhar and got an opportunity here to have an access into the Mughal Court. On a Monday, in the month of *Jamadi-us Sani,* 1048 A.H. (1638 A.D.) he attended on Shah Jahan, who honoured him with a costly *Khilat* and 1000 rupees. When Shah Jahan appointed Ali Mardan Khan as the Subehdar of Kashmir, Khandan Quli Khan went there with him and passed the rest of his life in Kashmir. After the death of Khandan Quli Khan, Shah Jahan, on the recommendation of Ali Mardan Khan, assigned a *jagir* along with a *mansab*, to his son Dargah Quli Khan I in the district of Thatta (Sindh). Ali Mardan Khan later on appointed Dargah Quli Khan I as the *Mire-saman* of his Subah. On Ali Mardan Khan's death, Prince Aurangzeb included the said Khan among his *Mansabdars.* Dargah Quli Khan I came to the Deccan along with his master and after some time left for Northern India and died there. Nauroz Quli Khan, a son of Durgah Quli Khan I, was then appointed as the *Qiladar* of Dadwar (in Deccan), a post which he held till his death. Khandan Quli Khan Sani, a son of Nauroz Quli Khan, received the *jagir* and *mansab* from the Mughal Court in recognition of his father's meritorious services and was posted at Aurangabad. Khan Dauran Nawab Zulqadar Dargah Quli Khan, the author of *Muraqqa-i-Delhi,* was the son of Khandan Quli Khan Sani. Dargah Quli Khan was born in Aurangabad on 29th *Rajab,* 1710 A.D. After completing his early education under his father, he attended on Nizamul Mulk for training in administrative matters. At the age of 14 (1724 A.D.) he received his paternal *jagir* and *mansab.* It was a great honour for him that Nizamul Mulk included Dargah Quli Khan in his company and after six years promoted him to the rank of his permanent attendants in private and in the public.

Notwithstanding Aurangzeb's 25 years strenuous efforts, the Maratha power could not be completely liquidated and after his death they again gradually gathered their lost political power. By the year 1737 A.D. the Marātha Sardar, Baji Rao, sacked Delhi, the capital of the Mughals, and the Mughal army that at one time had created awe and fear in the hearts of the Marathas, could not resist his entry. In 1738 A.D., the emperor Mohammad Shah invited Nizamul Mulk, who was a seasoned military commander, from the Deccan to check the Maratha menace. Nizamul Mulk, on receipt of the imperial *farman,* started for Delhi with his army. Dargah Quli Khan, who was then serving him as Chronicler, accompanied him in this journey. Nizamul Mulk first reached Delhi and then in 1738 A.D. marched towards Marathas to punish and chastise them. But the royal army was defeated and he had to come back disappointed. The news of Nadir Shah's projected invasion had already reached the Mughal capital by this time, when the Mughal military commanders and soldiery were broken-hearted. During this time Dargah Quli Khan stayed on in Delhi. He made use of this opportunity for mixing with the people and acquainting himself with the socio-cultural life of the capital. Besides this, close association with the emperor Mohammad Shah gave him opportunities to have more intimate knowledge of events taking place at that time. He returned home with Nizamul Mulk, in 1741 A.D., after staying in Delhi for nearly three years. An account of the social conditions and political events of these 3 years has been preserved in his small diary. No doubt the contemporary literature presents the ruined picture of Delhi, yet it continued to enjoy the privileged position of being the seat of Muslim-Hindu culture. Delhi was the fountain and streams of culture flowed therefrom to the quarters situated far away from the centre, but constituting its cultural outposts. It was a cosmopolitan city, inhabited by people not only of the Muslim world but also of Europe, from where they had brought their own culture and civilization, which had greatly influenced the Indian culture. Delhi was the abode of great scholars, poets, divines and artists, who enjoyed the patronage of its kings and the nobles. Nawab Sahib was very much attached to and fond of Delhi. This is evident from his hyperbolic and colourful description of the ruined city. However, the fact is that all contemporary sources lead us to the same conclusions, as found in the account of Delhi in his diary, though it may appear to a distant observer to be exaggerated. In that small diary Dargah Quli Khan has spot-lighted the various aspects of human life and it presents a lively picture of the society and culture of the 18th century Indo-Muslim India. The most fascinating events are those associated with the anniversary ceremonies at the shrines of great saints and the voluptuousness of the inhabitants of Delhi. Before attempting a critical evaluation of the contents of the diary, it is not out of place to give a brief outline of the social and political conditions of the period and the consequences of Nadir Shah's invasion. *Muraqqa-i-Delhi,* as such, is the reminiscence of that period when Delhi had already witnessed the dreary scenes of general massacre, looting, burning and devastations caused by the unscrupulous Nadir Shah.

A critical evaluation of the Mughal administrative institutions leads one to the conclusion that the debacle of the empire had set in early enough. The system on which the empire rested had reached its culminating point during Akbar's reign and further development was not possible. Whenever this stage is reached, decay and downfall become inevitable. Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb were of course men of great stature having administrative experience and organising capacity and they kept the disintegrating forces in check by their far-sighted diplomatic skill. The symptoms of disintegration however became clearly visible since the reign of Aurangzeb who, by his armed superiority, diplomacy and sagacity, did not allow the forces of opposition to gain strength. His death marked the beginning of the end of the Mughal empire. There was none among his successors possessing valour, diplomatic skill and capacity for organising military compaigns who could have saved the decaying prestige of the Mughal throne and sword. The administrative hold of the Government became loose and the forces of opposition, looking out for an opportunity to hit on the back, gradually gained much momentum. Civil wars, incompetency of the rulers, squabbles, rivalries and conspiracies of the nobles who wasted their energies in running down one another, the growing defiance of the Subehdars, military weakness and the bankruptcy of the State treasury, all accelerated the forces of disintegration. Nobles like Qutubul Mulk Abdullah Khan and Amirul Umera Husain Ali Khan dominated the affairs of the State to such an extent that outwardly the reins of the Government were in the ruler's hands but in fact they were in their hands. Court intrigues, religious cliques and thirst for power became so strong that many of the rulers fell victims to them. Almost all the Subehdars of distant provinces assumed a royal air for all practical purposes which ultimately weakened the economic stability of the Central Government. Insolvency of the State treasury had reached such a stage that the salaries of the soldiers fell in arrears and sometimes could not be paid for months together. The soldiers in disappointment, not only humiliated their masters, but also indulged in violent acts of disrespect towards them.[1] Sauda, a contemporary poet, describes the wretched condition of the soldiers in his peculiar style:

> "And those who are weak (and cannot challenge their masters for payment of their dues) take their place in the market on the banks of Jumna.
>
> They speak of their plight to every one, young and old, attached to the court.
>
> When this appeal fails, like a horde, clad in rags, and mourning for their sad lot they hover round every *'Palki'* (Sedan-Chair) proceeding towards the court.
>
> The sedan-chair thus surrounded seems to be the coffin. The narration of these conditions by the nobles occupying the *Palki* in the court finds no comment."[2]

Mohammad Shah himself had fallen into such a state of poverty that his female dresses, which he used to wear, were sold to meet his expenses.[3] The family of the emperor was hard hit by poverty. Sauda depicts their condition thus:

> "The salatins (in wretched conditions as they are) are loudly protesting and making a great din.
>
> Some of them have torn their garments and come out of their places.
>
> One (in dire frustration) slams his own doors (so as to draw other's attention to his pitiable lot).
>
> The other says, "Great burdens as we are, why not give all of us a cup of hemlock each!"[4]

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[1] For details, see: *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shujai* (Ms), pp. 73-74. *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani* (Ms), f. 70a-b, 72a-b.

[2] *Kulliyate-Sauda*, 1, p. 364.

[3] *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani* (Ms), f. 76a.

[4] *Kulliyate-Sauda*, 1, p. 369.

Nadir Shah's invasion was the most significant event after the death of Aurangzeb which depleted the royal treasury. *Muraqqa-i-Delhi* relates this ghastly event. A brief account of Nadir Shah's invasion seems necessary here.

On 30th February, 1739 A.D. the armies of Nadir Shah and the Mughal emperor Mohammad Shah made a final trial of their armed strength at Karnal and the Mughal's discomfiture was the net result of this contest. Even at this critical stage of affairs, when the Mughal throne was at stake, the court party politics was not inactive. On Burhanul Mulk's persuasion Nadir Shah came to Delhi. The contemporary literature preserves detailed information regarding the general massacre of the inhabitants of Delhi and the pillage of the city. While returning home Nadir Shah carried rich spoils and the people had to suffer untold miseries. Anand Ram Mukhlis remarks that Delhi had to face such misfortune after a lapse of 350 years.[5]

About the massacred people, Frazer writes, "As the great number of the dead bodies that lay about the castle and in the Bazars and other places, caused a very offensive stench, they pressed most of the people they met within streets, and employed them in removing the bodies. Some, by tying cords to the feet, they dragged without the city, they threw some into the river, and those whom they imagined to be Hindus, they piled 40 to 50 of their bodies atop of each other and burnt them with the timber of the demolished buildings."[6]

The total booty obtained by Nadir Shah amounted to 180 crores of Rupees.[7]

The fate of the masses in mediaeval India depended on the rulers and as such, every change, whatever its form might have been, had direct repercussions on them. The decadence of the Government had badly hit the people economically as well as politically and culturally. The Mughal Government was then not more than a sick man on the death bed, but even then the last breath was still far away. The last pang of foreign invasion was a source of great excitement for every section of people, from the king downwards, as if a naked sword, which could at any moment separate their heads from their bodies, was hanging on their necks. The memory of the past grandeur still haunted their minds but it could not provide them with material for peace and consolation. The *jagirdari* system had collapsed.

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[5] *Waqa-i-Anand Ram Mukhlis* (Ms), Vol. II, f. 17a

[6] Frazer: *Nadir Shah*: p. 389.

[7] *Tarikh-i-Farrukh Siyar Badshah* (Ms), Rampur: pp. 258-59.

Sauda describes the wretched conditions thus:[8]

> "Noblemen and high officials of state,
> Dwindled and run down as they are,
> Have lost their shields and swords in mortgage to the money lenders
> They knock at every door with leaning sticks and begging bowls in their hands."

Escape from the hardships of life was the only alternative left for the commonalty. The frustrations and disappointments in life compelled the people to seek shelter in the lap of luxury and listlessness. Prof. Shaikh Abdur Rasheed observes:

"The decay of the political authority of the highly centralized Mughal empire was the result, not the cause as is sometimes imagined, of the depletion of vitality of the Muslims, the arrest of growth of the Muslim civilization, the domination of the living by the dead, the moral inertia, the flight from the reality and unwillingness to face dangers of hardships for an ideal or a cause on the part of the Muslims. Luxury and ease had devitalised the Muslim society. The forces that counter cultural decay had been weakened by depletion and delusion of Muslim strength and by the resultant psychological and economic depression. Those with gifts for action became gangsters living for themselves in perfect abandonment without thought of the morrow or the interest of the community to which they belonged. Those who had no taste for action carried forward the process of decay by passive acquiescence and inner corruption. There was neither pride in the past nor hope for future. Neither the examples of the Pious Caliphs nor the earlier warriors in the Path of God worked as operative agents in their listless lives. The pacifism of the Sufi Orders degenerated into passivism. Optimistic as to the divine intervention and cowardly in their actions they were ripe for butchery. Without ambitions, without creative capacity, clothing themselves into tattered garments of an old civilisation, ostrich-like they hid their heads in the sands of Mughal glory."[9]

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[8] *Kulliyate-Sauda*, 1, p. 368.

Durgah Quli Khan's *Muraqqa-i-Delhi* is a mirror which reflects in a colourful manner the story of that escapism. Two ways were open for that escape: to hide under the garment of religion to work for individual salvation or to acquiesce in the feelings of failure in the material world and try to attain the glory of the world to come; or to delve deep into a life of listlessness and pleasure, after throwing to the winds the worries of the material world. Both these ways of escape are fully and explicitly portrayed in *Muraqqa–i–Delhi.* In no other period of Indian History grave worship and attachment to mysticism were so popular as at this time. Instead of mending their ways, the people sheltered themselves in things which could put them in a state of oblivion. The author himself was interested in and attached to such things.

Muraqqa-i-Delhi begins with an account of the Holy *Qadam Sharif* (the foot–print of the Holy Prophet) situated in Delhi. The author describes the place thus:

"The place which encloses within its precinct the Footprint of Holy Prophet, carries with it the benediction of accompanying intercession and forgiveness ...., Every Thursday the courtyard of the *Dargha* (Mausoleum) gets overcrowded in a manner with the pilgrims that to cross it so as to gain access to the Footprint, they undergo every kind of ordeal. Particularly in the month of *Rabiul-Awwal,* the place is flooded with pilgrims. This assembly included pilgrims and mendicants, who come from distant cities facing all the troubles and tribulations of the way with the object of paying their respects at the shrine ...., Those, who have means of acquisition resort to purchase land in the environs so that they may find a place for eternal rest in the close vicinity of the sacred footprint."

Strangely, to be buried in the close vicinity of the grave of a saint was regarded as the way to obtain salvation and to save oneself from the consuming fires of Hell. The author informs us that the shrine of Khawaja Baqi Billah[10] was accredited with this quality and enjoyed great reverence among the people. Thus he writes, "It is also no less a miracle that the citizens of Delhi seek to get buried in close vicinity of the shrine so as to find protection and refuge from the consuming fires of the Hell."

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[9] *Islamic Literature* (Lahore, 1955).

The commonalty and the gentry, both avoided the struggle for the survival of the fittest. Those who were capable of doing something for restoring the lost prestige of the empire and the community retired from active politics. This tendency finds expression in a couplet of Sauda:

> "Those prudent among the nobles
> Have taken to their scheduled corners,
> Where there is no one else than a mere attendant and one or two friends,
> Only a betel-box and a spittoon are left (of the past pomp and show.)"[11]

Instead of boldly facing the hard realities of life, people invoked the help of saints, living or dead, to overcome them. The author observes this tendency among the people when he describes the celebration of the death anniversary of a great saint, Shah Turkaman Shah.

"There is held the annual *Urs* on the 23rd of the month of *Rajab*. The attendants of the shrine and the followers of the saint make it a point to arrange the *Urs* with all devotion. During the *Urs* ceremony there is such illumination around the shrine that the heavens above appear to reflect it. All the inhabitants of Delhi have great faith in the saint and they invoke his help during troubles and tribulation, while the intensity of their belief is no doubt sometimes rewarded with fulfilment of their wishes."

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[10] *Hazrat Khawaja Baqi Billah* was born in Kabul and after completing his education in Samarqand, came to Delhi, during the reign of the Emperor, Akbar. He founded *Naqshbandi Silsila* in India and one of his prominent disciples Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi popularised this *Silsila*. Khawaja Baqi Billah died in 1603 A.D. at the age of 40 and was buried in Delhi. For biographical account see: *Khazinatul Asifiya*: pp. 605 to 607, *Safinnatul Auliya*-(Urdu Translation), p. 119.

[11] *Kulliyate Sauda*, 1, p. 368.

Similarly, the author attributes the same miraculous qualities to the shrines of Sultan-ul-Mashaikh Nizam Uddin Auliya,[12] Shaikh Nasir Uddin Chiragh-i-Delhi,[13] Shah Rasool Numa,[14] Shah

[12] *Shaikh Nizam Uddin Auliya,* popularly known as Mehboobe-Ilahi was born at Badaun in the year 1236 A.D. After receiving early education from his father, he was sent to *Maktab,* where he studied under the guidance of the best sholars of the period, and completed his studies at the age of twelve. To pursue further studies, Nizam Uddin Auliya came over to Delhi. It was here that he heard about Shaikh Baba Farid Ganje Shakar, of Ajodhan. He was so much impressed by the popularity of Baba Farid that he went to Ajodhan to get himself enrolled as his disciple. He was sent back by Baba Farid to Delhi with explicit instructions to work for the establishment of harmony and amity between the Hindus and the Muslims, one of the most important missions of the Chishti saints. Since then till his death in 1324 A.D. Shaikh made untiring efforts towards this end, sent his disciples to distant places of the country and kept all the time the doors of his *Khanqah* open for both Hindus and Muslims. The extent of his success in this regard may be found in the fact that, even at present as in the diarist's days, his shrine is daily visited by both Hindus and Muslims with equal devotion and attachment. For detailed biographical account see: *Sirul Auliya* (Mir Khurd) *Faudul Fuwaid* (conversations of the Shaikh), *Khazinatul-Asifiya, Nizami Bansari* by Raj Kumar Hardev.

[13] *Shaikh Nasir Uddin Mahmood,* popularly known as Chiragh-i-Delhi, was born in Oudh, and received his early education there. From his early youth Shaikh Nasir Uddin took great pains for spiritual perfection. It was most probably the wide popularity of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya that drew him to Delhi, at the age of 43. After being included in the circle of close disciples, Shaikh Nasir Uddin actively participated in carrying out, with great success, the mission of his spiritual guide for the establishment of harmony and amity between Hindus and Muslims. He died in the year 1356 A.D. and was buried in Delhi. The place is still known as Chirag Delhi. For detailed biographical notices see: *Khairul Mujalis* by Hamid Qalandar (edited by Prof. K. A. Nizami, Muslim University, Aligarh). *Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh of Delhi,* by Prof. Mohammad Habib.

[14] Nothing is known about his early life and other details except the information left about him by Khafi Khan. According to him, he was a symbol of spiritual perfection and rendered great service to human beings. The doors of his *Khanqah* remained open all the time for the needy and the indigent. He did not come in contact with the worldly people. It was generally believed that he could show the glimpses of Prophet Mohammad's face by his miraculous spiritual perfection on which account he was popularly known as Rasool Numa. *Muntakhabul Lubab,* Khafi Khan (text) 11, pp. 552-53.

Bayazid Allah,[15] Aziz Ullah,[16] Mirza Abdul Qadir Bedil,[17] etc. where, according to him, people used to come with the hope of getting their desires fulfilled or of attaining salvation.

Apart from the shrines of dead ones, the people had great faith in living saints and Sufis also. Most of such great personalities about whom the author has made special mention, are still shrouded in darkness. He gives an account of the living divines of Delhi; for example, he says:

"Hafiz Shah Saad Ullah,[18] is a great saint. The people, in general, are unanimous in recognising his attainments of sainthood and some even acknowledge him as a *qutub* (the highest position in spiritual order which a divine can attain). His wonder-working power is famous. He restored light to many blind. He belonged to the *Naqshbandi Order* and, therefore, he does not believe in '*Sama*' (mystic songs). Shah Ghulam Mohammad Davalpura is another divine, inspiring awe and steeped in resigned contentment. He regularly observes fastings and therefore he is physically weak and lean. He accepts nothing from anybody. It is a well-known fact that king and his Amirs unremittingly solicited for the acceptance of daily allowance by him which, however, remained unheeded. Shah Amir belongs to *Naqshbandi Silsila.* He is a man of miracles and, therefore, awe-inspiring. Thus most of his time is spent in either prayers, meditation or giving sermons without a moment's rest. The Kashmiris in particular, have great faith in him. Even Etamad-ud-Daula and other nobles of the city have become his disciples. There is another saint, Shah Pan Sadi Mani by name. He is of Turanian origin and, therefore, has bulky body and massive appearance. His abode is seen all the time crowded with people. Self-contentment and reliance on God are the prominent qualities of another saint, Mir Sayyid Mohammad. His face radiates light like sun and he is so fearless and outspoken that he does not even care for the king and his grandees. He is sweet in manners and polite in talk. Majnu Nanak Shah, true to his first name, is lean and thin, his abode is situated on the bank of Jamna. Hindus and Muslims both come to pay respects to him. What he gets in the form of presents, he distributes all among the poor and needy. Shah Kamal possesses a colourful personality and humorous disposition. He usually wears dresses of fine texture and eats clean and dainty dishes. He attends mystic assemblies and *Urs* (death anniversary function) regularly, where, with his strange demeanours, he provides the crowd an occasion for great entertainment. He remembers numerous Persian verses and occupies a prominent position among the *Rekhta* (Urdu) poets. There is another saint Shah Ghulam Mohammad by name. At his Khanqah, there is held on every Thursday, *sama* (mystic songs) which is attended and availed of by all the *Quwwals* of the city and the people of taste at large. Shah Rahmat Ullah is also a famous saint of Delhi. He dislikes exhibitionism, and hypocrisy. He showed favour to the boys of distillers of wine so that people may regard him a drunkard and condemn him as a hypocrite."

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[15] He descended from an Afghan tribe and was very famous for his hard life and sympathetic attitude towards the needy and the paupers. Both Hindus and Muslims resorted to his threshold to get their desires fulfilled by his spiritual intercession. He possessed dauntless courage and was outspoken. It is said that once during the *Juma Khutaba* he reprimanded Aurangzeb for not marrying his daughter, an open act of violation of *Sunnat.* He died in 1683 A.D. and his shrine is still extant near the Roshan Ara Garden of Delhi, *Khafi Khan*: (Text) II, pp. 551-52.

[16] No further information, except what the author of *Muraqqa-i-Delhi* gives, is available about him.

[17] He was poet-cum mystic of his times. Mirza Abdul Qadir's father, Abdul Khaliq, was a soldier by profession and resided at Azimabad (Patna). It was there Mirza Bedil was born in 1644 A.D. As he was a poet, Azam Shah, son of Aurangzeb, included him in the band of the poets of his court. It is said that one day the Prince Azam Shah requested Mirza Bedil to compose an eulogy in praise of him. Mirza Bedil, being a man of integrity and self-respect, having full reliance on God, felt hurt and submitted his resignation. He passed the rest of his life in meditation and prayer, guiding others in the path of spiritual perfection. He died in 1720 A.D. and was buried in Delhi. His shrine is near Stadium in New Delhi. During the time of the author of *Muraqqa-i-Delhi,* his anniversary was celebrated by organising a poetic assembly at his shrine. For detailed biographical notices see; *Safinah-ē-Khushgo,* pp. 103-1046; *Safinahē-Hindi,* pp. 28-29.

[18] He was born in Delhi. He belonged to the *Naqshbandi Silsila* and was a disciple of Shah Gulshan. In poetry he was a pupil of Mirza Qadir Bedil. Contrary to the principles of the Order to which he belonged, Shah Saad Ullah was keenly interested in music and a book on this subject goes to his credit. By his mystic practices he had attained the highest stage of spiritual perfection. He performed the Haj pilgrimage and remained in Delhi to the end of his life in 1727 or 1728 A.D. Wali Daccani, the father of Urdu poetry, was one of the disciples of Hafiz Shah Saad Ullah Gulshan. For short biographical notices see: *Mamulat-i-Mazhari,* p. 61 *Maqamat-i-Mazhari,* p. 22, *Nikat-us-Shuara* (Mir), p. 10, *Tazkara-i-Shuarai Urdu* (Mir Hasan), p. 204, *Safinahe Hindi,* p. 177.

From the above account of the Sufis and saints, it appears as if the *Khanqah* organisation had reached the culminating point of its development during the period under study and its decay became inevitable. *Khanqahs* were then only places where one could find relief from the afflictions of the realities of the time. Political and economic uncertainties compelled the people to turn towards these saints' *Khanqahs* and shrines. Stoddard gives the following deplorable picture of the Muslim world of the 18th century, India being no exception. He writes:

"As for religion, it was decadent as every thing else. The austere monotheism of Mohammad had become overlaid with rank growth of superstition and puerile mysticism. The mosques stood unfrequented and ruinous, deserted by the ignorant multitude, which decked out in amulets, charms and rosaries, and went on pilgrimage to the tombs of 'Holy men', worshipped as saints and 'intercessors' with Allah who had become too remote a being for the direct devotion of these benighted souls."[19]

The royalty actively indulged in hypocritic activities, political conspiracies and ruinous misdeeds on the one hand, and on the other, they tried to protect themselves against the nude, rowdy and hungry commonalty from whose eyes the flames of revolt shot forth.

The Sufis and saints had so great an influence over the ignorant and unsophisticated masses, that they could very easily be led to change their ways and means of life. It is on this account that we find the nobles and the kings of the period extending patronage to the *Khanqah* and providing maintenance allowances for the residents. Thus the saints were in a way to intoxicate the masses by inculcating in them reliance on God and on one's fate. The saints and Sufis were teaching the masses to regard this world like muddy place; the more one tried to come out, the more one would find oneself dragged in. There cannot be two opinions about the fact that both growing age and disappointments in life would lead one to a life of mendicancy and celibacy. Eighteenth century was a period of political, economic and social decay. The people wandered from place to place like a rudderless ship amidst stormy waves, in search of a harbour. Failing in their efforts to find such a place, they retired, broken-hearted, to the *Khanqah* where they were sure to get food and consolation and gradually adopted the life of mendicancy.

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[19] *The New World of Islam* (New York), pp. 25-26.

In short, the people of all the classes of Indian society frequented or retired to the *Khanqahs*. Many of the nobles, in spite of their long administrative experience and skill for organising military compaigns, could not find opportunities to get jobs because of the court party intrigues and groupism. They turned their faces against the party politics and joined the *Khanqah* life; in that case they could enjoy high position in the mystic organisation and therefore guide their own class of people. The main reason behind the popularity of mysticism was that it became an agency through which they would attain prestige and status. Thus mystic organisation got a very strong hold over the minds of the masses.

Listlessness was the other way of escape. Both upper and lower classes were suffering from the same malady. Aurangzeb, who had made all possible efforts to canalise his resources in putting the moral and religious beliefs of the Muslims in line with the true spirit of *Quran* and *Hadis,* did not leave behind anyone among his successors to carry further his programme. Very unfortunately, after his death, the Mughal rulers abandoned his programme, and began to indulge in the pleasures of life. Their example was imitated by the nobles and common people. Thus gradually the degeneration affected the Mughal society at all levels. The same swords which at one time were unsheathed against the foes of the State, were now used in destroying one another. The State treasury was empty, but even then there was illumination on a grand scale thrice in a month for recreation and entertainment, sometimes causing shortage of oil and *ghee* and raising their prices. The indulgent life of Jahandar Shah and Lal Kunwar, a public woman, who had great control over the king and the government, may be cited as the best example of the degeneration of the Mughal rulers. All the three brothers of Lal Kunwar were honoured with high titles and important assignments, like *Subehdariship* of important provinces, which ordinarily were exclusively reserved for the members of royal family. Thus people without administrative experience and background were elevated to high positions in preference to hereditary nobles, simply because they were related to the ruler's mistress.[20]

Dargah Quli Khan has depicted the luxurious life of the people during Mohammad Shah's reign. It will not be out of place here to present in brief the lively picture of the lax and voluptuous life of Mohammad Shah himself which sapped the glory of Mughal rule and society from the top to the bottom and ultimately caused the downfall of the empire.

Mohammad Shah was so notoriously indulgent in all forms of luxuries that for thirty years he never stepped out of the Red Fort of Delhi. He squandered away all the wealth stored by his predecessors, enjoying the pleasures of life ceaselessly.

A famous proverb says: as the king is, so are his subjects. The life of the nobles of the period was the replica of that of their master, whom they imitated in every aspect of their life. The son of Abdul Ghafoor, a noble of Mohammad Shah, was exceedingly dissolute, he never hesitated to take another's life with or without pretext. One of his freaks was to dress himself up as a loose woman wearing many gold ornaments, with his hands and feet *henna*-dyed. Dancers were called to dance at his gate while he sat there with wine cup in his hands. When intoxicated, he used to tie rattles to his ankles, cover his head with *shawls* and join the dance. Litters carrying the wives of poor men were stopped as they passed by his palace. The women were brought before him and those whom he approved were appropriated. For gratifying more unnatural passions too, he spent large sums of money.[21] During the reign of Shah Alam Ṣani (d. 1806 A.D.), even a brave and wise man like Najaf Khan, was, tempted to lead a life of wickedness. Mir Taqi Mir observes about him:

"But he was young, and Shahjehanbad resembles the world of wonders. The friends and comrades made him to indulge in pleasures. He, consequently, became too indulgent, resorting to obscene practices and physical intercourse with women so much that his health was completely shattered. In the end he became a victim of constant fever, which ate him up and he passed away."[22]

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[20] For details, see: *Jahandar Nama* (Ms), ff. 38b, 39a, b.

[21] *Later Mughals*, 11, pp. 269-70.

Dargah Quli Khan's observations in this connection deserve special study. While describing the shops of the Chauk of Saadullah, he gives an account of those hypocritical *hakims* who posed as specialists in matters of sex. They kept their shops in the open place, gathered around them a good number of people and talked about sex, *imsak* and venereal diseases.

Again the author speaks of such families of the nobles who had developed habits of luxury and practised pleasure-seeking as an art and spent most of their time in debased enjoyment. Azam Khan, the son of Fidvi Khan, the brother of Khan Jahan Khan, a grandee during the reign of Aurangzeb, is a great noble. Due to his colourful disposition and mastery over music, he is praised by all the singers of India. He is passionately attached to the teen-aged boys. He spends all that he gets from his *Jagirs* on them. Whenever he gets information of a beautiful youth, he entraps him by establishing friendship with him. Every beautiful boy is associated with Azam Khan and with no one else". Depicting the life of Mir Mannu, son of a noble, the author remarks thus:

"He is one among the Amirs of the period. His perfection for entrapping beautiful ones resembles the art of magic. Generally the sons of nobles take lessons from him in this art in order to entrap beautiful boys, and feel proud of being his pupils. His abode resembles the Paradise of Shaddad, in which was to be found the concourse of the beautiful ones. Every beautiful boy, who is not attached to his assembly is in darkness and one, who does not participate in these assemblies, cannot be relied on. This assembly is a touch-stone of beauty and a centre for the appraisal of flower-like faces".

The author lauds highly the assemblies organised by Latif Khan, a son of a noble. After extolling his etiquette, manner of reciting poetry, sociability, and entertainments extended to the guests, he observes:

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[22] *Mir Ki Asap Biti*, pp. 177-78.

"Noor Bai and other female dancers, players of musical instruments, and male dancers have been the main source of attraction for his assemblies." The *Basant,* one of the many festivals, attracted the attention of the author more because pomp and show was displayed on this occasion. It was celebrated for a whole week in Delhi, and every day a new programme was presented. After giving a detailed account of the celebration, the author summarises the week-end programme in the following lines:

"On the night of the 7th of this month, all the dancers of the city of Delhi visit the grave of *"Azizi"*, situated in the Adhipura. The grave is bathed by wine and throughout the night the dancers and singers, one by one, getting precedence on the basis of status dance and sing. All these activities are regarded as a source of peace for the soul of the saint. The *quwwals* also come along with their bands. Thus colourful assembly takes place. Beautiful ladies and handsome boys add charm to this gathering and they are provided there with suspicious privacy. As this programme extends over seven days, the lepers, the physically invalid and also the clever ones, fully utilise the week-long programme for their benefit and joy that suffices for the whole year."

The author has also given an account of those singers, instrumentalists, dancing girls and beautiful boys who in their arts surpassed all. The popularity of those artists makes it clear that the people of that period were keenly interested in dance and music along with wine and women, as an inseparable part of sensuality and debauchery, while swords and spears were no more than pieces of decoration for them. The author gives an account of Niyamat Khan, the *herp*-player and others:

"He is second to none in inventing the tunes of music. He has attained such mastery over this art that he is the accepted leader of the musicians of Delhi. Except the requests of the King (Mohammad Shah) he does not concede to the request of any one else. On the 12th of every month he organises a musical concert of his own in which the nobles and the wealthy participate. The keen interest of the people in these concerts makes them rush to the place where these are held from early in the morning, and by the evening there remains no space unoccupied. When Niyamat Khan begins to play *herp,* the people become restless like a fish out of water and forget their own selves. Niyamat Khan has a brother, who plays on a single musical instrument in different ways for hours together. He has devised a musical instrument which has three strings and is considered as one of the wonders of music. Taj Khan is a *quwwal,* his *quwwalis* have soothing effect on the soul and bring peace and joy to one's heart. He is a sufi-minded man. He arranges *sama* on the seventh of every month at his residence". Two sons of Taj Khan—Jani and Ghulam Rasool—were in no way inferior to their father in performing on the *quwwali.* Baqar Tambcorchi (Guitar player) was a unanimously acknowledged master-singer of his times. It is said, however, that when he played on the strings of the guitar, the sweet tunes made the hearts of the listeners restless. The king (Mohammad Shah) as well as the nobles and rich men patronised him.

Hasan Khan Rubabi (Rubab is a kind of violin) and Ghulam Mohammad (Sarungi-player), were noted musicians. Among the descendants of Tan Sen, Rahim and Tan Sen, the second, had won a great reputation for their art as they enjoyed the patronage of all the lovers of music. Their performances were excellent and surcharged with magical effect. They were masters in performing the *rag* of *Kabat* and *Dharpad.* Hasan Khan, *dholuk* player, had so much mastery on his art that he could play *dholuk* continuously even for six months, bringing out a new tune every night. His fingers moved so swiftly that eyes failed to catch them in motion. Thanna too was a *dholuk* player and enjoyed the privilege of being a student of Hasan Khan. The father of Shahbaz, the *Dhamdhami*-player, was attached to the court of Azam Shah. He was second to none in playing the *dhamdhami.* Shah Darwesh, the *sabucha*-player, was blind by birth, but he was a master-musician of his age, playing on the pitcher. Even most famous *dholuk* players felt ashamed of themselves when he played on the pitcher. He devised a new musical instrument which combined in itself the tunes of *Dholuk, pakhwaj* and *tambura.* When this instrument was played upon, it appeared that the notes of the three musical instruments had been combined, yet the note of each could be separately recognised. Another blind musician played *dholuk* on his belly. He played so nicely that sometimes his listeners could not believe that he was playing *dholuk* on his belly. Dancing girls danced to the tunes he thus produced. Similarly, Taqi was unanimously accepted as second to none in the art of performing *bhagat*. He enjoyed the special favour of the king (Mohammad Shah). Every kind of musical instruments needed for the performance of *bhagat* was possessed by him. Besides these artists, the author has given a short account of some others, too, for example, Hinga Amrad, Noor Bai, Amr Begum, Panna and Tannu. The account of Hinga Amrad is full of interest:

"He puts on yellow garment and has fair complexion. He presents his dance in front of the Red Fort of Delhi every day in the evening. The spectators have honoured him with the title of *Hinga Pirare* for he is one among the lacs. Because of this thousands of people feel emotionally attached to him. He is extremely handsome and attractive. He earns a lot of money by selling himself, but never goes to anybody's house. His lovers and buyers themselves paid visits to his abode and enjoyed his company and dance."

Among the *domnis* (a particular caste of Mussulmans, whose daughters are singing girls) of Delhi, Noor Bai occupied a prominent position. The nobles were always keen to get a glimpse of her. She used to go out on an elephant with great pomp and show. Wherever she went, she was presented with jewels and so she was able to accumulate much wealth. Anyone amongst the wealthy who established friendly relations with her, was ruined. She was extremely beautiful and sweet in manners and talk. It was well-known that Noor Bai was rolling in wealth behind the curtain of her beauty, yet whenever she came out smiling, everyone was spell-bound and under the charm of her face, ready to stake on her whatever one possessed. She was a consummate singer and perfect in singing *Jungala*. Amr Begum was indeed a strange dancing woman. Remaining nude all the time was her peculiarity; she got printed on her skin the prints of *Paijama* and thus appeared as if she was dressed while many people knew that she was naked. Panna and Tannu were both celebrated dancing women. They were patronised by the king on whom they had great influence. In fact, they were unequalled in the art of dancing. The people loved them and even at the commencement of their dance, laudatory acclamations rose to the sky. Panna in particular was very wanton and cleverly displayed her attractive blandishments.

The author's account of the luxurious and sexual atmosphere of Kasalpur is very significant. It indicates the demoralised plight and the degeneration of contemporary Delhi society. He sums up the whole atmosphere in the following words:

"Kasal Singh is *Panjhazari Mansabdar* of the king. In wealth and opulence, he is superior amongst his contemporaries. He has founded Kasalpura in a well-planned way, where all necessities of life are available. He has inhabited the place with all kinds of dancing women and such public women who possess much wealth. In spite of the large following of the *Mohtasib* (Moral censor) he has not the courage to go in that area to check. The very air of the place is sex-provoking."

Thus, on the whole, the people of Delhi in particular were indulging in unislamic practices like alcoholism and womanisation. They took refuge in wine or shrine. However, in course of time the two ways of escape so intermingled that the distinction between the tavern and the temple was lost sight of. They rendered service to saints to get individual salvation, which otherwise one could not have got because saints were the intermediaries between man and God. The kings and nobles, who excessively indulged in all sorts of worldly pleasures, extended much respect towards the saints. In return for their intercession, *Jagirs* and *Altamgha* were assigned in the form of *madade-moash*. Mohammad Shah's devotion to saints may be judged from the fact that Shah Mobarak, Shah Budha and Shah Ramz were honoured by him with the titles of *Burhanul Tariqat* and *Burhanul Haqiqat* and *Fasihul Bayan* respectively.[23]

On one occasion Mohammad Shah sent the following message to Mirza Mazhar Jan Jana through his Wazir, Qamaruddin Khan: "The God has given me a country, whatever area you desire, I can present it to you as a gift."[24] But Mirza Jan Jana refused to accept this gift. Nizamul-mulk Asaf Jah also presented thirty lacs of rupees to Mazhar and the latter turned down the overture with disdain.[25]

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[23] *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani*: ff. 75b, 76a.
[24] *Maqamate-Mazhari*, p. 34.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

Mysticism was very popular during the 18th century. Pederasty was commonly resorted to for satisfying the carnal desires. The people passed the day time in the *Khanqah* and nights in the tavern. It is on this account the *Urs* and fairs got much popularity during the period under study. In the neighbourhood of the Sarai Khawaja Basant, in Delhi, was situated the shrine of a saint, Nangal by name. *Urs* was held every month there. The author gives the following demoralised picture of that *Urs*.

'On the seventh of every month the ladies disposed towards sexualism, finely donned, came there in a constant stream to pay their respects. But, in fact, their ultimate aim is altogether different. They regale and delight themselves by meeting their lovers. They indulge in sex-gratification. The celibates and men of low professions frequented that place donned in fineries, aiming at some beautiful lady to get her attracted towards them. If, however, a strange man steps in this pleasure house, he immediately becomes a partner. The joy-seekers assemble in such a great number that the place becomes so short as the eye of an ant".

The son of Mir Musharraf organised the *Urs* ceremony of his father with great pomp and show. The fact goes that the ceremony was made an occasion for all sorts of physical indulgences. The author writes:

"Mir Kallu, his son, celebrated his father's *Urs*, with great pomp and show, a novelty by itself. On this occasion he sets out the illumination in many colourful designs and heart entrancing array .... These places serve for the entertainment of the nobles of the royal court and dancers and musicians to whom are extended a standing invitation. He himself is young and has friends amongst the sons of nobles, who always accept his invitation and bring with them their sweethearts. The natural accompaniment of this gathering is that under the shade of every individual tree or a cluster thereof or besides every lawn, there are pitched tents of colourful designs which resemble an assemblage of blossoms, while inside them are held carousals of wine and liquor. For the whole night and everywhere, there go on rounds of dancing to the strains of music and to the accompaniment of feasting with choice dishes and a plenty of provisions in keeping with the rank and standing of the guests. The pervading effect of the scene is that whole night looks like a *shabe-barat*, swathed with emitting lights, while the dawn appears as Roze-Id, bathed in its welcome and heartening colours .... In short, there is no check of formality or decorum with the result that all the dainties of food and other delicacies of taste are available to the extent of one's heart's content".

The following citation clearly indicates the extent to which religiosity and voluptuosity had been deplorably intermixed. Depicting the atmosphere of the *Urs* of Khuld Manzil, the author remarks:

> "On every 23rd *Muharrum-ul-Haram,* there is celebrated the *Urs* of Khuld Manzil, with pomp and show. His grave lies in the compound of Hazrar Qutub-ul-Aqtab (Qutubuddin Bakhtiar Kaki) and Mehr Parwar, his wife, pre-arranges the decoration with taste under the supervision of Hiyat Khan, the Nazir. The lay-out of vistas of illumination composed of lamps and lights of various colours are arranged all around it. These installations and decorations are done by the royal architects and artisans. They erect lampstands so upright that they dwarf the *sarv-wa-shamshad* (trees) noted for their beautiful vertical posture. The lamps are grouped in cluster of light, that they give the impression of trees of light spread over the whole scene. The illumination makes one feel that the sun does not peep out of the window of horizon till dawn, when shame-faced it shows itself at last. The licentious with their sweethearts roam about hand in hand everywhere, while the pleasure-seekers given over their lusts, dance about, crowding every bazar and street. The drunkards too, go about in search of the lascivious sports, while libertines are busy unchecked in love-making. The place is full of the blossoming youths who disturb the peace of the holy saints. In a word, the graveyard becomes a pleasure land for Nawabs and Khans and every nook and corner there is resounding to the tumult of the rich and the poor. The musicians and songsters abound everywhere, outnumbering even the flies and the beggars and the needy simply cannot be counted. The *Urs* ceremony thus provides the noble and ignoble of the city a means to satisfy their carnal desires".

While studying this diary it is to be kept in mind that the author gives us a picture of Delhi which had already been sacked and looted by Nadir Shah, who had butchered thousands of innocent people, and carried away unlimited wealth belonging to the Red Fort and the wealthy inhabitants of the city. *Muraqqa-i-Delhi* preserves an account of Delhi for three years, including the period just after the departure of Nadir Shah. When going through the pages of this book, which is full of vivid pictures of luxurious life and pastimes, one cannot imagine that it was the same Delhi which had already witnessed a wholesale massacre and desolation by Nadir Shah. The author has referred to the effects of Nadir Shah's invasion only twice. While writing about Latif Khan, he says:

"The wealth of Latif Khan has gone to dogs as a result of the contest between two kings (Nadir Shah and Mohammad Shah). Consequently the assemblies at his house are not like the previous ones, even then some close associates still assemble and spend a part of their night in delight and pleasure. This verse is to be found always recited by Latif Khan:

"In the banquets of the profligates, neither the day dawns
nor the night falls.

Herein is seen the cup going round, the revolutions of
the times have no place"

In his account of Kamal Bai, the author refers to Nadir Shah's invasion. Kamal Bai, a dancing girl was attached to the court of Mohammad Shah, but she was dismissed after the invasion. He further adds, "on account of Nadir Shah's invasion, the king has become indifferent to music and has dismissed all the (court) musicians".

The above statement of the author is not supported by any of the contemporary sources, in which we find evidences that after Nadir Shah's departure Mohammad Shah continued to enjoy music and dance. The author of *Jam Jahan Numa* remarks that the king Mohammad Shah, according to his natural taste, continued to take interest even after Nadir Shah's invasion and opened the doors of luxury for himself.[26]

In short, the Muslim society in Delhi had become morally too degenerate. The same however seems to have been the condition throughout the Muslim world during that period. Stoddard observes:—

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[26] *Jam Jahan Numa* (Ms. Rampur), p. 492, also see: *Biyane Waqai Nadir Shah* (Ms.) f. 71a.

> "As for the moral precepts of the *Koran,* they were ignored or defied. Wine drinking and opium-eating were well-nigh universal, prostitution was rampant, and the most degrading vices flaunted naked and unashamed. Even the holy cities, Mecca and Medina were sink-holes of iniquity, while the 'Hajj' or pilgrimage ordained by the Prophet, had become a scandal through its abuses. In fine the life had apparently gone out of Islam, leaving naught but a dry husk of soulless ritual and degrading superstition behind. Could Mohammad (the Prophet) have returned to earth, he would have anathematized his followers as apostates and idolators".[27]

Yet in this atmosphere of exuberant immorality there were some great silent reformers who were sincerely exerting themselves to the utmost to wean the Muslims from this darkness by the light of true morality and religiosity, and to bring them back to the teachings of the Quran and Hadith. Among them the names of Khawaja Mir Dard,[28] (1718-84) Mirza Mazhar Jan Jana,[29]

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[27] *New World of Islam; Stoddard* (New York, 1921), p. 26.

[28] Khawaja was born in Delhi in the year 1718 A.D. His father's name was Khawaja Mohd. Nasir Andleeb, who was a famous mystic-cum-poet of his times and belonged to *Naqshbandi Order*. Khawaja Mir Dard himself was an Urdu poet and a saint of repute. As a poet he is one among the four pioneers, who played a very important role in the standardisation of the Urdu language, As a mystic, he spent most of his time in the spiritual culture of Muslims. Besides, he was a famous musician and enrolled pupils. On 24th of every month, music concert was organised at his residence, where all the singers and those interested in music assembled. He was a great Persian scholar as well. Besides his Urdu Diwan, many literary works-most famous among which is *Ilmul Kitab,* go to his credit. He died in 1784 A.D. and was buried in Delhi. For details see: *Ab-i Hiyat* (Lucknow edition), pp. 225-235.

[29] Mirza's father, Mirza Jan, was a *mansabdar* under Aurangzeb but on account of his mystic bent of mind, Mirza Jan resigned from his Mansab and came back to Agra and settled there. He made proper arrangement for the education of his son under some of the best teachers of the age. Mirza Mazhar became the disciple of Hazra Noor Mohammad Badauni, a Naqshbandi saint, and established his *Khanqah* at Delhi and spent the rest of his life in the spiritual culture of the Muslims. In the history of the *Naqshbandi silsila* he occupies a very prominent position. With him begins the regeneration and revival of this *silsila* with a new name 'Shamsiya Mazha-

(1699-1780) Maulana Fakhruddin Dehlvi,[30] (1717-84) and Shah Wali Ullah[31] (1703-62) deserve special mention. These reformers not only saved the Muslim society from decay but anticipated all the social reform movements of the Muslims in the 19th and 20th centuries.

riya'. Mirza had cultivated very cordial relations with non-Muslims and his attitude towards Hindu religion was such that he openly declared that the Hindus of India could not be treated as the Mushriks of pre-Islamic Arabia. See *Maqamāl-i-Mazhari; Mamumāl-i-Mazhari*

[30] Son of a famous saint, Shaikh Nizamuddin Aurangabadi, who was a favourite disciple and Khalifa of Shah Kalim Ullah Shahjehanabadi. Shah Fakhruddin was born in 1717 A.D. at Aurangabad, Deccan. After completion of his education Shah Fakhruddin joined the army where he spent most of his time in prayers and meditation. After some time he resigned and came back to Aurangabad, where he devoted himself to the spiritual culture of Hindus and Muslims. Later he came over to Delhi and took his residence in his *Madrasah* of Ghazi-uddin Khan Firoz Jang, situated outside the Ajmeri Gate. That historic *Madrasah* at present is known as Delhi College.

He devoted himself to the removal of the social evils of the Muslim community by imparting teachings of Quran and Hadith to the Muslims on the one hand and by arresting the forces of moral and spiritual degeneration on the other. He died in the year 1784 A.D. and was buried in Delhi. His shrine is in Mehrauli. For detailed biographical account see: *Manaqib-e-Fakhriya, Fakhrut Talibeen.*

[31] Shah Wali Ullah was born in 1703 A.D. He completed his education at an early age. At the age of 15 he was initiated into *Naqshbandi silsila.* After performing his 2nd Haj pilgrimage in 1731 A.D., he settled down in Delhi and occupied himself with the teaching of the Quran and Hadith in the *Madrasai-Rahimia,* founded by his father Shah Abdur Rahim. He was a prolific writer and wrote more than 40 books which have till today exercised considerable influence on the development of Muslim thought.

Shah Wali Ullah started a movement for the removal of those social evils which had crept into the rank and file of the Muslim community, and for the restoration of the Mughal royalty. He invited Ahmad Shah Abdali in this connection. He died in 1762 A.D. and was buried in Delhi. For detailed biographical account see: *Hiyate Wali* by Maulana Rahim Bakhsh.

Origin and Ethnology of the Hūnas of India

BY

DR. ATREYI RAY, *Agra*

Hūṇa is undoubtedly the Sanskritised form of the western Hun. But the Hun people in themselves contained a great variety of racial types, with prominent ethnic differences and can be identified as numerous distinctive hordes. The *Hsiung-nu* of China, the *Hyon* of the *Avesta,* the *Hun* of Europe, the *Ephthalite* or Chionite (χιουες, χιωυες, OIONO) of Persia, the *Xun* of Sogdia, the *Hwn* of Chorasm, the *Hon* of Armenia were all known as Huns, yet they differed considerably from one another. Procopius[1] in his *History of the Wars* differentiated clearly among them.

The varieties of the Hūṇas, based probably on ethnological differences, were recognised by the ancient Indian scholars as well. We have in Indian literature references to *Śveta-Hūṇa* or *Hāra Hūṇa.* The words *Hāra* and *Śveta,* with the variants *Hala* and Sita, as applied to the Hūṇas, are found chiefly in the *Bṛhat Saṁhitā* and in the *Mahābhārata.*

The *Bṛhat Saṁhitā* in various ślokas enumerates certain tribal people on the north and north-western frontiers of India, amongst whom are the Hūṇas, sometimes accompanied by the adjectives *Hāra* and *Śveta.* We quote some examples:

While commenting on the influence of the comets Varāhamihira refers to the *Śveta Hūṇas,* who, he says, will be unhappy, if the tails of the comets are crossed by the fall of the meteors.[2] Later while describing the 'countries of the earth, beginning from the centre of Bhāratavarṣa and going round'[3] he refers to the *Hala Hūṇas* in the north of India.[4] Elsewhere Varāhamihira refers to the influence of planets on different tribes. In this context he says that *Ketu* presides over the *Pahlavas, Śveta Hūṇas, Colas Avagānas, Maru Cīnas* and the land of the Mlecchas.[5]

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[1] Procopius.—*History of the Wars.* (Loeb Classical Library), Vol. I, Ch. III, p. 2-7.

[2] Ch. XI. śl. 61.

In the same way, while referring to the tribes of the north and north-western frontier of India, the *Mahābhārata* mentions the *Hāra Hūṇas.* Thus Duryodhana after his return from the capital of Yudhiṣṭhira, describes the latter's prosperity. In that context he says that the *Hāra Hūṇas* and the other tribal peoples were waiting at his door, being refused permission to enter.[6] Further during Nakula's *pratīcī* (western) conquest the name of the *Hāra Hūṇas* occurs again with that of other tribes — *Ramaṭhān hārahūṇāṁśca pratīcyāścaiva ye nṛpāḥ tānsarvānsa vaśecakre śāsanādeva Pāṇḍavāḥ.*[7]

The *Mahābhārata* counts the name Hūṇa among the barbarous peoples created from the froth of the mouth of Vaśiṣṭha's cow.[8] The word *Hāra Hūṇa* occurs in some other Indian literature, with the variant Hāra Hūra. But in these cases the *Hāra Hūra* has a completely different meaning. Kauṭilya[9] dealing with intoxicating drinks, named *Hāra Hūra* says:

> *mṛdvikā — raso madhu; tasya svadeśo vyākhyānam kāpīśāyanaṁ hārahūrakam iti.*

"The juice of grapes is termed Madhu. Its own native place (*svadeśa*) is the commentary on such of its various forms as *Kāpiśāyana* and *hārahūraka.*"

In *Hemacandra Koṣa* we find the mention of the word *Hāra Hūra* as an intoxicating drink:

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[3] Ch. XIV. śl. 1.

[4] Ch. XIV. śl. 27.

[5] Ch. XVI. śl. 38.

[6] *Mahābhārata.*—Poona ed.—*Sabhāparva. Dyutaparva.* Adhyāya, 47, śl. 19.

[7] *Ibid.*—*Sabhāparva. Digvijayaparva.* Adhyāya, 29, śl. 11.

[8] *Mahābhārata;* Poona ed. *Ādiparva*, Adhyāya, 165, śl. 6.

[9] Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. II, Ch. 25.

Ṣuṇḍā hālā hārahūraṁ prasannā vāruṇī surā.[10]

and again:—

mṛdvikā hārahūra ca gokṣura sktatrikaṇṭakaḥ
svadaṁṣṭrāsthalaṣṛṅgāṭogirikarṇyaparājitāḥ.[11]

The origin and meaning of the words *Hāra Hūṇa* and *Śveta Hūṇa* is suggested by Sir H. W. Bailey.[12] He has shown that in *Bahman Yasht* — *Karmir Hyon* and *Spet Hyon* come side by side. *Karmir* means red and *spet* white and thus these two adjectives differentiate between red Huns and white Huns. The identification of the Indian *Śveta Hūṇa* with the Persian *Spet Hyon* is quite probable. This Karmir Hyon can be reasonably equated with the Pazand *Xarmara hayun* and Greek κερμιχιωνες. Bailey further points out that in the *Avesta* there is another word *Harada*, meaning red, which is probably equivalent to Hāra, also meaning red. And he suggests that the *Hāra Hūṇas* of Indian sources are the *Karmir Hyon* of the *Avesta*. Another parallel theory was produced by Marquart[13] and supported by Pelliot,[14] Rénou, Filliozat[15] and Lévi.[16] They all think that the word *Hāra* is corrupt form of the Turkish word *qāra*, meaning black. Whether it is derived from the *Avestan Harada* or Turkish *qāra*, it is clear that the word Hāra was originally meaning coloured (red or black). On the basis of this discussion, it can be said that Indians and Persians regarded the Hūṇas as divided into two groups — coloured Huns and white Huns.

This division of the Hūṇas was not arbitrarily made. If we look at the records of the European writers, it will be clear enough that they also knew these divisions of this tribe. They made a clear-cut distinction between the Huns who invaded Europe and the Hunnish tribes who struggled with Persia.

The poet Claudian,[17] who wrote about the time of the fall of the Roman Empire, gives a sketch of the Huns. "The Huns are a tribe who live on the extreme eastern borders of Scythia, beyond frozen Tanais; most infamous of all the children of the north. Hideous to look upon are their faces and loathsome their bodies, but indefatigable is their spirit. The chase supplies their food; bread they will not eat. They love to slash their faces and hold it a righteous act to swear by their murdered parents...... Disorderly, but of incredible swiftness, they often return to the fight when little expected." The Gothic writer, Jordanes, gives a detailed sketch of the origin, nature and physiognomy of the Hūṇas. He says "Filimer, king of the Goths, who invaded Scythia with his tribe, found among his people certain evil women who were called Halirunnae. Suspecting these women he expelled them from the midst of his race and compelled them to wander in solitary exile afar from his army. There the unclean spirits who beheld them, as they wandered through the wilderness, bestowed their embraces upon them and begot this savage race, which dwelt at first in the swamps — a stunted, foul and puny tribe, scarcely human, and having no language, save one which bore but slight resemblance to human speech. Such was the descent of the Huns, who came to the country of the Goths... By the terror of their features they inspired great fear in those whom perhaps they did not really surpass in war. They made their foes flee in horror, because their swarthy aspect was fearful and they had a sort of shapeless lump, not a head, with pinholes rather than eyes. Their hardihood is evident in their wild appearance and they are beings who are cruel to their children on the very day they are born. For they cut the cheeks of the males with a sword so that, before they receive the nourishment of milk, they must learn to endure wounds. Hence they grow old beardless and their young men are without comeliness, because a face furrowed by the sword spoils by its scars the natural beauty of a beard. They are short in stature, alert horsemen, broad shouldered, ready in the use of bow and arrows and have firm-set necks, which are ever erect in pride. Though they live in the form of men, they have the cruelty of the wild beasts.[18]

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[10] *Hemacandra Koṣa, Kāṇḍa*, III, śl. 567.
[11] *Ibid., Kāṇḍa*, IV, śl. 222.
[12] Bailey.—*Hārahūṇa, Asiatica*, 1954, p. 12-16; B.S.O.A.S., 1932, p. 945.
[13] J. Marquart.—*Uber des Volkstun der komanen*, p. 70-71.
[14] P. Pelliot, *J.A.*, 1920, i.p., 140.
[15] L. Rénou & J. Filliozat.—*L'Inde classique*, 1947, p. 254.
[16] S. Lévi, *B.E.F.S.O.*, ii. p. 250.
[17] Claudian.—*The Loeb Classical Library*, tr. by M. Platnauer, I, p. 49. (Original ref.: Libre, I, vs. 325).

The same description is given by Ammianus Marcellinus. He refers to a tribe of Huns dwelling beyond the Maeotic sea. "The cheeks of their children were deeply furrowed with steel, from their very birth, in order that the growth of hair, when it appears at the proper time, may be checked by the wrinkled scars. They grow old without beards and without any beauty, like eunuchs. They all have compact limbs, thick necks, and are ugly and misshapen. But they are hardy in their mode of life. They have no need of fire, nor of savoury food, but eat the roots of the wild plants and the half raw flesh of any kind of animal; this they put between their thighs and the back of their horses, and thus warm it a little... When they have once put their necks into a faded tunic it is not taken off or changed until by long wear or tear it has been reduced to rags and fallen from them bit by bit. They cover their heads with round caps and protect their hairy legs with goatskins. Their shoes are not formed upon lasts and so prevent their walking with free steps. For this reason they are not at all adapted to battles on foot but are almost glued to their horses, which are hardy, it is true, but ugly. From their horses by day and night every one of that nation buys and sells, eats and drinks and bowed over the narrow neck of their animal, relaxes into sleep. And when deliberation is called for about weighty matters they all consult in that fashion (i.e. on horseback). They are subject to no royal restraint but they are content with the disorderly government of their important men. No one in their country ever ploughs a field. They are all without fixed abodes, without hearth or law or settled mode of life, and keep roaming from place to place accompanied with their wagons in which their wives live and cohabit with their husbands. In truces they are faithless and unreliable; like unreasoning beasts they are utterly ignorant of the differences between right and wrong and ambiguous in speech, never bound by any reverence for religion, and superstition. They burn with an infinite thirst for gold and they are so fickle and prone to anger that they often quarrel with their allies."[19]

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[18] Jordanes.—*The Gothic History;* tr. in Eng. by C. C. Mierow, 1915, p. 85, 87.

The description tallies surprisingly with that of Jordanes especially in the details concerning physiognomy and they may have had a common source of information. There is no doubt that both authors are describing the same horde of Huns in Europe. But this does not imply that the Huns of Europe had not varieties in themselves. Ammianus makes the distinction between this horde of Huns and the other Hunnic horde named Halani (or sometimes known as Massagetae). He states that "the Halani were also Huns but were less savage in their manner of life and their habits. These Halani lived in a barbarous manner, worshipped a naked sword as the god of war."[20] About the difference between the Huns and the Massagetae, Procopius also gives detailed accounts. He says that during his period they were called Huns.[21] They had a great love of wine.[22] They fought in the army of Aetius[23] and joined the army of Belisarius in his African expedition.[24] He mentions the Huns (i.e. the Massagetae) under the Roman army of Constantinus.[25] As the chief characteristics of the Massagetae he gives two features — that they do not give any heed to bodily comforts; and that they are at all times covered with filth.[26] There are more references to them in relation to Rome, which we need not notice here.

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[19] Ammianus Marcellinus, iii, xxi, p. 2, 1-12.

On the other hand the Hunnish tribes in Persia were never described as having ugly looks and a terrifying appearance. Procopius[27] emphasises the fact that the Ephthalites or the white Huns, though they were of the stock of the Huns, in fact as well as in name, did not mingle with the Huns of Europe. They were located against the Persian frontier in the city of Gorgo and were not nomads like the other Hunnic people. They differed from the Huns of Europe in their appearance. The colour of their skin was white and their countenances were not ugly. They did not live in the manner of their kinsmen. They did not lead a savage life, but were ruled by a king, were guided by a lawful constitution and observed right and justice.

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[20] *Ibid.*, xxxi., 2, 13, 21-23.

[21] Procopius, III, XI, 9.

[22] *Ibid.*, III, XII, 8.

[23] *Ibid.*, III, IV, 24.

[24] *Ibid.*, III, XI. 11; XII. 8-10; XVII. 3; XVIII. 3, 12, 17, XIX. 18, 33; IV, XVIII. 2.

[25] *Ibid.*, V, III. 15; V. 4; XXVII. 2-27; VI. 1, 4-10.

[26] Ibid., V.I, XIV. 28.

[27] *Ibid.*, I, III. 2-7.

These preliminary discussions permit us to think that the people called Huns in ancient days were divided distinctly into two broad groups. The one was ferocious, completely nomadic, and ugly in appearance, whereas the other was more civilised, whiter in complexion, and of manly physique. The former horde had no kings, laws or constitutions of their own, whereas the latter group had regular rulers and observed law and order.

Now the question arises as to whether these Hunnish people were Mongolian, as can be supposed from the documents of Claudian, Jordanes and Ammianus, or whether they belong to some other ethnic group. The theory of their Mongolian origin is also strengthened by the linguistic sources discussed by such scholars as Shiratori, Bergmann, Bichurin etc. Shiratori at first propagated the Hsiung-nu Turk theory but afterwards changed his views and now believes that the Hsiung-nus were a Mongolian people.[28] Shiratori takes such Hsiung-nu words from the Chinese annals as the *Che-ki* and the *Ts'ien-han-shu* and tries to decide whether these words can be derived from Mongolian, Turkish or Tunguz. He concludes that among the twenty three Hsiung-nu words which he examined, four can be derived from any one of the three linguistic groups, Turk, Mongol or Tunguz, fourteen can be derived from Mongolian, while one word is certainly of Turkish etymology. However, even this word of Turkish origin may also be derived from an Iranian language. Thus probably the Hsiung-nu language was principally related to the Mongolian, having also adopted some words from the Tunguz. It has very little affinity with Turkish. In the same way Bergmann tries to explain the Hunnish name Mountsak from the Mongolian words *mou* = 'bad' and *tsak* = 'time'.[29] Yakint Bichurin,[30] a Russian sinologist, notes that *Hunnu* is the old national name of the Mongols. For the transcription of the word *Hunnu*, the Chinese used two characters (i) *Hun* = wicked and (ii) *nu* = slave.

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[28] K. Shiratori.—*Sur l'origine des Hsiung-nus, J.A.*, 1923, p. 77-80.

[29] M. Bergmann.—*Nomadische Streifereien under denkalküken, Riga*, 1904, i. p. 129.

[30] Y. Bichurin—*Sobranie Svedeuiy O Narodakh Obita[illegible]shikh Vsredney Azii v Drevniya vremena*, st. Petersburg, V. I, p. 1, n. 1.

But this *Hsiung-nu-Mongol* theory has been refuted by another group of scholars, most of whom believe that the *Hsiung-nus* were Turks.

They argue that, following the Gothic historians it had been supposed that the Huns lacked beards which is a Mongoloid characteristic. But this view cannot be accepted, for Ammianus[31] refers to the Huns as having hairy legs. Moreover the Chinese source *Chin-shu* (107-8-a) states that 'the Hsiung-nus were recognised by their high noses and full beards.' The stone figure at the tomb of the famous Ho-chü-ping, discussed by Carl Hentze[32] includes a Hsiung-nu, who is being trampled upon by the horse of Ho-chü-ping and who has a moustache and full beard. The face bears no Mongoloid feature except somewhat high cheekbones.

These references contradict the picture drawn by Gothic writers. Moreover, it is to be noted that Jordanes states that the Huns were beardless because they practised scarification, a custom not attributed to them while they were in the neighbourhood of China. Perhaps, while migrating westwards, they adopted this practice, which resulted in preventing the growth of beards. It is rather difficult to believe that the practice of scarification would completely inhibit the growth of beards, for unless the whole skin of the face was scarred, the growth of the beard would not be checked in the unaffected area, and such an inhuman practice is unthinkable. It is because of Jordanes' ignorance of physiology that he considered such a custom to be the cause of their beardlessness. Nevertheless, Jordanes' description does not necessarily imply that they grew not a single hair on their face: it may simply mean that because of such practices their beards were not full. In this case the scars must have been quite prominent to attract the attention so strikingly. Moreover, the ancient authors tended to depict exotic people and things with numerous exaggerations and this was no doubt the case with the detailed descriptions of Jordanes.

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[31] Ammianus.—XXXI, 2, 6.

[32] C. Hentze.—*Les influences etrangeres dans le monument de Houo-k'iu-ping.* — Artibus Asiae, 1925, No. 1, p. 31-35.

Why western writers depicted the Huns as ugly and ferocious can also be easily explained. Before the invasion of the Huns the Roman empire was attacked by the Goths and Vandals who were of Indo-Germanic origin. Then suddenly came the Huns, who were completely different from any people European writers had previously seen. Thus they appeared to the classical writers to be more ugly and ferocious than they really were.

This Hsiung-nu-Turk theory has been confirmed by some scholars from linguistic evidence. Hirth explains the Hsiung-nu word *ching-lu* (sword) which occurs in the *Han-shu* as related to the Turkish word *Kyngyrak* meaning 'a knife' and tries to prove that the Hsiung-nu language was akin to Turkish.[33] McGovern[34] discusses the same question from a different angle. He says—"In fact it is now generally believed that it was not until many centuries after the fall of the Hunnish empire, that the Mongolian speaking group constituted more than a small minority in the 'Mongolian population'. Incidentally this conclusion, which is arrived at by purely linguistic reasoning fits in very well with what we know regarding the racial affinities of the early Huns, in as much as it enabled us to believe that these Huns were both 'Turks' in race and 'Turkish' in language". Klaproth[35] has pointed out that the Chinese historians of the middle ages stated that the *Hoei-hes* were the descendants of the Hsiung-nus and their language was Turkish. The same sources say that the *Tu-kiu* or the Turks were the descendants of the Hsiung-nus who used to attack the Chinese empire.

We have seen that the Ephthalites were a branch of the Huns. Marquart and Grousset think that they were of Mongolian race. Enoki[36] has tried to prove them akin to the Iranians. He has explained the word *Hua*, another designation of the Epthalites, purely as a geographical name. He regards it not as an ethnic term but as a version of the name Gur, a region of Afghanistan. According to him, another place under the domination of this tribe was the *Hsimotalo* (Himatala) of Hsüan-tsang. He

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33. Dr. Hirth.—*Ahnentafai Attilas*, p. 223.
34. McGovern.—*The Early Empires of Central Asia*, p. 9.
35. Klaproth.—*Tableaux Historiques de l'Asie*, p. 122.
36. Enoki.—*On the nationality of Huns*, M.R.D.T.B., 1959.

thinks *Hsimotalo* to be the place of origin of the Ephthalites. It is well known that the Ephthalites practised polyandry. He believes that such a matrimonial system testifies to their remaining long in an isolated mountain region. The belief that *Hsimotalo* was their original abode may easily fit in with this hypothesis. Because the Ephthalites were first heard of in these regions of Central Asia it seems right to conclude with Enoki, that they originated from these places and so probably had Iranian affinities. In the review by the Russian Sinologist Mandel'shtam[37] the theory of Enoki is rightly criticised. First of all Enoki has completely disregarded the statement in *Liang-shu* that the Hua before their rise to political eminence were a minor power subject to the Jouan-jouan. This definitely challenges the theory of Enoki that the Ephthalites were first heard of in Central Asia and thus must have originated there. Secondly Enoki's supposition that Hua was a version of the name Gur, can also be refuted with the help of the *Liang-shu's* statement, which clearly testifies that the Hua were a people who extended their empire far and wide. Another objection can be raised that if Hua is one of the regions where the Ephthalites had their original kingdom, why should a subordinate region specifically figure as the Ephthalite state? Enoki failed to reply to this question. Moreover it is not an acceptable hypothesis that the system of polyandry originated from their having in an isolated region like *Hsimotalo*. Geographical reasons could not be the only cause of this system.

Stein supported Karabacek's etymological explanation of the title *Jauvla,* used by the Indian Hūna princes, as of pure Turkish origin and so concluded that the Ephthalites were Huns and that both originated from Turkish stock.[38]

From the above discussions about the origin and ethnology of the Huns and kindred tribes, it is now quite clear that there is no positive proof to establish the exact pedigree of this race. The linguistic evidence is hardly enough to solve the problem of the Hun's origin conclusively. The Hsiung-nu empire which extended over a considerable part of Central Asia would undoubtedly borrow words from various languages. Moreover, we have only a limited group of Hsiung-nu words, as so few words would not be enough to determine the racial and linguistic origin of any nation. In addition to this it cannot be denied that in the veins of the Huns there must have been a good deal of mixture of Mongolian and Turkish blood, which resulted from the intermarriage or at least interbreeding of the Hsiung-nus with the Chinese, when they were on the northern frontier of China, and with the Persians when they fought with them. Incidentally this assumption is strengthened by the skeletal remains from the Hunnish graves of Hungary and other parts of Europe, which show undoubtedly that the Huns were a mixed race in which a Mongolian strain was one of several prominent elements. O. Franke[39] considers the Hsiung-nus "as mostly Turkish blood but also mixed with Iranian, Scythian and Sarmatian". This sort of diversity in one great tribe is not unique. The tribe which was migrating continuously from one country to another, naturally acquired the blood and language of the various nations that it mixed with. Our question is which particular horde amongst these various groups of the Huns invaded India? Tentatively we can suggest that they were the Ephthalites or the white Huns (i.e. the *Śveta Hūṇas* of Indian literature). In support of our assumption we can forward a few arguments:

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[37] See *Narodi Azil i Afriki,* pt. 3, Moscow, 1962, p. 231-32.

[38] A. Stein.—*White Huns and Kindred tribes in the history of India,* I. A., 1905, p. 83-84.

The ferocious Huns, whom we equate with the Indian *Hāra Hūṇa*, probably did not penetrate the south of the Oxus. The Hunnish tribes which fought with the Sassanian emperors were white Huns. Therefore, there is hardly any chance of an invasion by the fierce-looking Huns on India. It is more likely that the white Huns, after crushing the Sassanian prestige, became interested in attacking the Indian territories. The fact that during the later part of the reign of Kubad the Ephthalites became uninterested in Persia suggests that they had found some other outlet for their expansion. It can be thought that they became involved in the politics of the north western frontier of India. It is evident from the history of the Liang[40] that the Hue (tribal name of the Ephthalites) carried their arms not only to Persia but to other countries including Kapiśā, Karashahr, Kashgar, Bai and Khotan. The text *Pei-shih*[41] corroborates the vast empire of the Ephthalites and states that Sogdiana, Khotan, Kashgar and Bukhara also submitted to their supremacy. The same source further enumerates a few more countries occupied by the Ephthalites: Kougiar, Wakhan, Zebak and Gandhāra. Thus these Chinese sources provide us with the most helpful evidence to prove that the Ephthalites gradually conquered the whole Oxus Valley and then proceeded to Gandhāra i.e. the north western frontier of India.

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[39] O. Franke.—*Geschichte des chinesischen reiches*, 1930, p. 328.

[40] *Liang-shu*, Ch. LIV, p. 13.

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The coins of the Indian Huna princes give the most solid basis of their identification with the white Huns. The portraits of the Hūṇa coins closely resemble the features of the Ephthalites, as described by Procopius.[42] They do not show Mongolian features but rather Persian. It seems clear that the Hūṇa kings who struck these issues were extremely influenced by the Persians. As the white Huns, and not the ferocious Huns, came into contact with Persia, it is reasonable to think that the Hūṇa kings who issued coins in India were of white Hun stock.

Now, if we assume that India was never invaded by the Hāra Hūṇas, the question arises as to where the Indians got their knowledge of them. Though India did not show very keen interest in the political changes outside its own boundaries there is some evidence of Indian knowledge of the historico-geographical position of the wider world. With regard to the Hāra Hūṇas it may be suggested that it was when the Huns were in the Oxus region and were going towards the west the Indians heard of their existence.

Aiyangar[43] has put forward a theory that the Hūṇas were known to the ancient Indian writers from a very early period, though not by the designation Hūṇa but by the name Uttarakurus. He locates the latter in the valley of the Tarim on the north-west margin of what is now known as the Taklamakan desert. We read of the Hsiung-nus in this area in the Chinese annals. This location of the Hsiung-nus near the Uttarakuru region is supported by the evidence of Orosius.[44] Thus Aiyangar believes that the authors of the *Purāṇas*, the *Mahābhārata*[45] and the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*[46] knew about a trans-Himalayan people, to whom they sometimes gave a legendary status, in Uttarakuru, and most probably these Uttarakuru people were the Hsiung-nus of Chinese histories and *Huni* of the geographer Orosius.

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[41] *Pei-shih*, Ch. XCVII, p. 11.
Ref.: Chavannes.—Documents surles Tou-kiue, p. 224-25.

[42] De Bello persico, I, 3. *Procopii Caesariensis Opera Omnia*, Ed. by G. Wirth, 1, de Bellis Libri, I-IV, 1963.

[43] *I.A.*, Vol. 48, 1919, p. 74-5.

This sort of knowledge about the wider world, though quite rare, is not completely absent in Indian literature. Kālidāsa evidently knew of the Hūṇas when they were residing in the Oxus valley. While describing Raghu's *digvijaya*, he mentions the Hūṇas in that region; though there are many manuscripts in which the word Sindhu occurs in place of vāṅkṣu (Oxus). The generally accepted text[47] runs as follows:

Pārasīkānstato jetuṁ pratasthe sthalavartmanā
Indrīyākhyāniva ripūn tattva-jñānena saṁyamī // 60
Yavanīmukhapadmānāmsehe madhu-madaṁ na sah
bālātapam ivābjānāmakala jaladodayaḥ // 61
saṁgrāmas tumulas tasya pāścātyairaśvasādhanaiḥ
śāraṅga-kūjita-vijñeya-pratiyodhe rajasya = bhūt // 62
bhallāpavarjjitais teṣān śirobhiḥ smaśrualirmahīm
tastāra saraghāvyāptaiḥ sa kṣaudra-paṭalairiva // 63
apanīta-śirastrāṇāḥ śeṣāstaṁ śaraṇaṁ yayuḥ
praṇipātapratikāraḥ saṁrambho hi mahātmanāṁ // 64
vinayante sma tadyodhāḥ madhubhir vijaya-śramam
āstīrṇajinaratnāsu drākṣāvalaya-bhūmiṣu // 65.
tataḥ pratasthe kauverīṁ bhāsvāniva Raghur diśaṁ
śarairustrairivodīcyān uddhariṣyan rasāniva // 66

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[44] King Alfred's Anglo-saxon version of *The compendious history of the world*, by Orosius, London, 1859.

[45] *Adi Parva*, Ch. 128.

[46] Haug's tr. VIII, 14-29.

[47] Kālidāsa.—*Raghuvaṁśa*, ed. by Jivananda Vidyasagara, sarga, 4th śl. 60-71.

vinītādhvaśramāstasya Sindhu-tīra-viceṣṭanaiḥ
dudhuvurvājinaḥ skandhān lagna-kūmkuma-keśarān // 67
tatra Hūṇāvarodhānām bhartṛṣu vyaktavikraman
kapalapāṭalādeśi babhūva Raghuceṣṭitaṁ // 68
kāmbojāḥ samare soḍhum tasya vīrya manīśvarāḥ
gajālāna parikliṣṭair akṣoṭaiḥ sārddham ānataḥ // 69
teṣām sadāśvabhū ṭiṣṭhāḥ tuṅgā draviṇarāśayaḥ
upadā viviśuḥ śāśvata ṅotsekāḥ kośaleśvaraṁ // 70
tato gaurigurum śailaṁ ārūrohāśva-sādhanaḥ
vardhayanniva tatkūṭān uddhūtair dhātu-reṇubhiḥ // 71.

Translation: 'In order to conquer the Persians he started by land just as an ascetic possessing self-restraint subdues his enemies called the senses, by true knowledge./60/ He could not bear to see the flush of wine in the countenance of Yavana women just as an untimely cloud does not allow the rising sun to shine on the lotuses./61/ He had a tumultuous contest with the western Yavanas, who were strong with their cavalry, and so dense was the dust raised that an adversary could not be guessed, except by the twanging of his bow./62/ He covered the ground with their bearded heads cut off with the spears (*bhallas*), resembling honeycomb over-spread with bees./63/ The survivors, taking off their turbans from their heads, sought his protection; for surely submission is remedy to the anger of the high-minded./64/ His warriors overcame the fatigue of their victorius fight by drinking wine in the vineyards spread over with the finest deer-skins./65/ Then Raghu, intent on extirpating the people of the north with arrows, started for that quarter of the globe which is presided over by Kuvera, just as the sun proceeds on his northern route to draw up moisture with his rays./66/ Having relieved the fatigue of their journey by rolling themselves on the banks of the Indus, the steeds shook their shoulders with their manes besmeared with saffron./67/ The Hūṇas were made to feel the effect of his power and the cheeks of their wives turned red at his exploits./68/ The Kāmbojas unable to withstand his valour in fight bent together with their walnut trees, weighed down by the fastening of the elephants./69/ Huge heaps of riches accompanied with fine steeds, they presented to him, but that did not make him vainglorious./70/ Then, on horseback, with his glory he ascended Himalaya mountains, enlarging as it were, its peaks with the mineral dust raised thereby./71/

The passage as given by Kalidasa, though set against the background of a mythical story, has some historical significance. When a poet writes this sort of poem he has two courses open to him. He can collect all the available historical information about the age of his hero and then present his hero against that background; or he may just project anachronistically the political condition of his own age. Which path will be followed by a certain author depends on his free will and the customs of the time. Nearly all ancient and mediaeval societies had no sense of the past as we have, and imagined it was just like the present or better. Most of the ancient historians followed the second alternative. In regard to the *digvijaya* description Kālidāsa had followed the second practice, as can be gathered from a comparison with the conventional descriptions of Raghu's conquest in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The passage cited above, when critically examined, appears to be in need of emendation. Many modern historians accepted the passage as it is quoted above, and have tried to infer from it a few historical facts.

M. Chakravarty[48] presumes that the description of Raghu's *digvijaya* indicates that in Kālidāsa's time the Persians were on the north-west frontier of India, because to their north were living the Kāmbojas and the Hūṇas on the bank of the Sindhu or Indus. He suggests that as we know from the Chinese and Persian historians that the region of Gāndhāra was conquered by the white Huns or the Ephthalites from Ki-to-lo at about A.D. 475 so the description of Kālidāsa of Raghu's conquest of the Hūṇas on the Sindhu reflects the political situation of a period round about this date. Pathak[49] follows the interpretation of Chakravarty. He believes that Kālidāsa specifically mentioned the saffron fields, on the banks of Sindhu where the horses of Raghu's army relaxed. He cites the *Amarakoṣa* in which *Kuṁkuma-kesara* has the synonym *Kāśmīraja.* Therefore the Sindhu was the Indus and the Hūṇas were ruling in Kashmir where saffron is grown, during the period of Kālidāsa, or shortly before him, so that the fact must have been still fresh in the recollection of the great poet.

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[48] J.R.A.S., 1903, p. 183-6.

[49] J.B.B.R.A.S., Vol. XIX, p. 35-37.

But instead of accepting the reading as it is quoted above we need to investigate further. A critical analysis of the passage reveals the following facts:

1. Raghu proceeded by land to conquer the Pārasikas.
2. He could not bear the sight of the redness of wine on the face of Yavana women. It seems that the term Yavana was used for the same Pārasikas.
3. The Yavanas were strong in cavalry.
4. They used to wear beards.
5. The defeated Yavanas surrendered to Raghu with the turbans removed from their heads.
6. The land was flourishing and contained numerous vineyards where Raghu's army relaxed.
7. Then Raghu intended to march northwards.
8. The horses relieved their fatigue by rolling on the banks of the Indus, and shook off the saffron clinging to their manes.
9. There, Raghu defeated the Hūṇas.
10. The cheeks of the wives of the Hūṇa warriors turned red with the display of Raghu's valour.
11. He subjugated the Kāmbojas whose country had an abundance of walnut trees.
12. He received a huge quantity of riches from these victories.
13. Then he ascended the Himālayas.

Raghu is described by Kālidāsa as conquering the Pārasikas i.e., Persia, but the people whom he encountered are simply mentioned as the Yavanas. It would be wrong to suppose that the Pārasikas and the Yavanas alluded to here were not the same people. The three characteristics ascribed to the Yavanas corroborate the hypothesis that they here stand for the Pārasikas. The Yavana women are described as flushing with the redness of wine.

Again the warriors of Raghu's army are mentioned as overcoming the fatigue of their victorious fights by drinking wine in the vineyards. We know that the vine was cultivated in Afghanistan,[50] which was no doubt under Persian supremacy for a long time. The expression *apānītaśirastrāṇāh* gives valuable information. It was a well known custom of the Persians that when the defeated party surrendered to the victor, they would remove their turbans and throw them around their necks as supplicants.[51] It appears that the compound *apanītaśirastrāṇāh* carries this idea. The fact that these Yavanas used to grow beards also suggests that they were the Pārasikas themselves, because beards were in fashion amongst the Persians.

Point No. 7 has exceptional importance which most of the writers who believe that the reading 'Sindhu' is correct fail to consider. We should keep in mind that after the conquest of Pārasika Raghu went northwards (*tataḥ pratasthekauverīṁ*) and then reached the banks of the Sindhu. As the Indus is not to the north of Persia, there is a strong possibility of a misreading in this particular word. Though many manuscripts of *Raghuvaṁśa* give the reading *Sindhutīra,*[52] some manuscripts give the readings *Vāṅkṣu* or *Vāṅku*. Aiyangar found the reading *Vāṅkṣu* in six manscripts out of nine he consulted. The reading *Sindhutīra* was supported by the well-known southern commentator Mallīnātha[53] but the reading *Vāṅkṣu* was given by another commentator, Kṣīrasvāmī.[54] Vallabha,[55] a native of Kashmir, gave the reading *Vāṅkṣu* though in some of his manuscripts it is written as *Vāṅku* (*Vāṅkunāmnī nadītyāha*). The word Vāṅku or Vāṅkṣu is the Sanskrit equivalent of the Greek word Oxus, as the 'O' in Greek always corresponds to 'va' in Sanskrit (eg. Peukelaotis = Puṣkalāvati). Thus when we find in many manuscripts the reading Vāṅkṣu it is better to accept this reading instead of Sindhu because the Oxus is to the north of Persia. The other two features mentioned by Kālidāsa with regard to the conquest of Vāṅkṣu are that the place was cultivated with saffron and the valley was inhabited by the Hūṅas, whose wives' cheeks became red through the display of Raghu's valour. Bactria or *Vālhīkadeśa* of Indian literature was equally famous for the saffron cultivated there as was Kashmir. Kṣīrasvāmī in his commentary on *Amarakoṣa* explains Vālhīka as meaning saffron, thus — *Vālhīka-deśajaṁ yad Raghor uttara-digvijaye dudhuvur vājinaḥ skandhānllagnakuṁkumakeśarān.* He was a writer of the 11th century. The synonym for *Kuṁkuma* was not only given as *Kāśmīrāja* but also as *Vālhīkam* and *varavālhīkam.*[56] It is explained in *Śabdakalpadruma* that the saffron was named in three ways according to its place of origin:

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[50] Chisholm.—*Handbook of Commercial Geography,* 1954, p. 143.

[51] Aiyangar.—*Hūṇa Problem in Indian History,* I, A., 1919, p. 68. (He does not mention the original source.)

[52] *Raghuvaṁśa,* B.M.Ms. No. Add. 26450 (W. Erskine's ms. in the British Museum).

[53] *Raghuvaṁśa,* ed. by Jivananda Vidyasagara, 1880, p. 161, f.n. 68.

[54] Amarasiṁha.—*Nāmāliṅganuśāsanaṁ,* with the commentary of Bhaṭṭa Kṣīrasvāmin; ed. by Hara Datta Sharma, 1941, p. 159, para, 124.

[55] *Raghuvaṁśa.*—Narayana Rama Acarya's ed. 1948, p. 101, Note, 1.

Deśabhede tatra trividham yathā
Kāsmīradeśaje kṣetre kuṁkumam yadbhaveddhitat
Sūkṣma keśaramāraktam padma gandhi taduttamam
Vālhīka deśa saṁjātaṁ kuṁkumam pāṇḍuram bhavet
Ketaki gandha yuktam tanmadhyam sūkṣma keśaram
Kuṁkuma pārasīkeya madhugandhi tadīritam
Iṣat pāṇḍurvarṇam taddhamam sthūlakeśaram.

Thus there would arise no difficulty in the reference to saffron if we accept the reading *Vāṅkṣu.*

As regards the explanation of the expression *kapolapāṭalādeśi* — We would suggest, following Pathak[57], that it is *Kapolapāṭanādeśi* as given by Vallabha.[58] He wrote — *kapolapāṭanāma hi (di) śatīti ... pativadhāt bhāryā rudantyaḥ kuca kapola nakhairvidārayati* (cutting the cheeks is intended — on the death of husband the wives used to weep and tear by their nails their breasts and cheeks). Cāritravardhana and Sumativijaya accepted the reading and said — *Hūṇayoṣitaḥ kuca-kapola-vidāraṇapūrvam rūdantīti, tad deśācāraḥ* (tr.: the Hūṇa women weep, tearing their breasts and cheeks, it is the custom of the country). Ammianus Marcellinus[59] while depicting the mourning of the Chionites when the son of Grumbates died during the siege of Amida, said — "The women for their part woefully beating their breasts and weeping after their wonted manner, loudly bewailed the hope of their nation cut off in the bloom of their youth." In the same way we read in the Hsüan-Tsang about the funeral custom of Central Asia. "They burn their dead and have no fixed period of mourning. They flay the face and cut off the ears ... among some tribes it apparently was the custom to tear or gash the face at the funeral of a parent or a chief ... we find it recorded moreover, that when the death of T'ang-tai-tsuang was announced, the barbarians sojourning at the capital expressed their sorrows by wailing, cutting off their hair, gashing their faces and cutting their ears until the blood washed the ground."[60] This peculiar custom of the Central Asian peoples was evidently the same as that referred to by Marcellinus. It seems quite reasonable to accept that Kālidāsa was describing the same custom when he wrote of the Hūṇa women that they gashed and tore their faces because of Raghu's display of valour. The explanation of Vallabha is more historically accurate and no doubt the southern commentator Mallīnātha changed the reading into *Kapolapāṭalādeśi* with the modified Indian notion of funeral mourning.

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[56] I.A., 1912, p. 266.
[57] I.A., 1912, p. 266.
[58] D.C.Ms. No. 150 of A. 1882-83.

Next Raghu conquered the Kāmbojas, whose country was well planted with walnut trees. As the context suggests, these were also a northern people. Generally Kāmboja country is believed to be situated in the northern part of Afghanistan. Stein locates it in the eastern part of Afghanistan.[61] We may regard them as somewhere not very far from the Hūna country in the Central Asia where walnut trees are quite prevalent.[62]

In the succeeding verses there is no reference to a further northward advance by the armies of Raghu. The next verse simply says that Raghu was presented by the defeated tribes with a huge amount of riches. It seems that Kālidāsa now made Raghu return with the riches and perhaps it was on his return journey that he ascended the mount Himālaya with his cavalry.

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[59] Ammianus Marcellinus. (Loeb Classical Library, ed.), XIX, 1, 11.
[60] Watter.—Hsüan-Tsang, I, 40-42.
[61] Chisholm.—*Handbook of Commercial Geography*, 1954, p. 143.
[62] *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, I, p. 136.

The further argument for Vāṅkṣu in preference to Sindhu is the well known principle of textual criticism known as Porson's Law—that in a choice of reading the less common word is likely to be correct. A copyist with inadequate geographical knowledge might well emend *Vāṅkṣu* to *Sindhu;* but it is hardly likely that he would emend *Sindhu* to *Vāṅkṣu.*

This detailed analysis of Kālidāsa's verse makes it clear that Kālidāsa intended to refer to the Hūṇas as in the Oxus valley, not on the banks of the Sindhu (the Indus). As modern historians make Kālidāsa the contemporary of the Candra Gupta II, Vikramāditya, we can assume that during the 4th century Hūṇas did not come directly in contact with the Indians but educated people like Kālidāsa knew of them as living around the Oxus to the north of Persia. It is moreover significant to note that the Hūṇas many times occur in Indian literature especially in the Epics, as the neighbours of the Persians. For example, being asked by Dhritarāṣṭra about the division of tribes in Bhāratavarsa, Saṁjaya refers to the Hūṇas and the Pārasikas in the north.[63]

To conclude, we are now fairly certain that the ancient authors of India had some idea of the geographical distribution of the tribes of the contemporary Central Asia, even though they had never come in close contact with them. The Hāra Hūṇas of the Epics and *Bṛhat Saṁhitā,* and the Hūṇas of Kālidāsa refer to the Hūṇas in the Oxus valley and not to the Hūṇas of India proper. The Hūṇas who invaded India were the white Huns who had also fought with the Sassanian kings of Persia. Gradually as they became more and more familiar to the Indian people the adjective *Śveta* was dropped and they became known simply as the Hūṇas, without qualification.

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[63] *Mahābhārata;* Poona ed. *Bhīṣmaparva,* Adh. X, śl. 64.

The Dating of the Elephanta Caves

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Since long, scholars have held different opinions regarding the chronology of the Elephanta caves, and have attributed their excavation to different dynasties. There has, however, been very little discussion on the subject. Excepting Dr. V. V. Mirashi, the other scholars who have expressed themselves on this subject have not made any attempt to justify their chronology, in spite of the fact that such justification was necessary in view of the existence of a silent controversy.

It is obvious that a discussion of the chronology of Elephanta must be preceded by a statement of the present position. James Burgess[1] held the view that they were excavated either in the latter part of the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century A.D. Fergusson[2] placed them in about A.D. 750, Stella Kramrisch[3] regards them Rashtrakuta and places them in the eighth century A.D. Hirananda Sastri[4] dates them to the Gupta period (fifth century A.D.). Y. R. Gupte[5] dates them to the first half of the seventh century A.D. and attributes them to the Mauryas of Konkan. Dr. Mirashi[6] accepts Gupte's dating but attributes their excavation to the Kalachuris. Benjamin Rowland[7] dates them to the eighth or ninth century A.D. In accepting this position, he seems to support the dating of Burgess. He does not, however, discuss his chronology. Percy Brown[8] dates them to the middle of the eighth century. Mulk Raj Anand[9] attributes them to the Chālukyas of Badāmi and dates them to the middle of the seventh century A.D. But he does not support his chronology.

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[1] Burgess, James, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, p. 467.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 467..

[3] *Indian Sculpture*, Calcutta, 1933, p. 88.

[4] *A Guide to Elephanta*, Delhi, 1934, pp. 11.

[5] *A Guide to Elephanta*, Bombay, 1942, pp. 5-6.

[6] *Kālāchuri Nripati āṇi tyāñchā kāḷa*, Nagpur, 1956, pp. 64-5.

[7] Rowland, Benjamin, *The Art and Architecture of India*, 1959, Reprint, p. 177.

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Of the scholars mentioned above, Burgess makes this brief statement. 'Architecturally, we may regard it as probably belonging to the later part of the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century of our era.' He does not state what these grounds are. Fergusson, in a short footnote expresses his dissent. He says, "I would feel inclined to place it slightly earlier. The Dumar Lena, I take to be earlier than the Kailasa at Ellora, and consequently was most probably excavated between 700 and 725 A.D. This cave seems to have followed almost immediately afterwards, and may therefore, have been well advanced if not completed before 750 A.D." Percy Brown holds a similar view.[10] Writing about the Dumar Lena of Ellora, he draws comparison between it and Elephanta and Jogeswara. He says that the latter were excavated in imitation of the former.

* * *

Dr. Mirashi while dating them to the early half of 7th century, uses arguments which are partly historical, and partly those of religious affiliation. His arguments may be briefly summarised. He disputes Gupte's contention that the cave was excavated by the Mauryas of Konkan on the ground that since they were merely the feudatories of the Kalachuris, they could not have commanded the resources required for the excavation of such a big rock-temple. This would have been possible only for the great Kalachuris, who had the resources necessary for excavating such a rock-temple. It is true that the Chālukyas of Badāmi conquered Ghārāpurī in the second half of the 7th century A.D. But the excavation of the cave cannot be attributed to them as they were Vaishnavites and therefore could not have carved a Śaiva cave. The figure of Lakuliśa at Elephanta, he feels, clinches the argument. Lakuliśa is worshipped by people belonging to the Pāśupata sect. The Kalachuri kings belonged to this sect. The presence of this sculpture, according to him, conclusively proves that the cave was excavated by the Kalachuris.

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[8] *Indian Architecture* (Buddhist and Hindu), Bombay, 1956, p. 73.
[9] Marg, *Elephanta*, Vol. XIII, 1960, p. 4.
[10] Percy Brown. Above. Cit. p. 72.

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The chronology of a cave can be decided by reference to a variety of factors. The evidence may be epigraphic, historical, religious, architectural and stylistic. All these factors have to be given due consideration while fixing chronology. Sometimes epigraphic evidence my be a determinative factor. The famous dated inscription of the Chālukya king Maṅgaleśa in cave 3 at Badāmi is a case in point. But where such determinative evidence is lacking, all the other factors have to be properly weighed.

In the case of Elephanta, no inscriptional evidence is available. We have the evidence of Diogo de Couto,[11] the Portuguese chronicler, of a stone inscription, "of large and well written characters, which was sent to the king, after the Governor of India had in vain endeavoured to find out any Hindu or Moor in the East who could decipher them. And the king D. Ioao III also used his endeavours to the same purpose, but without any effect, and the stone thus remained there, and now there is no trace of it."

Since the only available inscriptional evidence that could have been available has been irretrievably lost, it is necessary to turn to the other evidence, architectural and sculptural, that is still available. This, and the other evidence that is there, is adequate to enable us to fix the chronology of the cave.

* * *

Before advancing another theory, it is essential that those theories which are already in the field, be discussed. I shall first discuss the theory of Kalachuri excavation advanced by Dr. Mirashi. He attributes the excavation to the first half of the 7th century A.D. But this is not likely as in this very period, the Kalachuris were engaged in a life and death struggle with the Chālukyas of Badāmi. One of the earliest wars waged by Maṅgaleśa, was with the Kalachuris. It may be noted that this event is mentioned in the Mahākūṭa Pillar inscription[12] of 601 A.D. The inscription gleefully notes that the wealth of the Kalatsuris (Kalachuris) was expended for the idol procession of Mahākūṭēśwarnātha. The Aihoḷe Praśasti of Pulakeśin II says[13] that the cavalry of Maṅgaleśa raised canopies of dust on the shores of the eastern and western oceans.

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[11] De Couto, De Asia, Lisbon, 1778, p. 259.

Since the Mahākūṭa inscription is dated in A.D. 601, it is obvious that the wars of Maṅgaleśa with the Kalachuris must have preceded this date. In this connection, the undated Nerur[14] grant of Maṅgala may also be mentioned. Here Maṅgala is spoken of as having driven out the Kalachuri king Buddha, the son of Śaṅkaragaṇa. This epigraphic evidence shows that the Kalachuris were engaged in a losing struggle with the Chālukyas during this particular period. All their resources were devoted to fighting the Chālukyas. They obviously did not have the peace of mind necessary to excavate a rock-temple of this dimension. A work of art is undertaken only in a period of peace. The Kalachuris, therefore, could not have undertaken such an excavation work in a time of declining fortunes. Thus, Dr. Mirashi's argument does not stand the test of historical evidence.

His other argument is negative. He says that the cave cannot be attributed to the Chālukyas, because as Vaishṇavites, they could not have excavated a Śaivite cave. He, however, does not mention the fact that the Chālukyas were not purely Vaishṇavite, but that they worshipped Śaivite along with Vaishṇavite deities. He also does not mention the fact that the later Chālukyas became Śaivites. There is enough inscriptional evidence to prove this. The undated Nerur grant is one of the earliest grants of the Chālukyas. It records the donation of the village of Kuṇḍivaṭaka in the Konkan. It reads as follows:

> (1) "Svasti Śrīmatāṁ Svāmi—Mahāsena—Pādānudhyātānāṁ Mānavya-sago-

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[12] *The Chālukyan Architecture*, Trans. by Fleet, J. F., pp. 51-2.

[13] *Aihoḷe Praśasti of Pulakeśin, II.* See Historical and Literary Inscriptions, Ed. by R. B. Pande, Chowkambha Sanskrit, Series, Vol. XXIII, pp. 240.-2, See Kielhorn, E.I. Vol. VI, pp. 1-12. Also Fleet IA. Vol. V, p. 47 and Vol. VIII, p. 23.

[14] Fleet, J. F., *Indian Antiquary*, 1878, p. 161.

(2) trāṇām Hāritī putrāṇām Chalikyānaṁ vaiṅse sambhutaḥ Manava .... [15]

Hail! Born in the family of the Chalikyās, who are glorious, and who meditate on the feet of Svāmi—Mahāsena and who are of the lineage of Mānavya, and who are the descendants of Hāriti[16] ....

The copper-plate grant of the first Pulakeśin, dated Śaka 411 (A.D. 489-90) runs thus:

(1) Svasti II Jayanti = ananta-saṁsāra-pārāvār–aika–Setavaḥ Mahāvīra-āha (rha) taḥ = pūtās-charaṇāmbu-

(2) ja–renavaḥ II Śrīmatām viśva-viśvambhar abhisaṁstuyamāna–Mānavya–sagotrāṇām Hāritī.

(3) putrāṇām sapta-lo (10) ka-mātṛibhis = sapta–mātṛibhik abhivarddhitānāṁ Karttikeyapari-rakshaṇa-prāpta[17]... etc.

The Haidarabad copper-plate[18] grant of Pulakeśin II, dated saka 535 (A.D. 612-613) mentions Kārttikeya, the Saptamātṛikās etc. In this connection, the Mahākūṭa pillar inscription[19] is of great importance. It records a grant by Durlabhādevī, the wife of the *guru* of Maṅgaleśa, (actually his mother, probably stepmother) increasing by the grant of ten villages, a previous endowment of the god Śiva under the name of Makūṭeśvaranātha. All the early inscriptions of the Chālukyas thus refer to them as Hāritiputras of the Mānavya *gotra,* who were nourished by the Saptamātṛkās, and acquired an uninterrupted continuity of prosperity through the protection of Kārttikeya etc. This overwhelming evidence of the inscriptions cannot be ignored. This inscriptional evidence tells us that though the early Chālukyas were worshippers of Vishṇu, they also worshipped Śaivite deities like the Saptamātṛkās and Kārttikeya. It is interesting to note that Maṅgala of the Nerur grant is referred to as "Svāmi-Mahāsena pādānūdhyatānāṁ. "He meditates on the feet of Svāmi-Mahāsena i.e. Kārttikeya. It is of special significance that the Mahākūṭa inscription emphasizes the

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15. *Ibid.,* p. 161.
16. *Ibid.,* 162.
17. *Ibid.,* p. 209.
18. Fleet, J. F., *Indian Antiquary,* 1877, Vol. VI, pp. 72-3.
19. *Mahākuṭa Pillar Inscription, Chālukyan Architecture,* pp. 51-2.

Śaivite affiliations of the Chālukyas towards the beginning of the 7th century A.D. It also refutes Dr. Mirashi.

The inscriptions carved on the temple of Virūpāksha at Pattadkal, (an important Chālukya site), tell us that the temple is dedicated to Śiva. This temple of Lokeśvara, another name of Śiva, was built by the architect Guṇḍa for Lokamahādevī, the queen consort of the western Chālukya king Vikramāditya II, to commemorate her husband's three victories over Kāñchi.[20]

The evidence cited above destroys the theory advanced by Dr. Mirashi.

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Fergusson and Percy Brown fix the chronology of Elephanta on architectural grounds. Both regard Cave No. 29 of Ellora as



Cave No. 29, Ellora

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[20] Fleet, J. F., I.A., Vol. X, 1881, p. 163.



PLATE 1. *Badami.* Cave 3. Vishnu on Ananta with pillars in the hall



PLATE 2. *Elephanta.* Main Cave. Mahesamurti with pillars in the hall



PLATE 3. *Aiholli.* Durga temple Vrsabha-vahana Siva—detail



PLATE 4. *Aiholli.* Durga temple. Vishnu on Garuda



PLATE 5.
Pattadkal. Virupaksha temple.
Dwarapala in the East porch



PLATE 6.
Pattadkal. Virupaksha temple.
Couple with inscription on
the pillar of North porch



PLATE 7. *Badami.* Cave 3. Vishnu on Ananta



PLATE 8. *Mahakuta*. Sangameshura temple. Details of the upper portion of the Ardhanariswara



PLATE 9. *Elephanta*. Main Cave. Dwarapala of the Linga shrine



PLATE 10. *Elephanta*. Main Cave. Dwarapala of the Linga shrine

portion of the Ardhanariswara

of the Linga shrine

Linga shrine

यह पुस्तक वितरित न की जाय
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

Plate 11. *Aiholli.* Durga temple. Mahisasura mardini panel



Plate 12. *Badami.* Cave 1. Nataraja panel

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

Plate 13. *Elephanta.* Main Cave. Ardhanariswara panel—backwall, right of Mahesamurti



Plate 14. *Elephanta.* Main Cave. Kalyanasundaramurti panel



Plate 15. *Elephanta.* Main Cave. Nataraja panel at the entrance, right wall



Plate 16. *Ellora.* Cave No. 29



Plate 17. Ellora. Cave No. 29



Plate 18. *Ellora.* Cave No. 29

earlier than Elephanta. Neither of them, has, however, tried to justify the position he has taken. The latter just makes this flat statement while discussing the architecture of Dumar Lena (Cave No. 29) of Ellora: "Two other rock-cut temples of this class are known although on entirely different sites, one at Elephanta and the other the Jogeswara in Salsette, but the Dumar Lena is clearly the original by which these were inspired."[21] Percy Brown does not tell us how much time separates these two excavations. Fergusson separates the two by about 25 years.

Benjamin Rowland, while discussing Elephanta, writes: "its date is no earlier than the eighth or ninth century' (Abo. Cit. p. 177). On the same page, he also states that the arrangement of the shrines is similar at Elephanta and the temple of Lad Khan at Aihole. At both places, the shrine is attached to the back of the wall, which makes *pradakṣhiṇā* impossible. His second statement would contradict the first. If Elephanta has such close affinity with Lad Khan temple, the date of the former will have to be shifted to



Cave No. 1, Elephanta

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[21] Brown, Percy—Above Cit. p. 72.

[illegible] 23

the late fifth or early sixth century A.D. Rowland accepts Brown's dating of Lad Khan (A.D. 450—p. 126). This view is at best disputable. In an article on "The Date of the Lād Khān (Sūrya Nārāyaṇa) Temple at Aihole"[22] appearing in the October, 1961 issue of *Lalit Kala*, Dr. S. R. Balasubrahmanyam dates the temple to the middle of the sixth century A.D. (bet. A.D. 533 and 578). The boar symbol carved on one of the pillars of the *mukha-maṇḍapa* seems to bear him out. If Rowland's dating is accepted, his Elephanta dating would be widely off the mark. The peculiar position of the shrine which makes pradakṣhiṇā impossible would then bring it closer in point of time to Lad Khan and the dated Cave No. 3 of Badāmi.

Rowland however, has committed a factual error. His chief error lies in his misconception of the shrine. He considers the Maheśamūrti carved on the south back wall as the 'main object of worship'. This is not correct. In a Saivite temple, it is the *liṅga* shrine that is the main object of worship. At Elephanta also, the *liṅga* shrine carved in the central nave is the chief object of worship, and not the Maheṣamurti on the back wall. This *liṅga* shrine faces the east. Outside the cave temple, opposite to this shrine, is a round pedestal, where the *Nandī* was formerly placed. The carving of the *pradakṣhiṇā* passage round the shrine makes it later in point of time than Lad Khan and Badāmi Cave No. 3.

At Elephanta, the temple faces the east. In early architecture, the canon required that the temple should face the east. At Elephanta this canon seems to have been adhered to. For here, the temple does face the east unlike at Ellora, where Cave No. 29 faces the west. Percy Brown is not correct when he observes that at Elephanta 'the shrine is placed in a side aisle instead of opposite the main front' (Abo. Cit. p. 73). He makes this observation on the assumption that the now extant northern entrance is the original entrance to the rock temple. The carving of the Maheśamūrti on the back wall, opposite to the northern entrance, confirmed this belief as many regarded it as the main object of worship. At Elephanta, however, as in other Śaiva temples, it is the *liṅga* shrine that is the chief object of worship. At most places, the *liṅga* shrine is faced by a *Nandī,* seated opposite the shrine outside, in a special pavilion (as at Pātāleśvara at Bhamburde[23] near Poona) or on an open pedestal. At Elephanta, the place of the *Nandī-maṇḍapa* is clearly indicated by the round pedestal seen outside on the east, facing the *liṅga* shrine. This was probably the original entrance to the temple. In the course of time, the entrance became closed, making the temple accessible only from the north. Correctly observed, therefore, the Elephanta temple faces the east, like many of the early Chālukya temples such as Durgā, Lād Khān, etc. This architectural feature of Elephanta would also suggest its closeness to Aihoḷe and justify its being considered earlier than Ellora Cave 29. A comparison of the ground-plans of the two temples indicates how Ellora copies Elephanta in the arrangement of the pillars, the position of the shrine etc. Elephanta has two rows of pillars which divide the main hall into a central nave and two side aisles on each side. Four pillars on each side of these two rows form pillared chambers on the two sides. The right or northern chamber has two sculptural panels on its two walls (eastern and western). It opens up on the north, where a flight of stairs leads outside to the sea. The pillared chamber to the south leads to the Maheśamūrti.

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[22] Balasubrahmanyam, S. R., *Date of Lad Khan (Sūrya-Nārāyaṇa) Temple at Aihoḷe.* Lalit Kala, October, 1961, pp. 41-45.

At Ellora, the arrangements of the pillars is similar. The entrance, is, however, on the west. There are columned chambers on either side of the two rows of pillars in the centre. The one on the right, like Elephanta leads to a flight of stairs which lead to a rock pool below. In all this, Ellora Cave 29 bears close similarity to Elephanta. There is, however, one difference. At Ellora, groups of pillars are joined together by low and broad platforms. The two pillars at the entrance (with capitals supported by dwarfs) and the two side pilasters are joined in this manner. The eight pillars standing in two rows to form the central nave (which lead to the *liṅga*-shrine) are also joined. The columns of the side chambers are also similarly joined. This architectural feature Cave 29 shares with Cave 12 of Ellora, which is an eighth and ninth century excavation.

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[23] Fergusson and Burgess, *Indian Eastern Architecture,* Vol. II, London, 1910, 130-31, See Illa, 333 on p. 130.

It is also interesting to note that whereas at Elephanta the shrine *dvārapālas* have dwarf companions, at Ellora Rāshṭrakūṭa generosity gives them female companions. There is only one exception to this. The *dvārapāla* standing on the right of the northern entrance of the *liṅga*-shrine is accompanied by a dwarf.

Elephanta is closer to Badāmi Cave 3 from point of time. This affinity is noticed in the pillar-type used at the former place. The *āmalaka* type pillar which is carved at Badāmi is repeated at Elephanta. At Elephanta and Badāmi, the base has mouldings. Above, the base is plain. But this plain surface breaks into pleasant garland designs at the top. Two bands of floral designs above these are topped by lotus medallions carved in the round. Above this is another decorative band. The fluted shaft becomes rounded above and travels inward to form the neck, which is adorned with a floral band. The *āmalakaśila* which tops four expanding but roundish bands above, and the fluted two-armed capital above, reveal the architectural affinity of Bādami and Elephanta. The pillar-type at Ellora, though similar, lacks the ornate quality of Badāmi, and seems distant in point of time.

It is also difficult to understand as to how Ellora Cave 29 could have inspired Elephanta. Stylistically, they are poles apart. Stylistically, Elephanta shares the Chālukyan-Gupta tradition of Aihoḷe, Badāmi, Paṭṭadkal and Mahākūṭa. The sculptures of Elephanta reveal characteristics that are typically Chālukyan. Most of the figures wear *maṇi* or *puṣpa yajñopavītas*. The *keyūras* sometimes show *kīrtimukhas*. In these, they greatly resemble the sculptures of Aihoḷe where the earliest sculptures of the Chālukyas of Badāmi are carved. The standing figure of Śiva in *Vṛṣabha-vāhana*-Śiva panel of the Durgā temple (Pl. 3), the figure of Vishṇu on *Garuḍa* (Pl. 4) in the same temple, the *dvārapāla* of the Virupāksha temple who stands reclined on a mace (Pl. 5), the male who stands with his spouse reclining on him in the same temple at Paṭṭadkal (Pl. 6), Vishṇu seated on Ananta in Cave No. 3 of Badāmi (Pl. 7), the Ardhanārīśvara of Mahākūṭa (Pl. 8), show the pearl-*yajñopavīta* in a very pronounced manner. Elephanta shares this tradition (see Pls. 9 and 10).

Stylistically, Elephanta shares the same tradition. In the sculptures of the Durgā temple at Aihoḷe, the Chālukya-Gupta tradition finds its noblest expression. In bearing, gestures, features, they reveal a perfection of technique such as is seldom seen anywhere else. Plastic idiom reaches its highest expression here. The sculptures have the physical refinement, calm repose and intense spiritualism of Gupta plastic art. Their entire physiognomy is pervaded by an intense spiritual experience. The sculpture of Vṛṣabhavāhana-Śiva (Pl. 3) is classic in conception and execution. The slender and sensitive treatment of the body, its stance and grace, make it soar in the enjoyment of an inner spiritual experience. Śiva stands gracefully reclined on his vehicle bull. The sculpture is almost in full relief. Śiva stands reclined on the right foot, with the left bent. The right leg swerves beautifully to the right. This rightward movement of the body is balanced by a leftward movement made as he rests the elbow of one left hand on the back of the standing *Nandī.* One right hand is thrust gracefully upward. It is balanced by one left hand which descends to caress the left ear of the *Nandī.* The disposition of the eight hands is strikingly graceful and easy. The body bends gracefully in the *dvibhaṅga* as the right leg is thrust delicately to the right to be balanced by the upper part of the body which reclines to the left. The left leg which lightly rests on the ground (it is broken below the knee) gives a balance to the body. The *dvibhaṅga* position of Śiva breaks the body on its own axis resulting in a graceful and relaxed attitude, and lends to the form litheness and movement. As the contours of the body melt into each other, the sculpture acquires an easy and reposeful attitude born of an inner spiritual experience. The handsome face of Śiva expresses his inward bliss. The beautiful fleeting smile on the slightly bent face shows utter peace and contentment. The long and sharp bow-like eyebrows, the fish-shaped eyes which seem to look inward in contemplation, the sharp but small nose, the sensuous lips and the roundish face, all reveal a feeling of calm contemplation and repose.

The sculpture of Vishṇu seated on the *man-garuḍa* (Pl. 4) is in class with the sculpture just described. It has obviously been done by the same artist. This Vishṇu is just the former Śiva in another posture. It shows the same delicacy and refinement of form and the same relaxed attitude in respect of stance. The smiling face is expressive of great spiritual joy. The expression on the face is utterly sweet and captivating. The smooth and luminous body seems weightless. It seems to breathe the enjoyment of supreme bliss.

The sculpture of Mahishāsuramardinī (Pl. 11) of Durgā temple is in the same tradition. It is in almost full relief. Durgā is eight-handed. In spite of her numerous hands, the sculpture retains its grace and stance. The struggle with the demon Mahishā has not disturbed her stance and poise. It remains statuesque in its own inherent dignity. Durgā stands with her legs parted. Her right leg is thrust to the right while the left is lifted to rest on the back of the Buffalo-demon, and presses him into a sitting position, as she effortlessly drives her javelin into his back. The task of destruction is accomplished with ease. The face does not show any anger or hatred. It shows great peace and contentment. The relaxed attitude of the body, the easy disposition of the hands and the beautiful face with down-cast eyes are all expressive of bliss.

The Ardhanārīśvara of Mahākūṭa (Pl. 8) who stands gracefully reclined on the right leg, is in the same classic mould. The leftward thrust of the hip is well balanced by the graceful inclination of the torso to the right. This rightward inclination is supported by the palm of the right hand which rests on a thin stone slab. Ardhanārī Śiva stands in the *dvibhaṅga* pose. The female anatomy on the left is beautifully sculpted. The fullness of the hip, the roundness of the limbs, the delicacy of the hand which fondles the left ear-ring, the full and firm breast, all emphasize the female form. The handsome oval face shows peaceful contemplation and great inner contentment.

The Naṭarāja of Cave No. 1 of Badāmi (Pl. 12) continues the same tradition. It is surprising that in spite of his sixteen hands, he looks weightless and retains his grace and poise. The disposition of his numerous hands is skilfully done that, instead of destroying his charm or affecting his balance, these lend great charm to the figure. One left hand is brought forward in a graceful movement from across the chest to the right. This rightward thrust is balanced by one right hand brought gracefully before the chest. One left hand rests beautifully on the waist, lending great charm to the figure. In the dancing posture that Śiva takes the legs are parted in a lithe movement. The whole figure is beautifully modelled and correctly proportioned. The treatment of the various hands and their positioning is utterly charming. The entire body seems to be possessed by an inner impulse which drives it into action and yet controls every movement of every limb. This control of the body by the mind gives it great poise and balance and makes it so charming.

Stylistically, Elephanta continues the tradition of Aihoḷe, Mahākūṭa and Badāmi. The Ardhanāriśvara (Pl. 13) carved on the back wall, right side of the Maheśmūrti, who stands reclined on his vehicle Bull looks majestic. His stance and posture are strikingly graceful. He stands in the *dvibhaṅga* pose. This breaking of the body on its own axis and the inclination of the torso on the right to recline on the *Nandī*, with the slight but majestic inclination of the head to the right, endows the figure with poise and balance and gives it a sense of movement. This makes the figure pulsate with life. The graceful inclination of the head to the right, and the spirit of calm and peaceful contemplation, emphasize the spirit of *dhyāna*. The downcast eyes which seem fixed to the tip of the nose in an attitude of deep contemplation and the fleeting smile pervading the entire countenance, give the impression of an inward bliss. The disposition of the hands is attractive. One left hand lightly rests on the well-rounded left female hip and travels to rest below. Both the left hands are well-rounded. The other left hand is gracefully taken above to hold a mirror. One male right hand rests on the back of the *Nandī* standing submissively on the right, while the other which balance the upward movement of the left hand, holds a *Nāga*. The contours of Pārvati flow beautifully into the male body of Śiva and lend the entire sculpture a charm all its own. This Ardhanāriśvara carries, further to a higher level, the tradition of Mahākūṭa.

The Kalyāṇasundaramūrti of Elephanta (Pl. 14) depicting the marriage of Śiva and Pārvati retains its classic mould inspite of its mutiliated condition. The union of Śiva and Pārvatī is the union of the Male and the Female Principles. It is a cosmic union. The sculptor realized this and succeeded in imparting to it a cosmic grandeur. In typical Gupta tradition, it seems to be weightless in existence. Pārvatī is seen standing on the right of Śiva, reclined gracefully on the left leg. Though her legs below the knee are destroyed, she retains all the charm of her youthful figure. The slight inclination of the body to the left emphasizes the beautiful curve of her full hip and the slenderness of the thin waist and shows to advantage the shapely curve of the breasts. The inclination of the beautiful head to the left lends great charm to her entire stance and posture. The downcast eyes give the impression of quiet contemplation and deep contentment. Śiva who stands on the left of Pārvatī has lost the use of the right leg. He is seen standing slightly inclined to Pārvatī's side. He looks so weightless that one gets the feeling that he is not of this world. He has an easy and graceful stance. His handsome face with the downcast eyes are expressive of great spiritual calm and bliss. The Kalyāṇasundaramūrti is in a truly classic mould. It is improper to compare these sculptures with those of Cave 29 of Ellora. The latter are extremely inferior in comparison and reveal an altogether different tradition. This tradition is at least a century older than that of Elephanta.

The Elephanta Naṭarāja dancing on the right wall (Pl. 15) at the northern entrance of Elephanta, reminds one of the Badāmi Naṭarāja of Cave No. 1. Though very largely mutilated, it continues to pulsate with life. The right hand which moves gracefully to the left creates the impression of very forceful movement. This forceful leftward movement is balanced by an equally powerful rightward movement of the right leg. The rightward thrust of the torso is matched by the rightward movement of the right leg. One left hand travels upward in a very graceful move and is (immediately) balanced by the upward inclination of one right hand. The linear movement of the body lends cosmic grandeur to the sculpture. The leftward inclination of the face adds to the majesty of the figure.

The tall *dvārapāla* standing at the entrance of the *liṅga* shrine has tremendous grace (Pl. 9). He strongly resembles one of the Aihoḷe sculptures of Vishṇu and Śiva. He, however, carries the tradition further. His smiling countenance is indicative of peaceful repose and quiet contentment.

Compare this dignified *dvārapāla* of the shrine with his counterpart at Ellora Cave No. 29 (Pl. 16). He is also huge in dimension, but ugly to look at. His legs look like two columns put together most unattractively. The thigh waist and chest lines, all merge into one straight line to give the figure an unprepossessing appearance. The body looks stiff and rigid. The broad shoulders emphasize the rigidity of the form. The peculiar parting of the legs gives the sculpture a stupid appearance. This is further emphasized by the very stupid expression of the face. The column-like legs, the unbalanced anatomy, the rigidity of the form and features, and the complete lack of dignity and grace, reveal a sculptural style very different from that of Elephanta. It shows no affinity whatever with the dignified form at Elephanta.

The same may be said about the Kalyāṇasundaramūrti in the same cave (Pl. 17). Śiva of this panel is slightly better than the *dvārapāla* just described. But he lacks the grace of his counterpart at Elephanta. He looks stunted. The lack of proportion is obvious. The sculpture is carved in the *pañcha-tāla.* The proportion is not likely to lend charm to any sculpture. The figure looks heavy. Heaviness is a characteristic of Rāshṭrakuṭa sculpture. Whereas at Badāmi, Aihoḷe and Elephanta, the extra hands are borne with ease and grace, here they look as awkward adjuncts artificially attached to the body. The expression on the face lacks something vital. It lacks the spirituality of Elephanta. The entire posture is stiff and rigid. His spouse Pārvatī also compares unfavourably with her Elephanta counterpart. She does not possess the charm and elegance of the Elephanta Pārvatī.

It is, however, in the sculpting of Naṭarāja that Ellora reaches a new low (Pl. 18). This eight-handed figure is carved in the third transverse corridor of the Cave, on the left. It is in the *pañcha-tāla.* One right hand holds a *triśūla* and one a *ḍamaru.* One right hand is thrown to the left. It looks like an artificial limb superimposed on the torso. One right hand looks like a column and is bent at the elbow.

The execution of the hands is extremely clumsy. The entire figure is weighed down under their weight. The several hands seem to have been stuck on to Śiva like artificial limbs. They are crowded together in the most inartistic manner possible and add to the ugliness of the figure. The legs are short and stocky. The left leg looks shorter in proportion to the rest of the body. The entire figure is so clumsily done that attention is never drawn to the face. The face is that of a well-fed man, who had just had a full meal and looks contented. It has no spiritual content.

The sculptures of Ellora (Cave 29) are heavy and stunted. The artists entrusted with the excavation show little skill. The sculptures reveal a tradition which is alien and inferior to Elephanta. At Elephanta the best traditions of the Deccan and the south become blended with the refined touch of Gupta plastic idiom. They provide the highest and noblest example of Deccan art. They reveal an elemental force which becomes sublimated by a refined intellectualism. Elephanta continues and takes forward the great tradition of Aihoḷe, Badāmi and Mahākūṭa. The Elephanta sculptures are earthbound and sensuous like those of Aihoḷe, but these qualities have beautifully blended with Gupta intellectualism, which lends them a cosmic grandeur. Stylistically, therefore, Elephanta is nearer Aihoḷe, Mahākūṭa and Badāmi than to Ellora Cave 29, which is obviously a later excavation, probably Rāshṭrakūṭa, as heaviness is a characteristic of their sculpture.

The theory of the Chālukya excavation of the cave is further strengthened by the architecture and sculptures of the cave adjacent to the main cave.

Adjacent to the main cave, in the east wing, is another excavation which was taken probably side by side or started just after completion of the excavation of the main cave. It is excavated in the eastern courtyard on the north side of the rock. The cave is entered by a flight of steps with two pillars on either side and pilasters at both ends. The *liṅga* shrine is at the back with a circumambulatory passage for *pradakshiṇā*. On either side of the *pradakshiṇā patha* entrances are carved huge *dvārapālas* with dwarf attendants flanked by flying figures on either side. The *dvārapāḷas* are typical of the Gupta-Chālukya tradition.

On either side of the central hall are excavated two chambers which are entered by flights of steps. These are supported by two pillars and two pilasters of the cushion type. Their size is smaller in keeping with the size of the excavation. The right side chamber contains panels on the back and side walls of great significance. On the left wall is Gaṇeśa. The back wall has a mutilated figure of Vīrabhadra and eight mātṛkās.[24] These panels suggest that the caves were excavated by the Chālukyās who were the worshippers of the Mātṛkās, Kārttikeya and Śiva. The various copper-plate and rock inscriptions cited earlier make this clear. The Chālukyas were worshippers of Śiva, Kārttikeya and the Mātṛkās, and hence at Elephanta, they carved their family deities.

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[24] The Mātṛkas carved here are eight in number. It is of significance that the *Sthāpaka* here seems to have followed the tradition of the Śaivite Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa, which adds Caṇḍikaśakti Śivaduti as the eighth Mātṛka. See Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa—Original and Translated by K. V. Lele, p. 373; Also J. N. Banerjea's Development of Hindu Iconography, Calcutta, 1956, p. 504. Dr. R. C. Hazra (See The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1962,

It is relevant to remember here some facts of history. Towards the end of the sixth century A.D. the Chālukyas waged a war with the Kalachuris, defeated them and won undying glory for themselves, and secured much gold. Both the Mahākūṭa pillar inscription and the Aihoḷe Praśasti of Pulakeśin II mention the fact of this conquest. As a matter of fact the Mahākūṭa pillar was erected to mark the victory of Maṅgaleśa over the Kalachuris. The inscription states that...'he, having set his heart upon the conquest of the northern region, (and) having conquered king Buddha, (and) having taken possession of all his substance, (and) with an eager desire to set up a pillar of victory of (his) prowess on the bank of the river Bhāgīrathī, having determined in (his) mind that in the first place indeed there should be set up the prowess of a pillar of victory of religion....' It is significant to note that Maṅgaleśa set up a pillar of religion at Mahākūṭa prior to setting up one to mark his great victory over the Kalachuris. In the light of this declaration of intention to set up a pillar of victory it is possible to assume that Maṅgaleśa did set up such a pillar of victory, and that this was set up at Elephanta. What better site could have been selected than this island city which was 'the goddess of fortune of the western ocean'? It seems that this was the pillar which the Portuguese removed to Portugal, and which cannot now be traced. The Chālukya Maṅgaleśa must have celebrated his victory by the excavation of the rock-temple of Elephanta, dedicated to Śiva, and the erection of a pillar of victory, announcing the event. The stone inscription removed by the Portuguese might have proclaimed this. It seems possible that at the time when a temple was being dedicated to Mahākūṭeśvaranātha at Mahākūṭa near Badāmi at the instance of Maṅgaleśa,

Devi-Māhātmya which mentions the Matṛkas (Chapters LXXX-X (111) is dated to a period earlier than A.D. 600. This justifies my theory of the Matṛka Panel of Elephanta being carved in accordance with the description of them in this Purāṇa.

another might have been ordered to be excavated at Elephanta. The pillar of victory must have been erected sometime in A.D. 600 and the work on the rock-temple commenced then or a little earlier. The civil war between Maṅgaleśa and Pulakeśin II may have interrupted the excavation. In any case, at least half of the work on the main cave must have been completed by A.D. 610. The work must have, however, continued in the reign of Pulakeśin II. The main cave and the adjacent cave must have been completed by A.D. 645 or so. The available epigraphic, architectural, stylistic and historical evidence points to the excavation of Elephanta being done between A.D. 600 and 645 by the Chālukyas of Badāmi. The existing evidence permits no other conclusion.

Miguel Vaz, Pioneer of Indian Social Reform

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Miguel Vaz is still an unknown name to general students of Indian history, and the little that has been said of him of late will scarcely endear him to anyone. James Brodrick, the modern Jesuit biographer of Saint Francis Xavier, says of Vaz: "A zealous and honest man, 'the true father of the Indian Christians', as the Saint described him, he was yet narrow-minded and very oppressively hostile to the native religion. It was not, as he imagined, by destroying Hindu sanctuaries in Portuguese territory and applying their revenues to the building of churches that the Indians would be won to Christianity."[1] And this estimate has been approvingly quoted by A. K. Priolkar.[2]

Yet it was not Xavier only who had a high opinion of Miguel Vaz. In 1544, when Vaz temporarily left for Europe, the cathedral chapter of Goa testified to King John III of Portugal that "we and this land are very sorry because of his absence; and truly he lived in these parts so zealous and fervent for the spread of our holy faith and so forgetful of his own interests, combining therewith his moderation and life of integrity, that the land gives abundant testimony of it, making ours unnecessary."[3] And after Vaz's death Cosme Anes, Secretary of Finance to the Goa Government, informed the King that poor Hindus and Christians deeply felt the loss, for "they believed that they had in him every remedy and succour."[4]

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[1] J. Brodrick, S. J., *Saint Francis Xavier,* 1506-1552, (London 1952), 201, ftn. 1.

[2] *The Goa Inquisition,* (Bombay 1960), 56.

[3] *Documentação para a Historia das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente, India,* ed. Antonio da Silva Rego (12 vols., Lisbon, 1947-58), III, 201. (= SR).

It is the purpose of this article to discuss why Miguel Vaz was looked up to by the poor people, in spite of what some modern writers have to say of him. But before all, we must see who he was. A layman trained in Canon Law, he was for many years Vicar General of the vague area of Portuguese jurisdiction extending from the Cape of Good Hope to the Spice Islands and Japan. Francis Xaxier writing in 1545 says that Vaz had by then been Vicar General for twelve years.. Which is perhaps why Father Schurhammer thinks that he came out to India in 1533.[5] But a Franciscan reporting to King John III from Goa at the end of November, 1532, says: "The new Vicar General, whom Your Highness sends, has just arrived."[6] He must have reached India, then, that same year in September or October, which was the usual time for the arrival of the annual fleet from Portugal.

He often found himself in conflict with the Portuguese Indian Administration, and so he returned to Portugal in 1545 in order personally to inform the King about the state of affairs. He himself would have preferred to retire, but the King sent him back with every encouragement. But he did not survive long, for he died at Chaul in January 1547. Immediately the rumour started that he had been poisoned. Accordingly an official medical examination was held, which established that his death was due to cholera.[7]

We have two documents from the pen of Miguel Vaz which enable us to judge how far he deserves to be criticised, and to understand why he was loved by the poor. One is a letter he wrote to the King from Cochin in January 1543, the other is a memorial he presented to the King in Portugal in 1545 containing a long list of proposals intended to promote the Catholic Faith.

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[4] *Documenta Indica*, ed. J. Wicki, S. J., (8 vols, Rome, 1948-64), I, 214, (= DI).

[5] *Epistolae S. Francisci Xaverii, aliaque ejus scripta*, ed. G. Schurhammer, S. J.—J. Wicki, S. J. (2 vols., Rome 1944-45) I 244 ftn. 4, 282.

[6] SR II 230.

[7] G. Schurhammer, S. J., *Die Zeitgenössischen Quellen zur Geschichte Portugiesisch-Asiens und senier Nachbarländer zur Zeit des hl. Franz Xavers*, reprint (Rome 1962) no. 2735, (= Q), DI I, 214 f.

From his letter we learn that he was helped by a *lascarim* or Indian soldier, Fabião Gonçalves by name, in bringing about the demolition of the temples in the Goa Islands in 1540. The letter conveys the impression that Gonçalves himself directly pulled down all the temples, for it says that "by his hand were destroyed or pulled down all the temples and houses of gods that were in Goa."[8] But a Portuguese knight by the name of Martim Afomso de Mello, who was in Goa at the time, refers to the incident as though an indirect method was used.. Writing to John III in November, 1541, he says that Miguel Vaz "found a way to demolish all the temples and gods that were in this island."[9] And that fits in with the narrative of the contemporary writer Gaspar Correa, who tells us that dissensions and law-suits were provoked among the people so that they themselves preferred to pull down the temples.[10] In his memorial of 1545 Vaz went a step beyond and asked the king to suppress Hindu worship in the districts of Bardes and Salsette, and also to put a stop to the astrological observances with which every year the king of Cochin sold pepper to the Portuguese.[11]

All this sounds like irrational prejudice against Hindu worship, unless one remembers that the Hindu ceremonies which Vaz witnessed in Bardes and Salsette included widow burning and being transfixed to death on sharp hooks dangling from high poles.[11a] As to the astrological observances at Cochin, Vaz informed John III that the first unit of pepper used to be sold "to the accompaniment of much ceremony by the astrologers of the king of Cochin, who tell him when is the auspicious hour, and at times they make the officials of Your Highness wait a whole day and until late in the night by declaring it to be an inauspicious time." Hence, the practice impeded the rapid transaction of business. When Miguel Vaz therefore wanted Hindu worship to be suppressed, that included for him practices which have since been abolished or given up in the name of enlightenment and social reform. In the light of modern developments, though, he can be criticised for failing to distinguish between legitimate freedom of worship and socially harmful usages.

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[8] SR III, 343.
[9] DI I, 793.
[10] Gaspar Correa, *Lendas da India,* (4 vols., Lisbon 1860-1922), IV, 1, 290.
[11] DI I, 70, 77.
[11a] DI I, 253 f; VI, 497.

Vaz also requested John III to expel certain influential Hindus from Bassein and Goa, and to exclude other Hindus from official positions. He gave two reasons for this. One was that they were "very much opposed to the [Catholic] Faith," and we know from other sources that this included the harassing of poor Christians. The other reason was that their loyalty could not be trusted.[12] Interestingly enough, they were defended against this last charge by the City Council of Goa, a loyal Portuguese body, which informed the king in December 1546 that when earlier that year Diu was besieged by the Sultan of Gujarat, they had generously contributed sums for its defence.[13]

Like most men of his time Miguel Vaz did not see anything objectionable in buying and selling human beings as though they were real property, provided the original cause of enslavement was one of those admitted as just by reputed moralists. An ancient Indian custom permitted a person to sell himself and his dependents in times of distress.[14] It was also held among Christians that a person taken prisoner in a just war could be sold into slavery, though it is clear that it needs a delicate conscience to distinguish between a just war and a mere slave raid. The Portuguese in fact joined in the slave traffic in a manner which drew Vaz's disapproval. "Many Portuguese," he complained, "bring over slave boys from the Coromandel Coast and elsewhere, and in this they act most unscrupulously." But instead of ending their trade outright, Vaz merely requested King John to oblige them to sell their slaves to Christians only. All the same it is to be noted that he did draw attention to the unscrupulousness of slave-dealers.

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[12] DI I, 68-70, 86 f. Cf. the present writer's art. 'Administrative, Social and Religious Conditions in the Goa Islands 1510-50' in *Indica* (Bombay, 1964 f.), I, 33, 37.

[13] Q no. 2638.

[14] Cf. *Indica* I, 26 f.

However, if we would understand why poor Hindus also mourned his death we must consider the man's other actions.

Goan custom from olden days excluded women from inheritance, so that in the absence of a male hair the property of the deceased escheated to the Crown. Miguel Vaz is the first on record to call for a modification of this. From his personal knowledge of how this custom spelt "great inhumanities" for widows and daughters, Miguel Vaz secured from Governor Martin Afonso de Sousa (1542-45) a provision conceding them the entire movable property. But the Governor later revised this, and granted them only a part of the movable property and also the palm-leaf huts, such as those which can still be seen in Goa standing a little apart from the houses and which serve as store rooms. Vaz then suggested to the King that "those women who become Christians, even if it were after the death of their fathers, should have the entire property, as some would become Christians in this way."[15] And that calls for an explanation of his motive. His Christian belief meant everything to him, so that he intended his kindness to be an invitation to others to share his faith. In wanting to show preferential treatment to women who were willing to become Christians, he was from his point of view only being kinder to these than to the others. Some Christians, among them even priests, construed this as an offer of material inducement,[16] but Vaz does not seem to have been unduly perturbed by the criticism, for he nowhere makes any attempt to answer it. But since it is part of Christian teaching that the sincerity of persons seeking baptism should be tested, he should have had no difficulty in admitting that the religious value of a woman's conversion would have been all the more clear if no such hope of preferential treatment had been held out.

Again, custom obliged the people to supply the king with free labour, and an inscription of the twelfth century A.D. from Karnāṭaka actually attests the existence there of such compulsory services.[17] A similar rule prevailed in Goa, and was taken over and even extended by the Portuguese. Miguel Vaz described thus to the king one instance of it: "In Goa it is the custom to employ poor people of the land to beach the fleet and tow it out to sea again. They oblige them to leave off their work, whether it be agriculture or something else, whereby they earn their livelihood. A great deal of their time goes in this. It is not proper to demand a personal service from anyone without paying him for it, all the more so in view of the hardships to which these people are subjected, since they are poor and pay a large part of their produce in tax."[18] Vaz appealed to the king to free all, Hindus as well as Christians, from this burden; but the king showed himself disposed to grant remission only to Christians.

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[15] DI I, 71 f.
[16] DI I, 182 f.
[17] G. S. Dikshit, *Local Self-Government in Medieval Karnataka,* (Dharwar 1964), 129.

The key administrative post in Goa in those days was that of the chief thānādār, who used to be appointed by the Government to supervise the autonomous village administration. Again, the Portuguese continued the practice of farming out revenue which had been in vogue here under Bijapur rule. In the days of Miguel Vaz the chief thānādār was a certain Kṛṣṇa, who in combination with a certain Gopu used also to secure the contract for collecting the revenues of Bardes and Salsette.[19] There was a possibility in this of Kṛṣṇa misusing his position for personal ends, and Miguel Vaz told John III that the people of Bardes and Salsette were constantly complaining of him and Gopu. And he added, "Knowing how great tyrants they are, I take it that the people had good reason to complain."[20] The king showed himself ready to deprive them of the revenue contracts and give these to Christians. But the matter ended there as far as Kṛṣṇa was concerned, for he was just then detained at Bijapur whither he had gone in the party of the Portuguese ambassador,[21] and the Administration continued to give the contracts to Hindus.

High rates of interest have weighed heavily on India's poor in the past, and Goa was no exception. A few years after conquering the place the Portuguese accorded recognition to several native usages, one of which was that of charging an interest of eight per cent per month. But Miguel Vaz, in keeping with the common view of Christian moralists at the time, held that it was against God's law to charge interest, and accordingly he requested the king to forbid this practice. The king agreed to do so, but nothing actually came of it.[22] By way of explanation it needs to be pointed out that this opposition to the charging of interest was due to an idea of money which was true of the Europe of the Middle Ages. For in a simple agricultural economy, such as that of Europe as it slowly reconstructed itself after the invasion of the northern tribes, people resorted to borrowing mainly in order to provide themselves with the necessaries of life, and hence the charging of interest in such circumstances amounted to taking unjust advantage of a neighbour's need.

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[18] DI I, 71.

[19] Q nos. 906, 2018.

[20] DI I, 70 f.

[21] DI I, 327.

Dilatory processes, arbitrariness of the police, and sentencing people to be bled and to pay pecuniary fines were not unknown in early Portuguese justice; prison conditions too were unhealthy. Vaz forthrightly complained that "in the matter of legal proceedings, [trial of] cases and imprisonment, the people of the land are subjected to great hardships," and that "the constables treat the people of the land very harshly and often extort pecuniary fines from them, most of the time without their having been sentenced to pay." Vaz got the Governor to stop blood letting, and he advised the king to authorise a summary procedure for minor offences and to abolish monetary fines, because "any pecuniary penalty weighs oppressively on them, as they are generally poor." Next, turning to prisons Vaz reminded the king how at Francis Xavier's instance the Governor had made it a rule to go once a month and hear the grievances of prisoners. Saying that "never was there a better provision," he requested the king to confirm it and also to enlarge the prisons. In places like Cannanore and Cochin, where the Portuguese did not hold land in sovereignty but had only built forts with the permission of Indian rulers, these reforms affected only Christians since the Portuguese used to oblige the rulers to acknowledge their jurisdiction over these.[23]

The humanitarian interest of Miguel Vaz which we have thus far considered included non-Christians as well as Christians;

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[22] DI I, 75.

[23] DI I, 73 f.

though, as we have seen, it was inspired by his religious conviction. We must now turn to the help he afforded Christians.

An old custom obliged Christians to contribute a part of their income to the Church. Miguel Vaz saw these tithes, as the payment was called, being demanded of people as soon as they became Christians. In his own words, the custom used to be enforced "with insults and vexations without measure," so that very many did not ask for baptism "seeing that as soon as they are Christians they are obliged to pay." Vaz therefore asked the king to free them from this burden at least for the time being.[24] But his wish went unregarded.

Then there was a diocesan ordinance condemning one to pay a fine if one worked on Sundays or other holy days.[25] Miguel Vaz protested that some other way should be found of making people observe Sunday rest.[26]

The sympathy of Miguel Vaz went out specially to the Paravas of the Fishery Coast. These had become Christians in a body in the years 1535-1537 at the suggestion of a certain João da Cruz, a Christian from Travancore, who promised them that their life would be more bearable under Portuguese protection.[27] Their headmen or paṭṭankaṭṭis agreed to pay to the Portuguese the tribute which they formerly paid to their Indian overlords, and which was derived from the proceeds of their fisheries. But whereas the Indian rulers had been wont not to enforce payment for the period in which they were unable to put out to sea, some Portuguese officials now insisted that they should pay regularly the agreed amount.[28] In addition to that, some of the Portuguese used forcibly to take over their catch of shell-fish on their own arbitrary terms. Miguel Vaz expressed their plight in the following words in his letter of 1543: "The Christians of Tuticorin were for our sins so ill-treated till now by most of the captains and Portuguese who go there, that very few of them would remain with us if they could eke out a livelihood in the interior....All those who go there want to get rich at the expense of the sweat and labour of these poor people." At the instance of Vaz one such Portuguese was put under arrest to the great satisfaction of Hindus and Christians alike. Vaz also proposed that the tribute should be reduced by one-third, but the Governor reduced it only by one-fifth.[29] When he was in Portugal in 1545 Vaz further asked the king to see to it that these people could sell their catch of shell-fish in the free market.[30]

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[24] DI I, 72.

[25] SR IV, 138.

[26] DI I, 74.

[27] SR II, 257-59. G. Schurhammer, S. J., *Franz Xaver, sein Leben und seine Zeit*, (vols. I, II i, Freiburg, 1955, 1963), II, 256-59. The Paravas therefore became Christians before Francis Xavier arrived on the scene. For the contrary view cf K. A. N. Sastri, *A History of South India, from prehistoric times to the fall of Vijayanagar*, (Oxford, 1955), 278.

[28] DI I, 166 f. For the defence put up by Portuguese officials against this criticism, cf. *ib.*, 159-64.

Vaz also pleaded with the king for the ancient Christians of Kerala. They controlled most of the pepper trade and had agreed to sell it only to the Portuguese, although that meant for them a loss in comparison with what they used to get formerly by selling to the Arabs.[31] In spite of that, the Portuguese defrauded them by falsifying the weights. "It is only fair," Vaz told the king, "that Your Highness should stop the injustice which is being done to them by violating the terms of the contract ...... that they should not despoil them of such a large quantity of pepper." And the king did in fact send the Governor instructions to that effect.[32]

The plight of Hindus who became Christians also prompted Miguel Vaz to intervene. True enough, the ancient Christians of Travancore had come to occupy a place of honour in society; but the European priests who in the sixteenth century preached the message of Jesus paid no heed to caste rules, and consequently those who accepted Christianity from them were deemed to be outcastes. Vaz described their situation as follows: "As soon as the people of the land become Christians, they receive no more help and sympathy from their kith and kin, who turn against them." To Vaz it seemed obvious that if Christian fellow-feeling meant anything at all, something had to be done to help these

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29. SR II, 332 f.
30. DI I 80 f.
31. SR II, 175 f.
32. DI I 77; cf. *ib.*, 100 f.

people. As he himself put it, "Those who devote themselves to this task, if at all they have charity, will not be able to endure the sight of the many hardships they have to bear, without being able to help them." He therefore argued that a part of the Indian revenues should be set aside for their needs.[33]

Furthermore, according to an ancient custom, an outcaste forfeited his property, and hence the king of Cochin used to confiscate it. Miguel Vaz remonstrated against this, only to be told by the king that he was acting as his predecessors had done. Vaz then requested the Portuguese Governor to intervene, and the king appeared to yield. But it soon became clear that he meant to continue the practice. Accordingly, in his memorial of 1545 Vaz asked John III to use his influence with the king of Cochin. John III did so, but matters continued as before.[34]

Lastly, in 1541 Miguel Vaz joined some prominent people of Goa in founding the Confraternity of Holy Faith, one of whose aims was to help Christians in distress. During his absence in Portugal in 1546, this aim found expression in the establishment of a hospital for Indians.[35] Later in the century it was transferred from the City of Goa to Salsette, and a war-time episode illustrates how this institution impressed non-Christians. When the Bijapur forces invaded Salsette in 1578, we are told that they left the hospital intact "because it is a work of charity which they admire very much."[36]

Miguel Vaz returned to India late in 1546 fully authorised to seek the Governor's help as and when he thought fit. But his death in January 1547 prevented him from giving effect to his plans.

The present article has tried to study the man as a whole. The unfavourable verdict to which reference was made in the beginning proceeds from an incomplete understanding of him.[37] He indeed had his limitations, for which he can be criticised. As when he failed to distinguish between practices which had to be suppressed as a matter of social reform, and forms of worship against which no general humanitarian considerations could be urged. Or as when in his desire to help Christians, he does not appear to have shown sufficient concern for testing the sincerity of those who came seeking baptism. All the same, he was a man of sufficiently universal sympathy to condemn the unfair dealings of his own people towards Indians, and several of his proposals did constitute measures of social relief which earned him the gratitude of the poor, Hindus as well as Christians. He has therefore in Indian history a place, howsoever modest, as a pioneer of social reform.

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[33] DI I 82; cf. *ib.*, 76, 88.

[34] SR II, 329 f. DI I, 85, 102. Cf. *Indica* I, 25.

[35] DI I, 125 f., 775, 790.

[36] Sebastiam Gonçalves, S. J., *Primeira Parte da Historia dos Religiosos da Companhia de Jesus*, ed. J. Wicki, S. J., (3 vols., Coimbra, 1957-62), III, 99.

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37. One gets a similar impression from what Prof. G. M. Moraes has recently written on M. Vaz. He does not altogether neglect the man's beneficent activity, but he fails to take it into account when he comes to characterise the man as a whole. What is more, in the crucial discussion on the income of the temple lands, he does not test the claim of the village elders that these lands had been reckoned in the generl land tax, and he confuses the *coxivarado* with the sum which the elders had in June 1541 acceded to pay out of this income for the support of the Christian religion. Cf. his *A History of Christianity in India, from the early times to St. Francis Xavier:* A.D. 52-1542, (Bombay, 1964), 146, 230-34, 296.

Gokhale's Year of Decision*

BY

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I

Eighteen-ninety-seven was an eventful year for Gokhale. It suddenly lifted him into the limelight, revealed him as one of the most promising young politicians, and then almost as suddenly seemed to consign him to oblivion. A review of the sequence of events which made such an impact on him is rewarding for the light it throws not only on Gokhale's character and career, but also on the tangled politics of Maharashtra and Indo-British relations in that critical year.

Gokhale was one of the four Indians selected to appear before the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure in the spring of 1897. Among the members of this Commission, which was presided over by Lord Welby, were three ardent advocates of Indian aspirations in England — Wedderburn, Dadabhai Naoroji, and W. S. Caine. They had laboured for years to secure an inquiry into Indian affairs, and specially into the inequitable financial burdens as between India and Britain. They were keen to ensure that the Indian case before the Commission was presented in the best possible manner by the ablest men available. They would have liked Justice M. G. Ranade to come to England.[1] The proposal was acceptable to the Commission as a whole, but it did not find favour with the Government of India[2] and eventually D. E.

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* This article forms part of a larger study by the writer on "Gokhale:— A study in Indian Constitutional Development, 1885-1915", which is now in progress.

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[1] Ranade to Dadabhai Naoroji, July 28, 1896. *Gokhale Papers.*

[2] Elgin to Westland, June 28, 1896. *Elgin Papers,* 1·0., M.S.S., EUR, F 84/68. Also Telegram, June 30, 1896, from Viceroy to Secretary of State, *Hamilton Papers,* 1·0., M.S.S., EUR, D 508, vol. I.

Wacha from Bombay, Surendranath Banerjea from Calcutta and G. Subramania Iyer from Madras were deputed to London. Ranade himself was unable to go, but decided to send Gokhale as a representative of the Deccan Sabha of Poona.

Gokhale left India in the first week of March 1897. He was well-equipped for his mission. Not only did he carry voluminous notes compiled by that painstaking headmaster-economist, G. V. Joshi, but he had at his back nearly a decade of apprenticeship to Ranade, and valuable experience acquired for seven years as Secretary of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, and as editor of its Quarterly Journal. His written evidence before the Welby Commission, with its solid, statistical core (derived mostly from bluebooks and official sources) was a masterly exposition of the Indian case; he dwelt on the economic exploitation of India which was the recurrent theme of Naoroji and R. C. Dutt, but his assault was on a broad front, taking in its sweep the economic, financial and political policies of the Government of India. However, it was in his oral evidence, under the searching examination of old India hands like Sir James Peile, that he came off best. His extra-ordinary grasp of fundamentals as well as details, sense of proportion, quick wit, and courage made an excellent impression on the Commission. "Permit me to say", wrote Caine to Gokhale, "that I have never seen a cleverer or more masterly exposition of the views of an educated Indian reformer on all the subjects dealt with". It was (Caine added), "a splendid and unique service to your countrymen for which your countrymen ought to be grateful."[3] Ranade was glad to get good reports of the performance of his disciple. "Professor Gokhale is our rising man", he wrote to a friend on 21st May 1897.[4] Wedderburn, to whose care Ranade had commended Gokhale, was simply delighted with the young professor from Poona, who soon became his confidant and life-long friend. Wedderburn did his best in the next two months to initiate Gokhale into the political world of London, by arranging interviews with people who mattered in Indian affairs in and outside the Parliament, and by giving him an opportunity to address public meetings. Gokhale met, among others, T. P. 'O. Connor, Sir W. W. Hunter, Sir George Birdwood, and John Morley. He visited educational institutions, spoke on social subjects, met politicians holding different political views, rubbed shoulders with celebrities in the National Liberal Club, and paced the corridors of the House of Commons and saw it at work. He sensed the favourable impression he had made on the great veterans of the Indian national movement in England, on Wedderburn, Hume, Naoroji and Caine. Was it too much to hope that he might before long be in the House of Commons like good old Naoroji, who was now over 70 and well past his prime? The words "G. K. Gokhale M.P.", had a pleasant ring. Gokhale was young, and optimistic and the future looked bright, but just then six thousand miles away, back in his hometown, there were rumblings of a storm which was to wreck all these fancies.

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[3] Gokhale to G. V. Joshi, April 16, 1897. *Gokhale Papers.*

[4] Ranade to Subba Rao, K., May 21, 1897, in K. Subba Rao, *Revived Memories*, p. 253 (Madras, 1933).

II

In his evidence Gokhale had referred to the terrible famine of 1896-97 which was officially described at the time as the most disastrous in a century[5] which was no stranger to famines in India. More than half a million square miles of the country inhabited by nearly 97 million people were affected, and some of the worst districts were in the Deccan. Wedderburn, Naoroji and their friends of the British Committee of the Congress, who kept a watching brief for India in England, were naturally anxious about condtions in India; it was their pressure which led to the foundation of the Lord Mayor's Fund for famine relief. Not less important than immediate relief was the problem of focusing attention on the basic economic issues of India, of breaking through the spell of official optimism, to underline the terrible poverty which made it impossible for the hard-pressed peasantry to withstand a single failure of harvest.

In western India, to the rigours of famine were added the terrors of bubonic plague. Its first assault on India, like the one on Hongkong two years earlier, was particularly fierce. When Gokhale left for England early in March, several towns in western

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[5] B. M. Bhatia, *Famines in India*, p. 239, (Bombay, 1963).

India including Karachi, Bombay, Surat and Poona were in the grip of the epidemic. Mortality was heavy; medical science had yet much to learn about the prevention and treatment of this scourge. Those were the days when, in the words of the poet Gadkari,[6] one had to be more afraid of a dead rat than of lions and tigers.

With the spread of plague in India, European ports threatened to shut out British ships bearing produce from India. Claims of commerce no less than those of humanity dictated urgent measures for the suppression of the epidemic.[7] Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India pleaded with Lord Elgin, the Viceroy, to stamp out the dreadful disease, and not to allow the sanitary considerations to be subordinated to the political. This was no time to be squeamish about caste and social[8] prejudices. After some initial misgivings, the Government of India joined in the pressure on the Bombay Government for a more drastic campaign against plague.

In the second week of March 1897, the Bombay Government decided to form a Plague Committee, with Mr. W. C. Rand, I.C.S., as Chairman, and Lt. Colonel C. R. Phillipps and Surgeon-Captain W. W. O. Beverdige as members. Consisting of a senior civilian, a military officer and a doctor, the Committee was well-equipped to combat the epidemic in Poona.

The Plague Committee was authorized to supervise, and in some respects almost to supersede the local bodies exercising jurisdiction over the city, cantonment and suburban areas, to amend municipal bye-laws, to incur expenditure, to search and fumigate buildings, to segregate persons suspected of the disease, and even to demolish or burn infected huts or temporary structures. It was made obligatory to register every death; in case of default, any member of the funeral party could be detained by the police!

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[6] D. D. Karve, (ed.) *The New Brahmins*, p. 141, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963).

[7] Lord George Hamilton to Elgin, Jan. 21, 1897, 1·0., EUR, MSS., C 125/2.

[8] "I am sorry to hear", Elgin wrote to Hamilton on 7th April 1897, "that Dr. Lowson was not satisfied with the measures taken at Bombay to stamp out the plague... I venture to say that he was rash in assuming that the advisers of the Governor were "unduly afraid of exciting caste or religious prejudice". It is true that our Home Department were inclined to think that the risk must be run, and we urged the Bombay Government to take stronger line..." Elgin to Hamilton, April 7, 1897. MSS, EUR, D 509/4, vol. IV, 1897.

Lord Sandhurst, Governor of Bombay, who had taken much of the initiative in this campaign, called a meeting of leaders of various communities and parties in Poona, informed them that stringent measures were proposed, including the house-to-house search for patients with a view to their isolation and treatment in hospitals. There was an air of expectancy and even apprehension in Poona, but there was at first little disposition to criticize the Government for measures which obviously were in the interests of the town. Even Tilak's papers pointed out the cruel necessity of the proposed operations, if the town was to be purged of the epidemic.[9]

The Operation Plague started in Poona, rather dramatically. In the early hours of a March morning, the Budhwar Peth and part of Shukrawar were taken up by the military — about 200 cavalry and 100 infantry — for inspection. The streets were blockaded. At that early hour, some of the shop-keepers, who lived in outlying parts of the town, had not arrived. Their shops were forced open, disinfected, and left unattended. Between the British and Indian soldiers there was a division of labour; the former confined themselves to "inspection" and the latter to disinfection of buildings. The medical member of the Plague Committee, Dr. Beveridge, who had been well acquainted with the course of plague operations in Hongkong, felt that a native agency for inspection was as likely to fail in Poona as it had done in Hongkong, that only the British soldiers were capable of strict impartiality in segregating the sick. Whatever the reason for employing British soldiers for house-to-house searches, it was a tactical blunder of the first magnitude. The soldiers could hardly realize that if an Englishman's house is his castle, the Brahmin's house is his temple. The young Tommy, who stepped with his shoes on into rooms reserved for offering worship or taking food, could not even know that he had committed a sacrilege. Nor could he see harm in a mild pleasantry — such as when he lifted a flower from an idol to throw it on a trembling young Brahmin maiden.[10] Nevertheless, these were heinous offences in the eyes of the Brahmins of Poona, even if they occurred occasionally. The Poona press at once became critical of the Plague Committee; there were numerous allegations: soldiers were alleged to have opened metal safes, and cash boxes in search of patients, and to have burnt not only the personal belongings and beddings of diseased persons, but even their account books and sewing machines.

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[9] *Kesari*, March 30, 1897.

Complaints were carried to Rand but without much effect. "If anyone takes a complaint to Mr. Rand orally", wrote a local paper, "he simply laughs and sends the complainant away. If anyone sends a written petition, he gets a stereotyped reply that his allegations are false."[11] The same paper accused Rand of behaving "like the Sultan of Turkey". Tilak, who had been present in a deputation which had waited on Rand, castigated him in the *Kesari* and asked indignantly, "What people on earth, however docile, will continue to submit to this sort of mad terror?" Though Rand may not have been the "one of the most courteous and kindly men", it is not necessary to assume that he was trying deliberately to oppress the people. He knew he had a disagreeable and thankless job to do and he was determined to do it quickly. His reputation with the people of Poona was not high; the convictions in the *Wai* case had shown that he was no friend of the Brahmins or the educated community. Indeed, in common with most of his British colleagues in the civil service, he entertained a lively distrust of Poona Brahmins; so far as Rand was concerned, the germs of sedition seemed to have infected them long before the plague came to Poona. Inspection and segregation, if they were to be effective, were processes which could hardly be popular; it was not easy to distinguish between a really aggrieved person and one who was out to sabotage the operations, and Rand had no intention to get involved in a long argument.

Failing to secure redress through representations, deputations and complaints in the press, the people of Poona sent up a memorial to the Governor of Bombay. The initiative was taken by the

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[10] *Dnyan Prakash*, 19th April 1897, (Native Newspapers, Bombay, 1897).
[11] *Ibid.*, 22nd April 1897.

Deccan Sabha, which had been founded only in November 1896 under the inspiration of Ranade to serve as the mouthpiece of the moderate politicians of Poona, who were wedded to loyal and constitutional methods. The memorial which also bore the signatures of some leading members of the Anjuman Association, the premier organization of local Muslims, referred to the "irregular and oppressive high-handedness of the special agency employed by the Plague Committee", which had resulted "in a reign of terror" in Poona. Among the grievances were the rough and ready methods used by the soldiers, who carried off to hospitals not only patients, but even their relatives and passers-by; the indignity of public stripping of men and women for "inspection"; disregard of social and religious susceptibilities; the forcible opening of houses and business premises, and the wanton destruction of property. The enclosures to the memorial contained some specific cases in support of the allegations. Finally, there was a demand for the redress of grievances, and the substitution of the Plague Committee by "such other agency as will be more amenable to control, on the plan followed in Bombay with such success".

The memorial was dated 10th May 1897; the next ten days were spent in collecting signatures, and the memorial was submitted to Lord Sandhurst on 21st May. Gokhale read it in London, when he was engaged in the lecture tour organized by the British Committee. He could recognise the signatures of the more important men who had signed. There was V. M. Bhide, President of the Deccan Sabha, (of which Gokhale himself was a Secretary) a retired judge, a former head of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, and a highly respected spokesman of the moderate and reforming party in the town. There was Koopooswamy Mudaliar, elevated by the Government to the rank of a First Class Sirdar of the Deccan, a popular figure among the local Europeans, and one of the richest men in Poona, who took little interest in politics. Then there was Nawab Abdul Ferojkhan, President of the (Muslim) Anjuman Association. That Hindus and Muslims, despite recent communal tension in the town, should have agreed on a joint representation was a measure of the resentment roused by the operations of the Plague Committee.

The memorial was mailed to Gokhale, by his friend H. N. Apte, a famous Marathi novelist, and at that time one of the

Secretaries of the Deccan Sabha. When Gokhale left Poona early in March, Apte had promised to keep him posted about developments at home, but he left the town just before the Rand Committee went into action. "I was compelled", he wrote to Gokhale, "... to leave the place bag and baggage. A rumour was afloat that military search parties were to make house-to-house visitation in the city, and this terrified me as I had at that time in my house my sister suffering from fever for several months. It was no doubt an act of cowardice thus to take to one's heels at that time, but I preferred to discharge the duty of looking after those in my charge, to remain (ing) wilfully indifferent to their interest."[12] Apte's letter made ominous reading, but the Deccan Sabha in its memorial to Lord Sandhurst had also mentioned that in "a few cases the modesty of Native Ladies has not been respected". There were other complaints of alleged misconduct by soldiers. Pandita Ramabai, a prominent Christian social worker in Poona and Bombay complained in the *Bombay Guardian*, how one of her girls had been taken to the Plague Hospital, and had not been heard of again. "God Knows", she wrote, "how many young girls of good character have been ... obliged to go to the Plague Hospital and Segragation Camp and be ruined and lost for ever."[13]

The contents of the Deccan Sabha memorial were disquieting, but by the time Gokhale read them in England, Operation Plague in Poona was over; the house-to-house inspection for isolation of the sick had been completed; the soldiers were withdrawn; the mortality had perceptibly declined; the epidemic-deceptively, as it turned out—seemed to have been suppressed; the people of Poona could breathe again. But just as the end of this unhappy chapter was in sight, a tragedy occurred, which brought fresh trials not only for the town but also for its leaders including Gokhale.

III

The tragedy occurred on the midnight of 22nd June 1897. It had been a crowded and memorable day, marking as it did the sixtieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's reign. There could be little real rejoicing for a people afflicted by famine and plague, but there was a reservoir of a real reverence and affection for the Great White Queen. Colour and pageantry were much in evidence in the European quarter of the town. In the afternoon Governor Sandhurst held a *Levee,* which was attended by high European officials, the principal chiefs of the Deccan and "some Native Gentlemen", including the Hon'ble B. G. Tilak, Member of the Governor's Legislative Council. Ganesh Khind, the Poona residence of the Governor, which had been brilliantly illuminated, was the scene of a state banquet and then a reception. Huge fires on the hills beyond blazed merrily, lighting up the countryside for many miles. And finally, as a fitting close to a day of joyous celebration, came a spectacular display of fireworks.

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[12] H. N. Apte to Gokhale, May 27, 1897. *Gokhale Papers.*

[13] Letter dated, May 18, 1897, to the editor, *The Guardian* reproduced in *India*, August 1897.

Soon after midnight a string of carriages began to file out of the gates of Ganesh Khind. Among these was one carrying Mr. W. C. Rand to the Western India Club; it had gone only a few hundred yards when at a spot lined by an avenue of trees, somebody climbed his carriage from the back and fired. Almost simultaneously, Lt. Ayerst, whose carriage immediately followed that of Rand had his brains blown out with pistol shots. Ayerst died on the spot, but Rand lingered on for a few days.

It is not easy today to realize the impact this outrage made on European opinion in India and Britain. The attack on the 27 year old Lt. Ayerst, a junior officer in the Commissariat Department, seemed to be a case of mistaken identity, but in the case of Rand, there was immediately a suspicion of a political motive. The European community was deeply stirred; sympathy for the victims of the tragedy mingled with indignation against native, particularly Brahmin, wickedness. Memories of 1857 flooded back. In European clubs and offices and homes there were whispers on the gravity of the crisis; everyone seemed to agree that this was no time for weakness or misplaced kindness. The Bishop of Bombay, preaching in St. Paul's Church, Poona on the Sunday following the tragedy, sensed the feeling of his audience and tried to assuage it: "it was unjust to lump all Natives together in our loathing of those who are guilty ... After all these years ... do they (the natives) suppose us capable today of letting loose a military vengeance, indiscriminately for the shedding of Christian blood?"[14]

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[14] *India,* **August 1897.**

The news of the Poona murders was bad enough to earn for India the rare distinction of headlines and editorial comment in the British press. "Poona", wrote the *Daily Mail,* (July 1) "of course has long been notorious as the hotbed of Southern India fanaticism; a town and district where the crafty, mutinous, semi-educated Brahmin walked at large, and freely propagated in newspaper and bazaar his faith in the liberation and regeneration of India on high caste lines." Two days later, the *Morning Post* (July 3) after darkly hinting at the possibility of a "Second Mutiny", ascribed the "disturbances" in India to the fact "that for twelve years all sorts of *Babus* have been allowed by the special permission of Lord Ripon to scatter broadcast, whatever venomous lies it occurred to them to utter." The *Daily Mail* (July 1) held the "Brahmin editor" responsible for the Poona outrages, and observed that "assassination by the pen, may, in the long run, prove a deal more formidable to British rule in India than assassination by the sword."

"Assassination by the pen" was no journalistic hyperbole. Within a few hours of the Rand-Ayerst murders, Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India had enquired telegraphically from Lord Sandhurst, the Governor of Bombay: "Do you connect these outrages with the incendiary tone of the press?"[15] Ten days later, Hamilton urged Elgin to take strong measures as "public opinion in the Parliament and press and elsewhere" was "uneasy".[16] Hamilton had good reasons for anxiety. The year 1897 was "full of the tricks of malevolent fortune."[17] Famine and plague had ravaged large parts of India, and strained local administrations to the limit. A surprise raid on an armed escort accompanying a Political Officer on 10th June had not only resulted in the loss of British lives,[18] but had the ominous ring of a tribal rising on the north-west frontier. On 16th June Assam and

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[15] Secretary of State to Governor of Bombay, June 23, 1897, 1·0., MSS., EUR., D 508, vol. I, 1895-1899.

[16] Secretary of State to Viceroy, July 3, 1897, 1·0., MSS., EUR., D 508, vol. I, 1895-1899.

[17] Elgin to Hamilton, August 17, 1897, 1·0., MSS., EUR., D 509/6, vol. VI, 1897.

[18] Station Staff Officer Dalba Ubel to Military Simla, 1·0., MSS., EUR., F 84/70, 1897.

Bengal were rocked by a terrible earthquake. In Shillong, the capital of Assam, most of the public buildings and private houses were razed to the ground; in Cooch Behar only one house was left standing, and in Calcutta, the damage to buildings was considered so serious, that it was considered unsafe to fire a sixty-gun ceremonial salute on the Queen's Jubilee.[19] It was on the very night of the Jubilee that Rand and Ayerst had been shot down at Poona. A week later there was a riot at Calcutta in which local Muslims, outraged by nothing more than the execution of a legal process (which put a Hindu landlord in possession of property on which a mosque had been constructed) vented their fury on European inhabitants in Calcutta.

It is not surprising that, overwhelmed by bad news in such quick succession, Hamilton should have hastened to enquire from the Viceroy about "disposition of native troops" and if there was any connection between the tribal trouble in the northwest and the riot in Calcutta and the assassinations in Poona. The Viceroy consulted his Council and sounded the Governors, but discounted dangers of a Mutiny. Nor did he favour hasty legislation against the Indian Press or grant of more executive powers to the Bombay Government to deal with the emergency. "Sandhurst", wrote the Viceroy about the Bombay Governor, "has such ample military and police resources at his command that he can enforce anything which he thinks necessary, while in the Regulation of 1827 he has summary powers of arrest and imprisonment which ... probably exceed those of the Czar of Russia."[20]

As the police were unable to lay their hands on the assassins of Rand and Ayerst immediately, the Bombay Government announced a reward of Rs. 10,000 for clues leading to their discovery. "Investigations are proceeding", wrote the Bombay Governor to the Viceroy, "and so far as we have got indications point to Brahminism as being at the bottom of the plot ... My colleagues and I are unanimous in thinking strong action most necessary. We have resolved as a beginning to put into Poona, a punitive police force of 50 Europeans and 150 Natives. We are further considering the desirability of disarming Poona City ... while it might be necessary to put into force the power to arrest and detain persons as state prisoners ..."[21]

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[19] Elgin to Mackenzie, June 17, 1897, *Elgin Papers*, I·O., MSS., EUR., F 84/70, 1897.

[20] Elgin to Hamilton, July 6, 1897, I·O., MSS., EUR., D 509/6.

IV

The imposition of the punitive police on Poona, the smear campaign against educated Indians as a class, the outcry in the Anglo-Indian and Tory press for repressive measures and hints from the Secretary of State for India in the Parliament, that legislation to curb the native press was being contemplated, were developments which caused Wedderburn much concern. The question was not only of affording some relief to the unfortunate people of Poona who had been harassed by famine, plague, house-searches—and now by punitive police. An effort was clearly necessary to prevent new chains being forged for the Indian press: if the Poona assassinations could be duly shown in the local context of plague-operations and the bubble of a widespread conspiracy and an imminent mutiny were pricked, the threatened legislation against the Indian press might perhaps be staved off. Wedderburn decided to press for a public and impartial inquiry into Poona affairs. He convened a meeting of the Indian Parliamentary Committee in the Conference Room of the House of Commons on July 1, and invited to it the four Indian delegates who had appeared before the Welby Commission. It fell to Gokhale, as the representative of the Deccan, to do most of the briefing to the M.Ps. on the background of events in his hometown and on the reasons which made a public enquiry essential. After the meeting Gokhale gave an interview to a representative of the *Manchester Guardian*. The report of this interview, which appeared the following day (2nd July) constituted a sharp and unequivocal indictment of the entire Plague Administration; it had the same air of certainty and fighting spirit which had marked his cross-examination by the Welby Commission a few weeks earlier. "British soldiers (The *Manchester Guardian* quoted Gokhale as saying) ignorant of the language and contemptuous of the customs, the sentiments and the religious susceptibilities of the people", had been "let loose" upon the town; 'they had wantonly destroyed property, appropriated jewellery, burnt furniture, entered kitchens and places of worship, contaminated food, spat upon idols or broke them by throwing them on the ground, and dragged women into streets for inspection before removal to hospitals." "My correspondents", added Gokhale, "whose word I can trust absolutely, report the violation of two women, one of whom is said afterwards to have committed suicide rather than survive her shame."

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[21] Sandhurst to Elgin, June 25, 1897, MSS., EUR., F 84/71.

The Wedderburn-Gokhale strategy in highlighting the local significance of the Poona murders by seeking a public enquiry was a rational one, but in the irrational, almost hysterical, atmosphere created by the murders themselves it had no chance of success. A public enquiry into Poona affairs at any time would have been difficult to secure; but after 23rd June it was ruled out. For the Government to concede such an inquiry in July 1897 would have been to cast a slur on the record of Rand (who was lying in hospital in a grave condition when Gokhale gave his press interview), to question the honour of the British soldiers, and even to impugn the administration of Lord Sandhurst who was closely associated with the direction of plague operations

Hostile critics at once seized upon that part of the indictment of plague operations, which was the most difficult to prove: the alleged violation of women by the British soldiers. The major issue of the conduct of plague-operations in Poona and the justification for a public enquiry were relegated to the background, and Wedderburn and Gokhale found themselves chief targets of a scathing press campaign. Meanwhile, on the very day Gokhale addressed the Indian Parliamentary Committee, the Secretary of State had telegraphed to the Governor of Bombay for information. Lord Sandhurst's reply of 4th July was emphatic: "Gokhale is Poona Brahmin, his associates are known to be disaffected and to have done much to obstruct and defame plague operations. Probably question in Parliament is prompted by desire to gain some sympathy with Poona Brahmins, a section of whom are suspected to be promoters of Poona assassinations."[22]

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[22] Governor of Bombay to Secretary of State, July 4, 1897, I·O., MSS., EUR., D 508, vol. I, 1895-1899.

On 13th July, in reply to a question by Sir James Fergusson, the Secretary of State read from a telegram sent by Lord Sandhurst: "Regarding Gokhale's letter alleging violation of women, from all inquiries I have made, I am convinced this is still more gross and malevolent invention than that about stripping of women". Wedderburn, who was not present in the House of Commons when this question was answered, at once wrote a letter to *The Times*[23] bearing personal testimony to Prof. Gokhale's "highest character for integrity and his public spirit", and justifying a public enquiry into Poona affairs. Gokhale himself wrote to the *Manchester Guardian* on 14th July, explaining the context of the allegation about the misconduct of the soldiers and the grounds on which he had based it.

Gokhale's letter to the *Manchester Guardian* was published on July 15. The following day he left for India. However, he already had some idea of the severity of the storm which had broken over his head. Not only was he being branded as an arch-liar and a slanderer, but a campaign of vilification had opened against Poona Brahmins, indeed against educated Indians as a class whose claims for greater association with the administration of the country he had so ably advocated before the Welby Commission. If (as seemed likely) the allegation about the violation of the two women by the soldiers could not be proved, would it not give a handle to Anglo-Indian opponents of Indian Reform, who never lost an opportunity of denouncing Indian politicians as untrustworthy and irresponsible? Would it not make the task of good old Hume, Wedderburn, and Naoroji in putting across the Indian case to the British people even more difficult?[24]

When Wacha joined Gokhale aboard the *Caledonia* on 18th July, at Brindisi he found him in a deep depression.[25] With his head stooped low, the young professor paced the deck, brooding on the cruel turn of events which had brought his triumphant trip to England to a disastrous conclusion. A group of Europeans from Aden recognised Gokhale and went out of their way to insult him. Wacha, and Lawrence (a British civilian who was on his way to India) did their best to comfort Gokhale. Before landing in Bombay, Gokhale had an unexpected visitor: Vincent, the Commissioner of Police who came aboard to probe Gokhale for fuller details of the allegations and if possible, for the names of his correspondents in Poona. Gokhale was polite but firm; he would not oblige the Commissioner of Police, though he assured him that he proposed to act in a straightforward manner.

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[23] *The Times*, July 17, 1897.

[24] This opinion was later expressed by Subramania Iyer, editor of *The Hindu*, who had also appeared before the Welby Commission: "I cannot but think that on the whole we have received a heavy blow." Subramania Iyer To Gokhale, 21st September, 1897.

[25] D. E. Wacha: *Reminiscences of the Late Hon. Mr. G. K. Gokhale*, (Bombay, 1915), p. 45.

After meeting Ranade and other friends in Bombay and Poona Gokhale realized at once that there was no chance of his being able to substantiate the allegations. In the peculiar conditions of Indian social life, two months after the completion of the plague operations, production of evidence was difficult under the best of circumstances. But after the imposition of punitive police on Poona, the arrest of Tilak, and the deportation of the Natu brothers,[26] few people would have dared to defy the authorities. Though it was impossible to be sure, the chances of Gokhale being prosecuted were remote; his allegations had been made in England in good faith in general terms and avowedly on the basis of reports received from correspondents in India; moreover, he could not be charged with defaming a particular individual. If his case was legally tenable, did he not have a moral duty? "The very fact" he recorded later, "that the injured parties had no legal redress against me made my responsibilities as a gentleman all the greater."[27] The moral argument was reinforced by a political one: if the controversy on Rand and the soldiers continued, it could only further stoke up the fires of racial antagonism in Poona. If by a frank withdrawal of the charges, Gokhale could close the controversy would it not lower the political temperature and afford a sorely needed respite to that hapless town?

Within five days of landing in Bombay, Gokhale had mailed to Lord Sandhurst "a full statement containing explanation, full retraction" and "an unqualified apology" which was directed to all,

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[26] On 28th July, 1897.

[27] Gokhale's letter to the *Times of India*, January 8, 1898.

"to H.E., the Governor, to the members of the Plague Committee, and to soldiers engaged in plague operations".

For Gokhale, the "Apology" was a bitter cup of humiliation. He drained it to the dregs, but it seemed to do him little good. The wrath of the Government was not visibly abated. On 4th August Lord Sandhurst spoke in Bombay Legislative Council in terms of irony and scorn about "the apology and withdrawal made by a gentleman, whose name was prominently for a few days before the public". On 5th August, Sir M. Bhownaggree, made a stinging attack on Gokhale in the House of Commons: "There had appeared before them the precious Mr. Gokhale, who under the guidance of the Hon. Member for Banff* defiled the threshold of this building".[28] Nor did the apology go down well with the Indian press. A few papers such as the friendly *Dnyan Prakash* (9th August) or the *Indian Spectator* (8th August) praised Gokhale for acting like a gentleman, but many papers were frankly critical. "Whatever may be said in favour of the rising publicist", wrote the *Kaiser-i-Hind* (8th August) "this much is certain that he has much compromised his reputation." The *Gujerati* (8th August) referred to Gokhale's "absolute, frank, and helpless self-condemnation". Tilak's papers were far from sympathetic. The *Mahratta* (8th August) could not appreciate why "the humiliated professor", had withdrawn all the charges, when he was unable to substantiate one of them. The *Kesari* (10th August) expressed the fear that Gokhale's "overwhelming apology", and the repudiation of the joint memorial by the Muslims of Poona had lent support to Governor Sandhurst's charges against the people of Poona. In a private letter to a friend, Tilak, who had meanwhile been arrested and placed on trial for seditious writings, made a disparaging reference to Gokhale: "I think in me they (government) will not find a *Kutcha* (raw) reed as they did in Professor Gokhale."[29]

With political factionalism developed to a high degree in Poona, there was no dearth of men willing to embroider on the story of the apology. It was suggested that Gokhale had agreed to apologise under a threat from the Commissioner of Police who had met him on arrival at Bombay, that the draft of the apology had been made out by Bennett, the editor of *The Times of India.* It was argued that Gokhale had lowered the prestige of his country, that he had shown want of courage; that he had irretrievably damaged the Indian cause in England.

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* Sir William Wedderburn.

[28] Indian Parliamentary Debates, 1897, 373/374.

[29] To Motilal Ghose, in P. Dutt, *Memories of Motilal Ghose*, (Calcutta, 1935), pp. 97-98.

Gokhale was very lonely and unhappy, talked of giving up public life and wrote long letters to Hume, Wedderburn, Naoroji, and Caine to whom he opened out his heart. They were all sympathetic and realized his predicament. Caine,[30] Naoroji[31] and even Hume[32] pointed out that the apology was much too long and much too humble, but they admired his public spirit and did not see why he should talk of retiring from politics. "We look upon you", wrote Hume to Gokhale, "as a martyr to the cause", and advised him to "disregard the ravings alike of the Anglo-Indians and Indian lick-spittles."[33] Naoroji urged him to remain "cool and calm." Wedderburn acknowledged his own part in the affair: he had failed to forsee the risks of mentioning anything that was not capable of legal proof. "Among us", he told Gokhale "we made the mistake—it was a venial one—we were trying to protect the weak against the strong, and in such work we must expect sometimes to get hard knocks. . . . the very ferocity of the attack upon you testifies to the importance and value of the work you did in England on behalf of your countrymen".[34]

These were comforting words, but they could not solve Gokhale's immediate difficulties. On return from England he was duly excommunicated from the Chitapavin Brahmin community for breaking the taboo on foreign travel. Thus he became a social outcaste just at the time when he was being reduced to a political outcaste. He feared his opponents would go to any length to discredit him; he was haunted by the fear of a public affront which would only rub salt into his wounds. In the last week of August, the Bombay Presidency Association[35] called a special public meeting to honour him and Wacha for their work in connection with the Welby Commission. Gokhale was proud of his work in England and would have loved to be present at the meeting, but thought it prudent to stay away.

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[30] Caine to Gokhale, October 29, 1897, *Gokhale Papers.*
[31] Naoroji to Gokhale, August 27, 1897, *Gokhale Papers.*
[32] Hume to Gokhale, August 24, 1897, *Gokhale Papers.*
[33] Hume to Gokhale, August 24, 1897, *Gokhale Papers.*
[34] Wedderburn to Gokhale: August 24, 1897, *Gokhale Papers.*

As the Amraoti session of the Indian National Congress approached, friends urged Gokhale to attend it: to deliberately avoid it would be an act of cowardice, perhaps of political suicide. Gokhale was not well; the pain in his heart, caused by an accident at Calais in March, had revived and the week's quarantine for plague before entering Amraoti was a great trial.[36] Nevertheless he persevered in his resolve to attend the Congress. Unfortunately for him his worst fears were confirmed. The hostile demonstration, which he had dreaded all along, came when his name was proposed to be included in the list of speakers. He was denounced as a traitor by some delegates from Bengal, who were egged on by their friends from the Deccan.

Gokhale's cup of humiliation and sorrow brimmed over; once again he reviewed the whole course of events which had led to the fatal interview and the apology in a long letter to the press. It was a long, eloquent and even moving document; its concluding paragraph affirmed: "Public duties, undertaken at the bidding of no man cannot be laid down at the desire of any one. . . One is always glad of the approbation of the public of what one has done. . . . But it is not the highest purpose of existence, nor nearly the highest. If it comes — to use the words of Herbert Spencer — well, if not, well also, though not so well."[37] He was indeed hungering for public understanding, if not public appreciation. It might seem at first that he was wallowing in self-pity. Those who told him to lie down and let the incident be forgotten did not know Poona,[38] he knew his hometown too well to cherish any such illusion. The apology was going to be a very handy stick to beat him with. It is true that in his statements, and letters to friends he preferred to put the matter on a public plane, but he would have been more than human if he had not been conscious of the personal aspect of the crisis. Only two years before, in the winter of 1895-6, he and his friends had been squeezed out of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha. In February 1896 he had confided to a friend: "I have grown absolutely sick of public life in Poona ... personally I wish now to wash my hands of all political work in Poona. There is so much selfish and ignoble here, that I would fly from it to the furthest extremities of the world if I could."[39] With the foundation of the Deccan Sabha in November 1896 his party had made a fresh start. It was however, the visit to England in 1897 which had really put fresh heart into Gokhale, and opened new political vistas to him; he had even seen visions of fighting for his country from a seat in the House of Commons. But suddenly, after that fatal meeting of the Indian Parliamentary Committee and the press interview, his fortunes had suffered a drastic reversal. The high praise he had earned for his evidence before the Welby Commission was forgotten; in the eyes of the Europeans he was a slanderer; in those of his own countrymen he was a coward. "You must be prepared", W. S. Caine wrote to Gokhale on October 29, 1897 "if you came to settle in this country (England), to be constantly spoken of as the fellow who slandered the British soldiers."[40]

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[35] Letter from Secretaries of the Bombay Presidency Association to Prof. G. K. Gokhale, August 2, 1897. *Gokhale Papers.*

[36] Gokhale to G. V. Joshi, December, 9, 1897. *Gokhale Papers.*

[37] *The Times of India*, January 8, 1898.

[38] "By the way, is it true", wrote V. V. Khatidarkar to Gokhale on 24th August 1897, "that students of your own college treat you with hisses?" *Gokhale Papers.*

It was at the Amraoti session of the Congress that Gokhale's fortunes touched their nadir. He saw the virulence of his opponents and the heavy odds against which he would have to recover the ground he had lost. Was history going to repeat itself? Would he be edged out of the Indian National Congress, just as he had been edged out of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha two years earlier?

This was Gokhale's moment of truth. His extreme sensitiveness, and disdain for the rough and tumble of politics wrestled with his sense of self-preservation. "The best part of our nature" he wrote to a correspondent in January 1898, 'is manifested not in what we enjoy but what we endure. There is a sublimity and moral elevation in undeserved suffering, which nothing can equal, and which is almost its own reward.[41] This was almost a Gandhian approach, but high idealism alone was not enough to sustain him against the vicissitudes of politics. The flame of ambition had to be rekindled. During these weeks Gokhale went through much searching of heart, but emerged a stronger, if a sadder man. On 5th February 1898, he committed to his diary a remarkably ambitious programme. "By the grace of Sree Guru Dattatreya", he solemnly recorded, he "would endeavour humbly but firmly" to acquire yoga, knowledge of History, Philosophy, Astronomy, Geology, Physiology and French", and would "try to become a member of Bombay, the Supreme Legislative Council and the British Parliament. In all these assemblies I will try to do good to my country by all means in my power."[42]

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[39] Gokhale to G. V. Joshi, February 8, 1896. *Gokhale Papers.*

[40] W. S. Caine to Gokhale, October 29, 1897. *Gokhale Papers.*

Though the diary entry goes on to include even the preaching of a new religion, what is really important is the reassertion of Gokhale's intellectual and political ambitions. He was no longer thinking of retiring from the field of battle; he was bracing himself to face the obduracy and malice of his opponents and the fickleness of public opinion. Though he never acquired the cool reassurance of political gladiators who emerge completely unruffled from the heat and dust of political controversy, he was able to shed some of his ultra-sensitivity. He also realized that knowledge and courage were not enough; they needed to be tinged with caution, if the political struggle for Indian reform was to be waged on a long-term basis.

Henceforth Gokhale's speeches and writings though solidly based on facts and figures acquired a marked tendency to understatement; this was a great asset to one whose best political work was to be done in legislative chambers or in private negotiations with British statesmen.

V

In 1899, Gokhale was elected to the Bombay Legislative Council. In 1901, he sought the assistance of Sir Pherozeshah

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[41] Gokhale to A. K. Ghosh, Jan 15, 1898. *Gokhale Papers.*

[42] *Gokhale Papers*: also reproduced in V.S. Srinivasa Sastri: *Gopal Krishna Gokhale*, pp. 32-33, (Bangalore, 1937).

Mehta in securing the Bombay seat in the Imperial Legislative Council, which he planned only as a prelude to a parliamentary career in England. Nothing had wounded him more, he confided to Mehta,[43] "than Bhownaggree's denunciation of me in the House of Commons as a despicable perjurer. The words burnt into my heart and the night I read them, I made up my mind, as soon as I was free from my pledges,[44] to devote myself to the furtherance of our political cause in England, to which I had, without meaning it, done much serious injury."

Gokhale's election to the Imperial Legislative Council did not prove, as he had expected, a stepping-stone to the House of Commons. Nevertheless, it was a turning point in his career; it provided him with a forum where he could show his talents to the best advantage, and quickly win recognition as a statesman. The crisis in 1897, which had threatened to sweep him off the political stage also provided the dynamic for his spectacular come-back and for the important role he was to play in the political evolution of India for more than a decade.

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[43] Gokhale to Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, January 15, 1901. *Gokhale Papers.*
[44] To serve for twenty years as a life member of the Deccan Education Society.

The Institution of Dévadāsīs in Assam

BY

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Women had occupied an important place in the religious life of Assam in all ages. Though the 16th century Vaishnavite revolution under Śankara Deva deprived them of this privilege it is maintained in the folk-cults as well as the non-Vaishnavite forms of worship. One such example is the Dévadāsī dance. It was a very common feature in the Saivite temples of Hājo, Parihāréśwara temple of Dubi, the celebrated shrines at Dérgāon and Jaysāgar near present Sibsāgar. But its influence was equally felt at non-Saivite temples like that of Hayagrīva-Mādhava dedicated to Viṣnu which is sacred to Hindus and Buddhists alike. The Dévadāsī dance is a forgotten story now and the only living memories of the extraordinary religious dance style of Assam are the very old Dévadāsīs, though senility has effaced all memories of their hey-day till fifty years ago. But it is living in another form, the Deodhanī dance of Upper Assam which however is restricted only to the female oracles of the Marān and Maṭak communities. This less than pure dance consists only of the leaps, jumps and sprints of the violently shaking bodies of the females who had taken a vow and had been possessed. It is a trance dance. The Maibis of Manipur, also priestesses of folk-cults, are the counter-parts of the Deodhanīs of Assam. The term Deodhanī is the feminine form of Deodhāi which means the nurse of the gods, Déo for a god and Dhāi, a nurse.

The Dévadāsī is known as *Naṭi* or *Naṭinī* in Assam. This simplification of her designation only as a dancer attached to a temple proves that the origin of the system must have been secular. She was allotted to the temple only for the precise purpose of dancing at the time of the *Ārati* twice a day and no mysterious or semi-religious association is made with the profession as in the case of south India. Girls were usually selected and trained from the Naṭ Kalitā caste who are dancers and acrobats by profession.

They are not associated with any particular place but Kālugāon was one of their centres, whence came the famous Assamese queen and ruler, Pramathéśwarī Dévī, originally a Dévadāśī with the name Phuléśwarī attached to the temple of Joydol near Sibsagar. But she and her cousin Draupadī, later to be known as Amvikā Dévī (pl. I) ruled Assam in succession during the incumbency of their spouse Svargadeo Śiva Siṁha Mahārājā.

Other temples which were famous for Dévadāsīs were at Biśnāth in the district of Darrang and at Béngénā Āti in that of Sibsāgar. Tradition says that there was a time when 5,000 Dévadāsīs were employed in the Kāmākhyā temple of Gauhati too. But the temple being a Śaktist one, dedicated to Devi, it seems improbable.

Assamese history and literature are full of references, direct or indirect, to the practice of dedicating Dévadāsīs to temples and it appears to have been common till the Pre-British times. The origin of Dévadāsī institution is lost in mystery and tradition. All ancient cultures had at some time or other associated dance with religion. It grew ultimately of the fertility cult of primitive man who was awed at the reproductive capacity in the female. She became the nucleus for the conception of the supreme deity in the form of the Mother and mortal females too were regarded as possessors of some sparks of the energy of supreme Mother. Religious rites included dancing which had magical significance in Egypt, Phoenicea, Assyria, and Greece. Ancient Babylonians gave the wife her true status only when she had given herself up to the gratification of a stranger in the temple of goddess Mylitta. In Armenia too girls had to serve as temple attendants before they were married. An echo of this custom is still to be found among the Buddhist population of Lahul and Spiti and also in Himachal Pradesh. Among them girls who cannot be married off before attaining a reasonable age are dedicated to the Lamasaries as Jomos who take care of the places as well as of the Lamas who reside there. A kind of religious but clandestine prostitution arises out of this close association between the Jomos and the Lamas. The charm of religious dances had been so great in the ancient mind that even monotheistic and puritanical people as the Hebrews could not resist the temptation. We find references to such dances in the presence of the Golden Calf in the Old Testament


MAHARANI AMVIKA DEVI,
Queen Regnant of Assam,
1732–1739 A.D.
শ্রীশ্রীমতিঅম্বিকাদেবী

PLATE I

which was much to the chagrin of Moses. In Rome the Vestal Virgins were an important part of religious life. In India the earliest literary reference to female temple dancers can be found in Kālidāsa's *Meghadūtaṁ* which is assigned to the 4th century A.D. It says that the temple of Mahākāla at Ujjainī resounded with the sound of the ankle-bells of the numerous dancers who performed there. The *Rājatarangiṇī* mentions one Kamalā, the Dévadāsī of Paundravardhana or north Bengal who fell in love with the king of Kashmir. In the 11th century the continuance of the system has been vouchsafed by the Venetian traveller Marco Polo who came to India. It was about this time that *Tantricism* especially its *Vāmāchāra-mārga,* became powerful and the need for associating women with magico-religious rituals again began to be felt. It possibly influenced the concept of secret love as upheld by the *Parakiyā-Préma* ideal of the Neo-Vaishnavite movement in the 16th century. The Assamese Vaishnavite revival of the late 15th century however kept itself free from the above concept just as it had discarded idolatry too. As a result of Chaitanya Vaishnavism Dévadāsīs or Maharīs were engaged in the Jagannātha temple of Puri to recite and enact the *Gīta Govinda* daily. The temples of Tamilnad were already teeming with Dévadāsīs. In the Andhra region they were known as Vasavīs i.e., Vriṣavī, on account of their association with, Saivism. In the Chingleput district the weavers dedicate the eldest daughter to be Dévadāsī. She would thus fall under the category called the Dattā, i.e., the one given or dedicated. This custom is known as *Séja* all over the south. The other classes are named according to the way they come to the temple; for example, the *Vikritā* is one who had sold herself for debt or some such economic reasons to the temple. There were also some others called the *Hritās,* i.e., kidnapped ones. Such girls were forcibly removed to the temple on account of their exceptional beauty and charm, to be utilised for the service of gods. The Dévadāsīs of Maharaṣṭra areas were known as the *Muralīs* and Goa too preserved this custom in spite of four hundred years of Portuguese rule and persecution.

The life of a Dévadāsī was what she made of it. The term Dévadāsī (*Devaṁ indriyaṁ dāsmīti — hantītiḥ, devadās aṅ gaurāditvāt ngīṣ*) simply means the servant of the god or it can be twisted to mean the servant for the pleasure of the god (*devāya krīḍāay dāsīva*). This is the twist which brought infamy to the otherwise religious duty. The novices in the Chingleput district were initiated with due ceremonies to the sacred duties. They were supposed to practise *Brahmacharya* and lead a clean and pious life. But their youth, the pleasure of the flesh enjoyed in the lavish surroundings of the prosperous temple and the seduction by the priest and the laity made it hard for them to lead an ideal life. Those who took life too easy became no better than common prostitutes. Some of the girls were married to the icon, some again to the *Khaḍga* or the sabre for animal sacrifice in the temple. It is a simple marriage. The girl places a garland on the sabre, *Bhāṭ* or bard sings the benedictory verse while her mother blesses her with a married life with the tutelary deity. Thenceforth she is known as the *Bhavin* and remains a virgin. Such *Bhavins* live in matrilineal society for generations in the temple and those who have no daughters resort to adoption. People overlook the birth of children to *Bhavins* which is ascribed to divine grace. The *Bhavins* get up very early when there are yet two *Dandas* left for sunrise and are engaged in household works of the temple, i.e., their divine spouse. The evenings are dedicated to singing and dancing in the temple at the time of the *Ārati*.

Speculations however had been made from time to time as to the origin and necessity of and popular attitude towards the system of Dévadāsīs. In the earlier phases man might have desired to entertain his god with all the things that he enjoyed on earth. But gradually philosophy and rituals sought to give a new meaning and support to the otherwise not so popular system. The following observations by Dr. A. L. Basham appear quite convincing. "In the Middle Ages the god in his temple was treated like an earthly king, he had his wives, his ministers and attendants and all the paraphernalia of a court including his attendant prostitutes. These were often the children of mothers of the same profession, born and reared in the temple precincts, but they might be daughters of ordinary citizens, given in childhood to the god as pious offerings. They attended on the god's person, danced and sang before him and like the servants of any earthly king bestowed their favours on the courtiers whom he favoured, in this case the male worshippers who paid their fees to the temple."[1]

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[1] *The Wonder that was India:* Basham, A. L., p. 185.

Contrary to Western theories that the Dévadāsī system was actually given its position and aura of sanctity by the priestly classes only for their sensual gratification we find early mediaeval records showing the resentment of the Brahmins and priests towards the system which however was encouraged by the rulers for economic reasons. The priests wanted to clear the temples of such profanity and obscenity but popular interest in the dance and the dancers backed by royal support and grant for the maintenance of the Dévadāsīs in the temples was too strong for them. Al-Beruni says, "Kings maintained this institution for the benefit of their revenues in the teeth of opposition of Brahmana priests. But for the king...... no Brahmana or priest would allow in their temple women who sing, dance or play. The kings however make them a source of attraction to their subjects so that they may meet the expenditure of their armies out of the revenues derived therefrom."[2] The above statement shows the priestly and religious attitude towards the system at the end of the 1st millenium A.D. "But as we have noticed in many other cases the secular attitude differed very greatly from the religious ideals, and here it was the secular view which prevailed. By the Middle Ages the Brahmans who propounded the Sacred Laws might themselves be attached to the temples with hundreds of prostitutes on their staff."[3]

As regards the antiquity of the institution of Dévadāsīs in India we go back to the days of Aśoka as found from the inscription in Prākrit from Ramgarh, about 160 miles south of Banaras. It gives the names of Dévadinna, a painter and Sutanukā, the Dévadāsī whom he loved.[4] "The practice of maintaining Dévadāsīs in temples is at least as old as Kauṭilya (ii, 23); but there was no attempt before the 11th century A.D. to pool together all the dancing girls attached to all temples in a particular region with a view to adding to attraction of each and every religious festival".[5]

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[2] *Struggle for Empire*: Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, p. 496.

[3] *The Wonder that was India*: Basham, A. L., p. 185.

[4] *A.S.I.R.*: 1903-4, p. 122.

[5] *Economic History of North India*: Majumdar, B. P., p. 375.

It is difficult to determine when the Dévadāsī became an institution in Assam. "It appears probable that the institution developed in Assam under *Tantric* influences. It is however strange that the virgins dedicated for a noble cause living as it were the life of a Buddhist nun could degenerate into prostitutes and were allowed to defile the temple of gods."[6] Assam had been the greatest seat of *Tantricism* and it is no wonder that the system of maintaining Dévadāsīs would find a congenial atmosphere among a people given to dancing and music. The *Vajrayāna* and the *Kālachakrayāna* sects of Buddhists emphasise sex as a way to salvation in the doctrines as follows:

> *"Sambhōgārthamidaṁ sarvaṁ tridhātu kāmaśéṣataḥ*
> *Nirmitaṁ Vajranāthéna sādhakānām hitāyacha."*

The earliest epigraphic records mentioning the Dévadāsīs in Assam are the Tezpur Copper Plates Grants of Vanamāla who ruled during 835-'60 A.D. In many places of the three plates forming the grant which was made in the 19th year of the reign (c. 854 A.D.) are direct references to the dedication of women to the temples, to the quarters of prostitutes of this kind and also to the precise case of the offer of Dévadāsīs to the temple of Hāṭakéśvara or Hāṭaka Śulin at Tezpur. Line No. 24 of this grant reads as follows:

"Dhuruhe Nahuṣasya yéna patitam kālāntarādalayaṁ saudhaṁ bhaktinatā khilamaravaravratārchitanreḥ punaḥ prālayeachalaśringatungamatula grāmebhya véśyājanairyuktaṁ Hāṭakaśulinaḥ kshitibhujā bhaktyā naraṁ chakruṣā."[7] Again there is a reference to music in the temple in line No. 28 in this manner: *"Gāyantyadyapyabjrabhyaḥ suvapyon déśé déśê śālinīmasya kirtiṁ."* The donation of women for the temple has been recognised as a pious and meritorious act in line No. 29, *"Vahuhéma raupyagajavājihahi pramadādiratnanichayaṁvahuśaḥ"*. The river Lauhitya or the Brahmaputra has been compared to the appeal and

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[6] *History and Civilization of the People of Assam*: Chowdhury, P. C., p. 350.

[7] *Kāmarupa Sasanavali*: Bhattacharya Vidyavinod, Pandit Padmanath, pp. 62-4.

[8] *Purani Asam Buranji*, pp. 82-3.

coquetry of the Daluhāngana and the dancing girls: "*ramaṇīyā-daluhaganābhiriva sakalajanamanohārinīmhi naṭībhiriva nartaka puruṣakramaṇa samvardhitotkantabhi......*" The unusual term *Daluhānganā* has been successfully explained by Dr. B. K. Kakati as a woman of the *Daluhā* or the temple. According to him *Daluhā* is the temple or place or worship in Austric vocabulary. The Austric affiliation of Assamese religious dance has also been corroborated by Dr. P. C. Choudhury in his 'A History of Civilization of the People of Assam.'

Later references to *Nāṭīs* or Dévadāsīs are to be found in the capture of two of them by Satrājit from the Śiva temple at Biśnath near Tezpur. This happened in 1634 Saka or 1712 A.D. The Koch and Āhom kings of Assam had brought members of the Gandharva or *Naṭ-Kalitā* community, who were high grade Śūdras from many places of the lower Brahmaputra valley and settled them in the vicinity of temples of Śiva-Umānanda at Gauhati, Hayagrīva-Mādhava at Hājo, Svayambhulinga of Dubi and Śiva at Dérgaon to dance and sing their numbers on the deities.[9]

Classical Indian dancing received an impetus with the introduction into Assam of the Śrī Hastamūktāvalī, a treatise on dancing during Ahom rule. It was produced by Śuvankara probably in Mithila during 1583-1619 A.D. "Even the Ahom royal residence known as the 'Kāréng' was a compound of two Āhom words 'Kā' or dancing girl and 'Rén' or house.[10] But the crown jewels of the *Naṭ-Kalitās* were the two cousins, Phuléśwarī and Draupadī who by virtue of their beauty, charm and intelligence rose to the position of the chief queen of Assam, one after the other. Phuléśwarī was a daughter of a *Naṭ* family from Kālugāon — Chinātoli near Sibsagar. The eyes of the king, Śiva Singha fell on her on one occasion as she danced in the temple of Joydal and this set the ball rolling.[11]

The life and career of Phuléśwarī reads like a romance. "Soon after the coronation of Śiva Singha, the Rājaguru, Krishnarāma Nyāya Vāgisha declared that the king was under the evil effect of stars called the Chatrabhanga Yoga, and it were beneficial if he handed over charge of the government to some one else till the evil effect lasted. Now it was the time for Phuléśwarī to step in. She, a neo convert to Śaktism along with her husband, was in the favour of the Rājaguru, and thus was raised to the position of the ruling queen and was given the title of Bar-Rajā, or the 'great king'."[12] She even had coins struck in her name with the legend in Persian, 'Ahom Begum Pramatheswari Devi'. The Assamese legends on her conjoint coinage with her husband were, *'Śrī Śrī Swargadéva Śiva Singha nripa tadvallabhā Śrī Śrī Phuléśwarī Dévinām'* and those for her exclusive coins were *'Śrī Śrī Śiva Singha nripamahisī Śrī Śrī Phuléśwarī dévyāḥ'*, respectively.[13] Tradition says that she herself had been a girl of immense beauty and great intelligence and attracted the attention of Śiva Singha while he was still a prince.[14] But sober history says she was picked up by one officer Rupa Chandra Barbarua when she and her cousin Draupadī were tending cattle in childhood. They were presented to queen Ratnakānti, the first wife of Śiva Singha, as *Ligirīs* or handmaids. As Phuléśwarī grew in years the young king became more and more fascinated with her charms and wiles till at last she was married to the king and raised to the position of the *Bar-Kuañrī* or Mahisī, i.e., the chief queen. Another version makes her the *Ligiri* of the *Rājmāo* or the king's mother and not of Ratnakānti. Then followed an era of constructive activities, particularly in the building of the Dhāi Āli or the Nursemaid's Highway in memory of the nurse who looked after Śiva Singha as a boy. She also established schools for royal ladies and daughters of the nobility known as the *Bar-Rajār Paḍhāśālī.* Another direction in which the cultured spirit of the queen was manifested was her patronage of literature and of learned men. She inspired great poetical works. Kavirāja Chakravartī, the court poet, rendered into Assamese verse the story of Śakuntalā at the instance of the king and the queen. The same indomitable court poet translated for the poetically minded royal spouse the *Śam-*

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[9] *Sura Parichaya*: Bardoloi, K., 1928.

[10] *Ahom Jati Aru Asamiya Samskriti*: Gogoi, L., p. 161. 1961.

[11] *Buranjiya Parasa Nagar*: Gogoi, L., 1957.

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[12] *Manuscript Painting in Mediaeval Eastern India*: Das Gupta, R., Vol. I, p. 52.

[13] *Asam Buranji*: Dhekial Phukan, H., p. 40. 1830.

[14] *Manuscript Painting in Mediaeval Eastern India*: Das Gupta, R., Vol. I, p. 52.

khachūḍa Vadha, a chapter from the *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa,* the manuscript of which is still remarkable for its penmanship and illustrations. Another court poet Ananta Ācharya composed the Assamese translation of the *Ānanda Laharī,* a work in praise of goddess Dūrgā. The *Gītā Govinda* was also translated by Kavirāja Chakravartī and each and every folio contains illustrations on both sides. But the queen soon became unpopular on account of her *Śaktist* leanings which she expressed in violent oppressions and insults meted to Vaishnava *Gossains* of Āuniati, Garamur and Moāmarā. This resulted in growing discontent and internal feud in Assam which led to the Moāmariā rebellion during the days of Rājéśwar Singha, the next king. It not only weakened the House of Tungkhung but also prepared Assam for the era of foreign domination and plunder. However, the fortunate Phuléśwarī died long before all these, in 1731 A.D. in the 18th year of her husband's reign.[15]**

She was succeeded as the *Bar-Rajā* by her cousin Draupadī who was already married to the governor of Śadiya. The king re-married her and named her Amvikā Dévī or Madamvikā. She too was a patron of learning and advancement as her illustrious cousin Pramathéśwarī. She also had coins struck in her own name in Assamese. "The legends bore *Śrī Śrī Swarğadéva Śiva Singha nripamahishī Śrīmadamvikādévyāḥ*".[16] "The name of Queen Madavikā will go down to posterity as the inspirer of a great Assamese treatise on Elephantology, with the title *Hastividyārṇava.*"[17] Another important work of art of this period is the *Bhāgavata* Book VI painted by Vadha Ligirā in 1736 A.D. at the orders of the king, the queen and their son the Prince of Tipām. The *Dharmapurāṇa* was composed in metrical Assamese by Kavichandra Dwīja and was also illustrated by Vadha Ligirā....Other important works of this period were the *Ghorā Nidāna,* a treatise on the treatment and training of horses, the *Bhāsvatī,* an astronomical work based on the Sanskrit *Sūrya Siddhānta* and the *Dharma Saṁvāda*, a portion of the *Aśvamédha Parva* of the *Mahābhārata* by Subhanāth Dwija. Queen Amvikā was also a builder. She had the Muktinātha temple or the Śibdol built and the Sibsagar excavated in 1734 A.D., after which the present temple of Sibsagar was named. Temples were also built at Kālugāon, the ancestral village of the queens and the Dévidol or the temple of Dūrgā built at Gaurīsāgar.[18] Her coins bear the latest date 1735 A.D.[19]

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[15] *Buranjiya Parasa Nagar:* Gogoi, L., p. 46. 1957.

** The mound topped by the bungalow of the Manager of the Charaideo Tea Estate near Sibsagar is said to be the Maidam or grave of queen Phuléśwari. Buranjiye Parasha Nagar; by Lila Gogoi, Sibsagar. 1957; p. 7.

[16] *Asam Buranji: Dhekial Phukan,* H., p. 41. 1830.

[17] *An Assamese Nurjahan:* Bhuyan, S. K., 1925.

The dance of the Dévadāśīs is now extinct in Assam. But the author was fortunate enough in having the unique experience of seeing it performed by two teenage girls at a music conference at Gauhati a few years ago. They were from Dubi village in Kamrup district where amateur dancers are trying to revive the dance style by piecing together bits of instructions and training received from the members of the Dévadāsī community whom senility has disabled and whose memory has been affected. The *Bhāgavata* Book V dated 1539 A.D. from the Bali Sattra of Nowgong shows an *Apsarā* dancing, which is a perfect replica of the Dévadāsī dance in matters of pose, stance and costume. Like the Carmelite nuns of Christianity the Dévadāsīs were also primarily regarded as brides of the god, hence they dressed in bridal purity and decency. The dress consists of a billowy ankle-length skirt, full sleeved blouse and a veil covering the chest as well as the head. All is white like an Assamese bride's dress. Contrary to general conception (through Western imagination) of extreme lasciviousness in dress and manners of a temple dancer, the Dévadāsīs of Assam appeared like nuns. Ornaments include wide band-like wrist ornaments or *Gām-Khārus*, necklaces made of large gold beads with crescent-shaped lockets of solid gold known as the *Jon-Biri* or the moon-necklace. A circular vermillion mark on the forehead shows prominently.

The dancers stand facing the *Linga* with their heels joined but knees bent and thrust out sideways, very much as in

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[18] *Manuscript Painting in Mediæval Eastern India*: Das Gupta, R., Vol. I, p. 53.

[19] *An Account of Assam*: Hamilton, Franscis, p. 9.

Kathākali (Fig. 1). The orchestra is simple and consists of a drum, a pair of brass cymbals and a stringed instrument. The tempo is very slow at the beginning. The music seems to arouse the dancers from the trance-like attitude. They look sideways and the hands are held up at the sides up to the shoulders and the fingers open up like lotus blooms. The fingers remain thus formed and the palms rotate on the wrists only in half turns. Suddenly the music beats faster and the tempo catches up with it (Fig. 2) The end is a *Praṇāma* to the deity. The dancers face the public and fold hands at the chests in salutation. Then in that position they bend backwards in till the pointed chignons touch the ground (Fig. 3). The hands touch the ground and within a wink of the eye the dancers somersault and land on their feet facing the deity. Then they do a regular *Praṇāma* with folded hands and bowed heads. This *Bandha* is rather unusual. But it might have been derived from the Bhutanese way of doing *Praṇāma* to Hayagrīva Mādhava of Hājo whom they regard as a Buddhist deity, nay a statue of the Buddha himself. The Bhutanese who come to Assam for trade and worship every winter pay homage to the above deity by bending forward but instead of folding hands at the chest in the front they do it on the waist at the back.



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

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

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The prevalence of the system of Dévadāsīs in Assam till recent times and in Orissa to our days shows its great importance in the cults of eastern India. The *Rajatarangini* refers to Kamalā, the dancer of Paundravardhana or north Bengal who ultimately became supreme in Kashmir and even founded the city of Kamalāpura in her new home. Koncho village of Mithila in Bihar still has a class of religious dancing girls known as the *Nāchanī*. Both Hindu and Buddhist *Tāntrikas* assimilated cult of sex under many covers and philosophised its importance in life here and hereafter. "It is no wonder that by practising this kind of religion the whole of Eastern India lost all vigour and the whole population became corrupt on the eve of Turko-Afghan conquest".[20] Śankaradéva had been able to minimise the effects of an amorous atmosphere in religious institutions by his *Eka Śaraṇa Nāma Dharma*, but Chaitanya Vaishnavism retained the elements of the soil under the name *Parakiyā Préma* which found appreciation in Bengal, Manipur and Orissa. The memory of the Dévadāsīs still persists in a place name like Negheriting in Assam which is so named because of the resemblance of the hill with the pointed chignon of the Dévadāsīs known as the *Negheri-khopā*. In common parlance a coquettish girl is referred to as Nāṭī which brings an Assamese maiden low in the esteem of the society.

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[20] *Proceedings of the 3rd Oriental Conference*, Madras, 1925; Bhattacharya, B., pp. 139-40.

The Bāthū Shrine and the Rajas of Guler: A Brief Study of a Vaishnava Establishment

BY

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An important aspect of the study of religion in the Panjab Himalayas is the relationship in which the relatively new creed of Vaishnavism and the Rajas of the various hill states stood. A late comer to the hills, Vaishnavism entered a significant phase in the 17th and early 18th centuries: its impact upon a people predominantly Shaiva and Shākta in their faith began to be felt, and it succeeded decidedly in attracting an increasing following among the hill chieftains. Whether it is in Jagat Singh of Kulu and his building the Raghunath temple,[1] Jagat Singh Pathania of Nurpur and his installation of the Brijrājswāmī image in the Fort,[2] or Suraj Sen of Mandi and his surrender of his entire state to the Mādho Rāi idol,[3] the pattern of the progress made by Vaishnavism in the hills become increasingly discernible.

A link in the same chain is the patronage extended to the small but important Vaishnava shrine of Bāthū by the chiefs of the hill state of Guler.[4] Small and unpretentious, this out-of-the-way establishment lies one and a half miles off Anūr on the present day rail link from Pathankot to Jogindernagar. The shrine lies hidden in a quiet corner by the Bāngangā rivulet, but along with numerous other submontane Vaishnava establishments, is of basic importance to the understanding of the spread of Vaishnavism in these regions.

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[1] J. B. Lyall, *Report of the Land Revenue Settlement of the Kāngrā District* (Lāhore, 1889), p. 76; Hirānanda Shāstri, "Historical Documents of Kulu," *Arch. Survey of India, Annual Report,* 1907-08, II, p. 269.

[2] The oral tradition at Nurpur is emphatic on the point, and the old bard, Bānka Rāi of Nūrpur, tells a long and fascinating story about the foundation of the temple. Cf. H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Panjab etc.*, 3 Vols., (Lāhore, 1911-19), I, p. 374.

[3] *Gazetteer of the Mandī State*, Part A, 1904, p. 39.

[4] The principality of Guler was originally an offshoot from the larger state of Kāngrā, but later came to play a significant role in its own right in the history and culture of the Panjāb hills.

Bāthū does not claim an independent status for itself: it is content with regarding itself as a daughter-shrine of the important Vaishnava *matha* at Pindorī[5] in the Gurdaspur district. At Bathu there is a firm and steady belief in Shri Bhagwānjī and Shri Nārāyaṇjī, the two saints to whose zeal the Pindori and Damṭhāl[6] shrines owe themselves. Here also is preserved the memory of the connection between Bhagwānjī and Krishnadās Payāhārī, the famous Vaishnava ascetic, who seems to have been instrumental in bringing the Rāmānandī sect of Vaishnavas to these regions of the Panjab plains and hills.

But if the spiritual roots of the Bāthū establishment can be traced to Pindorī, its temporal connections were with the state of Guler in whose territory it lay. Both its inception and prosperity in fact emanate from its connection with the Guleria chiefs. The story told of the foundation of Bāthū at the shrine itself,[7] and in the brief published history of the parent *gaddi* of Pindorī,[8] involves with it "Rājā Bishan Singh of Guler." It is said to have taken place during the time of Mahant Rām Dāss of Pindorī, sixth in apostolic descent from Bhagwānji. He was, it is said, invited by Rājā Bishan Singh of Guler to Bāthū which lay in his territory. There he encountered a Brahmin widow, Bōdlī by name, who was devoutly worshipping a *shāligrām*, the ammonite stone which is the symbol of Vishnū. He bade her discontinue this practice, for to the worship of *shāligrām*, "women and low castes" were not entitled. Bodli readily agreed and took, on the Mahant's advice, to the worship of an idol of Rāma instead. While at Guler, Mahant Rām Dāss happened to mention this incidentally to Rājā Bishan Singh who, with more despatch than kindness, ordered that the *shāligrām* be seized from Bōdlī. The command was obeyed, with tragic consequences. Bōdlī hung herself, and the Raja, penitently, had a *samādh* built for her and ordered that a *Thākurdwārā*, the name given to Vaishnava shrines in the Panjab hills, be raised for the *shāligrām*. After some time Mahant Rām Dāss went back to Pindori, leaving behind a disciple, Vishnu Dāss, to head the establishment that was now, under the patronage of the Raja, built at Bāthū. Vishnu Dāss brought from Pindori a beautifully embroidered cloak, *gudṛī*, said to have belonged to Bhagwānjī. This *gudri*, along with a cap and a rosary, is to this day worshipped in the *navarātrā* of the month of *Ashvin* at Bāthū.

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[5] This shrine is one of the most important Vaishnava establishments in Northern India, and is described in the official records as belonging to the Rāmānandī sect of Vaishnavas. Brief accounts of its foundation and importance are to be found in the *Gazetteer of the Gurdāspur District*, 1914; Rose, *Glossary*, I, p. 393; G. S. Ghurye, *Indian Sadhūs* (Bombay, 1953), pp. 188-89.

[6] Damṭhāl lies 4 miles off Pathankot and was at one time in the Nūrpur State. At present it has an existence independent of Pindorī.

[7] Mahant Purshottam Dāss of Bāthū interviewed, May 1964.

[8] Pritam Ziyā, *Pindorī Dhām Kā Itihās* (Pindorī, 1961), pp. 65-66.

In this narrative there appears what is perhaps a mixture of fact with imagination. The essential core, however, of the circumstances in which the shrine came to be endowed finds unexpected mention in the First Regular Land Settlement record relating to the year 1868, giving details of the village of Bāthū which came, under the British, to be included in Tahsil Dehrā of the Kāngrā district. The record indicates[9] that the village was first inhabited by a Family of Thakkar Barōtrās, this land having been granted to them by Raja Bishan Singh Gularīa. Later, however, a lady by the name of Bōdlī, Brahmin by caste, brought a small idol, obviously Vaishnava, by the name of "Thākur Badrī Vishāla" and built a small temple there. This temple may have been patronised by Rājā Bishan Singh also, but the record is silent on the matter, although later it specifically states that Raja Govardhan Chand of Guler (ruled, according to Hutchison and Vogel,[10] *ca.* 1730-1773) afterwards raised an impressive temple to house the idol. During the reign of Govardhan Chand, the record entry says further, Mahant Rām Dāss of Pindorī came to the Guler territory. The Raja bequeathed the entire village of Bāthū as a *muāfī*, rent-free jagir, in the name of "Thakur Badrī Vishāla." He also urged upon Mahant Rām Dāss to stay there and not go away. It is almost certain, however, that Rām Dāss went back to the more important establishment at Pindorī, having installed his disciple, Vishnu Dāss on the *gaddi* at Bāthū, who is thus listed at the successor to Rām Dāss in the record. The mahants of Bāthū have remained in uninterrupted enjoyment of the *jāgīr* ever since.

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[9] See the *khewat* relating to the year 1868 for *tika* Bāthū, *mauza* Bāthū, *tahsil* Dehrā, district Kāngṛā. The record is preserved in the office of the Sadr Kānungō at Dharamsalā.

[10] J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel, *History of the Pānjab Hill States*, 2 Vols. (Lāhore, 1933), I, p. 206.

The Settlement Record, in the nature of things, does not contain very detailed information, but the broad outline of development at Bāthū seems to be reasonably certain. The original temple does seem to have owed its existence to the fervour of Bōdlī, although the part of the story by which she is made to kill herself may be open to some doubt. Bōdlī's contemporaneity with Raja Bishan Singh of Guler is almost certain. The endowment to the shrine seems to have come from the munificence of Raja Govardhan Chand. Mahant Rām Dāss must clearly have been instrumental in evoking this enthusiasm in the Raja's mind on behalf of Vaishnavism, and then establishing Vishnu Dāss in the Bāthū *gaddī*. The present mahant, Purushōttam Dāss, cites Vishnu Dass as the first mahant proper of the *gaddī*.

From this evidence arise certain points, however, which call perhaps for a little discussion before facts can be based in history. The mention of "Raja Bishan Singh of Guler" may even in fact raise some doubt as to the authenticity of the entire record thus far cited. No chief of this name is included in the list of the Rajas contained in the histories relevant to the Guler State. Hutchison and Vogel[11] do not give any indication of the existence of Bishan Singh. They treat Govardhan Chand, ever so briefly, as being the immediate successor of his father, Dalip Singh. The vernacular histories of Thākur Kāhan Singh Balauriā[12] and Dewān Sarbdiāl,[13] so informative as a rule, are silent on the subject and the valuable Guler chronicle, *Dīliparanjanī*,[14] provides no clue, for it ends in the reign of Dalip Singh, with Samvat 1760 (= A.D. 1703), the date of its composition. But there is need perhaps for some revision in the genealogical table of the Guler family. The evidence from the Pindōrī history, the oral tradition at Bāthū and, most important of all, the Settlement Record of 1868 is remarkably consistent in mentioning "Raja Bishan Singh" by name and placing him earlier than Raja Govardhan Chand. Fortunately we find Bishan Singh listed as one of the sons of Dalīp Singh of Guler by Thākur Kāhan Singh.[15] He in fact was the heir presumptive, being the eldest son of his father. The words: "during the reign of Raja Bishan Singh Guleriā" occur consistently in the Settlement Record. Any doubt that "Raja" here may be a merely complimentary epithet is easily dispelled by the emphatic reference to the "reign" of the Raja. It is reasonably certain then that the existing histories make a mistake and that Bishan Singh did in fact rule in Guler after the death of his father. It is possible that his reign may have been very short—that, in fact, may be the clue to his not figuring in the histories of Guler. Whether he died early or abdicated, we do not know. One thing is certain, however; he must have been childless for Govardhan Chand, his younger brother, could only in that circumstance have succeeded him.

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[11] *Ibid.*, I, p. 206.

[12] *Tawārikh-i Rājpūtāṇ-i Mulk-i Punjāb*, Vol. I, (Jammū, 1912).

[13] *Tawārikh-i Rājgān-i Zillāh Kāngrā* (Kangrā, n. d.).

[14] This history is composed in Hindi verse by Uttam Kavi, and is in possession, in manuscript form, of the Guler family. It is named after the poet's patron, Raja Dalīp Singh.

The fact of Bishan Singh having intervened between Dalīp Singh and Govardhan Chand seems to receive further support from a portrait, reproduced by Mr. Khandālavālā,[16] of a middle-aged, standing man, with a clear inscription at the back, making him out to be "Raja Bishan Singh Guleriā." This, in any case, seems to clear up the mystery of this unidentified prince, and if it is indeed Bishan Singh of Guler, the elder brother of Govardhan Chand, who is portrayed here, the date of the portrait may have to be shifted back from *ca.* A.D. 1750, to which date Mr. Khandālavālā assigns it, to at least a quarter of a century before.

It is not easy to fix the dates of Bishan Singh's rule. Any attempt at doing that must, of necessity, be conjectural, and intimately be connected with the date of Govardhan Chand's accession to the throne. Controversy surrounds the date of that distinguished prince. Hutchison and Vogel put his accession to A.D. 1730, about when, according to them Dalīp Singh died. They are by no means certain, however, as the "*circā*" would indicate. It is now generally believed, however, that this date is incorrect[17] and his accession is put now to A.D. 1744 or 1745, for just before that date, Dalīp Singh is mentioned in a campaign of Adīnā Beg Khān in the hills.

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[15] *Op.cit.*, I, p. 443.

[16] Karl J. Khandālāvālā, *Pahāri Miniature Painting* (Bombay, 1958), Study Supp., No. 110.

Fortunately, even on this point, the present writer came across clear evidence during a tour in the hills. At Jwālāmukhī, famed centre of Hindu pilgrimage, a *pattā* written in Tākrī and signed by Raja Govardhan Chand is available with a Brahmin family.[18] It bears the date Samvat 1803 which, the grant specifically states, corresponds to the 5th regnal year of Govardhan Chand's rule. The date of Govardhan Chand's accession can thus be finally fixed at Samvat 1798 (= A.D. 1741).

Now, if Dalīp Singh came to the throne in 1695 at the age of seven,[19] he must at least have ruled till *ca* 1738 A.D., for we have a portrait[20] of his showing him to be a man of about 45 years. To return, to Bishan Singh, then. His date must be somewhere between the date of the death of his father, and 1741, the date of the accession of Govardhan Chand, his brother and successor. Unluckily his being a contemporary of Mahant Rām Dāss of Pindorī does not afford much help in this matter, for the known dates of that mahant, A.D. 1727-1761,[21] cover the reigns of as many as three Guler chiefs. We have to content ourselves, then, with these uncertain, though by no means slight, data.

In the context of Bāthū, the real importance of Bishan Singh, to whom this somewhat long discussion has been devoted, is his patronage of this Vaishnava establishment. He is one of the links in the chain of consistent connections between the Guler Court and the Bāthū shrine. The temple at Bāthū is certainly not the first Vaishnava temple in Guler. The temple of Kalyān Rāi in Harīpur town is a testimony to the Vaishnava zeal of Dalīp Singh who is said to have brought the idol from Bīr Bangāhal after a conquest, and named the temple after his queen, Kalyān Dai.[22] But from the time of Bishan Singh onwards, the following of the Vaishnava faith by several Guler Rājas received strength from the presence of the Bāthu establishment in the State. The Vaishnava temples raised subsequent to the foundation of the Badrī Vishalā temple at Bāthū—the Rām Chandra and Govardhan temples at Haripur, the Murlī Manohar temple at Guler—perhaps owed themselves to the steadfastness with which the Bāthū mahants propagated their creed. A symbol of the intimate contact between Bāthū and the Guler chiefs was the loyal devotion of the late Raja Baldev Singh of Guler (who died only recently) to the Bāthū *gaddi.* Raja Baldev Singh regularly visited Bāthū and even lent help to regularize the affairs of the jagīr. The present mahant of Bāthū possesses several papers which show the Raja's efforts to put together the history of the shrine on which he pressed so much of his devotion.

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[17] For a brief discussion, see Khandālavālā, p. 354.

[18] Seen by the courtesy of Pt. Ishwarī Prasāda of Jwālāmukhī.

[19] Hutchison and Vogel, I, pp. 205-06.

[20] Reproduced in Khandālavālā, fig. 72.

[21] Pritam Ziyāi, *op.cit.*, pp. 65-68.

And if this mould of religious-temporal relationship is breaking up now, it is of interest to remember that for two and a half centuries were Bāthū and Guler closely linked together. But this is no great matter for surprise, for it apparently follows a fairly general pattern existing in the hills of the Panjab. The Pathānia Rajas of Nūrpur paid consistent homage to the Vaishnava *matha* of Damthal; the Jaswān Rajas regularly worshipped at Pindorī; and the Rajas of Kulu offered benevolent protection to Vaishnava *Bairāgis.*

Of the connection of Guler with Bāthū, the mahants also possess pictorial record. For the mahants of Bāthū, like their counterparts elsewhere, appear to have been serious patrons of Pahārī painting. Painting at religious establishments like these possibly served a devout end: artists may have been commissioned, in fact, to paint pictures of religious importance. They, in any case, embellished the walls of the shrines for the edification of the devotees.[23] At Bāthū, there are several miniatures, part perhaps of a much larger collection, now dispersed. These are appended to a Hindi manuscript which apparently contains the compositions, of the saint Nārāyanjī. There is no connection, except the physical, between the paintings and the manuscript. They were most probably bound together in the same covers by some mahant for the purpose of preserving them. The size of the paintings, which are horizontal as contrasted with the vertical format of the manuscript, is 10″ × 8″. For the present study, there are two paintings of significance: one of them shows Govardhan Chand, his portrait accurate to the small detail of his face bearing small-pox marks, bowing before Bhagwānjī and Nārāyanjī seated on a tigerskin. The other is of Raja Dalīp Singh, with his name inscribed on the border, similarly standing. Other themes that appear in the collection include Bhagwānjī and Nārāyanjī seated, with attendants on either side;[24] Nārāyanjī being administered poison at the command of the Emperor Jāhāṇgīr;[25] Nārāyanjī being worshipped by Rishīkumārs and other devotees; and, of course, the familiar scenes from Hindu mythology. We have here again, thus, the link with Pindorī to which shrine most of these themes are native, and where indeed similar paintings can be seen in large numbers on the walls of the Raghunath temple.

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[22] The oral tradition at Haripur, as gathered from the priest of the temple and Thakur Somnath Singh, seems to fully confirm the account of foundation of the temple given in the *Dīliparanjanī.*

The import of the paintings of Dalīp Singh and Govardhan Chand, exclusive to the Bāthū shrine, is not to be misunderstood. They do not make either of the two chiefs contemporary to Bhagwānjī and Nārāyanjī. They are merely the painter's naive effort at showing their faith in these two founders of the larger establishment of which Bāthū was after all a branch.

Great interest attaches to these paintings because of their style. They are executed in a vigorous, primitive manner and have faded narrow red borders.. The colours used by the painter mostly vegetable and pure, and the treatment of figures is distinctly reminiscent of the Basōhlī idiom. The line is faltering at places, but the design is strikingly good. The highly stylized treatment of mountains and water is indicative of an early date perhaps; certainly, of folk origins.

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[23] This temple at Bāthū appears at some time to have been decorated with murals which at present however have rubbed out. A faint outline of a near life-sized *dvārapāla* is still disecernible on the wall to the right of the shrine as one faces it.

[24] For other paintings on the same theme see Khandālavālā, fig. 27; the Panjāb Museum Collection at Chandigarh, Nos. 239, 1228.

[25] A painting on the same subjects is also reproduced in Khandālavālā, fig. 8. The Damṭhāl temple, too, has a fresco-panel showing the same occurrence.

Like other things connected with Bāthū, these paintings lead us once again to an area of controversy. The Bashōhlī-affiliated style raises several intriguing points. At about the time of Govardhan Chand, Guler had emerged as perhaps the most important centre of a finer *kalam,* elegant and refined.[26] The movement towards the Kāngrā style had, in fact, definitely begun. To find near-Basōhlī style paintings at Bāthū, so close to the heart of the Guler state, therefore, comes as a matter of considerable surprise. Could it be that artists adhering to the earlier style went out of favour and employment at the court of Guler and went and found patronage with lesser patrons like the mahants of Bāthū? Or, could it again be that the earlier style continued to be in vogue at some centres, regardless of the new and exciting developments at Guler proper? The co-existence of two different styles of painting in the Guler state in the first half of the eighteenth century, at any rate, is pointedly brought out by this hitherto unnoticed collection.

There is then the larger question of a relationship between Vaishnavism and Pahārī painting. The existence of a predominantly large number of paintings of the Vaishnava theme has led to the belief that the connection between them is causal. There are scholars who subscribe to the view that the religious wave in which the Vaishnava faith spread so widely was responsible for a spurt of activity, religious and aesthetic, of which Pahārī painting was a part.

This may or may not be true: it is a matter which certainly admits of more than one opinion. But discovery of collections like those of Bāthū, Pindorī and Damṭhāl are valuable evidence. From these the patronage of Pahārī art by Vaishnava establishments emerges as a fact at once significant and undeniable.

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[26] For a discussion of the development of painting at Guler, see W. G. Archer, Indian Painting in the Punjāb Hills (London, 1952); M. S. Randhāwā, "Guler: the Birthplace of Kāngrā Art," *Mārg.* Vol. VI, No. 4; Khaṇḍālavāla, *op.cit.*

The French Towns of India

BY

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The historian must remain mindful of keeping alive the memory of all those who have contributed to our growth lest they should be forgotten, since whatever has gone into the making of our history is worth remembering.

A short account of the origin of four French towns — Mahe, Karaikal, Chandernagore and Pondicherry — is here attempted, for these are the very monuments of the French stay in India. From another point of view they are their only visible monuments, for, unlike the Dutch and the English, the French are singularly bereft of individual monuments, save for the solitary example of the Dupleix statute at Pondicherry. The French have left in our midst not even a good tombstone. Even the grave of the great Bussy, the warrior-diplomat of the French during the hectic days of the Carnatic Wars, is too simple to be noted though it lies opposite the Cathedral at Pondicherry.

The death of the Maratha Raja of Tanjore, Tukaji, in 1735 gave occasion for a succession dispute among his three sons — two legitimate and one illegitimate — egged on by Sayid Khan, the Rajah's commander at Tanjore. One of the legal sons of the Rajah, Sahuji, had to flee the palace at Tanjore and seek refuge in the temple at Chidambaram. From here he opened negotiations with M. Dumas at Pondicherry offering to make over to him the town of Karaikal and the fort of Kirkangarhi, 10 villages in the country adjacent and all the lands depending on them, in return for aid in securing for him the throne at Tanjore. The French accepted the offer happily. They wanted a port town near Negapatam, where the Dutch were making good business and there was Sahuji offering it to them. The deal having been accepted Dumas sent the ruler one lakh rupees in cash and bound himself to help the Rajah with men, equipment, artillery and war-ships. Immediately the *Bourbon* of sixty guns and the *St. Geran* of forty guns were sent to take possession of Karaikal and afford the promised assistance to Sahuji.

These ships anchored before Karaikal in August 1738; but that would not become a French town so easily. Sahuji was in the meanwhile in torch with Sayid, who made easy his return to Tanjore by imprisoning the usurper in his own palace. Immediately Sahuji's troops poured for the defence of Karaikal against the French and the troops numbered nearly 4,000. Dumas was politely told by Sahuji that the cession of Karaikal would take a little time on account of political reasons. Thereupon the shrewd and prudent Governor of Pondicherry withdrew the ships hoping for a chance to come of its own accord. Curiously enough, as though by a mechanical device, Chanda Sahib, always a friend of the French, agreed to take Karaikal on their behalf. On the 6th of February 1739 a detachment of 4,000 horse commanded by a Spaniard, Francisco Pereira, accomplished the operation. The following day Pereira reached Pondicherry with the tidings of his victory. The cession of Karaikal bears the date 14th February 1739.[1]

Sahuji hearing of what had happened immediately communicated to Dumas the ratification of the Chidambaram parleys, throwing the whole blame for what had transpired between the talks and the ratification on the innocent Dutch at Negapatam. He sent two instruments of action dated 25th April 1739, one being the ratification referred to and the other, an order to the people of Pondicherry and round about to consider the French as their masters. When Dumas was still wondering at this turn of events, Sahuji was once again thrown out of his throne, which yielded place to his half brother, Pratab Singh, the illegitimate son of Tukaji. Like those who laugh last and best Pratab confirmed the cession once again and even recommended to Dumas the fortification of Karaikal as a military base.

II

A little earlier to the cession of Karaikal, the French were eager to capture Mahe, close to Tellicherry on the west coast, for

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[1] Account taken from Dumas' own version sent to Abbe Guyon (see the Abbe's *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, Paris, 1744).

REFERENCE BOOK

stragetic reasons. Situated on a high ground from the sea, it showed itself to be a good port town not easily vulnerable. Thus in the year 1725 a small French squadron sailing under the command of M. de Pardaillon came opposite to Mahe and called for its surrender. When it was naturally refused de Pardaillon was on the horns of a dilemma, to withdraw or to fight. It was a trouble called by the French upon themselves; but de Pardaillon did not possibly expect this turn of events. It was at this time that a captain of one of his ships, Bertrand Francis Mahe de La Bourdonnais, suggested a plan of action to the perplexed commander and requested him to appoint him on the job. The plan was audacious. It was to construct a raft in which the soldiers could be placed in battle array and taken in the cover of the night across the river in dry feet on to the village of Mahe. This was done and the place was stormed into submission.

It is often said that the name Mahe is a modification of the original Maihi. It seems doubtful whether such a name could have been borne by a place on the west coast earlier than La Bourdonnais, who also bore the name of Mahe. We have to presume, therefore, that it is his own name that now caps the little French town of Malabar.

III

It was during the Bengal viceroyalty of Shayista Khan, maternal uncle of Emperor Aurangzeb, that a French fleet entered the Hugli and disembarked a few settlers at the village of Chandernagar, as Chandernagore was then called. Aurangzeb had already ceded it to the French by an edict in 1688. The situation of the place was quite important and strategic. This may be seen from the fact that members of other European nations like the Dutch and the English had swarmed about the surroundings of Chandernagar and were careful to defend themselves by fortifications. The French alone, in spite of the fact that the place had been ceded to them by the Emperor at Delhi, did not worry about fortifying it. They wanted only to be peaceful traders in India at that time. The idea of establishing an empire for themselves in that country however came to them first but that was later. In February 1701 Aurangzeb himself placed Chandernagar under the Governor of Pondicherry but even that would not help either the trade or prosperity of the place. It was slowly languishing into decay, when it came under the magic wand of Dupleix.

यह पुस्तक वितरित न की जाय
NOT TO BE ISSUED

The great Governor knew the importance of possessing Chandernagar and being a friend of the Mughal. He therefore proceeded to the place, there to be installed as a Nawab under the Muhammadan Governor of Bengal. When this was done in 1742 he insisted on paying the first visit to the Governor. The Muhammadans being as famous for ceremonies and courtesies as the French themselves, the Governor humbly confessed that it would be improper for a person superior in rank to do that. In this way the French Nawab and the Muhammadan Governor got in terms of great intimacy with much mutual respect. At last Dupleix returned to Pondicherry and made a great display of his being an officer of the great Mughal and would not leave a single decoration or symbol pertaining to his office.

Those were days of French diplomacy at the height. But the very height led to a fall. The English in Bengal under the lead of Clive and Watson eyed these happenings with suspicion and decided to bring down the French prestige by attacking Chandernagar itself. The place was then under the command of M. Renault de St. Germain assisted by de Vigne and Terranneau. The English attack came to them as a bolt from the blue and they had very little force at their command. "We received 67 sipahis and a detachment of 61 Europeans of whom 45 were invalids, which added to the 85 Europeans we then had, made 146 Europeans."[2] The historian Orme gives us an account of the great precautions Renault took to ward off the inevitable fall. But the English were determined. In the words of Orme again "it was written that Chandernagar was to fall."[3] As the same historian rightly points out, "the capture of Chandernagar was not less a seal to French domination in Bengal than it was the starting point of the British supremacy in that province."[4]

IV

The French establishment of Pondicherry was not made easily. The English settlement at Madras was certainly an easy and natural working out of fate; but Pondicherry was formed for the French "under clash of war and falling of kingdoms." The astonishing way in which M. Martin, universally and fittingly acknowledged as the Founder of Pondicherry, kept the balance between the Maratha Rajah of Tanjore and the Muhammadan king of Golkonda even and his attempt to please them both at all costs will ever remain as one of the heights reached by diplomacy in the entire record dealing with the European occupation of India.

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[2] Extracts from the Official Records of the French establishment in Bengal.

[3] See Malleson; *History of the French in India*, 471.

[4] *Op.cit.*, 475.

The French, who wanted access to the sea first pitched upon St. Thome. But the danger of the Portuguese and even more of the Dutch taking it away from them was always imminent. Thus it was that Martin, advised by the Directors of the French East India Company, arranged with Sher Khan Lodi, the Governor of the king of Bijapur, for the purchase of a plot of ground bordering on Gingi along the sea-coast. Almost immediately with the help of the king of Golkonda the Dutch, as expected, got rid of the French from St. Thome. Martin knew the jealousy and the martial superiority of the Dutch; still undaunted he continued his work of finding a good foot-hold for the French. He built a small township over the ground purchased from Sher Khan with just 60 Europeans at his command. The natives called the rising township *'Philcheru'* for reasons best known to them and that became Pondicherry in the mouth of the European. So stands the town to-day with its name unexplained.

In 1677 Gingi came under the Marathas, the great Sivaji himself taking possession of it. Martin succeeded in placating him. But a still greater hurdle arose in 1693, when war broke out between France and Holland. The Dutch captured Pondicherry and there was no help for it until peace was restored in Europe. Pondicherry remained with the Dutch, for a period of four years, until the treaty of Ryswick in 1697. In a way this was a blessing in disguise, since during this period the Dutch had strengthened its fortifications. The treaty of Ryswick that decided about Pondicherry being handed over to the French had stipulated the payment of 16,000 pagodas to the Dutch by the French for the improvements they had made in that town while in their hands. The money was paid and Pondicherry was secured for the French. Martin died in 1706.

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Some light on the Origins of the Bhumij Revolt of 1832-33

BY

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Professor C. Von Haimendorf's remarks, made in another context, might very aptly be applied to the Jungle Mahals (present Manbhum district of Bihar) in the Bengal Presidency where the unprecedented tribal revolt of 1832-33 occurred: "Any one with first hand experience in the backward areas and the appalling oppression and exploitation to which many aboriginals are subjected at the hands of more advanced populations must be surprised, not by the occurrence of risings, but by the infrequency of violent reaction on the part of the aboriginals to the loss of their ancestral lands and to their economic enslavement."[1] That enslavement of the Bhumijes had followed almost automatically from the action of the Bengal Government in extending the Permanent Settlement and the Cornwallis Code to these undeveloped areas towards the end of the eighteenth century, without taking any note of tribal interests, needs and customs. As J. H. Hutton says, the early British administration "did very great detriment to the economic position of the tribes through ignorance and neglect of their rights and customs."[2]

Though it was the Indian subordinate officials, the *amlas* of the courts, *thanas,* and excise and revenue services, who actually harassed and exploited with the new and complex regulations of the Bengal Government, and though in tribal eyes they were the chief villains of the piece, it was the British administration which, as O'Malley says, "was ultimately responsible as it facilitated contacts with tribes which had hitherto been unaffected or only slightly affected by them."[3] It was only the presence of the British power which permitted 'the administrative frontier', 'the traders' frontier' and 'the settlers' frontier'[4] to encroach upon the tribal territory.

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[1] "The Aboriginal Rebellions of the Deccan", *Man in India*, Rebellion Number, XXV, Dec. 1945, no. 4.

[2] O'Malley (ed.), *Modern India and the West*, 438.

Governor General Lord Cornwallis, while introducing his Code, placed the greatest stress upon the importance of the judicial side of the administration and the setting up of courts of law free from the play of personality and of uncertainty in the law itself. Yet in the Jungle Mahals the introduction of British courts and of shrewd *darogas* and *munsifs* was by no means a blessing. With the opening up of tribal territory by the British troops after 1767 money-lenders and traders appeared and by 1828 it was reported that "all that their (tribal peoples') vigilance can preserve from the ravages of wild beasts, is extorted from them by the rapacity of the money-lenders."[5] But neither the Government nor the local authorities did anything to check the rapacious spirit of the money-lenders, rather their courts and laws facilitated the collection of debts or the compulsory sale of lands on payment of the usurious claims of the money-lenders.

The chiefs and rajas of the Jungle Mahals, who had played a part in introducing outsiders into their estates, often themselves suffered at the hands of money-lenders or their stewards and agents. Exposed to the action of the sale laws for non-payment of revenue to the British authorities, they often lost their lands to scheming officials, or having recourse to the money-lenders, became hopelessly involved in debts. If some of the chiefs did very little to prevent the attacks of the tribal insurgents upon the money lending class during the rising of 1832-33 it was perhaps not so much from powerlessness as from a lack of will to act on behalf of a class which had them too in its clutches.

The rise of the Brahmans, or of Muslim merchants, to positions of authority in the feudal estates of the Jungle Mahals, and the oppressive activities of the money-lenders were much resented by the Bhumijes. But to them the most obnoxious class of non-tribal people was that of the *amlas* or petty officials of the East India Company. The menial staff of the *munsifs,* the *peadas,* and the Muslim police *barkandazes* were certainly guilty of acts of oppression, when deputed on duty to the villages. These acts might be no more than the forcible provision of fowls or kids for their tables, but might extend to the levying of a regular toll upon all the villages in the district. The police *daroga* set the example by taking a rupee or so from every village on appointment and much larger sums when he was on the *mofussil.* His subordinates imitated the *daroga* and found pretexts for exacting their petty 'fines' from the *ghatwals*[6] and villagers. The police officers might thus collect as much as two or three thousand rupees a year from a *pargana.*[7] Naturally enough, the police *thanas,* the court, etc., were constantly attacked and fired by the tribal rebels during the revolt of 1832-33.

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[3] *Ibid.*, 737.

[4] Vide F. G. Bailey, *Caste and the Economic Frontier*, 230-235.

[5] Hamilton, *East India Gazetteer*, II, 229.

The salt *daroga* and his subordinates at the *chauki* were other officials who abused their powers and suffered in consequence. In Barabhum *pargana,* for example, the *ghatwals* accused the *daroga* of taking ten rupees a year from each person carrying salt for sale. In course of the investigation after the revolt it was proved that the salt *daroga* collected a fee called *Minkara* of one anna per maund on all salt imported into Barabhum and one rupee annual *salami* from each person selling salt, besides a douceur paid to the salt *chaprasis.*[8]

In the context of these oppressions and exploitations the explosion of 1832-33 may in general terms be attributed to the pressure of outsiders upon tribal life, and the misguided action of the East India Company in subjecting the tribal people to the complex regulations of judicial and revenue systems worked out in other more developed areas.

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[6] They would accuse a *ghatwal* (marcher lord) of neglect of his duty of guarding the passes and then accept hush money.

[7] Braddon to Government, 12 June, 1832, B.C. (Board's Collections), 1501/58887, India Office Library, London. Also see Dent to Government, 4 Sept. 1833, para. 23, B.C. 1501/58886: "The usual annual payments of two to three rupees from each village according to its size were made to the police at the time of entering the revised lists of Ghatwal's and Chowkidar's collections: in making local investigations, payments to be exempted from proceeding to Bancoorah were here as elsewhere sources of emoluments to the police."

[8] W. Dent to Government, 4 Sept. 1833, para. 23, B.C. 1501/58886.

Had the tribal people been left under their chiefs—the *sardar ghatwals*—or had British officials maintained a close control of their subordinates, disaster might have been avoided. It must be recognised, however, that in Barabhum in particular special conditions operated to bring dissatisfaction to a head. The early success of the Kols when they rose in revolt in the neighbouring areas of Chota-Nagpur proper and Palamau in 1831-32,[8a] and then in the British protected area of Bamanghati and in unsettled Singhbhum, could not fail to cause a stir in the Jungle Mahals. It is difficult, indeed, to establish any direct connection between the risings of the Dhangar Kols in Chota-Nagpur, and those of the Cheros and Kharwars of Palamau with the Bhumij risings. But it seems very likely indeed that the court of Directors were correct in asserting that "the insurrection in the Jungle Estates doubtless had its origin in the disturbances which still prevailed in Moherbunge [Mayurbhanj], Bamanghati and Kohlan, and which had been only recently suppressed in Chota-Nagpore".[9] The tribal revolt of 1832-1833 in the Jungle Mahals, popularly known as Ganga Narain's *Hangama* (or turmoil), thus falls into place as a natural continuation of the earlier resistance to the British system.

But the fact that in popular legend it is always linked with the name of Ganga Narain serves as a reminder of the particular part played by the personalities of Ganga Narain and of Madhava Singh. Had there been no pre-existing general discontent among the tribal masses, Ganga Narain could not have obtained such influence.[10] But without a Ganga Narain, equally, the discontent might have continued to simmer without boiling over into violence.

When Russell, the Jungle Mahals magistrate, first gave his views on the causes of the rising in May 1832, he made four points. "The disturbances appear to have arisen at first," he wrote, "out of malice towards the zemindar's half brother Madhub Singh, between whom and Ganga Narain Singh a most deadly hatred has existed for some years past, which has increased of late".[11] He then referred to Madhava Singh's oppressive methods of money-lending[12] which made him obnoxious to the *ghatwals* and to the general Bhumij masses. Thirdly he referred to a decision of the *munsif* of Barabazar in favour of Madhava Singh in money suits against the Bhumijes.[13] Lastly, he suggested that the attacks upon the *thana* and police officials had a double motive: they arose from "the spite towards the police officers from the nature of their calling" and were designed to force them "to leave the pergannah through fear and to deter them thereby from making any investigation into the disturbances."[14]

[8a] See J. C. Jha, *The Kol Insurrection in Chota-Nagpur*, Calcutta, 1964.

[9] Court of Directors to Bengal Government, 16 Sept. 1832, para 8, India and Bengal Despatches, vol. 6, p. 374.

[10] An officer of the 50th N.I., *India Gazette*, 19 May 1832.

Martin, the Assistant to the Jungle Mahals magistrate, thought that "the state of the Rajah's family and the conduct of Madhub Singh" was the cause of unrest".[15] The Barabhum raja was "deficient in intellect and totally incompetent to manage his own affairs", and his son was "also weak in intellect tho' not in the same degree as his father."[16] Consequently the management of the zamindari had fallen entirely into the hands of Madhava Singh, the raja's step-brother, "a shrewd, cunning and avaricious person, who was besides engaged in trade to a considerable extent."[17] This Madhava Singh had harassed Ganga Narain in various ways, even though the latter had a better claim to the Barabhum *gaddi* than Raja Ganga Govind according to the tribal custom.

In fact, the succession struggles had been continuing for about half a century, one important effect of which was that the tribal chieftains, who were alienated by the Company's over-riding of their succession customs, became aware that it was possible to defy the Company with some impunity. This was particularly true of Ganga Narain, who had a double grievance, over his father's death in prison and the harassing of his uncle, apart from their rejection of his own claims, despite the presentation of five or six petitions.[18] To take revenge upon his enemies he developed the closest contact with the tribal *sardars* and the Bhumij masses who helped him in various ways during the revolt of 1832-33.

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[11] Russell to Braddon, 11 May 1832, B.C. 1501/58887.

[12] Also see Braddon to Government, 28 May 1832, para. 4, *ibid.*

[13] According to a correspondent in the 50th N.I., these unjust decisions were a primary cause of the outbreak: *India Gazette*, 19 May 1832.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832, para. 6, B.C. 1501/58887.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *Ibid.*

Land is nearly always considered the basis of tribal society, and the original clearers of land have a permanent claim to it. The unfeeling and cruel attachment and sale of a debtor's property in land which he enforced was a rude shock to these "ignorant people, particularly attached to their lands."[19] They were ready to pay according to their means, but "they could not comprehend the justice which turned them out of house and land."[20] "The house and effects of the debtor were attached and advertised for sale on an appointed day, previous to which the claim was generally adjusted by the private transfer of a village or piece of land in satisfaction of the claims, and an urze [petition] was given into the moonsiff (through whom all these processes were executed) begging that the sale might be suspended as the claim had been settled."[21] Such adjustments could not long continue. The debtor reached the point where he had no more land to spare, and where he refused to sell further house-hold property. The *diwan* (Madhava Singh) took to other more degrading methods. In the case of the minor *sardar ghatwal* of Satrakhani Madhava Singh attached the house-hold property and the family-mansion at Gulargosi in the heart of Satrakhani and sold them in satisfaction of a decree against the minor's father. As little was realized by this, a second attachment in the same account was taken against other properties including the sardar's *thakurbari* (temple) and an idol of the God, which were all sold. When this case came before W. Dent as the judge of the Jungle Mahals, he cancelled the sale on the ground that it would "outrage the feelings of the ghatwals."[22] There was no doubt that the *diwan* did not care for the "feelings and prejudices"[23] of the tribal people. But if this extortion was halted there were others which did not come to the notice of the British authorities. Dent admitted in 1833, "Our law of debtor and creditor, severe perhaps in itself, was rendered doubly so when applied to these rude and ignorant people and Madhub Singh did not hesitate to avail himself to the utmost of the entire power it gave him over the property of his debtors in compelling payment."[24]

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[18] Vide petition, no. 3, Ganga Narain, enclosure, Braddon to Govt., 12 June 1832, B.C. 1501/58887.

[19] Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, para. 21, B.C. 1501/58886.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Dent to Govt., 4 Sept., 1833, para. 21, B.C. 1501/58886.

[22] *Ibid.*

In the beginning the local British officers assigned the cause of the unrest solely to the mutual enmity between Ganga Narain and Madhava Singh Diwan and the latter's unpopularity among the Bhumijes.[25] But eventually it was realized that the grievances were many. The *ghatwals,* in their petition, charged the Raja of Barabhum, the police officers, the *munsif* and the salt *daroga* with various acts of oppression.[26]

The Burdwan Commissioner thought that the *ghatwals* should have represented their grievances to the European authorities at Bankura who had never ignored their complaints: "I have no reason to believe that any complaints preferred by the Ghatwals did not receive from the European public functionaries that degree of attention to which they appeared to be entitled."[27] Dent, on the other hand, thought that had not the *diwan* and the raja been their chief oppressors, several minor abuses would have been kept within bounds.[28] But no one blamed the European authorities for leaving this undeveloped tribal area at the mercy of the non-tribal subordinate officers, tax-farmers and others. In fact, the encroachment by the administrative frontier in the form of regulations and taxes had jeopardized the very existence of the tribal society. Naturally enough, the reaction of the tribal peoples was so violent.

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[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.*, para. 11.

[25] Martin to Braddon, 5 June 1832, para. B-C. 1501/58887.

[26] Dent thought that the insurgents had a sanguine hope (after their partial success in the beginning and after the hasty withdrawal of the troops early in June 1832 with the commencement of the rains) that they could not be apprehended, and that they would eventually make terms with the authorities: Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, para. 18, B.C. 1501/58886.

[27] Braddon to Govt., 12 June 1832, para. 15, B.C. 1501/58887.

[28] Dent to Govt., 4 Sept. 1833, para. 23, B.C. 1501/58886.

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Final Triumph of the Dutch and end of the Portuguese domination in Malabar

BY

DR. T. I. POONEN, M.A., PH.D.

(continued from Vol. XLIII, Part I, April 1965)

Directions to Van Goens about the operations in Malabar

Van Goens was ordered, if he perceived no danger in front of Wingurla, to go down to Cochin with the entire fleet. It was hoped that by this the Portuguese would lose courage and that they would themselves surrender without storming becoming necessary. The Governor-General and Council considered it necessary that, after a successful landing, some ships from the front of Cochin should be sent back to Goa for preventing reinforcements being conveyed to that place. If the Portuguese did not immediately surrender, then the siege should be resumed with all force. After the town was captured Van Goens had to bring the military forces quickly to Cannanore where it was hoped no strong resistance would be offered. Through the capture of both these places the United East India Company would become master of the entire Malabar coast. For being able to command the trade in pepper and the production of wild cinnamon and to assure themselves of the loyalty of the Malabar princes, the High Government judged it useful, after dismantling the town of Cochin, to provide a small fort on the river side in the hope that the trade would make good the expenses. The Governor-General and Council cherished great expectations of the yield of the Cochin timber. Van Goens was commanded by the High College to practise the utmost economy in all his dealings and therefore the Governor-General and Council deemed that it was not desirable that Quilon and Cranganore should be provided with fortresses. Here it was sufficient only to establish a commercial factory unless Van Goens considered that at Cranganore the old citadel could be rebuilt into a lodge. A force of 20 or 30 men should be camped there as a garrison for the security of the Company's possessions as also to extend support to the Zamorin against the Portuguese and their partisans of whom divers persons were still remaining in those lands. It was in the interest of the United East India Company that the old enmity between the Zamorin and Cochin should be made up so that there might be peace in their lands. When the United East India Company became master of Cochin, they could direct that matter according to their wish and so manipulate that a firm agreement was made between the Zamorin and the adjacent princes. The model of such a draft treaty was given to Van Goens along with his instructions by his superiors. It was herein stipulated that the Zamorin remained in possession of the lands which were possessed by him from olden times with the understanding that the king of Cranganore obtained his old rights. The island of Vypeen should remain under the lordship of its then master, the Paliyatteer as vassal of the Zamorin while the Paliyatteer and his heirs should acknowledge the Company as their patron. The rulers of the lands of Chennote (Chennamangalam), Parur and Mangatti (Alangad) were required to maintain the treaties concluded with the Company and acknowledge both the Company and the Zamorin as their protectors. The King of Cochin obtained the lands of Anjikaimal, Castello de Sima and the land of Cochin to beyond Purakkad. The King of Purakkad was regarded in the treaty as subject of the King of Cochin. If he refused, he must be compelled to participate in the treaty. The already very old Queen of Cochin should, as long as she lived, remain in her old dignity.

Only to the United East India Company might the entire pepper and wild cinnamon be sold for a firm and fixed price. Of the wild cinnamon only as little as possible ought to be bought. The exportation of this cinnamon should be hindered as the cinnamon trade would only bring harm in connection with the Ceylon trade. The natives were more inclined to raise this cheap cinnamon although it was of less fine quality to buy than the Ceylonese cinnamon which fetched high price for the United East India Company.

The High Government hoped that if the Dutch granted to the princes an indemnity in the form of a sum paid as compensation they would indeed be found ready to cause the wild cinnamon in their land to be extirpated. If in those lands something else was grown, for example, if pepper was planted, this would not be otherwise than profitable to the United East India Company. The heavy burdens which this policy involved, the Company could not stand as the wild cinnamon was met with not only in the single region of Malabar but also grew in many other places in India. It was left to Van Goens' wise discretion how he should come to an agreement with the princes, i.e., whether he should conclude a treaty with them jointly or whether he should negotiate with each one separately. Especially Van Goens ought not to forget the king of Kayamkulam who, according to his experience, was, like the Queen of Quilon, tributary to the king of Travancore. In order to compel the princes to keep the treaties, it was necessary that at Cochin which should be the headquarters of the coast there should be appointed a competent Chief who might be authorised to take action to see that the good understanding with the princes was kept up. At Kayamkulam Reynier Van Serooskercken was still residing. Because of the very unfavourable report that Van Goens brought about him, and that especially in connection with the man's moral decline, he was dismissed by the High Government and Juriaen Hendrick Willingh was to replace him.

When the United East India Company was the master of the Malabar Coast, the High Government considered it necessary that Van Goens drove out from there all the Portuguese and their adherents so as to prevent all the intrigues of those people with the Indian princes and the native population. Only the native Christians could continue to remain there and enjoy freedom of worship. Perhaps they could indeed, in the long run, be brought to better understanding through polite treatment.

To the south of the river of Quilon, only native and no European clergyman could stay. So as not to disquiet too much the minds of the Indian people the Company should, on the advice of Van Goens, still tolerate European priests to the north of that river on condition that these priests took the oath of loyalty to the Company and conducted themselves as faithful subjects. To convert the natives to Calvinism the presence of a learned and gentle clergyman at Cochin was necessary. For this purpose the Governor-General and Councillors recommended Henricus Wallius. Two others should still follow.

For the timely capture of Cochin and Cannanore, the High Government wished to see the expedition proceeded. Van Goens must appear in front of Goa with the fleet. The capture of that place would however, be fraught with great difficulties as the town, especially on the sea coast, was very strong by reason of its citadels. The affair would be more promising if, at the time of Van Goens' appearance in front of Goa, some grandees of Bijapur supported the Dutch by besieging the town from the landside. Van Goens must make proposals in that direction covertly and promise to them a share of the plunder as they were avaricious griffins. An audience with the king at the court to discuss this question would cost much time and Van Goens was dissuaded from that. If Goa, however, had received considerable reinforcements, then the carrying out of these plans was not to be thought of. On an eventual capture of the town, that place must not be occupied with a garrison, but they were to plunder and burn it—also the forts and the sea coast. Afterwards, the Dutch could make over the town to the king of Bijapur on condition that no Portuguese or other Europeans would be permitted to live there, much less to build forts or fortresses. The High Government did not bother themselves about getting the consent of the king of Bijapur. He must also be contented with a portion of the booty.

To the capture of Diu, the Governor-General and Councillors, however, gave preference to that of Goa. If the Dutch captured this town, they ought to keep it in possession and be prepared for a siege. Also, Van Goens who feared very much the plans of the English strongly pressed for the capture of that town. It was to be hoped that the venture against Mozambique would also succeed. The other places which the Portuguese possessed on the coast such as Bassein and Chaul, were judged by the High Government as of less importance and would fall of themselves to the Company without much resistance. But those places must be made over to the Great Mughal on the same terms as Goa to the King of Bijapur. In either case the Company should reserve to themselves freedom from toll. The High Government cared most for the capture of these places where men must take all Portuguese as prisoners. It was impossible for the Dutch to transport all people on the Dutch ships and it was therefore decided that the women, children and old people—those who were not capable of bearing arms—should be left to land in the neighbourhood of Goa and only the men capable of bearing arms be kept as prisoners and, if any such place was surrendered by agreement, then the Dutch must trust the word of the Portuguese.

The Governor-General and Council commanded Van Goens that, as the enemy had received no auxiliary squadron and the Dutch ships in front of the coast could be dispensed with, these should again be sent back to Batavia. Also the native auxiliary troops, Mardijkers, Bandanese etc. were, as speedily as possible, to be sent back. Jacob Borchorst was appointed administrator of the expedition.

The High Government met the wish of Van Goens that the military charge should not be combined with that of the inspection of the factories as it was necessary that a man's whole time should be occupied with the war.

Before the departure of Van Goens, the friendship with the princes allied to the Company was strengthened, especially of those whose lands lay in the neighbourhood of the Malabar coast. Raja Singa received a complimentary letter. The Thevar was propitiated with an elephant.

Since the break up of the Dutch military forces in March 1662, the Portuguese at Cochin had obtained only a small relief of three frigates with people, money and necessaries just shortly before the arrival of Godske on the coast. A reinforcement of three naval boats sent to Cochin in May manned by 100 Portuguese and loaded with ammunition and money was forced to flee to a river of Canara. Here the vessels were distrained by the Naik. Only the people were allowed to go back to Goa. The Portuguese readily took revenge and sent a war fleet to the Naik's coast. For the time being, they decided to take in custody under them the goods and subjects of the Naik.

In Cochin the relief that had arrived meant however little in view of the great desertion that was daily taking place there. Indeed 100 tried Portuguese fled to the land. In their place the Portuguese obtained only weak inexperienced Topasses and natives who were partly still children.

Godske on the Malabar Coast

Some attempts of the Portuguese to drive the Dutch from Palliport after the departure of the Dutch fleet failed because of the undaunted conduct of the garrison left behind there. These speedily received the support of Godske who had meanwhile come to the coast with the ships *Beurs van Amsterdam*, *Vlieland* and *Meyboom*. A prosperous voyage had already brought Godske in the neighbourhood of Goa and Wingurla. The *Vlieland* was sent by Godske to Wingurla to gather information about the situation of the Portuguese and to acquaint the chief there of the forthcoming expedition. The native Kanarins whom Godske tried to persuade to take service with their vessels under the United East India Company showed little inclination thereto and did not wish to be used in dangerous places against the Portuguese. It took some days for the *Vlieland* to come back with the required information. On the 10th September Godske came with two ships in front of the river of Cranganore. They were joined on the 15th September by the *Vlieland*. This caused great joy to the Dutch left behind and also to the allied princes especially when they learned that a strong fleet further followed. These Malabarees had at first attached faith to the rumours spread by the Portuguese of an expected Portuguese-English squadron and were therefore very much afraid that the alliance concluded by them with the Dutch could not endure. Shortly before Godske's arrival, the Zamorin expired all of a sudden, probably poisoned at the instigation of one of the hereditary princes, the so-called 'old prince' who was regent for the almost mentally deficient successor. While the deceased Zamorin was a capable and clever man, his successor was not able even to use his tongue and limbs; half lame, he was not mentally fully developed and was a tool in the hands of the ambitious "old prince" who was much less well disposed to the Company than the deceased Zamorin. But even the latter had, after the departure of the Dutch, again been gained over to the side of the Portuguese and had declared that, as a fleet from Batavia did not appear quickly, he would himself withdraw to Calicut. He had begun already to blame the Dutch that they had brought him in that situation and this demonstrated how little reliance could be placed on him and his countrymen and what help the Dutch could expect in the case of a bad termination. Extraordinarily these ships, sent out from Batavia, now came at the opportune time and by this means the princes were again brought on the good path.

Because of the death of the Zamorin, Godske did not offer to the princes the letters which had been given to him from Batavia as in Malabar reigning kings could not accept letters addressed to their predecessors and in order not to provoke any jealousy the letters to the king of Cranganore and the Paliyatteer were kept undelivered. But this did not prevent Godske from urging those princes to send speedily auxiliary troops for the complete occupation of the island of Vypeen where to the northwards the Dutch already possessed in Palliport a fortress so that against the coming of the Dutch fleet they might be ready on the south side to attack the town of Cochin. But more with words than with deeds did the princes show themselves inclined to this.

As Godske considered his military forces sufficient for the conquest of the island, he decided not to delay any longer and with or without the help of the Zamorin to risk the attack. Through the occupation of Vypeen the Dutch had it in their power to cut off the supply of paddy to the town of Cochin. Of this produce Vypeen constituted the granary for Cochin. When the Dutch arrived, the crop was just ripe to be harvested.

Godske's campaign: Godske marched with nine of the best companies consisting of 573 men. Under the command of Verspreet there still remained behind 250 persons at Cranganore and 40 at Palliport. Godske did not meet with the least opposition on his way and after a march of two days the Dutch troops, on the 14th September, reached what was left of their camp during the previous expedition. In accordance with his promise the Paliyatteer sent 200 Nayars. After the Dutch had to press him many times, the Zamorin also appeared with some Nayars in the field but this prince had so few followers that it was a case of the Dutch having to protect him more than his lending help to them. In spite of his having seen the heavy work of the Dutch soldiers, he requested from these troops a hundred men as life guards — a request which caused great offence to the Dutch and which made them reckon him as an impudent person. They refused whereupon the Zamorin reduced his demand to fifty persons. The Dutch knew that this proceeding was the work of the Crown Prince who in this way hoped to be excused from having to summon more Nayars. When the Dutch refused to him this last request also, he complained of the huge camp expense for a matter which he considered of little importance, thus separating sharply the Company's interests and his from each other. And even a fairly dangerous situation wherein the Zamorin and his troops were affected did not bring him into more activity. Thus the Portuguese had observed with what weak military forces this prince had marched and as they did not dare to begin any action against the Dutch, they wished to drive the Zamorin to a tight corner. On a night, accompanied by 3000 Cochin Nayars, they attempted to land in seven frigates and reach the camp of the Zamorin who at that point of time and in that place could hardly be relieved by the Dutch. The Cochin Nayars, animated by the old hatred against the ruler of Calicut, wanted to kill him and they almost succeeded in this. A number of hostile Nayars penetrated into his sleeping apartment as the greatest portion of his Nayars was decoyed by a false alarm to another side of the army camp. The Zamorin, thanks to the darkness, managed to hide himself until he was relieved by his Nayars who put the Portuguese to flight. But in spite of the affront to the Zamorin this incident did not result in the reinforcement of the Zamorin's troops.

When they came opposite Cochin the Dutch noticed that the enemy had demolished all houses and buildings on the island opposite the town except the church Nossa Sra de Boa Esperance. Besides all the trees were cut in consequence of which a free field of fire was obtained and the Portuguese could keep off an approaching enemy in time and hinder their crossing over the river.

Immediately they directed a heavy fire against the Dutch. But this brought only little harm. The Dutch in their turn began immediately to strengthen themselves at the mouth of the river where they controlled the entrance and threw up an entrenchment for being protected against the enemy's cannonade as also against a surprise attack. The work was not easy as the necessary cocoanut trees had to be supplied from a much greater distance than at the first siege. But on the 24th September the entrenchment Nieuw Orange was provided with four points and a wall was put around it. Still closer to the mouth of the river under the protection of the entrenchment a battery with five pieces of heavy artillery was mounted. No ship could now sail up into the river or it must pass thirteen of such pieces. To protect the further point of the island towards the east the church Nossa Sra de Boa Esperance was made by the Dutch a fortress and occupied by three companies. From a battery on the most eastern point of the island the Dutch obstructed the access from Cochin to the inland water (Backwaters). Sometime later, because of the great distance, they put up half way between the entrenchment and the church, on the site of the demolished house of the Bishop, where the river was narrowest and the town was very near, a small fenced entrenchment which was occupied with one company. Especially in the night the patrolling sentry had now less peril of being attacked by the enemy. In this way was the town blockaded from Vypeen on the river side along the entire shore situated opposite while the Company's ships shut out the town from the sea side.

The Portuguese who had not expected that besides the three Dutch ships still others would follow were helped out of this erroneous opinion by two French deserters. With feverish haste they now tried to strengthen the town on the sea-side as they had already done on the landside immediately after the departure of the Dutch in the spring of 1662. Here the defence works of the town on the outside were increased with a palisade and trenches. The Dutch could not, to their regret, hinder these double reinforcements.

In order to prevent desertions in the Dutch camp which could not be limited to the two Frenchmen, the people were treated as well as possible so that they might not have any reason for entertaining bad thoughts. Instead of daily wages, they conjointly received, in addition to the daily quantity of arrack, a sum of 350 reals with which they were not only contented but showed themselves thankful.

Before the departure from Cranganore Godske had caused the yachts *Roode Leeuw* and *Kat* besides the sloops *Kaneeltak* and *Snoek* to be brought inside the river where they with the other ships must cruise round the enemy frigates which might try to come inside for the relief of Cochin. Yet a Portuguese ship managed to escape this blockade.

The *Vlieland,* after its return from Wingurla, was sent to Quilon to bring reinforcements of troops from there. Notice was to be given to the Signatty of the confirmation by the Governor-General and Council of the recently concluded contract under promise that the remaining 1000 reals would be paid to her and the cannon given back. But it appeared that the Queen, notwithstanding her contract with the Dutch, had not dismissed the Portuguese from her land. Probably she wished to delay doing this until the Dutch had captured Cochin and no danger from the Portuguese was any longer to be thought of.

How bad the position of the Portuguese in Cochin was and with what great shortage of people, money and ammunition they had to struggle became obvious to the Dutch from a letter dated 21st September from the Governor Ignatio Sermento to the Governor of Goa which fell into the hands of the Zamorin's Nayars and was delivered by them to the Dutch. Sermento wrote to his superiors that there were not sufficient troops present in the town for occupying all posts, that the supply of gunpowder had already been described and the money received with three frigates was wholly spent so that the soldiers could not any longer get their salary paid out. "What avail walls and bulwarks, if men and materials to defend them are missing?" Relief could not be counted on as almost all approaches to the town were in the hands of the Dutch while the coast was blockaded by the ships. Only with the land of the great Kymal (Ernakulam) past which the town obtained abundant supplies of provisions, communication still remained unintercepted. This ruler at the outset showed little inclination to give ear to the Company's wish to cut off this supply because he was afraid that the Portuguese, out of vengeance, would devastate his land, Anjikaimal. But in order not to make himself suspected by the Dutch and to show that he was not in communication with the Portuguese, this Malabaree magnate set out landwards to a place which could be reached only after a three days' journey and there awaited the arrival of the Dutch fleet and the landing of the Dutch troops. Indeed he could choose that party which gained the upper hand.

Arrival of Hustaert in Malabar

When Godske completed his activities in Vypeen, the war fleet under the command of Admiral Hustaert appeared in front of Cochin harbour on the 7th October after a voyage which was none too prosperous. It was fortunate that on the way they met no enemy galleons, for the Dutch ships were so heavily loaded with war material that with most of the vessels men could have found it impossible to make an attack.

On the very same day that Hustaert landed he called together the army council and laid before the members the proposal of an immediate storming of the town, the plan which the Governor-General and Councillors had, on the advice of Van Goens, commanded him to carry out, but none of the members agreed to this. Hustaert himself would have gladly followed Van Goens' advice as he feared that a formal siege would involve great trouble, time and expense, especially they must begin again in the same way as in the previous year. But he too had to yield to the view of the Council that storming would bring with it very great risk especially because of the extensive fortifications which the enemy had set up inside the town. With the storming of the walls they could not for a long time be masters of the town, but they would still have to deal with the heaviest fighting.

As no reinforcement from Portugal was expected in Goa, and much less could a squadron come from that town to Cochin for help, Hustaert believed that the order of the High Government to send a portion of his ships to the north for occupying the bar of Goa could be left unperformed. He very much needed the sailors for the siege. For the present Hustaert expected no meddling from the English, howevermuch the Portuguese Commander Sermento might therewith inspire his men with courage.

After Hustaert's soldiers were gone to land in the island of Vypeen, two possibilities presented themselves. They could first try to occupy the Papen island or they could risk a landing on the south side of Cochin for laying siege to the town from that side. The possession of Papen island would enable the Dutch to cut off all supplies through the inland waterways and this was necessary if the siege was to have any effect. Yet they gave the preference to the landing on the southern side; lack of vessels for being able to resist the eleven enemy frigates was the cause of this. Bad weather and the time that was spent for fetching the landing vessels made men postpone the landing for ten days. While there were left behind 150 soldiers at Cranganore, 180 in Vypeen and 168 at Quilon, the Captains Poolman and Schuylenberg got 268 soldiers from their garrisons to join the army. On the 28th October Hustaert landed with 1600 men about two (Dutch) miles south of the town. Because of the lack of vessels from the Madura coast the galliot *Parkiet*, the *Star* and *Cabo Jacques* were used for the landing. Six ensigns of the Portuguese and 2000 Nayars waited to hinder the Dutch from their landing. The Portuguese offered bitter opposition, but the Dutch managed to drive them to flight leaving behind 4 or 5 dead and 2 prisoners. From the Portuguese prisoners they learned that in the garrison in Cochin there were 17 companies of soldiers, each company consisting of 30 persons. With the companies of Topasses this should not be more than 600 persons, a small garrison for such a big town.

The Dutch pitched their camp at night in St. John's Church. They noted that the enemy had their defence works much stronger than in the previous year.

Cochin lies on a spit of land running into the sea bounded on the east and north-east by an outstretched sea, in the north by a channel by which the backwater is connected with the sea between the land spit and the island Vypeen. In the west is the sea. Portuguese Cochin made up a segment, about one-third portion of a circle of which the middlemost portion of the arch turned towards Vypeen while the chord was formed by a wall which ran almost from the north-east to the south-west and in this way separated Poruguese Cochin from native Cochin. In the south the chord of the sector ran not through the meeting place of the arc on the sea side and the sea but the incomplete arc and chord were connected by a wall turning to the landside of 1½ miles length. The entire circumference was about 7000 feet long. The Portuguese had to defend on the landside as well as on the seaside 1¼ miles including walls and bastions besides a considerable lake. During the interim period between the departure of the Dutch from the coast and their return the Portuguese had here also as in Vypeen pulled down all houses and cut down all cocoanut trees.

By chance Godske still found on the sea-coast close to the new Portuguese fortifications a trench of the previous siege which was immediately occupied by the Dutch and where men in spite of the enemy's heavy cannon fire managed to put up an entrenchment from which they could fire at the town even as they did at the northern side from Vypeen. The cannonade must have been so heavy that a breach was made and men could risk a storming. The church of St. Thomas just as the church of St. John standing outside the town was still left intact by the Portuguese. Therefore the Dutch decided to provide this church with defensive works and make it serve as quarters for the army.

In the old palace of the queen of Cochin the Portuguese protegee Godavarma who had entrenched himself in this building as in a fortress was staying. According to the indications of the Portuguese there was here an extensive fence built with six bulwarks wherein there was room enough to quarter 10,000 men. But with the landing of the Dutch this fortification was abandoned without any blow or shot and Godavarma and his Nayars took to flight to the joy of the Dutch who had already feared that Godavarma would try to hinder their siege works and they would be driven to the necessity of compelling him, by a regular siege, to surrender and be driven out, which would certainly not have happened so quietly as at the first capture of this palace.

Immediately, two companies were encamped in the palace and within the large fortification at which one thousand men must have laboured a small easily defensible fortress was made. Through the possession of the palace the Dutch had strengthened their control over the inland waterways.

In proportion to the large circumference of the town, it cost much trouble to the Dutch with the small number of their men to surround the town completely. Without the help of the sailors that task was utterly impossible. From a hunger blockade the Dutch expected little salvation. The enemy had large stocks of rice in the town, sufficient to enable them to hold out till the departure of the Dutch ships at the commencement of the monsoon. The most practicable means for compelling the Portuguese to surrender was a heavy bombardment of the town.

With tension, Hustaert awaited the arrival of Van Goens and the necessaries and men from Ceylon. Hustaert had the same complaints about the Malabar princes as Godske. They had come to greet him but in point of fact promised only to supply the army with provisions. The princes on the opposite side of the backwaters, those of Anjikaimal, Vadakkenkur and Tekkenkur still held aloof and awaited who would be conqueror. The rightful claimant of Cochin, the Moottatavazhi prince, had felt himself so little safe in Malabar after the departure of the Dutch in the spring of 1662 that he had fled to Mannar. There he was received hospitably by the Dutch. The place of abode of the old queen of Cochin was utterly unknown to the Company.

Van Goens arrives in Malabar

Even before Van Goens arrived in front of Cochin Godske took leave of Hustaert and his army and departed with the ship *Nieupoort* for Batavia. They could not persuade him to stay any longer as he desired so very much to be able to return to the fatherland with the returning ships. In front of Quilon Godske met Van Goens who had just arrived from Ceylon.

The two ships with which Van Goens departed from Batavia were separated from each other by cross currents. In consequence the *Zeepaard* on which the Admiral Van Goens was travelling in due course reached the coast of Ceylon to the south of Galle. Van Goens travelled overland to Colombo where the *Zeepaard* came to anchor on the 11th October. Only after a delay of 16 days could Van Goens go under sail to the Malabar coast where he found again the yacht *Maria* on the 5th November and met his favourite, Godske, in the *Nieupoort*. Even Van Goens could not persuade this man to stay on. Furnished with strong letters of recommendation to the Lords Seventeen from his powerful patron wherein Van Goens described Godske as the only person who could acquaint Their Right Worshipfuls on Ceylonese affairs, Godske proceeded on his voyage to Batavia.

With 400 old select soldiers and 500 lascars Van Goens came in front of Cochin. With full energy he set himself towards the task entrusted to him. The army was divided into three divisions under Van Goens, Hustaert and Dupon. Van Goens encamped at the outset in the Church of St. Thomas. Later, however, this church was transformed into a hospital. One of the first actions of Van Goens, after his arrival, was the summoning of his war Council and one of the first points for discussion was the security measures against a Portuguese attack from Goa. Therefore, they decided on sending at the outset to the bar of Goa seven ships which at the same time were to serve as convoy for the Cargo ships *Golden Flower* and *Achilles*. Men feared besides that as Goa had long remained unoccupied the enemy would equip one or two galleons for being sent to Portugal loaded with merchandise. The naval forces of the Portuguese in

Goa consisted still of 8 galleons and carracks, 5 to 6 pataches or galliots and 40 to 50 frigates. Not all these ships were sea-worthy nor had the Portuguese enough people to man them on sea. One of the carracks was kept by them in readiness to go to Portugal, but nevertheless, was not finally sent. Probably the news of the siege of Cochin had excited great commotion in Goa. Afraid that after Cochin the attack would be aimed at Goa, the Portuguese strengthened this town formidably, and in particular the citadels situated in front of it. A blockade of Goa, should it happen, would obstruct further relief in front of Cochin and protect the Company's merchantmen from an enemy attack.

Further, before Van Goens arrived in the camp of Hustaert, he had already made plans for the capture of Diu. Especially as they could not immediately storm Cochin, he judged it unserviceable to leave the entire naval forces idle in front of Cochin during the probably long lasting siege. These were, however, plans made before he himself examined the actual situation. Then it became clear that the sending away of the blockading ships must be postponed till after the storming which they had planned to risk after a heavy bombarding as all batteries were brought in readiness. For the storming as well as for the siegeworks it was impossible to miss the sailors and the gunners for operating on the artillery; over and above that, the departure of so large a portion of the squadron would make an entirely bad impression on friend and foe and would make the Dutch soldiers lose their courage.

A direct storming of Cochin, Van Goens had provisionally to renounce because of the unthought of strong situation. The siege works on the southside of the town meanwhile progressed well. Near the beach halfway to St. John's Church which had been fitted up as a magazine the Dutch threw up a fence or entrenchment. In front of this were placed, one after the other, two batteries from where men, with six pieces of artillery, could fire at the church Nossa Sra de Gratia, a very high building which protruded far above the fortification work and formed an easy target and also at the bulwark of the same name. Also, in front of the next bulwark, St. Lasaro situated at about the middle of the southern wall there was a battery almost completed. Finally, a quarter was put up near the river side. Since the arrival of Van Goens, these activities were continued at full speed.

As the Portuguese had caused all trees and houses that in the previous year stood erect about the town to be pulled down, the Dutch had to approach the town in full sight of the enemy. Continually the Portuguese fired at the Dutch and it did not appear that for the time being they had any shortage of gunpowder. The making of the trenches under the heavy cannon fire of the enemy was a perilous and bloody work whereby several soldiers lost their lives. The lascars and the Canarins (Konkannis) could only be used for activities behind the positions for the dragging of palisades, of cannon etc. as they appeared to be entirely unsuitable for digging work.

From the bulwark St. Lasaro to the river the land was so marshy that men almost could not make trenches of a proper depth; besides, they were hindered by the roots and stumps of the trees which the Portuguese had chopped off. Still worse was this when the heavy continuous rain during the last half of December made the work almost impossible. The trenches were, to a certain extent, unserviceable. The soldiers who stood continuously in the salt water again suffered very much from beri-beri. Extra reward must keep their courage animated and prevent the troops from getting faint hearted. Finally on the south side, the town was completely enclosed by a trench across a length of 2500 feet from the beach to the river (backwaters).

(*To be concluded*)

The Secret understanding between Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang and Mahārāja Ajīt Singh (June-July 1709)

BY

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Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān Fīrūz Jang, father of Chin Qulich Khān (later Niẓām-ul-Mulk), was the acknowledged leader of the Tūrānī group of nobles at the Mughal Court, till his death on 8th December, 1710. This group took no part in the war of succession of 1707 A.D., but as the new Emperor Bahādur Shāh was not favourably inclined towards Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān, he was transferred from the Government of Berār to *Sūbah* Gujerāt where he was likely to be less dangerous.[1] It is a known fact that there existed feelings of rivalry and animosity between the Tūrāni and the Īrānī groups of nobles, the leading personalities of the latter being Wakīl-i-Mutlaq Asad Khān and his son Zulfiqār Khān, the *Mīr Bakshī.*[2] It is believed that Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān and the other Tūrānīs did not favour Bahādur Shāh's policy of concessions towards the Rājputs who had risen against the Mughal Government and advocated a stern policy towards them.[3] Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān's secret pact with the Rājpūts in 1709 A.D., therefore comes as a surprise. The circumstances which brought about it are briefly indicated below.

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[1] For Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān's career, his relations with Bahādur Shāh, refer to *Maāsir-ul-Umarā* (Bib. Ind.), Vol. I, pp. 587-592, *Maāṣir-i-Ālamgīrī* (Bib. Ind.), pp. 462, 464; W. Irvine, *Later Mughals,* Vol. I, pp. 3, 38, 39, 125, 269-270.

[2] For a detailed account of beginning of group rivalry at the Mughal Court, refer to Dr. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court,* 1959, pp. 1-10 (hereafter abbreviated as *Parties and Politics*). His analysis regarding the character of the groups being not racial differs from that of Mr. Irvine. (See *Later Mughals,* Vol. I, pp. 272-73).

[3] *Safinah-i-Khushgu,* (O.P.L.) f. 158b, quoted in *Parties and Politics,* p. 28.

It is well known that Bahādur Shāh, soon after his accession ordered (July, 1707) that Amber and Jodhpur should be taken into *Khālisah*.[4] The rulers of these states—Sawāi Jai Singh and Ajit Singh, patiently negotiated with the Imperialists for the restoration of their *watans*, but finding no intention on the part of the Emperor to do so, they abruptly broke off (30th April, 1708) from the Imperial army then proceeding towards the Deccan, and came to Udaipur.[5] The three premier states of Rājpūtānā now formed a concert (May-June, 1708) with the specific object of defying the Mughal authority and of driving out the Mughals from Amber and Jodhpur. They decided to continue the hostilities till the orders for the resumption of their patrimonies were withdrawn.[6] Thus commenced the Rājpūt rising of 1708 A.D. which lasted for about two years.

Here only a very brief account of the rising will be relevant. In July 1708, the armies of the Rājpūt concert easily expelled the Mughals from Jodhpur, and the following month they recovered Amber also.[7] In Oct-Nov. 1708, they inflicted a serious blow on the Mughal military position and prestige in Ajmer *Subāh* by defeating a large Mughal army near Sambhar, killing the *faujdārs* of Mewāt, Merta and Nārnol.[8] The Rājpūt rulers also sent armies towards Delhi and Agra, established military outposts at Rewārī and Narnol, and Ajit Singh besieged Ajmer for a fortnight and forced Shujaāt Khān, the provincial governor, to pay Rs. 80,000 as *peshkash*.[9] By any standard, the success achieved by the Rājpūts was brilliant, and not limited in nature.

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[4] Jai Singh to Rānā Amar Singh, letter dated 22 July, 1707, Jaipur State Archives (hereafter abbreviated as *JSA*) *Akhbārāt* of 17 Shaban, 7 Zilhijjah 1119 H, *JSA;* Khafi Khān, *Munta Khab-ul-Lubāb*, (Bib. Ind.), pp. 605-06.

[5] Shyāmal Dās, *Vīr Vinōd*, p. 769; *Later Mughals,* Vol. I, p. 49.

[6] For a detailed account of Rājpūt deliberations at Udaipur, refer *Vīr Vinōd*, pp. 769-772.

[7] *Akhbārāt*, 14 August, 1708, *JSA; Vīr Vinōd*, pp. 774-5; *Later Mughals,* Vol. I, p. 69.

[8] *Akhbārāt,* 12 Nov.—18 Nov. 1708, *JSA; Arzadāsht* of Jagjīwandās Panchōlī to Jai Singh, Dec. 1708, *JSA.*

[9] *Akhbārāt*, 30 March, 1709, *JSA*. But it does not mention *peshkash* levied by Ajit Singh. For the *peshkash*, see G. H. Ojha, *Jōdhpur Rājya Kī Itihās,* Vol. II, p. 546; *Jōdhpur Kī Khyāt,* Vol. II, p. 94.

Meanwhile negotiations for a settlement between the two parties were also in progress.[10] After such procrastination, the Mughals agreed (July, 1707) to restore to the two Rajahs their *watans,* but on the condition that they would evacuate Sāmbhar, and Ajīt Singh and Jai Singh accepted postings at Kābul and Ahmedābād respectively.[11]

It was at this stage that Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān came in the picture. Knowing that the Rājpūts would demur in accepting even the above mentioned offer, the Imperialists, it seems, decided to bring pressure upon them by announcing (June-July, 1709) the appointment of Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān as *Sūbahdār* of Ajmer province.[12] The Khān was a well-known commander and administrator, and his appointment was likely to bring the Rajpūts in a reasonable mood to negotiate with the Mughal Government. As Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān and the other Tūrānīs were believed to be in favour of a stern policy towards the Rājpūts, it was expected that they would act with greater vigour in supressing the rising.[13] But the truth was, that Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān was in secret correspondence with Ajīt Singh, and being inimically disposed towards the Emperor and the Īrānī group, entertained friendly feelings towards the Rājpūts, and had even committed himself not to undertake any campaign against them. The following extracts from a letter[14] sent by Ajīt Singh to Sawāi Jai Singh on 11 July, 1709 make it abundantly clear.

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[10] For earlier offers of the Mughals, see Jai Singh to Mahārānā Amar Singh, letter dated 22 Dec. 1708, *JSA; Arzadāsht* of Jagjīwandās to Jai Singh Dec. 1708, *JSA.*

[11] Copy of Jai Singh's letter to Rānā Amar Singh, 27 July, 1709, *JSA.*

[12] *Akhbārāt* 21st and 23rd *Rabi* I, 1121 H. *JSA.* *Akhbār* of 27 *Rabi* I informs that the Emperor allowed Ghāzi-ud-din Khān to accept two horses sent by Ajīt Singh as present, which the Khān had refused till Emperor's assent had been obtained! Dr. Satish Chandra on the basis of Kanwar Khān's *Tazkirat-us-Salātin-i-Chughtāi* (Lucknow Ms., 93b) and *Akhbarāt* says that Firūz Jang was made absentee Governor of Ajmer *Subāh* on April 12, 1708, dismissed shortly afterwards and reappointed on June 15 (*Parties and Politics,* p. 36, fn. 47) If it was so then it means that there was likelihood of Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān again being sent to Rājpūtānā in May-June 1709, as Ajīt's letter used in this paper is of July 11, 1709. Obviously, his first appointment of July 12, 1708 had no connection with the Rājpūt rising which flared up more than a month afterwards. cf. Yusuf Hussain, *Nizām-ul-Mulk Āsaf Jāh I,* 1936, pp. 38-39.

[13] *Parties and Politics,* pp. 28, 36.

> "..... Received Your Highness's letter. Learnt the news. Your Highness had sent copies of Nabāb's (Asad Khān) letters which were duly received. Your Highness has written that Nabāb is pressing to accept postings at Kābul and Ahmedābād, and to raise *thānās* from Sāmbhar and Dīdwānā, and that Nabāb says "If the postings are accepted and *thānās* raised I will sign *Qabūlnāmā* (promising restoration of the *watans*)". When your letter to this purport arrived, that very time I received the report of my *Wakīl* at the Emperor's camp, which informed that two *farmāns* addressed to us have been despatched, which will soon reach Nabāb Āsaf-ud-Daulāh (Asad Khān). Then I thought that both these news (i.e. Asad Khān's offer conveyed to Sawāi Jai Singh and the news of the two *farmāns* with as yet unknown contents) are mysterious. If it is really so (i.e. a ruse), then no doubt Emperor etc., are *thugs*. In their stand they are steadfast, about other proposals (made by the Rājpūts) they have reservations. Then I thought that as *farmāns* are on the way, so let us see what Nabāb now writes. That is why I delayed in writing to you."

Ajīt Singh further wrote that soon after he received two letters from Asad Khān in which he had repeated the same terms for the restoration of *watans*. Ajīt also asked Sawāi Jai Singh to send a copy of the *farmān* which he would receive, and promised to send a copy of the *farmān* on way to him (Ajīt Singh). Continuing Ajīt Singh wrote "After going through these it will be clear whether the Emperor is restoring *watan* or not. And if he writes for postings at Kābul and Ahmedābād, in that case we should say that we shall accept postings together; distant postings we shall never accept.[15] In case restoration of *watans* is postponed, then their motives will be exposed. Thereafter whatever decision is taken, we will not delay in implementing it, for the Emperor is advancing (towards this side).[16] So it is better to get prepared before he arrives. That is why I write to Your Highness to obtain the *farmān* at the earliest. After receiving the *farmān*, I will communicate to you our view (regarding the steps to be taken to meet the situation).

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[14] Ajīt Singh to Sawāi Jai Singh, letter dated 11. July, 1709, *JSA*. This important letter gives much new information regarding Rājput—Mughal negotiations not given in the Persian histories, and should help in forming a more correct idea of Rājpūt demands and their position vis-à-vis the Mughals, than that based mainly on the Persian sources.

"Your Highness has written about Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān. So from here a reliable man was sent to the Nabāb (Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān). He has returned after holding negotiations (with him). From (his) talks it appeared that he is with us. But then who can say about the wiles of the Mughals. Whatever may be the case, Your Highness should not worry on account of Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān. Save the Emperor or Prince (?) none (dares) come against me, and if at all Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān is coming then if God helps, he will meet the same fate as the Saiyids[17] (killed near Sāmbhar in Oct-Nov. 1708). And I again remind Your Highness about the *farmān*. If the *farmān* mentions restoration of our *watans*, it is well; if it is not mentioned then there is no use (in accepting Mughal terms). We shall remain prepared and give them a hot welcome! In all the letters received till now from Ahmedābād, Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān always wrote to send a reliable man to him. So from here I had sent Bhāi Raghunāth. With him the Nabāb has sent lotus and rōtī (wheaten cake) and the message. "It is my *"kaul"* (promise) that (if) the Emperor orders me to proceed against the two Rājās, then I shall resign from the *mansab*, rather than accept to go against them, and I shall spare no effort in writing (recommending) to the Emperor about both the Rājās". And with Bhāi Raghunāth, Nabāb has sent from his side Khōjā Beroz. With him he has sent presents listed as follows:

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[15] In May-June, 1710, when hostilities came to an end, the Imperialists quietly accepted Ajīt's demand for the cancellation of postings at Kābul and Ahmedābād.

[16] By Jan. 1709, Bahādur Shāh was free from the affair of Kām Baksh. By the middle of June, 1709, he had reached Aurangābād on his return march from Deccan (*Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 67).

[17] It will be noted that far from being panicky, the Rājpūts were in a confident mood and fully determined not to stop hostilities till their demand for the restoration of their *watans* was accepted by the Mughal Government, without any pre-conditions.

From Nabāb Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān—
1 *Katār* Jewelled, 8 *Thāns* of cloth.
From Nabāb Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān's son (Chin Qulich Khān)-
1 Sword Plain, 7 *Thāns* of cloth..."

This important letter which shows that the Tūrānī nobles were in secret league with the Rājpūts contains the earliest known mention of the use of lotus and wheaten cake in dealings of political nature, and, fortunately, the purpose for which these were sent by Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān is clear. This should be of some help in understanding the real meaning of the mysterious *chapātīs* circulated in large numbers at the time of the outbreak of 1857, which occurrence has baffled all attempts to explain it. Some regarded the dissemination of the *chapātīs* (as a signal for the uprising, and for prompting people to prepare themselves for the coming crisis. Some believed that these were charms for spreading the revolt. Some held that these were propitiatory observance to avert some calamity or to ward off illness. Many people believed that the *chapātīs* were circulated by the English to pollute the religion of the people, while some thought that these warned about the coming danger to their caste and religion. The *chapātīs* were also taken to be an invitation to all people to unite for some secret object afterwards to be disclosed. There was yet another view that these had originated in some vow, and those who partook of the *chapātīs* were pledged to obey any order which they might receive at any time.[18] In fact different people interpreted the circulation of the *chapātīs* differently and it still remains an "insoluble mystery" like similar distribution of sugar before the mutiny of the Coast Army in 1800, or of coconuts in Central India in 1818, or of a branch of the Sāl tree before the Santhāl rebellion.[19]

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[18] For the different views about the meaning and origin of the *Chapātīs* refer to Kaye, *A History of the Sepoy War in India* (1857-58), Vol. I, pp. 566, 570-72, 631-638, 647; Thornhill, *The Personal Adventures and experiences of a Magistrate during the Rise, Progress and Suppression of the Indian Mutiny*, 1884, pp. 2-3; Malleson, *History of Indian Mutiny*, 1907, Vol. IV, pp. 63, 280, 292, 340-41; R. C. Majumdar, *Sepoy Mutiny*, 1963, pp. 76, 338 ff, 366 ff, 375; S. N. Sen, *Eighteen Fifty-seven*, 1958, pp. 398-401.

But it is obvious that the lotus and chapātī sent by Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān to Ajīt Singh in 1709 could not be a signal for an uprising or charms for spreading the revolt, for the rising was already widespread in Rājpūtānā. It may be noted that Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān had sent lotus and *rōtī* (*Chapātī*) while conveying his vow, to imply that his vow was inviolable and that, henceforth, both the parties were bound by a solemn oath of secrecy and performance of promise, sanctified by lotus regarded by the Hindūs as holy and pure, and also by grain which is sacred to all. The view that the *chapātīs* circulated in 1857 had originated in some vow, then, seems to be correct, though it is also true that their meaning and the purpose were differently understood by different people at that time, and afterwards also.

The letter of Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān also conclusively proves that whatever was his outward policy he entertained friendly feelings towards Rājpūts who had risen against Emperor Bahādur Shāh. This fact necessitates a change in our present notions about the attitude of the Tūrānī group towards the Rājpūts. Ghāzi-ud-dīn's hostility towards the Emperor and the Īrānī group of nobles drew him towards Ajīt Singh and Sawāi Jai Singh, and to the former he even sent lotus and *chapātī* solemnly binding himself not to undertake any campaign against the Rājpūts. Besides exposing the raging conflict among the Mughal nobility at that time the letter also provides an instance of Rājpūt diplomacy at work in the eighteenth century.

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[19] Kaye, *op.cit.*, p. 638 fn.

Gwalior under the Mutineers

BY

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By the beginning of 1858, when the mutiny in Central India was coming to an end, the news of the capture of Gwalior by the mutineers under the bold leadership of Tatya Topee and Ranee of Jhansi came as "a sad disappointment" for many of the British Generals and Administrators. Gwalior remained under the rule of the mutineers only upto 19th June, 1858, and in this paper, an attempt has been made to describe the day-to-day activities of these people.

Tatya Topee, after the defeat at Koonch, went secretly to Gwalior to align with himself the Maratha troops of Maharaja Scindia. Neither the Maharaja of Gwalior nor his people had expected that after their complete defeat at Kalpee in May, 1858, the mutineers would ever "try a move upon Gwalior." However, according to the reports, it has been found that the mutineers held their "first Council after the rout at Kalpee and resolved to proceed to Sheshghur, but before they separated a letter was received and handed round to the great satisfaction of all, when they resolved to go to Gwalior and moved to Indoorkee."[1]

After completing the arrangements at Gwalior, Tatya Topee had gone back to meet other leaders at Gopalpur. By 31st of May, the mutineers were in a position to launch an attack on Gwalior. Actual fighting between the mutineers and the Maharaja Scindia took place early in the morning of 1st June, 1858, when by the order of the Maharaja, "guns were placed in position and the first shot was fired. Seeing the heavy fire from the guns, the mutineers' troops began to fly."[2] At this critical stage, a speech by Rao Sahib and the Rani of Jhansi put a new vigour into the flying troops. Rao Sahib and the Jhansi Rani harangued the troops, "You always begin to fly when the time to fight comes. Where shall we go if our own servants get us beaten? We are determined to die here, let those who are also so determined, come with us, but let those otherwise disposed go away." On this, the Bareilly and Banda Nawabas said "we will die with you."[3] The speech had its desired effect and the troops were divided into three bodies. Two were detached to the right and left and one was sent in the centre and by a simultaneous attack, the guns of the Maharaja Scindia were taken. "His Highness, the Maharaja, finding himself unable to resist them and deserted by his troops fled to Agra. The whole of his force joined the rebels. Dinkar Rao, the Prime Minister of Maharaja Scindia, also went away and the armed men at Phoolbagh seeing the defeat, plundered all the property under their guards."[4]

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[1] Gwalior Residency letter book from 3rd June 1858, to 1st December 1858.

[2] Gwalior Residency File No. 1261/1858.

The Rao Sahib, Tatya Topee and the Rani of Jhansi entered the city in triumph and declared Nana as Peshwa. About evening the mutineers' authority was established in the whole town. Immediately orders were issued by Rao Sahib that "no ryots should be plundered."[5] Ameer Chand Bantia, the Treasurer of Maharaja Scindia was sent for and asked "to pay some money as no plunder was committed in the town. He apparently pleaded his inability to do so. Measures were taken to guard the town at night."[6] Rao Sahib had assumed the real authority and had been declared as the deputy of Nana Sahib Peshwa. On 2nd June, 1858, in the morning, Tatya Topee along with Ram Rao Govind went to the Kotwali and ordered it to be "proclaimed by the beat of a tom-tom that anybody who might have plundered must bring the property back to the Kotwali, which being duly claimed and recognised by the owner shall be returned to him." Another notice was issued to "the effect that nobody should be sorry or afraid as the Rao Sahib will give no trouble to anyone. Ameer Chand Bantia was again called by Rao Sahib and asked to supply money and this the Banker promised to do."[7]

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[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*

It is an admitted fact that the mutineers had no inclination to hold Gwalior for ever, their simple motive was to bring Scindia into the vortex of the mutiny, which he had refused to join. On the 2nd June, Rao Sahib sent a letter to Her Highness the Baiza Baee begging of her to return assuring her that the rebels did not wish to remain long at Gwalior.

"Tatya Topee ordered all the troops to be assured that they will receive two months' pay and three months' more as reward."[8]

The fort of Gwalior which was still under the troops of the Maharaja was vacated by Baldev Singh on 3rd June, 1858, and Tatya Topee sent 1,000 Teleganas and Villaytes with guns to hold it. The bodyguards (of the Maharaja of Gwalior) were sent for and required to give up horses and other Government property they might have, and receive pay. Persons in want of employment paid their respect to the revolutionaries.

"On the 3rd June, 1858, the Ranee of Jhansi went to see the palace and having seen it all round returned to Phoolbagh. The Rao Sahib inspected the camps, the magazine, the mistrekhana, encouraging everybody, and having placed another guard over the treasury, came back."[9]

The mutineers during their stay in Gwalior paid particular attention to its safety. On 3rd June, 1858, "Gulab Singh was detached to watch all the Chambal Ghats and to allow no British troops to cross."[10] In fact upto this day, the mutineers had been busy with the management of affairs at Gwalior and their greatest anxiety was to safeguard it against any attack from the British side as far as possible. It was on the fourth of June, 1858, that the real organisation of the temporary Government was formed. On this date "Tatya Topee was appointed Bukshee of all the forces, Ram Rao Govind was put in command of the Sepoys. Two Maulvees were nominated to the adaulat at the Kotwali, 2 companies were sent to guard the palace in addition to Rao Sahib's Regiment already there. A salute of 33 guns was fired from the Fort. The body-guards were told not to be sorry and assured

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8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*

that pay and reward will be issued to them to-morrow. The striking of clocks was resumed by order."[11]

The military arrangements continued even on the fifth of June, 1858 when the "body-guards together with infantry and band were ordered to attend the parade." They were told "that anybody who prefers to join them must say so or deny if he does not. Tatya Topee then came and took the officers with him from the Tinsee to the Campoo giving them orders to the above effect. The son of Moolecdhur Chindhree got clothes of honor and was ordered to watch all the Ghats and Nakas, he gave every assurance of fidelity and said he could from his country collect 25000 troops. He applied for a Regiment of horse and one of foot and some guns to stop the Indoorkee Ghats. Bholaram Jamadar was ordered to employ 200 runners and to supply correct intelligence."[12] On the 6th June, 1858 Rao Sahib "took money from Ameer Chand Rantia and ordered five months' pay to be issued to all the troops. He released also all the "Rangurors" (or Rajput Takurs) who were in jail and having given them clothes of honor appointed them to the several "Nakas" or posts to watch. "The Pultuns and the body-guards received the pay first and the rest of the troops were paid on the 7th June, 1858, another letter was sent to Baiza Baee."[13]

On the 8th June, 1858, "a deputation came from Her Highness Baiza Baee. They were received in Moolajees' house and it was settled that Pandurang Baba be despatched to the Maharaja to bring his answer." Next day "the deputies of Her Highness Baiza Baee were told that if Her Highness wanted to take possession of Gwalior, she must come and do so within a week; after that they would do what they liked."[14] Some of the letters of Moonshi Ganshi Lall, the Superintendent of Jingee (Duttiah) also throw some light on the activities of the mutineers in Gwalior. Moonshi Ganshi Lall had employed his agents to report on the affairs of Gwalior. One of his agents, Moonshi Tota Ram, was arrested by the mutineers. His letter of 13th June, 1858, gives a fairly good picture about the personal side of many of the leaders of the Mutiny. He writes that on 9th June, 1858, "A Durbar was held; the officers and noblemen in the service of Baiza Baee Sahib asked Rao Sahib to take as much money, and as many troops and guns as he wanted and to leave the place, after which they will come and occupy it. Rao Sahib's answer to this was that he would decide the matter next day.

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[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*

"Rao Sahib lives in the Baee's or Scindia's Palace and at night sleeps in the camp. Tatya Topee lives in a house in the camp and is zealous in making warlike preparations... Sometimes she (the Ranee of Jhansee) puts on "Saree and Choole," and at others, she ties a Roomal round her head, after the fashion of the Pathans. Dewan Dinkar Rao's house together with his property has been made over to the Nawab of Banda, who has placed his guards over it, and will personally occupy it in a day or two. In the same manner the houses of other nobles of Gwalior are being set apart for the several rebel chiefs. Bhola Hurkara who had been confined for life by Maharaja Scindia has been released by Rao Sahib's order and 500 Harkaras having been appointed, he has been made Jamedar of that. All the business of the Dawk is carried on through him."[15]

Most elaborate military precautions were taken on 10th June, 1858 to safeguard the approaches to Gwalior. "Two regiments of infantry and 12 guns were ordered to the Indoorkee Ghats. Those servants of Maharaja Scindia, who are present in Gwalior got their former situation, and places of those who have run away are supplied by others. The people of Gwalior daily leave for villages. The nobility have gone off in general, but none is allowed to take with him property worth a farthing (Anyone who wanted to leave Gwalior was allowed to do so under a special permit system which the mutineers' government had introduced)."[16] And the mutineers had made the following arrangements to check the infiltration of undesirable people in Gwalior. "They had posted 1000 sowars and 100 footmen in the direction of Antree and 200 sowars and 400 footmen on the side of Noorbad, guns were placed on all the surrounding hillocks."[17]

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[15] Foreign Secret Consultations, 27th August, 1858, Nos. 75-77.

[16] Original Telegrams sent to Mr. W. A. Reade, quoted in History of Freedom Movement, Uttar Pradesh, Vol. III.

Though Tatya Topee was in charge of all the military arrangements that were being made in Gwalior, the other leaders were also not oblivious of the fact that the British forces were gathering around Gwalior from all sides; therefore every leader inspected personally that the arrangements were properly made. Thus we find that on 12th June, 1858 "Ranee of Jhansi went to Morar and saw that the body-guards and the gunners had run away. She therefore sent a reprimand to Tatya Topee, saying how will this end, and he ran to Morar and found the troops had actually fled, other troops were therefore sent to Morar."[18]

Though the mutineers were busy with military affairs still other functions were not totally neglected. On 12th June, 1858, "Rao Sahib celebrated the Dussehra in honour of the Ganges in the palace and gave dinner to 1000 Brahmins, who were to receive an anna each as donation. The mutineers had also employed a number of agents to report on the movements of the British soldiers and Rs. 50 was offered as reward to anybody bringing intelligence of the British."[19]

On the 13th June, 1858, the mutineers had full knowledge that "the British troops were coming from all sides, that some had reached Choppra. News was received from Buddha that the British forces were pushing on and that nothing could stop them. Troops were therefore dispatched against them but many of them fled, a notice was issued offering 500 Rupees reward to anybody bringing 500 men for service or more according to the assistance given."[20] The mutineers' Government used to deal very harshly with the persons who were suspected of being British agents and on 14th June, 1858, "three men were hanged for having written news to the British, their letters were caught and they were therefore shot, other people, about 20, were also caught on similar grounds."[21] On the 15th June, 1858, "the horses belonging to the body-guards were distributed among the rebel troops. The shops were opened under assurance of protection. Bhola was ordered to stop his Dak. Two Christian women and a boy with others were brought as prisoners. The Jhansi Ranee asked them who they were and where they resided, which all being written down, they were sent to the Kotwali; Rao Sahib, however, ordered them to be released, and to be sent away out of Gwalior limits by giving them something for expenses."[22] By the 15th June, 1858, the British troops had arrived at Seppoolee and on 16th June, "about 8 A.M. a fight took place between the British troops and the rebel pickets at Budeeguri and a little ahead of Morar, and the Rao Sahib repaired thither to oppose them." But by evening the news had been brought by the Sepoys that the "British had occupied Morar." The fighting continued on the 17th June, and the records give the news about the death of Rani of Jhansi. "About 8 A.M. the combatants met at the Canal, about noon the Europeans advanced, the Jhansee Ranee was killed on the Campoo, the battle lasted till evening in which the rebels fired many volleys and the Europeans went up the hills. The rebels returned having burnt the corpses of the Jhansi Ranee and another woman (Moondir) who had fallen with her."[23]

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[17] Gwalior Residency File No. 1261/1858.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*

By 18th of June, 1858, the mutineers had realised that it was not possible for them to continue to hold Gwalior for a long time against the advancing British armies. Rao Sahib along with the troops had gathered at Mama's garden. "The Banda and the Bareilly Nawabs and other officers entreated the Rao Sahib and threw their turbans at his feet begging of him not to leave Gwalior, a place like which they will find nowhere, but the Rao Sahib told them that they were in the habit of running away everywhere and being defeated, that he could not depend upon them and therefore could no longer fight."[24] However, before leaving Gwalior, the mutineers fought the last battle on the 19th June, 1858, but by afternoon, "the Europeans took the magazine, the Jinsee and the palace. The British officers gave assurance of protection to the subjects and said they would see their Maharaja back again on the Gudee. Some troops encamped on the Phoolbagh plain. Anybody who opposed the Europeans was killed."[25]

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[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*

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On the 20th June, 1858, "the Maharaja Scindia attended by the Governor-General's agents for Central India and Sir Hugh Rose, and escorted by British troops, was restored to the place of ancestors;[26] with the recapture of Gwalior, one chapter of the mutiny in Central India was closed and a new chapter now opened with Tatya Topee taking to guerilla warfare.

This is in brief the account of the activities of the mutineers during their stay in Gwalior.

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[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Forrest "Selection from State papers", Vol. IV.

Revenue Administration of Nagpur State under the British Management (1818-1830)

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Prologue

The Third Maratha War (1817-18) was followed by the deposition of Appa Sahib. After that, the British recognised a minor prince of the Bhonsla family, Raghuji III, as the Raja of the Nagpur Kingdom; and the British Resident Sir Richard Jenkins, carried on the administration of the state during the minority of the Raja. During the period of British superintendence, the administration of the kingdom which had become grossly slack and inefficient on account of the disturbances of war was reformed and reorganised.

The purpose of this paper is to study a chapter of local history which marks the period of transition from the system of indigenous administration to that set up by the British when they annexed the Nagpur Kingdom in 1854.

Introduction

The British did not introduce any radical innovation in the administration of revenue, and retained in its broad and essential features, the system prevailing under the Bhonsla rule. Their avowed aim was to remove abuses and introduce "maxims of regularity, economy and purity into the administration", rather than to devise a new system of their own. Many abuses had crept into the Bhonsla administration, particularly after 1792. Matters were aggravated as a result of the disastrous war of 1803, so that a system which had once brought prosperity to the country began to weigh heavily upon the peasantry. The oppressive assessments, imposition of *pattis,* extortion of presents and incorrect anticipation of the revenue were only some of the evils afflicting the country.

"The first objects" therefore "to which the attention of every Superintendent was called were to distribute the country.... into more convenient portions; to appoint the most respectable of the revenue officers of the old Government to the situation of *Kamarisdar;* to pay them according to the size and revenue of their divisions, to put a stop to their former illicit gains, to oblige them to reside in their districts....in short, in all the offices of revenue which were in the appointment of the Government to introduce maxims of regularity, economy and purity into the administration."[1]

Jenkins says that "little or no change in the establishments of the *Pargana* revenue officers was introduced." Their duties and emoluments may thus be described.

The *Kamavisdar* was the highest authority in all departments in the *Pargana.* His duties in the administration of revenue were very important. He collected revenue according to the instalments prescribed by the Superintendent, relative to each village, and furnished to him "detailed monthly accounts of receipts and disbursements." The surplus amount in hand was sent by the *Kamavisdar* to the *Sadar* treasury or to some of the subordinate treasuries in the district which were established by the Superintendents to facilitate the transmission of revenue from a distance. When the last instalment had been collected, the *Kamavisdar* prepared his accounts and submitted a list of amounts which were outstanding with recommendations that they might be held over till his accounts had been examined. The amounts outstanding, were remitted or realised according to circumstances of each case. The *kamavisdar* was expected to acquaint himself with the circumstances of the *Patels* in his *Pargana* and with the state of cultivation in it. It was his duty to ensure that the accounts of the *Wararpandes* were regularly kept and that the general abstracts of the *lagans* of each village, which were required by the Superintendent for the purpose of making assessments were according to the actual collections of the *Patels.* To ascertain this, the *Kamavisdar* was required to visit all the villages personally and communicate with the raiyats. He was paid a monthly salary of 80 to 100 rupees according to the size of the *Pargana*. The duty of the *Phadnis* was the same as under the Bhonsla rule, and to him were forwarded the accounts of receipts and disbursements of the *Pargana*. He received 25 rupees as his monthly pay, together with one rupee on each village and one rupee on all orders proceeding for his office.

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[1] Jenkins' Report, 1827, p. 96

The work of the *Wararpande* substantially increased during the period of British management. The assessments were made by the British with reference to the *lagan* or rent roll. The *Wararpande* had, therefore, to ascertain the correctness of the rent-rolls, by going to each village as soon as the sowing was over and verify the correctness of the entries by communicating with the raiyats and village servants. He collected the *lagans* (rent-rolls) of all the villages and sent copies of it to the Superintendent, while keeping with himself the necessary material from which he prepared the *Sadhnuk* i.e. the general abstract of the *lagans* of each village.

The British created the office of *Peshkar* to serve as a check on *Phadnis*—the former maintained another set of accounts. He supervised the office in the absence of the *Phadnis*, and also prepared population returns, a statement of price, current in the *pargana* and reported all extraordinary happenings to the Superintendent.

The *Potdar's* duty was to examine all the money received into the Superintendent's treasury. He received one rupee annually from each village and was required to replace such bad coins as bore the mark of his examination.

The *Pandhripande* kept the *Pandhri* and *Kalali* (excise duty on liquor) accounts of the *Kasba* to which he was attached.

Supervision by the Superintendent

Though *Patels* were left a free hand *vis-a-vis* the raiyats, they were subject to the general control of the Resident. The *Kamavisdars* and *Patels* were forbidden to superimpose or realise new *pattis* on any account whatsoever and they were directed to enter the existing ones in the *lagans* or rent-rolls. Disobedience of this rule was punishable with fine.

The raiyats were warned against meeting unauthorised demands and were sometimes penalised for complying with them. The *Patels* were enjoined to adhere to the agreements made with the *Kisans* and any *Patel* who was found to be depriving a *kisan* of his field to which he was entitled, was punished, and the field was restored to the *kisan*.

The *kisans* were equally required to fulfil their part of the engagement, and pay the assessment agreed upon. Little or no interference was made in the work of *Patel* who was at liberty to let the land in any way he chose. The Superintendent intervened only in such cases in which the raiyats complained of the violation of agreement. But the attitude of the *Patel* towards the raiyats was generally marked by justice and was seldom vexatious, unless motivated by the desire of getting rid of a bad character and seeing him out of the village.

Jenkins has given an account of the proceedings of the Superintendents in carrying out the settlements of their different districts. As the conditions prevailing in them differed, it would be convenient to consider them districtwise.

Deogarh below the Ghats of Nagpur

Two methods were adopted for the settlement. According to the first, the gross assessment of the *Pargana* was settled with the *Patels* and the details adjusted afterwards, while according to the second, the settlement was made with individual *Patels* for each village without the prior fixation of the *pargana* rate. There were 23 *parganas* in the district, of which 15 were settled according to the first and 8 according to the second mode.

The first mode was more expeditious than the second. The threat of measurements and a strict examination of the condition of the land induced the *patels* to accept the terms offered. When the assessment on the whole *pargana* had been agreed to by the *Patels*, villagewise, distribution was adjusted by the *pargana* officers in the presence of the Superintendent, assisted by the principal *Patels* and the staff of the Superintendent's office. The amount of rent payable by the *Patels* having been settled, they gave to the Superintendent a *'Kabuliatnama'* or an acknowledgment of their consent, and received in return a *'Kaulnama',* specifying the terms of the lease and other particulars. The *Patels* also received a document signed by the Superintendent specifying the amount of instalments and indicating the time for their payment.

The second mode of settlement which was carried out separately with each village was more tedious. It involved a very close examination of the fields, the degree of their productivity and the amount of their assessment in the past years. It was found necessary sometimes to measure the field and leave a village unassessed till a *Patel* was found to undertake collections. When this arduous process was over, '*Kaulnamas*' were given to the *Patels* and the business of settlement concluded. The *Patels* were allowed a free hand, but were desired to be moderate in their demands as the best means of bringing their lands under cultivation.

Settlement of other dues

The settlement made with the *Patels* included a cess of four rupees on each plough, the *Kalali*,[2] *pandhri*,[3] *zamindari* and all other petty dues pertaining to their respective villages. Other items of extra revenue, for which no specific engagements were concluded, were the *Siwai*,[4] *Jama*, *kalali* of the *kasbas* and *palasuti* villages. On these, the first two were the special preserve of the Raja.

Khasgi and other kinds of villages

The *Khasgi* villages[5] were formerly under a separate management, seed being provided to them by the Raja. But in 1818, they were incorporated with the *parganas*, and brought under the general administration of the country in charge of the *Kamavisdars*, who now supplied seed to them from the Government stores. Many *Khasgi* villages were depopulated, because in the event of failure of crops, so far as the distribution of seeds went, the *pargana* villages were given preference with the result that lands in the *khasgi* villages remained uncultivated.

[2] Excise duty on liquor.

[3] A local tax levied on non-agricultural classes.

[4] Assessment made on miscellaneous income as from forest, fisheries, etc.

[5] Crown lands.

The *mukasa*[6] villages were held by military chiefs, ministers and other high officials. Many of these suffered as a result of plunder to which they were subjected by such chiefs as fled the country after the war of 1817-18. They fell into such a state of decay that it was difficult to find *Patels* prepared to assume responsibility for them. The *palasuti* villages had been without *Patels* for years, having been abandoned by their former occupants owing to the pressure of assessments and other causes.

To attract *Patels* to such villages, special terms were offered to them, and in some districts and villages which were in a very bad state, the leases were extended to four years and in case of deserted villages, leases for five and six years were granted.

Effect of settlements

The *parganas* which were settled by the Superintendents with out the mediation of *Patels* improved sooner than thouse in which they were allowed to have a hand. It was found that the *Patels* had exerted themselves to secure comparatively lighter assessments for themselves and their friends at the expense of others. The result of the unequal pressure was that many *Patels* in Berar were obliged to give up their villages, and many of them suffered so much that it became necessary to grant them some remissions. This was not due to over-assessment, but was the result of the endeavours of the *Patels* to make up the sum required and to hold their own lands at a reduced rate. The fall in the prices of grain added further to the difficulty of the situation.[7]

An account of the settlements effected

Settlements for the year 1818 and 1819 were made for one year only, for reasons to be explained in the following lines:—

For the year 1818

Captain Gordon who was in charge of the settlements of this district spared no pains to ascertain "the general amount of the collections, disbursement and balances for the year 1227" *Fasli* i.e.

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[6] A portion of land or village assigned to an individual, either rent-free or at a low quit rent, on condition of service, or for service rendered.

[7] Jenkin's Report 1827, p. 103.

1817 A.D. This being known, he proceeded with the settlement of the year 1818 which was carried out on the basis of the previous years' settlement. From enquiries it was ascertained that the *jama* for the year 1817 had been fixed at 19,58,142 rupees, but further investigation revealed that part of it was "a mere nominal revenue."[8]

Heavy additional assessment was imposed on the country after the ruinous war of 1803 and was continued upto 1808, when it was found that the impoverished districts could hardly stand the heavy demands made upon them. Captain Gordon, therefore, selected some of the districts upon which demands pressed with the greatest weight, and they were leased out at a reduced value, but with the same nominal assessment. The difference between the reduced value and nominal assessment was deducted from the *jama* of 1817 from which the rent of lands which had fallen out of cultivation in 1817 was further deducted. The resultant amount of 17,02,702 rupees was, thus, fixed as the assessment for the year 1818.[9]

But the effects of the war of 1817, heavy rains and consequent famine reduced the collection of the above amount impracticable. To relieve distress, it was found necessary to remit the amount of 1,05,390 rupees, thus reducing the amount collected to 15,97,332 rupees.[10]

The operation of similar adverse conditions bore even worse results in 1229 *Fasli* or 1819 A.D. necessitating the grant of remissions, further reducing the amount of actual collections.[11]

Settlement for longer terms

The experience of the years 1818 and 1819 and the improved condition of the *parganas* rendered possible the introduction of settlements for longer terms. The step was also deemed to be necessary for establishing confidence in the stability of the existing order of things.[12] The Resident, therefore, sanctioned the grant-ing of leases for three years. In order to make a success of the new arrangement, detailed investigations were carried out in the *parganas,* the accounts and assessments for the year 1818 being carefully scrutinised. The data supplied by the settlement of 1819 were similarly examined and thus the paying capacity of the country ascertained. The actual conditions being thus ascertained, the assessment was regulated "to a considerable extent with reference to the *jama* exhibited in these accounts."[13] The leases for 1820, 1821 and 1822 were granted for three years.

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 100.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

The fall in the prices of produce necessitated reversion to annual settlement in 1823 and 1824, though, in some particular instances, leases extending to three years were also granted. The *parganas* the leases of which expired in 1824 were granted settlements of one and two years.

Conclusion

From the statistical tables provided by Jenkins, we can safely infer that during the period of British management, a large number of villages which had been deserted, depopulated or otherwise uncultivated, regained their prosperity. The collection of revenue improved and the peasantry enjoyed a life of comparative peace which had been periodically disturbed in the past as a result of wars and visitations of the Pindaris.

Year	Number of fields in cultivation	Revenue realised	Price of grain per *Khandi** *Wheat*	*Juar*	Remarks
1229	86927	13,99,788	20/3/4	16/1/4	
1230	92684	14,94,372	11/-/-	10/-/-	
1231	99276	15,74,501	9/11/9	6/13/-	
1232	101329	16,29,534	7/11/10	6/-/-	
1233	102981	16,22,066	7/14/-	7/7/11	
1234	109588	16,24,518	7/3/9	4/1/6	
1235	—	16,46,607	3/14/6	2/9/-	Somewhat too low

[13] *Ibid.*

* 2½ maunds.

The above table exhibits at a glance the number of fields cultivated, the amount of revenue realised and the average price of the two principal articles of produce from *Fasli* 1229 to *Fasli* 1235.[14]

Wengaga District

A large portion of this district was held by Zamindars. The plains to the east of the Wengaga river were fully cultivated, with the exception of such portions as were left out for pasturage. To the west of the river, extensive lands were left waste, probably, as a result of oppressive exactions in the past.

The district was divided into 13 *parganas*, and the establishment for collection of revenue was the same as in Deogarh.

Captain Wilkinson who was in charge of the district concluded a triennial settlement for the year 1230, 1231 and 1232 *Fasli.* The settlement operations were preceded by similar detailed investigations as have been described above in the case of Deogarh.

The care with which the state demand was fixed, bearing in mind the taxable capacity of the villages together with the establishment of order and stability, enhanced the amount of revenue collected from year to year. It is amply evident from the figures adduced by Jenkins in his report which he presented to the Supreme Government in 1827.[15]

Chanda

This district was subdivided into 10 *parganas.* The country was in a flourishing state before the war of 1803 and yielded considerable revenue. Cloth manufactured in this region found market outside the Nagpur state and was exported to Bombay and Arabia.[16] But the produce commerce as well as the population of Chanda declined on account of disturbances, rebellion and general disorders during which the district was mercilessly sacked and many villages depopulated. Famine and epidemics hastened the decline of this district with the consequent falling off in the amount of collections.

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 107.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

The revenue system of Chanda was similar to that of Deogarh and the operations of the Superintendent, Captain Crawford, were preceded by investigations and enquiries which have already been noticed in the case of Deogarh. For the years 1228 and 1229 *Fasli*, annual settlements were concluded. Thereafter the Superintendent concluded triennial settlements for the years 1230; 1231 and 1232 *Fasli*. These arrangements worked well and the amount of revenue increased. But for this, Captain Crawford made settlements for 5 years which resulted in considerably reducing the revenue collections. This had been done by the Superintendent "acting on a misconception of authority vested in him", and though Jenkins did not approve of it, he did not disturb the arrangement as the faith of the Government had been pledged for its observance.

The *Patels* received 15 per cent on all villages yielding above 700 rupees and 13 per cent on those yielding a smaller sum. The administrative establishment was the same as in Deogarh.

Deogarh above the ghats, Chhindwara

This district had suffered from the effects of the ravages of the Gonds, excessive assessments and disorders of Appa Sahib's reign. The low prices of the product affected this tract more adversely owing to the general poverty of the *Patels*, and the revenue settlement was influenced by that adopted in the Company's acquired districts which surrounded it on three sides. Nevertheless, steps were taken to improve the situation and thus a foundation was laid for the enhancement of the revenue in future.

The revenue system was modelled on that of Deogarh below the Ghats, described above, without any innovation. For the years 1228 and 1229, (*Fasli*) annual settlements were made and trienniel leases were granted for 1230, 1231 and 1232 (*Fasli*). After that, leases for one or two years were granted. The amount of revenue collected in any year for 1228 to 1234 (*Fasli*) did not equal the average of that realised during the decade preceding the period of British occupation, but it is possible to find improvement from year to year.[17]

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

Chhattisgarh

The revenue arrangements of Chhattisgarh were built upon the system prevalent in that region before the advent of the British superintendence. All that the British officers did in this regard was to reorganise it and make it more effective.

The *pattis* (surcharge) of the latest introduction were abolished, the payment of *'kists'* (instalments) was fixed at periods favourable to the raiyat, and the payments were directed to be made to *Gontias* (village headmen). All unauthorised perquisites were done away with and the salaries of revenue officials fixed.

The duties of *Patels* and *Gontias* were laid down and their emoluments settled. The details of agreements entered into between the *Gontias* and raiyats were put on record.

As in Deogarh, the Superintendent of Chhattisgarh, Colonel Agnew, started enquiries into the state of collections of the past years in order to fix the assessments in the different *parganas.* But no satisfactory information could be obtained on account of the imperfect state of the records. In the absence, therefore, of precedents for his guidance Colonel Agnew based his decisions on circumstances of a general nature. He fixed the amount of *pargana* assessment and obtained the consent of the *Patels* and *Gontias* whom he assembled at the *Kasba* (village). The work of assessing the different villages was left to the *Kamavisdars* and in case of opposition the matter was referred for decision to the Superintendent. When the settlements were complete, proclamations specifying the amount to be paid by each village were issued in order to avoid undue exactions.

The settlements were made only for one year as the migratory habits of the people and the general poverty of the *Gontias* prevented settlement being concluded for longer periods.[18]

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[18] "It was my wish to have concluded a three years settlement in Chhattisgarh as in other parts of the Raja's dominions, but Major Agnew thinks annual settlements as yet necessary. The chief grounds of this opinion, he states, to be extraordinary variety in all statistical points between different parganas ... which with undoubted habits of the Ryots to migrate from place to place, renders it indispensable that every Statistical account

Colonel Agnew has given a detailed list of officials whose role in the organisation of village economy was of considerable importance. They were, broadly speaking, the counterparts of those who performed similar functions in Deogarh below the Ghats.[19]

Conclusion

Thus we find that the British did not establish any new system in the revenue administration of the Nagpur state during the period of their superintendence, both in view of the instructions of the Governor-General and the need for eventual transfer of the administration to the Raja's government. Moreover, the Maratha administration was carefully adapted to the needs of the people, and changes of a fundamental character were not warranted in a system which had so long stood the test of time. The country had prospered and the land revenue attained its just maximum.[20] This state of affairs continued from the establishment of the Bhonsla Raj upto 1792 when evils of misrule, excessive exactions and other corrupt practices began to show themselves. In the beginning of this period, oppressive assessments were not carried to excess; but in the period following the war of 1803 increased assessment became a permanent feature of the revenue administration. The loss of Cuttack and Berar had reduced the revenues of Raghuji II who "strove to raise the revenue of his remaining territory to make up, in some measure, for his losses in the war."[21] The weight of assessment having increased, the Government resorted to extraordinary methods of taking "large nazzars and advances of rents from the Kamavisdars, which they received with interest by bargains or extraordinary imposts on the *Patels*, who levied in their turns as much as they could from the ryots."[22] While this course was generally pursued in the districts near the capital, the more

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to be correct should be recent in date and narrowed in locality; in consequence of the fallaciousness of general results to any practical purpose and the general poverty and fluctuating state of the country". Nagpur Residency and Secretariat Records, Case File No. 1 of 1821—Revenue Department; Letter from Jenkins to Hastings, dated 15th June 1821.

[19] Agnew's Report, 1820.

[20] Jenkins' Report, 1827, p. 96.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.*

distant ones were given in jagir to the military chiefs, in augmented estimates of their revenue, for the payment of troops. The disturbances following the death of Raghuji II and the war of 1817-18 completed the story of agrarian distress which the officers appointed by the Resident sought to remove. This was done by reverting "to the regular principles of the ancient system", and "without introducing any innovations in it." The old system thus reorganised and revitalised survived the period of British management and held the field till the annexation of Nagpur state by the British.

Later days of Nana Saheb of Bithur

BY

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Little is known of the activities of Nana Saheb of Bithur after the mutiny of 1857. This fiery patriot has passed into the annals of our land as a strange though fascinating figure. Recounting the last days of Nana as a man frustrated and insane, Percival Landon remarked: "This perhaps all we shall ever know of the later days of Nana Saheb."[1]

Nana Saheb, *alias* Dhandu Pant was a Marathi Brahman, the second son of Madho Rao Bhao Bhat. He was adopted by the last Peshwa, Baji Rao, who after his forced retirement by the British settled down at Bithur with a pension of £80,000 a year. In 1851, Nana Saheb inherited his entire property, without however the pension.[2]

The last battle in which Nana Saheb was decidedly present was of 6 December 1857, after which he left *via* Bithur to collect his family and property for a destination unknown. He took along with him some English ladies, 17 bandmen, and a daughter of the Collector of Kanpur.[3] He was joined by Hazrat Mahal, the Begam of Oudh and her 9-year-old son Brijis Kadir in Tarai and reached Sonagaon.[4] The English ladies became all the more dominant cause for the hot chase of Nana by the British Government. In the course of this flight the two English ladies were done to death after the battle of Butwal with Col. Kelly.[5] The news about the English ladies was communicated to the Prime Minister, Nepal. He at once ordered Col. Siddhaman Singh to proceed to the rebel camp and recover the ladies.[6] He was able to trace a Bugler, Allen and his mother[7] and expressed his satisfaction after the search of the rebel camps that there were no English ladies with them.[8] He, however, could not contact Nana Saheb.

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[1] Percival Landon—*Under the Sun—The later days of Nana Saheb*—288.

[2] *Ibid.*, 275-76.

[3] T. D. Forsyth Secretary Chief Commissioner Oudh to Cecil Beadon Secretary Government of India, dated 13 May 1859, Foreign Political, 3 June 1859, No. 401-4, F.P. 19 August 1859, 189-190.

[4] Chief Commissioner, Oudh, to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, dated 9 January 1859, F.P. 15 July 1859, No. 413E.

On the information of the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, the Governor General instructed him that no troops should cross the Nepal border unless they were attacked from the other side because of the larger question of maintaining the territorial integrity of the independent state.[9]

Soon after reaching Sonagaon Begam Hazrat Mahal received a letter from Jung Bahadur, dated 26 Jan. 1859, in which he had asked the rebels to proceed to Chitwan. Begam, in reply to the above, had expressed her hope of receiving co-operation from Nepal. This letter was written under the signature of Brijis Kadir and was dated 1st February 1859. Nana acknowledged this letter of Jung Bahadur to Begam, dated 2nd February 1859 and sealed his letter by the seal of Baji Rao Peshwa, in which he also expressed the hope for co-operation, and deputed Bala Rao, his younger brother, for explaining every particular in detail.[10] It appears that a meeting between Nana and Jung Bahadur took place at Chitwan, but what transpired between them is not known. Immediately after this, the role of Jung Bahadur became very peculiar.

Jung Bahadur, the then Prime Minister of Nepal, played a very peculiar role between the British Government and the leaders of the mutiny. He told the British Government that he was ignorant about the presence of Nana Saheb in Nepal, and at the same time he advised Begam Hazrat Mahal to fight the British.[11] He tried to negotiate the terms of surrender of the rebel leaders and also facilitated the escape of Nana Saheb. As far as the surrender of Nana was concerned, it was made known to the Maharaja of Nepal by the Governor-General in his letter dated 7th January 1859, that, "No promise of mercy can be given to the Nana."[12] It was made clear that, "it is the fixed purpose of the Government that Bala Rao shall upon submission, be brought to trial and that he will be dealt with according to the part which he may be proved to have taken."[13] Similar was the rule for all others. To facilitate the escape of Nana Saheb, Jung Bahadur announced his death. But this conduct of duplicity was known to Resident Lt. Col. G. Ramsay, who remarked that "It is impossible to believe that Jung Bahadur really credits the statements he makes to me."[14] Because of this peculiar conduct of Jung Bahadur, Ramsay wrote to Cecil Beadon, Secretary of the Government that, "if the communication be permitted (with Nana and his family) we can have no security that the Nana himself and other leaders whose persons the Gorkhas profess to be ignorant of—may not come up into the hills in the garb of attendants or disguised as Fakirs in which later case, they could easily pass on to Muktinath or some other place of Hindu pilgrimage and like Appa Saheb, the deposed Raja of Nagpore might elude all attempts to trace them for many years to come."[15]

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[5] Col. Ramsay, Resident in Nepal to Cecil Beadon, Secretary, Government of India dated 4 July 1859. F.P. 15 July 1859—239-40.

[6] *Ibid.*, F. P. No. 228-29, dated 15 July 1859.

[7] *Ibid.*, F.P. No. 230-32A, dated 15 July 1859.

[8] *Ibid.*, F.P. No. 236-38, dated 15 July 1859.

[9] Chief Commissioner, Oudh to Secretary, Foreign Department, dated 19 January 1859. F.C. No. 413E, dated 15 July 1859.

[10] Capt. C. H. Byris, Assistant Resident, Nepal to Mr. Simson, Under-Secretary, Government of India, dated 14 Feb. 1859. F.P. No. 540-44 Supplement dated 30 Dec. 1859.

In spite of several exchanges of letters Nana could secure no assistance from Nepal but on the contrary was told that he would not be allowed to remain long in the country. After this announcement the leader Khuda Buksh started collecting army for fighting the British in June 1859.[16] It was reported by the Military Headquarters that Nana had issued a proclamation to the effect that the rebels were not to surrender or give themselves up to the British, that as soon as the season would admit they would again be led against the British and receive regular pay. The breaking up of the rains was named as the period when hostilities and pay would re-commence.[17]

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[11] Resident, Nepal, to Secretary Beadon, dated 15 September 1859. F.P. No. 204-6, dated 30 September 1859.

[12] F.P. 8 July 1859, No. 247.

[13] Foreign Secretary to Resident, Nepal, dated 8 July 1859. F.P. 15 July 1859, No. 233.

[14] Resident, Nepal, to Secretary, Government of India, dated 6 August 1859, F.P. 19 August 1859, No. 189-90.

[15] *Ibid.*, dated 12 July 1859, F. P., 22 July 1859, No. 210-11.

[16] *Ibid.*, dated 21 July 1859, F. P., 5 August 1859, No. 266-67.

But in the meanwhile an epidemic broke out in the rebel camp[18] and most of his trusted followers died. Raja Devi Bux of Gonda died on 13th July 1859,[19] Bala Rao died on 29th July 1859.[20] Khuda Buksh died,[21] Hurdut Suwaee, the Raja of Eundee and Mummoo Khan were reported ill, Nana himself was very ill.[22] Azeem Ulla also was reported dead,[23] but his death was doubtful, because Percival Landon reported that Azeem Ulla went along with Sakha Ram, father-in-law of Nana Saheb to Nepal to meet his daughter Krishna Bai.[24] Under these confused conditions Jang Bahadur announced the death of Nana Saheb, and soon it was universally believed that Nana Saheb had died in 1859.

After the announcement of the death of Nana Saheb, Jung Bahadur made an engagement with the ladies Maina Bai, Saie Bai, Krishna Bai, Kashi Bai and Begam Hazrat Mahal to the following effect, "We do hereby bind ourselves not to speak anything or to write any paper which may tend to cause disturbance in the British Provinces, nor will we entertain any new servants in our service, but we will keep only those who have accompanied us to this place . . . . "[25]

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[17] Extract from Military Department, F. P., dated 16 Sept., 1859, No. 109.

[18] Col. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, dated 6 July 1859, F. P., 15 July 1859, No. 214.

[19] *Ibid.*, 26 July 1859, F. P., 19 Aug. 1859, No. 185.

[20] F. P., B. Part September 1861, No. 469-70. Petition of Nanak Chand,

[21] Col. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, dated 25 Aug. 1859, F. P., 23 Sept. 1859, No. 244.

[22] F. P., B Part September 1861, No. 469-70. Petition of Nanak Chand.

[23] Col. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon 21 July 1859, F. P., 5 August, 1859, No. 226-27.

[24] Percival Landon — *Under the Sun,* 283.

[25] Col. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon 9 July 1860, F. P., A Part July 1860, No. 265-66.

Let us now examine the truth about the death of Nana and the ignorance of Jung Bahadur of his presence in Nepal. Jung Bahadur announced the death of Nana Saheb on the authority of some villagers, who had seen a burning corpse in the vicinity where Nana was living.[26] Nanak Chand reported that Nana died at 2 P.M. on 26th September 1859 at Devyankpore.[27] Another source says that he died on 24th September 1859.[28] Primarily the announcement of Jung Bahadur had no basis, because none had seen Nana's body burning. The corpse which was burning might have been of somebody else and secondly, the reported dates of death of Nana Saheb are contradictory. Nana was alive when Jung Bahadur went to Tarai to expel the rebels on 15th November 1859[29] and this view was supported by Ganga Prasad, a zamindar of Butwal Teraie, who reported to the Havaldar of the Residency that Nana was in the neighbourhood of Butwal.[30] The enquiry of Col. Ramsay supported the existence of Nana in Nepal after the announcement of his death. On the 20th September 1861, Col. Ramsay wrote to Secretary Cecil Beadon that he had "fair presumptive evidence of the Nana's existence" and continued: "I confess that it confirms in my mind the very strong conviction I have always had that the Nana's death at the time it was alleged to have occurred was given out to favour his escape and to aid in his concealment in the Nepalese territory, ... from frequent and positive assurance of Jung Bahadur that he knew he would die, which led us to anticipate the announcement of the event."[31] Jung Bahadur himself told Dr. Oldfield, the Residency Surgeon, that "I admit that I have some doubt in my own mind whether he is really dead."[32] If Jung Bahadur was ignorant of the presence of Nana in Nepal, what was the necessity of ordering a Fakir not to speak anything which he knew about Nana Saheb?[33]

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[26] Col. Ramsay to H. M. Durand, dated 23 Nov. 1861, F. P. A., Dec. 1861, No. 17-18.

[27] Petition of Nanak Chand, dated 23 June 1861 F. P., B. Sept. 1861, No. 469-70.

[28] Col. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, dated 20 Sept. 1861, F. P., A. Oct. 1861, No. 33-34.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] Col. Ramsay to H. M. Durand, dated 4 Nov. 1859, F. P., A. Nov. 1861, No. 81.

[31] F. P. A. October 1861, No. 33-34.

[32] Col. Ramsay to H. M. Durand, dated 23 Nov. 1861, F. P. A., Dec. 1861, No. 17-18.

Nana Saheb wandered in Nepal from 1859 to 1861. He went to Sonagaon and thence to Chitwan. He was present along with Hurdut Suwaee, the Raja of Bondee on the Hills of Deopur in Deokuree with 9,000 Nuserabad troops.[34] Later his presence was reported near Dhokul Thapa.[35] After the illness Nana Saheb was present at Doongurgaon with his three to four hundred sepoys, in the garb of Fakir early in 1861.[36] On this flight he had maintained contact with other leaders and had communications with emissaries of Kashmir.[37] Towards the end of 1861 he was present beyond Muktinath near Tibet.[38] While in Nepal he deposited jewellery and cash with Jung Bahadur and had obtained two documents about it.[39]

While in Nepal Nana was dreaming of taking back the freedom of the country, and he availed himself of the first opportunity which came to him. It seems that Nana was maintaining contacts with Firoze Shah. The fruit-seller of Kabul, one Ghunee Khan who was arrested in Nepal, stated that he had a letter for Nana from Firoze Shah, but he destroyed it on the way for fear of arrest.[40] Nana was maintaining contact also with his home country. About 15th or 16th Dec. 1861, Jung Bahadur bade farewell to Nana Saheb from his country. Col. Ramsay reported that Jung Bahadur "will pass close to the place where I suppose the Nana to be now lurking."

Central Asia (i.e., Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan) was in a state of rebellion against its nominal Chinese masters in 1862-77.[41] Nana

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[33] Col. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, dated 20 Sept. 1861, F. P. A., Oct. 1861, No. 33-34.

[34] Extract from Military Department, F. P., 16 Sept. 1859, No. 109.

[35] Col. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, dated 12 July 1859, F. P., 22 July 1859, No. 210-11; *Ibid.*, dated 2 July 1859, F. P., 15 July 1859, No 36-38.

[36] Col. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, 20 Sept. 1861, F. P. A., Oct. 1861, No. 33-34.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] Foreign Secret, No. 107, Feb. 1878.

[39] F. P., March 1863, No. 232-33.

[40] Col. Ramsay to H. M. Durand, dated 23 Nov. 1861, F. P. A., Dec. 1861, No. 17-18.

[41] Owen Lattimore — *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, 181.

Saheb tried to make fortune out of this discontent. It is hard to say by which route he went to Khotan. The most frequented route was from Kailash to Gartok, Leh, Karakoram Pass, Shahidulla Khoja and then to Ilchi, the capital of Khotan. He must have followed this route because he was in communication with the emissaries of Kashmir, and in Kashmir there was no British officer before 1865. Dr. Cayley was appointed officer on special duty at Leh in 1866. Thus sometime in 1862, Nana Saheb reached Ilchi the capital of Khotan.[42]

Nana Saheb, along with two of his lieutenants, reached Ilchi in the garb of a monkey charmer.[43] Hardly before he reached Ilchi, he became the commander of the Infantry belonging to the Khan Badshah of Khotan, Habibulla Khan, in the name of Mohamad Ali. Mr. Johnson of the Trigonometrical Survey of India who crossed into Khotan sometime about 20 Sept. 1865, paints this Indian hero in such a graphic manner that it leaves no room for doubt about his identity and presence. Johnson says, "I have a strong impression that this man is the celebrated Nana of Bithur. His present name is Mohamad Ali, but I was informed that he is a Hindu and has merely assumed a Mohamedan name as no Hindus are allowed to remain in this country."[44] Nana was in close friendship with a Hindu merchant of Shikarpoor and was well disposed towards people from Kabul. At Khotan he used to provide meals for his 300 soldiers in batches. At the same time the presence of Firoze Shah was also reported in Khotan.[45]

In 1862 Firoze Shah was in Persia and its neighbourhood.[46] It was reported that Firoze Shah was to march with some forces from Bokhara. There must have been some link between Nana and Firoze Shah, as one was to march from West and the other was commanding an infantry in North. But neither could materialize his plans. Hence Nana decided to go from Khotan, and to this effect he expressed his intention to Johnson in 1865.[47] It was the irony of fate that Nana was not allowed to go from Khotan by the ruler Habibulla Khan, as there was no second man to command the infantry.

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[42] Johnson's Report, F. P., A. June 1866, No. 135-39.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] Foreign Secret, A. Feb. 1874, 102-109 (103).

[46] For detailed discussion refer author's article in I. H. R. C. Volume, XXXVII, Part II 1962, pp. 28-33.

[47] Johnson's Report, F. P. A., June 1866, 135-39.

Nana got his first opportunity in the year 1869, at the time of the rise of Ameer Beg Khusbegi in Kashgar. He along with one of his followers came to Ladakh in the garb of vakils of Atalik for the purchase of arms. Nana Saheb expressed his desire to Dr. Cayley about going to Mecca.[48] Dr. Cayley in his letter dated 24th August 1869 says that Mohamad Ali had come "chiefly to purchase arms, as rifles, revolvers etc., etc. He intends to proceed *via* Kangra to the Punjab and probably to Bombay and Mecca."[49] Another companion of Nana went much earlier straight from Khotan to St. Petersburg, Constantinople and Moscow and became popular in the name of Nawab Sultan Ibrahim Khan.[50] Thus the rebels concentrated in the Muslim countries.

Nana Saheb reached Mecca sometime towards the end of 1869 or in the beginning of 1870.[51] He was joined by Azeem Ulla and Firoze Shah.[52] Mecca was chosen as the most suitable place for maintaining regular contact with the home country. A proper network with the native people was maintained for ascertaining the pulse of the nation.[53] Nawab Sultan Ibrahim was made an agent for collecting money and arms and maintaining contacts with the leaders of the mutiny at Constantinople, Cairo, Turkey and other places.[54]

Nawab Sultan Ibrahim was such a master mind that he could not be charged with anything by the huge Imperial machinery. He was in possession of passports of different countries besides British passport and was also in possession of two letters of credit from the Nizam of Hyderabad.[55] He told one Deelabourally, a Bombay merchant in Cairo, that he got these letters of credit through Nana Saheb. It is just possible that Nana Saheb secured these letters from Nawab while passing through India in 1869.

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[48] Foreign, S. I., 1869, No. 156-72.
[49] Foreign, S. I., 1869, No. 19-22.
[50] Foreign Secret, Feb. 1878, No. 61-116.
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] Landon, P., *op.cit.,* 284.
[53] Foreign Secret, Feb. 1878, No. 61-116.
[54] *Ibid.*
[55] *Ibid.,* No. 80.

The scheme of Nana Saheb along with Azeem Ulla and Firoze Shah at Mecca was to ferment a general uprising in India. Sultan Ibrahim had made at Morocco a contract with some American firm for the supply of ammunition to the amount of £2,000,000. It was decided to meet several Brahmins at Mecca from Baroda and other places in 1877. Nana Saheb was planning to secure the co-operation of a large number of Indian Muslims and Brahmins, the latter were to come to Mecca dressed in Muslim costume, and to receive their orders. It was also reported that Nana Saheb had enlisted the co-operation of some Indian Princes.[56] This was probably the last effort to overthrow the British Government in India.

Unfortunately, the scheme was revealed by Sultan Ibrahim to the British Government through Deelabourally Shake Tyab, the Bombay businessman and hence the Government became alert. In the meantime Azeemulla died and Firoze Shah who was suffering at Mecca as a result of a paralytic stroke also died in June 1877. Nana again remained a solitary figure in the field. In the same year Jung Bahadur of Nepal also died.

Later on we find that Nana Saheb came back and settled in the Black Mountain near Nepal in a Hindu temple called Sinkh. He had secured his residence in such a way that he was able to bury alive any number of men that would enter the defile.[57] Some efforts have been made recently to construct the life of Nana after the mutiny.[58] Percival Landon is of the opinion that Nana Saheb died at Rajkot in 1895.[59]

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[56] *Ibid.*

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] A. N. Misra — *Nana Saheb Peshwa* (Lucknow 1961), 455-85; *Nana Saheb and the rising of Cawnpore*, Gupta, P. C.

[59] Percival Landon — *Nepal*, Vol. I, 156-170 (London, 1928).

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Battle of Narnaul

(A FORGOTTEN BATTLE OF THE INDIAN UPRISING OF 1857)

BY

KRIPAL CHANDRA YADAV, M.A., B.T.

The present paper gives a short account of a forgotten battle that was fought on November 16, 1857 during the historic uprising of 1857-58, at Narnaul, a town in the Punjab, situated near the border of Rajasthan.

The British forces had re-captured Delhi on 20th September, 1857. But the country round the capital was still inflamed with the fire of revolt.[1] Several operations for the reduction of this region were carried on. Before the close of September, 1857, General Courtland had succeeded in restoring order in the districts to north-west.[2] On the 2nd of October, Brigadier General Showers let out a column of 1500 men[3] from Delhi to reduce the western and south-western districts of Gurgaon and Rohtak and Jhajjar State.[4] He returned to Delhi on 19th October, with two local Chiefs as prisoners and a booty of the value of £70,000, seventy guns and a large quantity of ammunition.[5]

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[1] Kaye and Malleson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, IV, 75.

[2] Holmes, *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, 395.

[3] Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of the N. W. Provinces in India, 1857, ii, DCC, IXXIX, Saunder's letter to W. Muir, dated Delhi, October 8, 1857.

[4] Holmes, 395. For a detailed account of the campaign See '*Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life*' by Hodson, pp. 325-40, Illustrated London News, Vol. XXXI, No. 891, December 5, 1857, pp. 574-75 and '*Annals of the Indian Rebellion*' by Chick, pp. 718-19.

[5] Holmes, 395. Malleson estimates the value of the booty at £ 80,000 in his '*The Indian Mutiny* of 1857, p. 319. But the amount mentioned in the text seems to be correct as the same finds mention in the columns of Illustrated London News, Vol. XXXII, December 19, 1857, p. 603, too.

But this sweep of Showers had no effect on two local Chiefs of note, Rao Tula Ram of Rewari and Samad Khan, the General to and the father-in-law of the Nawab of Jhajjar. When Showers attacked the stronghold of Rao Tula Ram on 6 October, 1857, he left it and retired towards the Shekhawati region in the north of Rajasthan, where he met the famous Jodhpur-legion.[6] Showers had scarcely left Rewari, when Tula Ram re-occupied it.[7] His rebellious proceedings caused great anxiety to the British.[8] Samad Khan after the fall of Delhi, had proceeded in the direction of Narnaul and occupied the town without any opposition.[9]

The British authorities at Delhi were greatly alarmed. They sent a strong column on 10th November 1857 under Col. Gerrard, "an officer of conspicuous merit[10] "to punish the rebel chiefs". The column reached Rewari on the 13th November 1857.[11] Tula Ram left the place immediately and moved down to Narnaul in order to oppose the British army in junction with Samad Khan.[12]

Having seized Rewari, Gerrard proceeded to Kanaund, 51 kilometers west of Rewari, on 15 November and reached the destination on the same day.[13] In the evening he was joined by Hariana field force,[14] comprising 23rd Punjab Infantry, Patiala Infantry and Hariana Infantry.[15] Gerrard's own column consisted of the

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[6] Jawala Sahai, *The Loyal Rajputana*, 219. The Jodhpur legion was a contingent force. They broke out on 21 August, 1857 at Anadia and Abu. They joined the Thakur of Awah and defeated the Jodhpur army and English force under General Lawrence at Awah. Having quarrelled with the Thakur, they left Awah and marched on to Delhi. But before they could reach Delhi, the city had fallen and this disappointed them. In that state of confusion they met Rao Tula Ram and Samad Khan and fought desperately in the battle of Narnaul on 16 Nov. 1857.

[7] Malleson, 319.

[8] S. B. Chaudhuri, *Civil Rebellion in the Indian Mutinies*, 1857-59, 239

[9] Jawala Sahai, 219.

[10] Malleson, 319; Jawala Sahai, 219; Holmes, 396.

[11] Malleson 319; Records Intelligence Deptt., II, 216-17, letter from Muir to Sherer, Agra, November 19, 1857.

[12] S. B. Chaudhuri, 239.

[13] Records Intelligence Department, II, 272-73; Kaye and Malleson, IV, 76.

[14] Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 15-17, January 29, 1858.

[15] Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, January 28, 1858.

First Bengal European Fusiliers, the 7th Punjab Infantry, Cook Worthy's troops of Horse artillery, Gillespie's heavy battery, The Carbineers, the Cavalry of the Guides, and the Multani Horse.[16] The British forces were well organised under experienced officers and had a troop of heavy artillery too. They had two 18 pounder guns.[17] Gerrard collected necessary information in order to launch a heavy attack on Narnaul, 25 kilometers away, the next day.[18]

The column under Gerrard marched from Kanaund at 1 A.M. on the 16th November, 1857.[19] The sandy nature of the ground made the march difficult. The guns could only be dragged along with difficulty and the Infantry had to halt again and again to give them time to come up.[20] The column halted at Nasibpur, a small village, 3 kilometers north-west of Narnaul and rested there for a while.[21]

The Indian forces comprised the Jodhpur legion and the Ahirs and Rānghārs jointly commanded by Rao Tula Ram and the forces of the Nawab of Jhajjar, commanded by his general Samad Khan. Their number was a little above 5,000.[22] They had half a dozen guns of medium size.[23] Their artillery being rather weak, they mainly depended on the infantry and cavalry. The Indians deployed themselves in a very strong and spacious fort-like building right in the centre of the town in the early hours of the cool morning of 16 November, 1857.[24]

Hardly had the British forces rested for a while at Nasipur, before they saw a little cloud of dust rising over a sloping ground at their front.[25] It was an Indian force advancing to pounce upon the British after having abandoned their strong fort in the centre of the town. It was really a blunder on the part of the Indians that they became impatient and chose to take the offensive instead of awaiting an attack by the British, "for so strong was indeed their position", says Malleson, "that had they had the patience to await attack, Gerrard would have found that all his work had been cut out for him".[26]

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[16] Records Intelligence Department, II, 272-73; Kaye and Malleson, IV, 76; Jawala Sahai, 219.

[17] Records Intelligence Department, II, 272-73.

[18] Holmes, 396; Kaye and Malleson, IV, 77.

[19] Kaye and Malleson, IV, 77.

[20] Holmes, 396; Jawala Sahai, 219.

[21] Holmes, 397.

[22] Records Intelligence Deptt., II, 272-73; Illustrated London News, Vol. XXXII, January 2, 1858, p. 18.

[23] Keith Young, Delhi, 1857, p. 307.

[24] Holmes, 396; Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 15-17, January 20, 1858.

[25] *Ibid.*

The British forces alerted themselves and speedily stood on guard in obedience to their commander, Col. Gerrard; " 23rd Punjab Infantry in the right, Artillery in the centre and Patiala Infantry on the left,"[27] supported by the Multani Horse on the left, the First Bengal European Fusiliers and the 7th Punjab Infantry on right, and the Guides and the Carbineers in the centre.[28] The action began a little before 12 o'clock.[29] The first Indian charge was irresistible and the British forces scattered before them like chaff before the wind. The Patiala Infantry and the Multani Horse on the British left were completely disheartened.[30] The whole of the right flank fled away. At this juncture the Guides and the Carbineers came to their rescue and saved the situation.[31]

A graphic picture of the whole engagement between the Indian cavalry and the Guides and the carbineers has been given by Kaye and Malleson[32] and T. R. Holmes.[33] "The enemies (Indians) met the shock of the Guides and the carbineers right gallantly", remarked Holmes.[34] "It was a gallant conflict" said Kaye and Malleson, "and never did the enemy (Indians) fight better. There was neither shirking nor lurching. Never was there a charge more gallant and certainly never were the British cavalry met so fully or in so full a swing by the rebel horse".[35]

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26. Malleson, 319; Holmes and Jawala Sahai also agree with it.
27. Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, January 28, 1858.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Records of the Intelligence Department, II, 272-73.
30. Malleson, 319.
31. Kaye and Malleson, IV, 79-80.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Holmes, 397.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Kaye and Malleson, IV, 80.

This most violent action did not last long for the English fire—their heavy artillery and the horse guns having steady aims—was too much for the Indian cavalry and footmen coming straight on the British deployment and they had to fall back.[36] The guides and the carbineers under the cover of the artillery fire, made a desperate attack and broke the order of the battle of the Indians. Just then the 1st Bengal Fusilers swooping upon the weak Indian artillery captured some of their guns.[37] This encouraged the British cavalry at right and they pressed hard through the Indian ranks and successfully overpowered them on the right and in the centre.[38]

But soon the situation took an unexpected turn when Col. Gerrard, the British commandant was mortally wounded by a musket ball.[39] The British troops were demoralized. Taking full advantage of the circumstances, the Indians dashed in resistless sweep upon them. The British troops could not stand the charge. The Multani Horse in bewilderment fled away.[40] The Indian cavalry recaptured its lost guns and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. The right and the left wings of the British forces were thrown into confusion.[41]

Taking a serious view of the whole affair, Major Caulfield, the new English commandant, ordered his artillery to cause heavy bombardment on the Indian troops and led his cavalry and infantry men straight with full force into their front ranks. The Indians fought back furiously and stuck to their ground. But British artillery fire broke their backbone and split the Indian force into two parts—one engaged in the close quarter battle and the other, fleeing back to go out of the range of the British guns. Meanwhile Rao Kishan Gopal and Ramlal, the two best Indian commanders received musket shots and died. This disheartened the Indians and they effected retreat.[42]

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[36] Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, January 28, 1858.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] Kripal Chandra Yadav, *Rao Tula Ram — A Hero of* 1857, pp. 35-36.
[39] Holmes, 397; Malleson, 329.
[40] Holmes, 397.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Kripal Chandra Yadav, 37.

The British resumed advance in the same previous order until they came to the dry bed of a monsoonish stream flowing between Nasibpur and Narnaul. The British guns were unable to cross the stream owing to sand, so they diverged to the right and took up a position near the horse artillery guns, whilst the 23rd Punjab Infantry and Patiala Infantry along with other units of the cavalry crossed the stream and advanced towards the Indian camp.[43]

The heavy artillery shelling and infantry fires confused the Indians and they ran pell-mell in all directions. Mostly, they retreated to the town and hid themselves in the buildings. The pursuit of the fleeing soldiers was quick and inexorable and they were very soon driven out of the city after a little combating.[44] The Indians lost the day and when the sun went down[45] there remained none in Narnaul except heaps of corpses here and there. Rao Tula Ram of Rewari escaped.

On the Indian side, the number of the dead in the battle of Narnaul was supposed to have gone beyond many hundreds; Rao Kishan Gopal,[46] Ram Lal,[47] Samad Khan's son[48] and many other top-ranking officers were killed in the action.[49] The British took 9 Indian guns and many other standard arms.[50]

The total loss on the British side was 70 killed and 45 wounded.[51] They lost their commanders, Col. Gerrard and Capt. Wallace while Lieuts. Graije, Kennedy, Peaise and Hamphreys were wounded in action.[52]

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[43] Stafford's Report, vide Foreign Secret Consultations, Nos. 21-27, dated 29 Jan. 1858.

[44] Malleson, 320.

[45] Records of the Intelligence Department, II 272-73, 277.

[46] Rao Mān Singh, Ābhīr Kuldipikā, p. 208.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] Records of the Intelligence Department, II, 272-73.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] Illustrated London News, Vol. XXXII, p. 18.

[52] Records Intelligence Department, II, 272-73.

Conclusion

The battle of Narnaul was undoubtedly one of the decisive battles of the Indian revolt of 1857. The English felt jubilant over their success in this battle,[53] for it resulted in the complete rout of three powers, Rao Tula Ram of Rewari, Samad Khan of Jhajjar and the Jodhpur Legion. It marked the close of the crucial period of struggle in the Delhi division and northern Rajasthan and the restoration of the British supremacy in this region. It was truly the last bright glow of the great extinguishing conflagration.

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[53] Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 1951, January 13, 1858.

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Reviews

INDIAN PANDITS IN THE LAND OF SNOW, Sarat Chandra Das; reprinted with an Introduction by Nirmal Chandra Sinha, M.A. Firma, K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1965, p. xxiv, 101, and 33, price Rs. 10/-.

Sarat Chandra Das (1849-1917) was a pioneer explorer and scholar. His *Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow* was first published in 1893 and contains the subject-matter of four more or less popular lectures based on his study and travels. 'The book contains', as N. C. Sinha says in his Introduction, 'chips from a workshop where the raw materials were Sanskrit, Pali, Tibetan and Chinese'. (IV) The book is now rather antiquated and the researches of scholars, mostly European and sometimes Indian, have advanced our knowledge of the subject in many ways, and the introduction by Sinha draws attention to the most important advances so made.

S. C. Das speaks of three waves of missionary activities of the Indian Buddhists that reached Tibet. The first period extended from the time of the Buddha to the first century A.D. (B.C. according to Das) when the Great Asoka, Menander and Kanishka sent missionaries far and wide. The second period extended from the first century to the seventh century A.D. when Hiuen Tsang visited India and returned to China. This was the period of "Brahmin Buddhistic activity which stands unrivalled in the history of Buddhism". (page 23). The third and later period was remarkable for the part played by Bengal in the revival of Buddhism in Tibet and for Tibetan Buddhism civilizing the rude and blood-thirsty Mongols and the warlike Manchus from the foot of the Himalayas to the Arctic Ocean.

The six relatively short appendices deal with sundry matters with a bearing on the subject including the occasion of S. C. Das' visit to China, the relations between the British in India and the Chinese, the Lama's relations with Indian centres and the wanderings of an Indian ascetic all over the Steppes of Eurasia.

In his Introduction Mr. Sinha draws attention to the new outlook we have gained on the *pax Mangolica* and its contributions; the better knowledge we now have of Padmasambhava born in the Swat Valley; the need for avoiding the modern term Bengal and using the old name Vangala for the area from which Atisa came, the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet and China earlier than the time of Atisa by the mediacy of the ancient Central Asian Indian colonies and other relevant subjects. Sinha asks: 'Did Tibet receive new ideas about society and polity from the theory of Bodhisatva and monastic institutions of India?' and adds: 'Here is a challenge to Indian scholarship, to confirm or to contradict the theory of Indian origins of Lama's hierarchy'.

The book is a paper back well-printed and reasonably priced and readers will be grateful to Mukhopadhyaya for the service he has done by reprinting this excellent book of S. C. Das.

K. A. Nilakanta Sastri

DAWN OF RANASCENT INDIA, by K. K. Datta, Second Edition, Allied Publishers (P.) Ltd., Bombay, London, New York, 1964, p. xii and 152; dozen plates; Bibliography, Index, Rs. 18.00.

This second edition of a book published first in 1950 "contains additional information collected from contemporary sources. Illustrations regarding some prominent personalities of the time have also been added". The book contains the substance of lectures delivered under an endowment in the Nagpur University early in 1950. Dr. Kalikinkar Datta is a well-known writer on Indian History, particularly on its modern side, and is now Vice-Chancellor of Magadh University. He says in his preface: 'Modern Indian renaissance is essentially a change of spirit and a reorientation of outlook of the vast multitude of this continent through various forces in the new world of the nineteenth century'. (VI) The book deals with the first half of the last century and comprises five chapters bearing titles: Background and Genesis; The New Education, The Hindu College, Literary and Scientific organisations, and New Trends in Literature; Discovery of the past; and a New Era of Social reform. The account is mostly factual and lays main stress on Bengal. One may doubt if the movements traced had affected the mass of the people in the period dealt with; but the account is a very handy compilation of much recondite information from many sources not easy of access to the general reader who will find here a reliable guide to the subjects dealt with.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

INDIA AND THE WORLD: Researches in India's policies, contacts and relationships with other countries and peoples of the world; by Buddha Prakash, M.A., LL.B., Ph.D., D.Litt, Kurukshetra University, V.I. Series—31, Hoshiarpur, V.V.R.I. 1964, pp. xii and 392, price Rs. 20/-.

The author's standpoint in this book can be gathered from his citations from Toynbee, "India is the central link in a chain of regional civilizations that extend from Japan in the far North East to Ireland in the far North-west. Between these two extremities the chain sags down southwards in a festoon, that dips below the equator in Indonesia. It is not of course only in a geographical sense that India is in a key position. At the present moment, for instance, it is widely recognised that India holds the balance between rival ideologies", (p. 34) Again "So now we turn to India; the spiritual gift that makes man human is still alive in Indian souls. Go on giving the world Indian examples of it. Nothing else can do so much to help mankind to save itself from self-destruction" (p. 38). These citations form the background against which the first chapter in the book, also entitled India and world, is written.

For the rest there are fourteen other chapters which deal primarily with the geography and sometimes history of South Eastern and Central Asia in the light of data culled from the epics, the puranas and the Arthasastra. A vast amount of material, primary and secondary, has been brought together and discussed at great length, though not sufficiently critically. The identifications suggested often deviate from those of earlier writers but not in all cases more acceptable. Chapter XII on Saka dvipa, XIII on Central Asia geography in the Ramayana and XIV on India and Red Sea regions are of greater interest than the rest. There is a final chapter on India and the West which seeks to prove that "Indian culture did not remain confined to Alexandria and Rome but reached Gaul and Scandinavia in North Europe" (p. 269).

The public interested in the glory of ancient Indian culture will be grateful to the author and the Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute which has published this patriotic interpretation of ancient lore.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

EASTERN CĀḶUKYAN TEMPLES OF ANDHRA DĒŚA, by Dr. M. Rama Rao, Andhra Pradesh Government Archaeological Series No. 19, Edited by Mohd. Abdul Waheed Khan, Published by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, 1964, pp. 48, Rs. 6-50.

This is a general and descriptive account of some of the more important eastern Cāḷukyan temples in Andhra Pradesh, the importance of which in the history of South Indian art and architecture can hardly be exaggerated. The author has chosen the Rājarājeśvara and other temples at Bikkavolur, the Bhīmēśvara temple at Drākshārāma, the Bhīmeśvara and Māndavyanārāyaṇa temple at Bhīmāvaram, the Amaresvara temple at Amarāvati, the Sōmeśvara temple at Sōmārāma, the Rāmaliṅgeśvara temple at Pālakollu and the Bhīmeśvara temple at Chēbrōlu for treatment. The architectural description of these temples is fairly complete and their sculptural wealth is well brought out. Notice has also been made of all the published inscriptions in the temples.

It would have been useful if the author had given a general account of the architectural features of the Eastern Cāḷukyan temples and the stylistic characteristics of the sculptures in them, to understand better the distinct architectural features of each of the temples and the sculptures in them. The illustrations are exhaustive and good. As an introduction to one of the less known phases of South Indian architecture, this publication will serve its purpose well.

T. V. MAHALINGAM

INDO-AFGHAN RELATIONS, by R. S. Rastogi (pp. 215 + 7 appendices, Navjyoti Press, Lucknow, price Rs. 16.50).

This is a thesis submitted for the Ph.D. degree of the Lucknow University. It deals with the period 1880-1900, most crucial in the history of Afghanistan, torn as it was then between the British and the Russians, who laid claim in their own way for the obeisance of that country.

The book has been written with full knowledge of the original sources, official documents and treaties and lets one see heights of diplomacy and the activity of men like Curzon in the charmed sphere of foreign policy. Reference is made to various agreements between the British and the Afghan ruler, the Chitral expedition, the Mohmand affairs etc., and a full chapter is devoted to the Durand agreement. The author points out the main defects of the agreement made by Sir Mortimer Durand, an important name in the Indo-Afghan relations of the period, agreeably and convincingly.

On the whole the book instructs and impresses the reader. It lays before us the tangled web of Indo-Afghan relations during the critical twenty years from 1880 to 1900 with clarity. It has six maps and seven appendices.

M. Arokiaswami

THE LEGACY OF CHINA, Edited by Raymond Dawson, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, pp. 392, price Rs. 17.50.

This book is a welcome addition to the series of which the first volume, *The Legacy of Greece,* appeared more than forty years ago. The object of this volume is "to survey the legacy of traditional Chinese civilization", or, in other words, "to survey our debt to the civilizatory achievements of the Chinese". This object has been fulfilled by the co-operation of a band of writers whose painstaking study and scrupulous regard for truth have delineated the essential features of Chinese civilization that have contributed to the progress of humanity. These features are discussed in detail by a group of more than ten scholars, mainly under the following heads: Philosophy and religious thought with special reference to Buddhism, Literature, Art, Science, and the system of Government, with a concluding review of the intellectual and artistic influences of China upon the world and the value of the study of Chinese civilization. At the outset the Editor has made a very interesting and comprehensive survey of the Western conceptions of Chinese civilization which may be regarded as the *raison d'etre* of such a volume.

No review can do justice to a book of this size packed with important statements and observations which may secure approval or provoke challenge, but always add to our knowledge or stimulate our desire to know more. All that can be done is to draw attention to only a few of them so that the inquisitive or interested reader may turn to the book itself. In the domain of philosophical thought attention may be drawn to the evolution in China of a humanistic ethic independent of revealed religion, and the prominent place which, generally speaking, reason occupies in the Chinese philosophical tradition. "Confucius (551-479 B.C.) is the discoverer for China of the Golden Rule and of the principle that love for others is the basis of morality". Of equally special importance to the Modern Age is the opinion of Mo-tzu (c. 480-c. 390 B.C.), the founder of the Mohist School, on many political, moral and other topics of a practical nature. One which challenges Confucius may be quoted: "The Confucians say: 'To be a good man a gentleman must assume the opinions and dress of the ancients'. My reply is that what we call ancient opinions and dress were all new once, so that the most ancient of the men who expressed these opinions and wore this dress were not gentlemen" (p. 34). Mo-tzu judged the accepted morality only by the benefits resulting from it. He also cared for theories only with reference to their practical consequences, and his first concern was whether the consequence was beneficial or harmful. This rationalistic approach offers a striking contrast to the state of things in ancient India where human mind was overridden in minute details of life by the dictates of revealed religion and authority of Sastric texts.

A special section has been devoted to Buddhism in China. The process of adaptation through which it passed gave rise to "various highly characteristic and distinctively Chinese forms of Buddhism, some of which have flourished for several centuries, producing an amazing wealth of scholastic literature". They also influenced many aspects of Chinese culture, notably in the fields of art, belles-lettres, and popular religion (p. 59). Detailed account has been given of what is usually known as Ch'an or 'Meditation School' ('Zen' in Japanese) "which became one of the greatest creative forces in Far Eastern Culture" (p. 79). The writer of this section simply remarks that "Ch'an is a product of a great but archaic and alien civilization" (p. 79). Evidently he is unaware of its obvious derivation from the Tantric form of Buddhism in India.

So far as literature was concerned there was a revolutionary change in the 19th century such as took place also in India. The old system of education was "steadily eroded, and enlightened Chinese began a wholesale and unreserved study of Western civilization in all its aspects" (p. 81). Though the archaic classical Chinese literature has lost its old importance, at least one branch of it is of great value even today, namely historiography. Few countries have equalled China in its systematic endeavour to preserve the historical record of the past, which began in right earnest in the second century B.C. and continued ever afterwards. There is a comprehensive and critical account of the historiographical tradition of China.

In the chapter on Chinese Art an attempt has been made to bring out the real artistic excellence of Chinese porcelain, bronzes and paintings which has not yet been properly appreciated by the Western world.

Of far greater interest is the long list of scientific and technological discoveries of China which have exerted profound influence on the scientific development of the world. The following is quite an interesting list: "The efficient equine harness, the technology of iron and steel, the inventions of gunpowder and paper, the mechanical clock, and basic engineering devices such as the driving-belt, the chain drive, and the standard method of converting rotary to rectilinear motion, together with segmental arch bridges and nautical techniques such as the stern-post rudder" (pp. 237-8). Credit has also been given to China for the first successful immunization technique, namely Variolation, the forerunner of Jennerian vaccination, advanced Anatomy, iron-chain suspension bridge, steel-making by the co-fusion process and by the direct oxygenation of cast iron, and the sailing—carriage, which served as the model for that of early seventeenth-century Europe.

Special credit must be given to China for three discoveries namely; printing, gunpowder and the magnet. As observed by Bacon, "these three have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world, the first in literature, the second in warfare, the third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable changes; insomuch that no empire, no sect, no star, seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries" (p. 242). Bacon regarded their origin as obscure and even modern writers have ignored China's contribution, but the writer of this section has clearly demonstrated by a critical discussion that the credit for these discoveries must go to China.

This volume reveals the extent of China's legacy to mankind and enables us to make a correct appraisal of her culture. It has fully maintained the high reputation already earned by the "Legacy Series" to which it belongs.

R. C. MAJUMDAR.

THE CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION OF ANCIENT INDIA IN HISTORICAL OUTLINE, by D. D. Kosambi. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965, pp. 243, Price 50 s.net.

The title of the book would seem to many as a great misnomer, for the author uses the terms 'culture' and 'history' in a sense very different from what is generally understood by them. He defines History as "the presentation in chronological order of successive changes in the means and relations of production" (p. 10). He also does not agree with those people who "regard culture as purely a matter of intellectual and spiritual values, in the sense of religion, philosophy, legal systems, literature, art, music, and the like" (p. 10). To him the "basis of any formal culture must lie in the availability of a food supply" and therefore the imposing ziggurat temples of Mesopotamia or the Pyramids of Egypt are far less important than the surplus of food "which made it possible to build them." As a considerable part of the book is devoted to a theoretical discussion of the probable development of the stages of food supply—for which there is very little positive evidence—it has been claimed that this is "the first real cultural history of India", implying thereby that the numerous books written so far about the Indian culture have all followed a wrong track. The author has also scant regard for history as it is generally understood and some of his remarks are almost provoking. As an instance we may cite the following: "Much that has been talked about India's glorious past, unhampered by fact or common sense, is even more free than Indian elections" (p. xi). Such statements may please foreigners, including publishers, but would hardly redound to the credit of an Indian author with any pretension to a knowledge of Indian history and culture.

The author was certainly wise in not undertaking to write the history and culture of India in the accepted sense of these two terms, for he has really very scanty knowledge of either. His remark that "virtually no dates can be determined for any Indian personality till the Muslim period" (p. 10) would, to use Macaulay's words, "move laughter in girls at a High School in India."

But the scantiness of records in Indian history, of which the author justly complains, is equally true of the economic history of the people which he takes as the only theme that matters in judging of culture. How, then, one might ask, does he give such a comprehensive view of Culture as he understands it? The answer is simple. Not only does he reject the current interpretation of history, he also repudiates the scientific method of writing history which demands that definite conclusions must be based only on positive evidence. So, undismayed by the lack of records or contemporary evidence, he bases his history upon "the survival within different social layers of many forms that allow the reconstruction of totally diverse stages" (p. 13). In other words, he reconstructs the past on the basis of what exists at present or rather that part of it which suits his fancy to accept as a true relic of the past at a certain stage. So he weaves a pattern of history, more or less true of many other lands, which cannot be checked by any positive evidence and must necessarily have been greatly influenced by the predilections of the writer. It has, however, got one supreme advantage—you can neither prove nor disprove anything said by him; but, then, it is an imaginary picture not acceptable as a true fact, and hardly deserves any serious consideration as history.

The author would have acted wisely if he had confined himself to Indian history as defined by him. Unfortunately, he has also occasionally trespassed into fields lying outside his special reserve. He dabbles into history proper for which he has neither adequate knowledge nor proper training. His treatment of Indian history and culture as generally understood—i.e. account of kings and states, religion, philosophy, art, literature, etc.—is perfunctory and full of mistakes. The book abounds in statements which can be proved to be positively wrong or which are not supported by positive evidence. A few specimens, which may be multiplied to almost any extent, of each type are given below:

For the first type cf. the following: 1. Bindusāra, the second Mauryan emperor defeated Seleukos Nikator (p. 148). 2. Doubts about the authenticity of the Arthaśāstra have since been removed by long discussion (p. 142). 3. Chaitanya's death in 1527 (p. 204). 4. The quarrel between the followers of Rāmānuja and Śaṁkara "led to the breaking of heads and lasted till late into the nineteenth century" (p. 204). 5. Even in the seventh century B.C. there could not have been more than two really large cities (p. 89). 6. The Ṛigveda makes Dīrghatamas a river pilot in his old age (p. 90).

To the second type belong the following statements: 1. The Asokan edicts clearly provide the first constitutional checks against the crown, the first Bill of Rights for the citizen (p. 163). 2. The temples were maintained by sources including "the substantial profits from temple dancing-girl prostitution" (p. 196). 3. Taxila was hardly more than a village before the fourth century B.C. (p. 92). 4. "The god (Kṛishṇa) himself was new; his supreme godhead would not be admitted for centuries afterwards" (i.e. after the third century A.D. presumably from the context) (p. 93). 5. The Mauryas were, though Aryanised, of aboriginal or mixed descent (p. 139). 6. The entire third para of p. 163, particularly such statements as "Copper mines in Bihar had begun to reach water-level; there were no pumps;" etc.

To this category also belong the identification and illustration of the coins issued by King Prasenajit (127), the Sisunāga king

सन्दर्भ ग्रन्थ
REFERENCE BOOK

Kālāśoka (158), Mahāpadma Nanda (146) and the first three Maurya Emperors (158). If the author could prove only all this his book would have been worth something of great value.

While dealing with political history the author runs over thousands of years in breathless haste. The political and economic changes during the interval between the end of the Mauryas and the fall of the Guptas—a period of about seven hundred years are treated in seven pages. Then he comments: "The process of decay was so long and gradual that a book like the present could be terminated at any date after Harsha. Harsha's was the last great personally administered empire without a feudal basis reaching down to the villages" (p. 193). It betrays such utter ignorance of Indian history that one is provoked to comment that a book like his could be terminated at least a thousand years earlier to the mutual advantage of both the readers and the author. The indomitable author, however, next takes up the history of the Muslim rule in India and covers the period of six hundred years from A.D. 712 to 1312 in twenty-seven lines—a historical outline with a vengeance.

Finally, attention may be drawn to the following statement of the author: "So far as annals, king lists, chronicles, dates of important battles, biographies of rulers and cultural figures go, there is no Indian history worth reading. Any work where the casual reader may find such detailed personal or episodic history for ancient India should be enjoyed as romantic fiction (like some Indian railway time-tables!), but not believed" (p. 23). This is too puerile to be taken seriously, but the words "should be enjoyed as romantic fiction but not believed" give such an apt description of the book under review that it may be regarded as the epitaph written by the author himself on his own handiwork.

These are harsh words and nobody regrets them and the other observations made above more than the reviewer himself. It was a painful necessity forced upon him in order to caution the unwary reader that the fine printing and get-up of the book and its publication by a reputable firm should not mislead him about its real worth.

R. C. Majumdar.

यह पुस्तक वितरित न की जायें
NOT TO BE ISSUED

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE HILL TRIBES OF ASSAM, by Birendra Chandra Chakravarty. Published by Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya—1964. Price Rs. 12.

The nineteenth century in India had witnessed the drama of British dealings with the virile and martial Pathan and Baluch tribes on the north-western frontiers. Gradually, by a process of experiment, a policy was developed which combined military action or the display of superior force with political management comprising payment of subsidies, holding tribal jirgas and otherwise asserting paramount authority. But the brave Pathans failed to be subdued and till the end of British rule over India, the problem of the north-west defied solution. Its importance generated interest and considerable literature has been produced on the subject. To a large extent the gravity of the problem was enhanced by the presence of an independent Afghanistan, to the ruler of which some tribes owed allegiance and the proximity of Russian Empire, the expansive tendencies of which created alarm in England and India. The tribal problem on the north-west frontier had thus integrated with the imperial problem of safeguarding the defence of India and protecting or promoting British interests in Asia. This may account for extensive research and profusion of literature on that subject.

Relatively the eastern frontier did not provoke interest because with the annexation of Burma in the east and the weakness of the Tibetans and the Chinese in the north-east, there was no major power in that zone to contest the sovereignty of the British. Unlike the Russians, in the east, the French were unable to penetrate the Burmese screen, and as such the tribes on the eastern frontier did not assume any international significance. Their advance in civilisation was also extremely limited, and their almost primitive conditions of living and warfare did not create that feeling of fear which was excited in the north-west. Hence the comparative neglect of the affairs of the eastern frontier and lack of books on the subject. In the last thirty years, only one scholar had worked in this field, but that work has not been published so far. Thus Dr. Chakravarty's book 'British Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam' fills the vacuum and presents an account of the frontier developments in the east as well.

The author has adopted the method of treating his subject according to tribes which inhabit separate areas. This brings into focus the developments on the various frontiers of Assam, but in a way prevents an analysis of British policy in its various stages of growth. The chronicle is interesting but slightly repetitive and abounding with details.

It is interesting to note that the experiment on the eastern frontier in essentials conformed to the pattern on the north-western side. The distinction between the administered or the inner line and the tribal area was made, and in respect of the latter, a policy of non-intervention or non-penetration was adopted. But the administered line was sliding forward and every act of hostile resistance by the tribal people afforded occasion for a forward move. In Lytton's time the 'forward policy' became the established policy and with the annexation of Burma and the endeavours to bring Tibet under British influence, forward movement was the recognised mode of dealing with the tribal people. But no endeavour was made to influence the tribesmen or better their position, economic or social. In their internal matters complete non-interference or un-concern was the definite policy adopted. The result was that over all the years of British rule, the tribes remained cut off from the main stream of cultural advance or material development. Maintenance of peace and order was the only function of the British authorities, who became active only when there were raids by tribesmen or occasional risings in their midst or some inter-tribal wars. There was little sympathy with their social or religious sentiments and practices. This made for further complications. As in the north-west so also in the north-east, the border tribes continued to remain a problem, which had to be tackled after Independence. Of course, the tribes whose habitat came within the expanse of the British dominion, soon progressed in the scale of civilisation; but the process here was also activised by Christian missions rather than by governmental agencies.

The book makes interesting reading. However there are many typographical mistakes which could have been corrected.

Bisheshwar Prasad.

THE CHURCHILL LEGEND: AN ANTHOLOGY—By Graham Cawthorne Cleaver, Hume Press Ltd., London, Pp. 124, Price 2s. 6d.

This is an excellent booklet on what H. B. Boyne has called Churchill lore or Churchilliana. The Churchill legend began to take shape from the day Winston Churchill entered Parliament and came to an end with his death a few months ago. But there is another kind of legend — the imitation legend — that is still growing and will not cease to grow for generations to come. Mr. Graham Cawthorne whose first-hand knowledge about the late British leader is profound has, however, provided the genuine legend in this small book for the benefit of English-knowing readers the world over.

The anthology begins with Winston's birth and career at school where he found himself allergic to reading and writing. But later, when he had left school and entered life, he became a voracious reader and a vivid writer. He started his career as a soldier and spent years in India and South Africa, and took part in four wars. He entered Parliament at the age of twenty-five. There he at once made his mark, and became a junior minister at thirty and full minister at thirty-three. Twice he became Prime Minister, and held that great office for a longer period than other Prime Ministers in Britain's history except three — Pitt the younger, Earl of Liverpool and Asquith. His most momentous term, and in fact the period of life, coincided with the World War II from which he emerged as Britain's saviour and one of the greatest leaders and statesmen on the globe. 'The Churchill Legend' pithily describes in a vivid manner the anecdotes about the great leader, his manysided genius and activity, his whims and idiosyncrasies, his habits and manner, his clothes, hats and cigars, his fondness for domestic animals, his full-blooded life of activity and adventures. The book makes a very pleasant reading and will, no doubt, be enjoyed by readers in all the continents.

A. L. SRIVASTAVA.

NEPAL AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY—By B. D. Sanwal, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1965, Pp. 345 + VIII, Price Rs. 22.

We welcome Sri Sanwal's book on Nepal. Though it professedly deals with Nepal's relations with the English East India Company, it is in fact a history of Nepal from the earliest times to 1858. Out of twenty-two chapters of the book as many as seven have been devoted to Nepal's early history. The chapters on Nepal's geography and people are good, informative and well-written. But those on the sources of its history and Gorkha conquest should have been more critical, and the historical facts should have been examined on more reliable evidence. For example, the origin and ancestry of the ruling family, which traces its descent from the Ranas of Mewar in Rajasthan could have been examined on the basis of the authentic history of that State as given in the scholarly works of Kaviraja Shyamal Das and G. H. Ojha, if not on that of numerous extant inscriptions and khyats. The ruling house of Chittor belonged to the Surya Vanshi branch of the ancient Kshatriyas, and not to the Chandra Vanshi branch (p. 58). Chapter VI on the 'Political condition in Nepal before the Gorkha conquest' should have, with some alterations and modifications, preceded Chapter V on the "History of the Gorkha Conquest."

The main portion of the book, dealing with Nepal and the English East India Company, is the result of painstaking research and is based primarily on the Company's records. Nepal's relations with the East India Company began in 1767 when, taking advantage of the Gorkha siege of that country, the English invaded it; but the expedition under Capt. Kinloch, the English Military Officer at Patna, proved to be a failure. The idea of a second expedition, for which preparations were made, was given up for the time being. Meanwhile there broke out a war between Nepal and Tibet, and the Company sent a mission under Kirkpatrick to Kathmandu for increased commerce between her and Nepal, which too produced no tangible result. The first draft treaty negotiated on February 4, 1792 was not implemented by Nepal. In 1800 the English seized the opportunity to interfere in the affairs of Nepal. That year Raja Ran Bahadur Shah, driven by his chiefs and people, had taken shelter at Benaras. The East India Company gave him a monthly stipend, and started negotiations with the ruling clique at Kathmandu for a commercial treaty. Hearing this Ran Bahadur tried to get rid of British protection, but was not allowed to do so. The Company negotiated a treaty through the envoys from the ruling clique in October 1801. Nepal was opposed to the establishment of a Political Resident at Kathmandu, but had to agree. This treaty too was soon dissolved, as Nepal did not accede to Resident Knox's request to permit two other Englishmen to join him at Kathmandu. The Resident consequently withdrew to the Company's territory. Meanwhile Ran Bahadur staged a comeback to Nepal and regained his throne. But he was a blood-thirsty tyrant and was soon murdered. Now Amar Singh Thapa's son, Bhim Sen, became prime minister and ruled the country for the next thirty years.

Mr. Sanwal discusses the causes of the Nepal war (1814-16) in great detail and brings to bear his knowledge of the topography of the Kumaon region on the subject. He gives a vivid account of the Company's minute preparations for the war and its persistent, though unsuccessful, attempt to tamper the loyalty of the Gorkhas and seduce their commanders by offers of tempting bribes. The treaty of Segouli (1816) is discussed in a scholarly manner. Thereafter Nepal remained friendly to the East India Company. The minister Bhim Sen Thapa who was responsible for Nepal's policy towards the Company was removed from the office in 1837, and he committed suicide in 1839. In the confusion that followed the British Resident succeeded in wringing some concessions and encroaching upon Nepal's sovereignty in some important matters. In 1840 the Gorkhas attempted to occupy a belt of the Indian territory and war seemed imminent. But it was averted on account of Lord Auckland's pre-occupation in the Afghan War. Nepal enjoyed immunity from foreign interference during the prime ministership of Jang Bahadur who assumed the reins of government in September, 1846. He was a shrewd politician and an able commander. He paid a visit to England with a view not only to form an idea of British power at its base, but also to ask for the loan of English technicians for the manufacture of modern weapons in Nepal. Although the mission failed in its main object, Jang Bahadur returned home with a wholesome fear of British strength. And he decided once for all to cultivate the Company's friendship and never measure swords with it. It was for this reason that he helped the British to quell the Indian revolt of 1857-58. The learned author has given a good narrative of the relations between the two powers. He has correctly laid stress on the contrast between the crude medieval diplomacy of the Indian world and the modern 19th century diplomacy of the East India Company. He has also shown the disparity between the old world Indian weapons and mode of warfare and scientific military training, strategy and fire arms of the Company. And above all he has rightly emphasised the loyalty and patriotism of the Gorkha commanders and officers as well as rank and file, which was responsible for the maintenance of Nepal's freedom in the 19th century.

A. L. SRIVASTAVA.

MUSLIM CIVILIZATION IN INDIA—By S. M. Ikram. Edited by Ainslie T. Embree, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964, Pp. 325, Price $ 6·00.

The scheme of cultural collaboration between the U.S.A., Canada and other countries of the West on the one hand and Pakistan on the other, has been fruitful in as much as several Pakistani scholars have taken advantage of the liberal terms offered by those opulent countries to lecture in their universities on the favourite themes of their choice and also to produce works on mediaeval Indian history and culture, from a new or Pakistani angle of vision. Of these works three, namely, 'The Muslim Community in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent' by I. H. Qureshi, 'Studies in Islamic culture in the Indian Environment' by Azez Ahmad and the present book by S. M. Ikram, deserve notice. Although an abridgment of his more comprehensive compilation, entitled, 'Muslim Civilization in India and Pakistan' (Lahore, 1962), the value of this work lies in the fact that perhaps it is a little more objectively written than the first two aforesaid books.

'Muslim Civilization in India' is divided into two parts. The first deals with the history of the early invasions and the Delhi Sultanate (712-1526), and the second with that of the Mughal period (1526-1858). At the end of the first part are given three chapters on administration, society and culture and interaction of Islam and Hinduism. The learned author, unlike other Muslim writers, admits that "during military operations they (Hindus) suffered losses in property and life. Even when the harsh laws of war gave place to peace, the Hindus were burdened by certain handicaps. The sultanate period was more difficult for them than any other period of Muslim rule" (p. 108). He says that in Bengal Islam spread rapidly among the outcasts and depressed classes on account of peculiar conditions there, and also because the Muslim missionaries "very frequently transferred ancient Hindu and Buddhist stories of miracles to Muslim saints, fusing the old religion into the new on a level that could be accepted by the masses." (p. 124). According to him Kabir and Dadu were Muslims and Chaitanya was responsible for the revival of orthodox Hinduism. Islam was to a certain extent influenced by Hinduism, but in many cases "it is not a case of Hindu influence, but simply of incomplete change from the old way of life" (p. 130). He is also right when he says that during the sultanate period there was only superficial contact between Hindus and Musalmans and not only the Hindus but indigenous Muslims also were discriminated against by the foreign Turko-Afghan rulers.

The political history of the Mughal empire has been briefly sketched, but the author has not ignored the administrative and cultural aspects. He has sympathetically dealt with Akbar's attempt at inaugurating a new age of Indian nationalism. But he is of the opinion that the emperor's attempt to set himself up as a *Jagat Guru* or the spiritual leader of the people, was a "political mistake." He says that on account of the defiant spirit produced by a great Hindu religious revival Akbar's efforts at religious syncretism "were doomed to failure" (p. 165). Mr. Ikram frankly discusses the movement of orthodox Muslim reaction started by Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi in the 17th Century and the extravagance of the court under Jahangir and Shah Jahan. But his verdict on Aurangzeb's policy and administration smacks not only of partiality for that highly bigoted monarch but also of his religious bias. According to him "Aurangzab can be seen not as the instigator of policies that led to ruin but as the guardian of the Islamic State in India." (208)

There is hardly anything new in the chapters on the administration and the economic and social developments under the Mughals. The author's theory that during the Mughal age especially from about the middle of Akbar's reign Islam was more in need of protection than Hinduism requires more solid substantiation than just a few doubtful examples quoted by him. He is, however, on safer ground when he says that "the impression one gains from looking at social conditions during the Mughal period is of a society moving towards an integration of its manifold political regions, social systems and cultural inheritances." (p. 237).

Mr. Ikram gives an outline of the causes of the downfall of the Mughal empire and concludes his account with what he calls ‘the seeds of separation" in which the linguistic factor and the British policy of ‘divide and rule' occupy a prominent place. But he correctly observes that had the soil not been congenial, the British policies would not have succeeded.

The book is well-written and well-printed and got up. But there are a few mistakes of facts and of typography. For example, the date of Akbar's death was the night following October 15 (O.S.), 1605 and not January 7, 1606 as given by the author (p. 146). Mathra on page 165, line 18, should be Mathura, Azad Khan on p. 255 line 32, should be Asad Khan, jaqir on p. 302 should be jagir and Khan M. N. on p. 310 should be Khan, M. H. These, we hope, will be corrected in the next edition.

A. L. Srivastava.

SĀMAVIDHĀNA BRĀHMAṆA, critically edited by Dr. B. R. Sharma, Director, Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupathi, 1964; pp. 4 + xxii + 316.

The Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa (=SVB) critically edited by Dr. B. R. Sharma with its two commentaries, viz; the Vedārthaprakāśa of Sāyaṇa and Padārthamātravivṛti of Bharatasvāmin, constitutes the inaugural volume of the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha series. In the introduction, the editor rapidly describes the contents of this work. While a good deal of the text may be looked upon as a treatise on magic, its earlier section (four out of the eight anuvākas in the first Prapāṭhaka) is a collection of expiatory practices. In this sense this work may be held to anticipate the materials of the classical Dharmaśāstras. In the words of the editor this Brāhmaṇa may, with justice, be described as a "medley of Śrauta ceremonies, magical rites, and *kāmya* rituals."

The significance of the adjective *sāmavidhāna* in the title may be sought in the fact that in this work have been presented *sāmans* for the purpose of achieving ends ordinarily attainable only by performing lengthy sacrifices.

Besides describing the contents of the text succinctly, the learned introduction draws attention to the verses in SVB, so far untraced, the unidentified *gānas* technically known as *tavasyavīya* and *kaksavarga,* and the variant readings of the text as recorded in the commentaries. The uniqueness of the present publication consists in the fact that for the first time SVB has been presented to the reading public with two commentaries one of which, viz., the Padārthamātravivṛti of Bharatasvāmin, has so far been unpublished.

In the suggestive foreword to this work contributed by Prof. V. Raghavan of the Madras University a mild protest has been recorded against the derogatory use of the term 'magic' to denote the contents of works like SVB. (p. 3). He argues that, as a matter of fact, these works represent the transition of thought from the emphasis on and preoccupation with rituals to the adequacy of knowledge which found its culmination in the Upaniṣads. Equally notable is the emendation of a reading in Bharatasvāmin's commentary as "atha vācāapūta" instead of the printed text "athavā cāpūta."

Other commendable features of this valuable edition are (i) the appended critical notes; (ii) Appendix A consisting of an alphabetical index of verses quoted in SVB. and of verses referred to by group names; (iii) Appendix B consisting of an alphabetical list of the technical names of *sāmagānas* referred to in the text; (iv) Appendix C, a list of quotations occurring in the text and commentaries, and (v) Appendix D, a glossary of technical words used in the commentaries. Notable also is the index of all words including members of compound words occurring in the text. The inevitable list of errata, of course, is there, but, fortunately, it is not too long.

One may appropriately echo the hope expressed in the foreword that the learned editor of SVB. will bring out in the same series in due course critical editions of other shorter Brāhmaṇas also of the Sāmaveda which are at present not available in print.

DR. A. G. KRISHNA WARRIER.

SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN ENGLAND, 1780-1960: A selection of readings and comments. Edited by J. F. C. Harrison. Harper and Row. Publishers, New York, Evanston and London, 1965, pp. 482.

History to many readers is nothing more than a dull record of past events. The greater emphasis laid in recent historical writings on the experience and attainments of ordinary men and women of the community in the field of education, religion and social, cultural and economic activities rather than on the governments' achievements in the political, military and international spheres has contributed only a little to the removal of this wrong notion about an important branch of knowledge. The reason for this prejudice is to be found by and large in the fact that even a good history textbook is quite often only a summary of past happenings interpreted in the light of later developments by a single scholar or a small group of scholars. The present book dealing with society and politics in England in the modern period is an attempt to make history both interesting and informative. By collecting together and arranging the extracts from historical records in proper sequence, Prof. J. F. C. Harrison enables the reader to get a glimpse of English history from what contemporary politicians, statesmen, religious leaders, reformists, economists and literary men—many of whom played a significant part in shaping the history of their country—had to say about things that happened before their eyes.

It is possible to observe four phases in the evolution of English social, economic and political life since the close of the 18th century—the transition from an agricultural to a highly industrialised country; development of a broad-based democracy along with an awakening on the part of labour to their rights, privileges and responsibilities; economic prosperity and cultural and literary progress in the latter part of the 19th century and lastly, attainment of what may be called economic maturity and the evolution of welfare ideals in quite recent years. In his book Prof. Harrison divides this process of change into six sections each containing readings which throw light on the nature and characteristics of the developments that took place in the particular period. The editor's introductory note prefacing each section provides a key to the understanding of the main trends. These readings are of a-wide range including extracts from blue books and official records, speeches of political and social leaders, diaries of parsons and scholars and compositions of essayists and poets. The reader is thus provided with a varied fare of writings many of which have great literary charm and scientific value and is enabled to enter into the spirit of the times and understand historical events as they happened. The *'Diary of a Country Parson'* gives a better insight into the conditions of life in an English village at the close of the 18th century than what a lengthy and learned chapter of a book would do. The extract from the *'Evidence before the Michael Sadler's Committee on Child Labour in Factories'* furnishes a realistic picture of labour conditions in England in the early years of industrialisation and the writings of R. H. Tawney and Beatrice Webb convey the true spirit of New Liberalism and the motives that actuated the Labour Party in the first half of the present century.

Altogether this book provides fascinating reading. In the preface the editor expresses the hope that the short readings which he has collected and brought out would 'convey a little more of the flavour of English society and politics than it is normally possible to contain in a text-book'. The reader would readily agree that this is a very modest hope. To say that this book would help the student to learn history without tears is saying little. It makes reading history an enjoyment and more than this, it is sure to create an interest in the subject and a desire on the part of the more serious-minded among the students to read the original works. And to such, the suggestions for further reading given at the end of each part would be of great value.

D. BRIGHT SINGH

GOA: THE PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION: Edited by A. B. Shah. Publishers: P. C. Manaktala and Sons, Bombay-1.

This small book comprises the papers presented at a Seminar convened by the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom to discuss the problems of transition facing Goa as a result of its merger with the Indian Union in December, 1961. The emphasis is on the social and economic aspects of the development of the region and not so much on the controversial issue of its political integration.

The problems of transition in Goa are not essentially different from those posed by the Indian States about 15 years ago except perhaps in the matter of cultural and social aspects. Nearly 450 years of Portuguese domination have given this tiny colony, no bigger than a revenue district, a particular set of political, social economic and cultural institutions and attitudes. This cultural isolation partly explains why the extension of Indian Union policies and institutions with the purpose of building up the economy of the region has met with some resistance. The standard of living in Goa which was 1/3 higher than that of India before merger has since then declined considerably because of a fall in incomes and in the level of economic activity. To a large extent this deterioration is due to uncertainty and discontent with the manner in which the problems of transition are tackled.

The region has a great potential for development, being well-endowed with natural resources and an enterprising and educated population. In fact the National Council of Applied Economic Research has envisaged an annual growth rate of 15.7 per cent over the period 1961-75. Needless to say, this potential can become a reality only if the transitional problems are tackled over a fairly long period with sympathy and understanding by the Indian Union as well as the people of Goa. The need for such an attitude is correctly emphasised in nearly all the papers contained in this volume. The Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom have done well in making available to the reading public the thoughts and views of competent men on an important political problem of our country to-day.

M. G. LAKSHMI

THE CHRISTIANISATION OF THE GOA ISLANDS, (1510-67), by Anthony D' Costa, S. J. The Heras Institute, St. Xavier's College, Bombay, 1965, price Rs. 9.

This is a study based an original contemporary documents (in the form of annual reports or letters sent by the Jesuits in Goa to Europe) rather than tradition clothed in popular fancy. It covers the region including the islands of Tisvadi, Chorao, Divar, Vamsim and Zuve. The Franciscans established themselves here from 1518, the Jesuits from 1542 and the Dominicans from 1548. Goa was made an archbishopric in 1558. The study stops with the year, 1567, when the first Provincial Council of Goa "evaluated and codified the experience of the previous decades and laid down norms for the future".

The book gives a very brief account of secular life and institutions in Goa in the sixteenth century. But as the title indicates, it is more devoted to the portrayal of Christian life of the first generation to whom religious instruction was a subject of deep concern. The "rigour of mercy" as the process of Christianisation of the islands is called, seems to have started less than a decade after Albuquerque's conquest. There were two schools of Catholic theologians during the period under review, one appealing to Natural Law and the other emphasising the Christian ruler's duty to provide for the people's spiritual well-being. Though coercion was of course adopted, with its own text of 'arbitrary' laws and evangelistic theory, conversion prompted by sincere convictions as well as belief, to a small extent, in omens and soothsayings was not absent. It may also be remembered that only three individuals were affected in 1558 by the law against Hindu rites and that there is no indication of any infliction of penalty in this respect after that year.

Subjective considerations resulting from unhappy political experiences in subsequent days should not be allowed to cloud one's vision and warp one's judgment on historical events. It will be an error to try to measure the processes of human thought and action in the sixteenth century by the yard-stick of the twentieth. Our conception of social morality, political rights and religious freedom has advanced considerably. We should therefore survey the events of the past from the stand-point of the appropriate century and take care not to generalise or twist the references in documents out of context. Injustice and callousness there were. The Jesuits had their own defects. But it should not be overlooked that the priests of that century, truly bred up in the tradition of Christian humanism, never failed to appreciate much of what they saw in Indian character and culture and were willing to learn and rectify their own mistakes. The 'rigour' did not disturb the population as a whole and the Hindus and Muslims, as the records point out, lived in terms of amity with the priests who only did things under the urge of ideas honestly maintained by them. Contemporary Hindu society also was prone at that time to use coercion to prevent one from doing what was deemed socially dishonourable. Christian charity and love found several avenues for expression. The author correctly says: "We have benefited much from subsequent development of social thought which in turn is a fruit of the ideal for which the evangelists stood, namely, the ideal of free and fraternal communication between men."

We therefore welcome this publication based, as it is, on original contemporary sources. It is not an attempt to justify but explain and put things in the proper perspective. While acknowledging the debit side, it emphasises the credit side in a positive manner.

P. K. K. MENON

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23. *Political Scientist*, Ranchi.
24. *Studies in Islam*, New Delhi.
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26. *University of Ceylon Review.*
27. *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal*, Hoshiarpur.

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REFERENCE BOOK

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